# Belljaw financial model

This is a cash-budget model for the proposed Firm, not a forecast, valuation, token quote or commitment to execute a buyback. The selected launch configuration is A, without player payouts. B is a legally flagged comparison. All market demand, costs and execution inputs below are authored assumptions [A1-A8]; none is presented as historical BELLJAW activity. R identifiers refer to RESEARCH.md.

## Boundaries and fixed inputs

The fixed supply and transfer rules in CONCEPT.md apply without alteration. The developer receives the entire required allocation in one transfer, later manually sends the required portion to the specified dead address, and retains the specified remainder. The model neither automates nor finances that transfer. It must remain pending in reports until observed.

| Fixed item | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Chain / launch pair | Base, 8453 / BELLJAW-ETH |
| Supply / decimals | 1,000,000,000 / 18 |
| Pool seed / swarm / developer launch allocation | 35% / 10% / 55% |
| Manual developer transfer / retained supply share | 50% / 5% |
| Dead-address destination | 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD |
| Pool fee / launching side / network | 1.25% / 1% / 0.25% of trade |
| Launch-side fraction of pool fee | 80% |
| Extra hook fee / transfer tax | 0% / 0% |
| Postlaunch owner mint / automatic token burn | None / none |

Only trades in designated Firm pools are modeled. An outside pool can bypass Firm fees; this is demand leakage, not missing revenue to be invented. All designated pools use the same fixed fee split; all their LP positions are held by the vault with principal removal prohibited. The network recipient is the launch-network fee recipient, not the chain gas system.

V is exogenous launch-pool volume. W is exogenous volume in separate Portfolio pools. Launch LP receipts F already equal the launching-side fee: they are not a second LP-income line. Separate LP cash I is collected from W only. The assumption that W scales with V is a demand scenario, not an economic identity or evidence that adding liquidity creates volume. If additional pools never pass their gates, set W and I to zero; the launch-fee loop still functions subject to budgets.

| Input | Value | Definition and reason |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Planning length | 12 months; 365 days | Non-leap planning year; not a committed launch date |
| Portfolio outside-volume ratio, first month | 0% of V | No assumed expansion income at launch |
| Portfolio outside-volume ratio, later months | 20% of V | Explicit sensitivity input; requires external users |
| Portfolio LP ownership modeled | 100% vault | Sole LP restriction; no invented external LP claims |
| Portfolio cash sent to buyback | 100% of I | Makes additional LP income traceable |
| Reference token price P_m, every month | USD 0.01 per token | Arbitrary accounting input, not a prediction or launch price |
| Buyback swap fee | 1.25% | Same fixed pool fee |
| Additional buyback execution loss assumption | 0.25% of gross buyback budget | Illustrative impact and conversion allowance; actual fills govern |
| Liquidity conversion amount | 50% of gross liquidity budget | Simplified equal-value inventory purchase |
| Liquidity conversion loss on converted half | 1.50% | Pool fee plus same execution-loss allowance |
| Initial operational reserve | USD 6,000 equivalent | External developer funding in ETH; not counted as fees |
| Operating spend cap | USD 300 per month | Inclusive of keeper gas reimbursements and periodic security monitoring |
| Keeper reimbursement cap per successful slice | USD 0.10 equivalent | Actual gas only, included in operating cap; no per-call bounty |
| Minimum execution budget | USD 25 equivalent | Accrue below this; frequency can fall as activity falls |

The reference token input is deliberately independent of initial seed ratios. Replace it with the actual volume-weighted execution price to calculate observed tokens. USD marks are reporting units; the contracts transact in their actual assets. ETH and quote-asset volatility, nonexecution, inventory losses and stale oracles can make actual amounts differ. Reports must distinguish cash received, queued budgets, gross spending, execution cost, token output, LP inventory and mark-to-market changes. No table asserts a burn minimum.

## Two split sets side by side

Percentages in the first block divide only F, not the full trading fee or I.

| Allocation | A: selected, no payouts | B: optional, legal review required |
| --- | --- | --- |
| F to buyback, a | 50% | 40% |
| F to liquidity, b | 35% | 30% |
| F to players, c | 0% | 15% |
| F to expenses/reserve, r | 15% | 15% |
| Sum of F shares | 100% | 100% |
| I to buyback | 100% | 100% |
| I to liquidity / players / expenses | 0% / 0% / 0% | 0% / 0% / 0% |

A prioritizes a simple common pool of activity. B reduces the other discretionary buckets to fund participation; it does not increase fees, mint tokens or take seed inventory. All B player tables assume the entire funded budget is eligible and claimed. With no eligible claims, unallocated or expired amounts are added to liquidity, so the displayed player line is an upper budget bound.

## Formula ledger

Use unrounded values until display. Decimal commas in tables are thousands separators. Month numbers are ordinal planning months. Dollar columns are USD equivalents.

| Symbol or cell | Formula |
| --- | --- |
| Monthly launch volume | V_m = daily_launch_m * days_m |
| Monthly Portfolio volume | W_m = daily_portfolio_m * days_m |
| Launch cash to Firm | F_m = 0.01 * V_m |
| Separate Portfolio LP cash to Firm | I_m = 0.01 * W_m |
| External gross vault receipts | G_m = F_m + I_m |
| External network receipts | N_m = 0.0025 * (V_m + W_m) |
| All externally paid pool fees | G_m + N_m = 0.0125 * (V_m + W_m) |
| Gross buyback budget | B_m = a * F_m + I_m |
| Gross liquidity budget | L_m = b * F_m |
| Maximum player budget | U_m = c * F_m |
| Operating allocation before recycled fees | R_m = 0.15 * F_m |
| Allocation conservation | B_m + L_m + U_m + R_m = G_m |
| Conditional monthly tokens sent to dead address | T_m = B_m * (1 - 0.0125 - 0.0025) / P_m |
| Modeled LP inventory value immediately after conversion | J_m = L_m * (1 - 0.5 * 0.015) |
| Vault's own swap input volume | S_m = B_m + 0.5 * L_m |
| Own fees credited back to vault, retained as reserve | Q_m = 0.01 * S_m |
| Additional network receipts from vault execution | H_m = 0.0025 * S_m |
| Full network receipts including own execution | N_m + H_m |
| Operating reserve ending balance | E_m = 6000 + sum_through_m(R_i + Q_i - 300) |
| Conservative reserve excluding all recycled fees | E0_m = 6000 + sum_through_m(R_i - 300) |
| Annual cell | Sum corresponding monthly cells |
| Scenario-average monthly cell | Annual cell / 12 |
| Scenario-average weekly cell | Annual cell * 7 / 365 |
| Any month's seven-day run-rate cell | Monthly cell * 7 / days_m |
| Any actual calendar week crossing months | Sum each overlapping month's daily cell times days overlapped |

Own swaps pay the same fee. Q is a refund of the vault's own expenditure, not external revenue, and is retained in expense reserves rather than recursively allocated. H is separately shown so network cash is not understated. Nominal gross budgets include internal fees and conversion loss. Net asset depletion is gross B plus gross L plus players plus operating spend minus Q; it is not gross allocations plus Q. Reported inventory J is an illustrative entry value, not a later LP valuation. Half-L conversion assumes the remaining half is already in the required quote asset; any extra quote conversion is paid within that lane's budget and reduces J further. The tables give a transparent upper execution case, not certainty that every budget can be filled.

For a fully filled month at the assumed execution loss, economic assets reconcile as follows: external receipts plus Q, less operating spend, equal tokens acquired at reference value, new LP inventory, player cash, reserve increase and execution leakage. Tokens acquired at reference value are immediately sent to the dead address and cease to be vault assets. Execution leakage is the fee plus modeled impact in B and the converted half of L. Internal Q remains inside the Firm, while network H and market execution loss leave it. New LP inventory is capital, never a second expense claimed against a holder.

## Daily volume path by month

Bad assumes attention fades throughout the year. Base assumes gradual repeat usage. Good is an aggressive routing-demand sensitivity, not a promotional target. They assume no leverage, token emissions, outside donations after initial funding, paid wash volume or proceeds from the developer's retained tokens. Month labels and day counts are model inputs [A1].
| Month | Days | Bad V/day | Bad W/day | Base V/day | Base W/day | Good V/day | Good W/day |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 31 | 10,000 | 0 | 50,000 | 0 | 150,000 | 0 |
| 2 | 28 | 9,000 | 1,800 | 60,000 | 12,000 | 180,000 | 36,000 |
| 3 | 31 | 8,000 | 1,600 | 70,000 | 14,000 | 210,000 | 42,000 |
| 4 | 30 | 7,000 | 1,400 | 75,000 | 15,000 | 240,000 | 48,000 |
| 5 | 31 | 6,000 | 1,200 | 80,000 | 16,000 | 270,000 | 54,000 |
| 6 | 30 | 5,000 | 1,000 | 85,000 | 17,000 | 300,000 | 60,000 |
| 7 | 31 | 4,000 | 800 | 90,000 | 18,000 | 330,000 | 66,000 |
| 8 | 31 | 3,000 | 600 | 95,000 | 19,000 | 360,000 | 72,000 |
| 9 | 30 | 3,000 | 600 | 100,000 | 20,000 | 390,000 | 78,000 |
| 10 | 31 | 2,500 | 500 | 105,000 | 21,000 | 420,000 | 84,000 |
| 11 | 30 | 2,000 | 400 | 110,000 | 22,000 | 450,000 | 90,000 |
| 12 | 31 | 1,500 | 300 | 120,000 | 24,000 | 480,000 | 96,000 |

## Monthly cash budgets, both sets

Each scenario has its own complete monthly ledger. F, I, G, N and R are common to A and B. BA/LA/UA are A buyback/liquidity/players; BB/LB/UB are B equivalents. N excludes vault self-swaps; those appear in the execution memo below. Dollar units throughout.

### Bad

| Month | F | I | Vault G | Network N | BA | LA | UA | BB | LB | UB | Reserve R |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 3,100.00 | 0.00 | 3,100.00 | 775.00 | 1,550.00 | 1,085.00 | 0.00 | 1,240.00 | 930.00 | 465.00 | 465.00 |
| 2 | 2,520.00 | 504.00 | 3,024.00 | 756.00 | 1,764.00 | 882.00 | 0.00 | 1,512.00 | 756.00 | 378.00 | 378.00 |
| 3 | 2,480.00 | 496.00 | 2,976.00 | 744.00 | 1,736.00 | 868.00 | 0.00 | 1,488.00 | 744.00 | 372.00 | 372.00 |
| 4 | 2,100.00 | 420.00 | 2,520.00 | 630.00 | 1,470.00 | 735.00 | 0.00 | 1,260.00 | 630.00 | 315.00 | 315.00 |
| 5 | 1,860.00 | 372.00 | 2,232.00 | 558.00 | 1,302.00 | 651.00 | 0.00 | 1,116.00 | 558.00 | 279.00 | 279.00 |
| 6 | 1,500.00 | 300.00 | 1,800.00 | 450.00 | 1,050.00 | 525.00 | 0.00 | 900.00 | 450.00 | 225.00 | 225.00 |
| 7 | 1,240.00 | 248.00 | 1,488.00 | 372.00 | 868.00 | 434.00 | 0.00 | 744.00 | 372.00 | 186.00 | 186.00 |
| 8 | 930.00 | 186.00 | 1,116.00 | 279.00 | 651.00 | 325.50 | 0.00 | 558.00 | 279.00 | 139.50 | 139.50 |
| 9 | 900.00 | 180.00 | 1,080.00 | 270.00 | 630.00 | 315.00 | 0.00 | 540.00 | 270.00 | 135.00 | 135.00 |
| 10 | 775.00 | 155.00 | 930.00 | 232.50 | 542.50 | 271.25 | 0.00 | 465.00 | 232.50 | 116.25 | 116.25 |
| 11 | 600.00 | 120.00 | 720.00 | 180.00 | 420.00 | 210.00 | 0.00 | 360.00 | 180.00 | 90.00 | 90.00 |
| 12 | 465.00 | 93.00 | 558.00 | 139.50 | 325.50 | 162.75 | 0.00 | 279.00 | 139.50 | 69.75 | 69.75 |

### Base

| Month | F | I | Vault G | Network N | BA | LA | UA | BB | LB | UB | Reserve R |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 15,500.00 | 0.00 | 15,500.00 | 3,875.00 | 7,750.00 | 5,425.00 | 0.00 | 6,200.00 | 4,650.00 | 2,325.00 | 2,325.00 |
| 2 | 16,800.00 | 3,360.00 | 20,160.00 | 5,040.00 | 11,760.00 | 5,880.00 | 0.00 | 10,080.00 | 5,040.00 | 2,520.00 | 2,520.00 |
| 3 | 21,700.00 | 4,340.00 | 26,040.00 | 6,510.00 | 15,190.00 | 7,595.00 | 0.00 | 13,020.00 | 6,510.00 | 3,255.00 | 3,255.00 |
| 4 | 22,500.00 | 4,500.00 | 27,000.00 | 6,750.00 | 15,750.00 | 7,875.00 | 0.00 | 13,500.00 | 6,750.00 | 3,375.00 | 3,375.00 |
| 5 | 24,800.00 | 4,960.00 | 29,760.00 | 7,440.00 | 17,360.00 | 8,680.00 | 0.00 | 14,880.00 | 7,440.00 | 3,720.00 | 3,720.00 |
| 6 | 25,500.00 | 5,100.00 | 30,600.00 | 7,650.00 | 17,850.00 | 8,925.00 | 0.00 | 15,300.00 | 7,650.00 | 3,825.00 | 3,825.00 |
| 7 | 27,900.00 | 5,580.00 | 33,480.00 | 8,370.00 | 19,530.00 | 9,765.00 | 0.00 | 16,740.00 | 8,370.00 | 4,185.00 | 4,185.00 |
| 8 | 29,450.00 | 5,890.00 | 35,340.00 | 8,835.00 | 20,615.00 | 10,307.50 | 0.00 | 17,670.00 | 8,835.00 | 4,417.50 | 4,417.50 |
| 9 | 30,000.00 | 6,000.00 | 36,000.00 | 9,000.00 | 21,000.00 | 10,500.00 | 0.00 | 18,000.00 | 9,000.00 | 4,500.00 | 4,500.00 |
| 10 | 32,550.00 | 6,510.00 | 39,060.00 | 9,765.00 | 22,785.00 | 11,392.50 | 0.00 | 19,530.00 | 9,765.00 | 4,882.50 | 4,882.50 |
| 11 | 33,000.00 | 6,600.00 | 39,600.00 | 9,900.00 | 23,100.00 | 11,550.00 | 0.00 | 19,800.00 | 9,900.00 | 4,950.00 | 4,950.00 |
| 12 | 37,200.00 | 7,440.00 | 44,640.00 | 11,160.00 | 26,040.00 | 13,020.00 | 0.00 | 22,320.00 | 11,160.00 | 5,580.00 | 5,580.00 |

### Good

| Month | F | I | Vault G | Network N | BA | LA | UA | BB | LB | UB | Reserve R |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 46,500.00 | 0.00 | 46,500.00 | 11,625.00 | 23,250.00 | 16,275.00 | 0.00 | 18,600.00 | 13,950.00 | 6,975.00 | 6,975.00 |
| 2 | 50,400.00 | 10,080.00 | 60,480.00 | 15,120.00 | 35,280.00 | 17,640.00 | 0.00 | 30,240.00 | 15,120.00 | 7,560.00 | 7,560.00 |
| 3 | 65,100.00 | 13,020.00 | 78,120.00 | 19,530.00 | 45,570.00 | 22,785.00 | 0.00 | 39,060.00 | 19,530.00 | 9,765.00 | 9,765.00 |
| 4 | 72,000.00 | 14,400.00 | 86,400.00 | 21,600.00 | 50,400.00 | 25,200.00 | 0.00 | 43,200.00 | 21,600.00 | 10,800.00 | 10,800.00 |
| 5 | 83,700.00 | 16,740.00 | 100,440.00 | 25,110.00 | 58,590.00 | 29,295.00 | 0.00 | 50,220.00 | 25,110.00 | 12,555.00 | 12,555.00 |
| 6 | 90,000.00 | 18,000.00 | 108,000.00 | 27,000.00 | 63,000.00 | 31,500.00 | 0.00 | 54,000.00 | 27,000.00 | 13,500.00 | 13,500.00 |
| 7 | 102,300.00 | 20,460.00 | 122,760.00 | 30,690.00 | 71,610.00 | 35,805.00 | 0.00 | 61,380.00 | 30,690.00 | 15,345.00 | 15,345.00 |
| 8 | 111,600.00 | 22,320.00 | 133,920.00 | 33,480.00 | 78,120.00 | 39,060.00 | 0.00 | 66,960.00 | 33,480.00 | 16,740.00 | 16,740.00 |
| 9 | 117,000.00 | 23,400.00 | 140,400.00 | 35,100.00 | 81,900.00 | 40,950.00 | 0.00 | 70,200.00 | 35,100.00 | 17,550.00 | 17,550.00 |
| 10 | 130,200.00 | 26,040.00 | 156,240.00 | 39,060.00 | 91,140.00 | 45,570.00 | 0.00 | 78,120.00 | 39,060.00 | 19,530.00 | 19,530.00 |
| 11 | 135,000.00 | 27,000.00 | 162,000.00 | 40,500.00 | 94,500.00 | 47,250.00 | 0.00 | 81,000.00 | 40,500.00 | 20,250.00 | 20,250.00 |
| 12 | 148,800.00 | 29,760.00 | 178,560.00 | 44,640.00 | 104,160.00 | 52,080.00 | 0.00 | 89,280.00 | 44,640.00 | 22,320.00 | 22,320.00 |

## Annual totals and average periods

Weekly figures below are year-average seven-day equivalents, not assumed calendar payments. Monthly averages below do not replace the exact monthly ledger above. Any month-specific weekly budget is recomputable with the seven-day formula; actual partial weeks use overlapping days. The year has a final partial week. All dollar amounts are gross budget allocations except explicitly labeled network and reserve items.

### Year

| Scenario | Set | To vault G | Buyback B | Liquidity L | Players U | External network N | Full network N+H | Reserve R |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bad | A | 21,544.00 | 12,309.00 | 6,464.50 | 0.00 | 5,386.00 | 5,424.85 | 2,770.50 |
| Bad | B | 21,544.00 | 10,462.00 | 5,541.00 | 2,770.50 | 5,386.00 | 5,419.08 | 2,770.50 |
| Base | A | 377,180.00 | 218,730.00 | 110,915.00 | 0.00 | 94,295.00 | 94,980.47 | 47,535.00 |
| Base | B | 377,180.00 | 187,040.00 | 95,070.00 | 47,535.00 | 94,295.00 | 94,881.44 | 47,535.00 |
| Good | A | 1,373,820.00 | 797,520.00 | 403,410.00 | 0.00 | 343,455.00 | 345,953.06 | 172,890.00 |
| Good | B | 1,373,820.00 | 682,260.00 | 345,780.00 | 172,890.00 | 343,455.00 | 345,592.88 | 172,890.00 |

### Average month

| Scenario | Set | To vault G | Buyback B | Liquidity L | Players U | External network N | Full network N+H | Reserve R |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bad | A | 1,795.33 | 1,025.75 | 538.71 | 0.00 | 448.83 | 452.07 | 230.88 |
| Bad | B | 1,795.33 | 871.83 | 461.75 | 230.88 | 448.83 | 451.59 | 230.88 |
| Base | A | 31,431.67 | 18,227.50 | 9,242.92 | 0.00 | 7,857.92 | 7,915.04 | 3,961.25 |
| Base | B | 31,431.67 | 15,586.67 | 7,922.50 | 3,961.25 | 7,857.92 | 7,906.79 | 3,961.25 |
| Good | A | 114,485.00 | 66,460.00 | 33,617.50 | 0.00 | 28,621.25 | 28,829.42 | 14,407.50 |
| Good | B | 114,485.00 | 56,855.00 | 28,815.00 | 14,407.50 | 28,621.25 | 28,799.41 | 14,407.50 |

### Average week

| Scenario | Set | To vault G | Buyback B | Liquidity L | Players U | External network N | Full network N+H | Reserve R |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bad | A | 413.17 | 236.06 | 123.98 | 0.00 | 103.29 | 104.04 | 53.13 |
| Bad | B | 413.17 | 200.64 | 106.27 | 53.13 | 103.29 | 103.93 | 53.13 |
| Base | A | 7,233.59 | 4,194.82 | 2,127.14 | 0.00 | 1,808.40 | 1,821.54 | 911.63 |
| Base | B | 7,233.59 | 3,587.07 | 1,823.26 | 911.63 | 1,808.40 | 1,819.64 | 911.63 |
| Good | A | 26,347.23 | 15,294.90 | 7,736.63 | 0.00 | 6,586.81 | 6,634.72 | 3,315.70 |
| Good | B | 26,347.23 | 13,084.44 | 6,631.40 | 3,315.70 | 6,586.81 | 6,627.81 | 3,315.70 |

## Monthly buyback token accounting

The following quantities are conditional on spending the full budget at the input price and execution allowance. Pending or failed slices stay queued; they are not reported as tokens sent. The developer manual transfer is excluded from these token totals. All prices in this table are USD per token accounting inputs. Tokens are whole-token display quantities rounded from full precision.

| Month | P_m input | Bad A tokens | Bad B tokens | Base A tokens | Base B tokens | Good A tokens | Good B tokens |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0.01 | 152,675 | 122,140 | 763,375 | 610,700 | 2,290,125 | 1,832,100 |
| 2 | 0.01 | 173,754 | 148,932 | 1,158,360 | 992,880 | 3,475,080 | 2,978,640 |
| 3 | 0.01 | 170,996 | 146,568 | 1,496,215 | 1,282,470 | 4,488,645 | 3,847,410 |
| 4 | 0.01 | 144,795 | 124,110 | 1,551,375 | 1,329,750 | 4,964,400 | 4,255,200 |
| 5 | 0.01 | 128,247 | 109,926 | 1,709,960 | 1,465,680 | 5,771,115 | 4,946,670 |
| 6 | 0.01 | 103,425 | 88,650 | 1,758,225 | 1,507,050 | 6,205,500 | 5,319,000 |
| 7 | 0.01 | 85,498 | 73,284 | 1,923,705 | 1,648,890 | 7,053,585 | 6,045,930 |
| 8 | 0.01 | 64,124 | 54,963 | 2,030,578 | 1,740,495 | 7,694,820 | 6,595,560 |
| 9 | 0.01 | 62,055 | 53,190 | 2,068,500 | 1,773,000 | 8,067,150 | 6,914,700 |
| 10 | 0.01 | 53,436 | 45,803 | 2,244,323 | 1,923,705 | 8,977,290 | 7,694,820 |
| 11 | 0.01 | 41,370 | 35,460 | 2,275,350 | 1,950,300 | 9,308,250 | 7,978,500 |
| 12 | 0.01 | 32,062 | 27,482 | 2,564,940 | 2,198,520 | 10,259,760 | 8,794,080 |

### Execution and reserve memo, annual

This table exposes internal fee recycling, additional network cash, converted LP entry value and reserve balances. No Q or H is folded into external volume. Reserve balances include the initial funding and the annual operating spend.

| Scenario | Set | Recycled Q | Own-swap network H | Total network N+H | LP entry J | Tokens to dead address | Ending E | Conservative E0 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bad | A | 155.41 | 38.85 | 5,424.85 | 6,416.02 | 1,212,437 | 5,325.91 | 5,170.50 |
| Bad | B | 132.33 | 33.08 | 5,419.08 | 5,499.44 | 1,030,507 | 5,302.83 | 5,170.50 |
| Base | A | 2,741.88 | 685.47 | 94,980.47 | 110,083.14 | 21,544,905 | 52,676.88 | 49,935.00 |
| Base | B | 2,345.75 | 586.44 | 94,881.44 | 94,356.98 | 18,423,440 | 52,280.75 | 49,935.00 |
| Good | A | 9,992.25 | 2,498.06 | 345,953.06 | 400,384.43 | 78,555,720 | 185,282.25 | 175,290.00 |
| Good | B | 8,551.50 | 2,137.88 | 345,592.88 | 343,186.65 | 67,202,610 | 183,841.50 | 175,290.00 |

No table subtracts the manual developer transfer twice. Dead-address balance can include unrelated transfers; the report must reconcile event-attributed vault acquisitions, the separate manual transfer and unsolicited deposits. The token's totalSupply is unchanged by these transfers. A queued budget is not a scheduled minimum removal.

## Inventory risk is outside the cash budget

For a full-range equal-value constant-product position, let x be the token/quote relative-price ratio after versus before entry. Relative holding loss is 2 * sqrt(x) / (1 + x) - 1 [R2]. This is an inventory-risk sensitivity, not a forecast for BELLJAW. Changing the reference price to recompute token acquisitions does not remove this risk.

| Inventory sensitivity input or output | Value | Formula or scope |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Illustrative relative-price ratio x | 0.25 | Scenario input only |
| LP inventory versus holding the original two assets | 80% | 2 * sqrt(0.25) / (1 + 0.25) |
| Relative holding loss | 20% | 1 - 0.8; before fees and costs |
| Compensation assumed from future fees | USD 0 | No assurance that fee cash offsets inventory loss |
| Post-manual-transfer supply outside dead address before vault purchases | 500,000,000 tokens | Original supply less required manual transfer, conditional on that transfer |

The largest conditional annual buyback quantity in the displayed scenarios remains below the available-supply bound; tokens bought for LP additions remain circulating. If a later price input would request more tokens than executable inventory permits, cap executions at actual available liquidity and leave the rest of the cash queued. Never use the spreadsheet to imply that more than the available inventory can be acquired.

## Costs, developer commitment and break-even

Costs are planning allowances, not supplier quotes [A5]. Existing test-counter work is context, not a claim that financial infrastructure has passed review.

| Developer-funded item | USD budget | Payment source and treatment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Token, vault, fee adapter, escrow and reporting engineering | 8,000 | External developer cash; sunk work |
| Independent contract and integration review | 10,000 | External developer cash; launch gate |
| Original art and initial narrative production | 2,000 | External developer cash; no copied assets |
| Jurisdiction and disclosure review of default design | 3,000 | External developer cash; optional B needs separate review |
| Initial deployment, verification and contingency gas | 1,000 | External developer cash; budget only |
| Total setup work | 24,000 | Sum of setup rows |
| ETH launch seed | 40,000 | 20 ETH at planning ETH mark of USD 2,000; not a live quote |
| Initial vault expense reserve | 6,000 | ETH funded separately; not fee revenue |
| Total initial cash commitment | 70,000 | Setup plus seed plus reserve |
| Continuing developer maintenance outside vault | 1,000 per month | External developer expense; no treasury withdrawal authority |
| Annual continuing developer maintenance | 12,000 | Monthly expense times 12 |
| First-year external developer commitment | 82,000 | Initial commitment plus annual external maintenance; initial reserve already funds vault operating costs |
| Maximum vault operating spend | 3,600 per year | Monthly cap times 12, distinct from external developer work |

Pool seed ETH becomes locked principal; it is not a redeemable developer deposit. The model does not value the initial token inventory as external cash raised. The retained developer allocation and swarm allocation have no assumed liquidation value in these budgets. All contract recipients must be genuine deployment inputs, not addresses invented by this report.

| Break-even question | Equation and result | Meaning |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Vault operating coverage, ignoring recycled fees and LP income | 0.0015 * annual V = 3,600; annual V = USD 2,400,000 | Reserve allocation alone covers the operating cap |
| Same threshold per day | 2,400,000 / 365 = USD 6,575.34 | Outside launch volume, not total volume including self-swaps |
| Same threshold for a 30-day month | 300 / (0.0015 * 30) = USD 6,666.67 per day | Calendar length changes the daily threshold |
| Gross vault receipt coverage of operating cap, at mature W ratio | 0.012 * V = 300; V = USD 25,000 per month | Only a gross-receipt comparison; spending other buckets would violate the split |
| Developer cash recovery from vault fees | No finite threshold under either set | Developer is not a fee recipient; setup and maintenance cannot be recouped through treasury claims |
| Developer token-sale break-even | Not modeled | Would require a future execution price, market depth and a decision to sell; no such assumption is made |

The useful meaning of "feeds itself" is covering a bounded operation while externally paid fees finance further activity. It is not monetary self-sufficiency without trading demand. At any positive outside volume there can be a proportional buyback/liquidity budget; executing it depends on minimum size and oracle/depth guards. Additional LP income funds more conditional buyback activity but is unnecessary to the conservative operating threshold.

### Severe volume drop and zero-volume boundary

The stress below uses the base scenario's first-month launch volume run-rate and a mature Portfolio ratio for an easy reproducible comparison. It is separate from the monthly path. Set A is shown; both sets have the same operating allocation. Dollar units.

| Item in a 30-day comparison | Before drop | After 90% drop |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Outside launch volume per day | 50,000.00 | 5,000.00 |
| Outside Portfolio volume per day | 10,000.00 | 1,000.00 |
| Monthly F | 15,000.00 | 1,500.00 |
| Monthly I | 3,000.00 | 300.00 |
| Monthly G | 18,000.00 | 1,800.00 |
| Monthly buyback budget A | 10,500.00 | 1,050.00 |
| Monthly liquidity budget A | 5,250.00 | 525.00 |
| Monthly players A | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Monthly external network N | 4,500.00 | 450.00 |
| Monthly expense allocation R | 2,250.00 | 225.00 |
| Monthly capped operating spend | 300.00 | 300.00 |
| Monthly expense shortfall, ignoring recycled fees | 0.00 | 75.00 |
| Months the initial reserve covers this shortfall | Not needed | 80.00 |

After the drop, buckets shrink in proportion to actual receipts and new pools wait for their minimum funded size. The startup reserve covers the illustrated expense gap; batch calls become less frequent if balances or gas make execution inefficient. There is no mandatory payment, leveraged position or emitted reward that requires a rescue contribution. The comparison demonstrates finite runway, not survival under every adverse condition. At zero volume, F and I are zero; spending stops after accrued budgets and reserves are exhausted. With the full operating cap and no receipts, the initial reserve covers twenty months. Contract reads and voluntary ballots can continue without a paid operator; no one can force funded activity.

If the gold lane stays inactive, its budget follows the ETH fallback. If every additional Portfolio lane stays inactive, remove I from G and B, and remove W from N. At the same launch volumes the operating reserve allocation is unchanged. Impermanent loss and quote-asset freezes can reduce LP asset value even when this cash model balances; they are not expenses conveniently erased by adding fee income.