## Identity Read **2026-10-27 (UTC)**. [Requested URL](https://l2beat.com/scaling/projects/optimism) redirects to [OP Mainnet](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet). - Display name: **“OP Mainnet”**; category (page label “Type”): **“Optimistic Rollup”**; host chain: **“Ethereum”**; chain ID: **10**. [L2BEAT summary](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet.md) - Total Value Secured: **$1.71 B USD**, rounded displayed value read **2026-10-27**, above $500 million. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#tvs) - Badges: **“EVM”**, **“Ethereum with blobs”**, **“Built on OP Stack”**, **“Part of the Superchain”**, **“Governance”**. [L2BEAT badges](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#summary) ## 1. Stage “OP Mainnet is a Stage 1 Optimistic Rollup.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) “The project passes the walkaway test: users can exit in the presence of malicious operators even if the Security Council disappears.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) Full project checklist, retaining L2BEAT’s wording and status: **Stage 0 — “6 requirements met.”** [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “A complete and functional proof system is deployed.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “There are at least 5 external actors who can submit fraud proofs.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “The project calls itself a rollup.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “Inputs for the state transition function are posted to Ethereum L1.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from Ethereum L1 data. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) **Stage 1 — “5 requirements met.”** [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET — Principle: “Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council is the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “In case of an unwanted upgrade by actors more centralized than a Security Council, users have at least 7d to exit.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “The Security Council is properly set up.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) **Stage 2 — “2 issues need fixing.”** [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - MET: “Fraud proof submission is open to everyone.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - UNMET (Issue): “Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - UNMET (Issue): “The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) “Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) **Banners/review:** No active under-review or stage-downgrade banner found; stage section data has `isUnderReview: false`. The quoted warning and Stage 2 issues are displayed. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) **Linked stages material:** The [explainer](https://l2beat.com/stages), last updated 23 Jul 2025, still says 7 days. Its linked precise specification records “30 April, 2026: Stage 1 minimum challenge period reduction from 7d to 5d” and counts air gaps/execution delays toward that minimum. [Specification/changelog](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-stages-framework/291) The project checklist above retains its displayed 7d wording. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) ## 2. Proof system - State Validation value, verbatim: **“Fraud proofs (INT)”**. “Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#risk-analysis) - Proofs are live: “A complete and functional proof system is deployed.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - Proposing and challenging are permissionless, subject to funds: “Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#state-validation) “Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#state-validation) - Challenge/finality label, verbatim: **“3d 12h challenge period + 3d 12h execution delay”**. [L2BEAT risk analysis](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#risk-analysis) “Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#state-validation) **Permissions:** An explicit actor entry granting open proposing/challenging is **NOT FOUND**; current Permissions lists privileged actors. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#permissions) The active `SuperFaultDisputeGame` description confirms “anyone posting the bond can challenge it.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SuperFaultDisputeGame) The Permissions entry **Optimism Security Council**, via Optimism Guardian Multisig: “Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)”. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#Optimism%20Security%20Council) **Fallback, not the active type:** “The permissioned fallback is now type 5, SUPER_PERMISSIONED, which carries no bond and defines only a proposer. It has no challenger, so the OP Foundation Operations Safe no longer holds a challenger role.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#637b2364) “Only the proposer configured in the DisputeGameFactory can create games of this type, and each one commits to a super root anchored to an L2 timestamp.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SuperPermissionedDisputeGame) **Withdrawal timing:** “When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#exit-mechanisms-1) ## 3. Exit window and upgrades Exit Window value, verbatim: **“None”**. Explanation, verbatim: “There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#risk-analysis) Upgrade control, verbatim: “All contracts are upgradable by the `SuperchainProxyAdmin` which is controlled by a 2/2 multisig composed by the Optimism Foundation and a Security Council.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#upgrades-and-governance) The risk summary states: “a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Both regular and emergency upgrades must be approved by both the Security Council and the Foundation. There is no delay on regular upgrades.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#risk-summary) **Current council and multisig entries** (thresholds and roles as shown): | Named actor | Threshold | Powers and delay | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | SuperchainProxyAdminOwner | “2/2” | “Can upgrade with no delay”; participants OpFoundationUpgradeSafe and Optimism Security Council. “set the dispute game implementation and initial bond for any game type”. | [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SuperchainProxyAdminOwner) | | OpFoundationUpgradeSafe | “5/7” | “Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.” Uses SaferSafes. “it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system”. | [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#OpFoundationUpgradeSafe) | | Optimism Security Council | “10/13” | “Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.” Uses LivenessModule; participates in instant 2/2 upgrades. | [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#Optimism%20Security%20Council) [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#upgrades-and-governance) | | Optimism Guardian Multisig | “1/1” | Sole participant Optimism Security Council; uses DeputyPauseModule; Guardian/pause role. | [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#Optimism%20Guardian%20Multisig) [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SuperchainConfig) | | SafeL2 | “6/9” | Uses SaferSafes; “Member of MintManagerOwner.” “can mint OP up to the hardcoded inflation cap”. Upgrade powers/delay: **NOT FOUND**. | [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SafeL2) | | MintManagerOwner | “1/1” | Sole participant SafeL2. Upgrade powers/delay: **NOT FOUND**. | [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#MintManagerOwner) | **SuperchainProxyAdminOwner’s “Can upgrade with no delay” contract list:** [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SuperchainProxyAdminOwner) - Via **SuperchainProxyAdmin**: `DelayedWETH`, `SystemConfig`, `AnchorStateRegistry`, `L1CrossDomainMessenger`, `ETHLockbox`, `L1ERC721Bridge`, `OptimismMintableERC20Factory`, `SuperchainConfig`, `L1StandardBridge`, `OptimismPortal2`, `DisputeGameFactory`. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SuperchainProxyAdminOwner) - Via **L2ProxyAdmin**: `DeployerWhitelist`, `L2CrossDomainMessenger`, `GasPriceOracle`, `L2StandardBridge`, `SequencerFeeVault`, `OptimismMintableERC20Factory`, `L1BlockNumber`, `L2ERC721Bridge`, `L1Block`, `L2ToL1MessagePasser`, `OptimismMintableERC721Factory`, `L2ProxyAdmin`, `BaseFeeVault`, `L1FeeVault`, `OperatorFeeVault`, `SchemaRegistry`, `EAS`. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#SuperchainProxyAdminOwner) **Regular governance policy:** “Technical review by the 7-member elected Developer Advisory Board (DAB, 5/7 quorum for approval)” → “release on Sepolia” → “7-day veto window” → “SC + Foundation Upgrade Safe (2/2 SuperchainProxyAdminOwner) co-sign the L1 transaction → execute.” “Maintenance upgrades use a shortened path.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#upgrades-and-governance) **Emergency upgrade path**, verbatim: “SC + Foundation Upgrade Safe (2/2), instant — "may preemptively address actual or anticipated bugs, defects, or stability issues without specific Governance approval" (Charter v0.1). No DAB review, no veto window. Mandatory after-the-fact public retrospective.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#upgrades-and-governance) **Guardian limits and liveness:** “Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended or unpaused by the Security Council. The Security Council can remove the module if the Foundation becomes malicious.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#upgrades-and-governance) The LivenessModule is “used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#LivenessModule) OpFoundationUpgradeSafe’s inherited Guardian permission is explicitly conditional on that below-eight-member fallback. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#OpFoundationUpgradeSafe) **Deputy pause:** `Optimism EOA 1` acts through DeputyPauseModule “though restricted to the SuperchainConfig's `pause()` function”. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#Optimism-EOA-1) **Naming discrepancy:** Governance says “The single Sequencer actor can be modified by the `OpFoundationOperationsSafe` via the `SystemConfig` contract.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#upgrades-and-governance) Permissions instead lists `OpFoundationUpgradeSafe` (5/7) for that power and omits OperationsSafe. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#permissions) A **2026-09-30** snapshot records OperationsSafe as **“5 of 7 (71%)”**; current threshold/role: **NOT FOUND**. [Historical config](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/blob/65e15aefbf807aa6fcdc89f1109068adc7f4c0e7/packages/config/src/projects/optimism/discovered.json) ## 4. Data availability DA value, verbatim: **“Onchain”**. “All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#risk-analysis) “All data required for proofs is published on chain” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#data-availability) “All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#data-availability) The **“Ethereum with blobs”** badge says “This project is posting its data to Ethereum as blobs”. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#summary) External DA/DAC and threshold: **NOT FOUND** in the DA assessment. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#data-availability) ## 5. Sequencer and forced inclusion “OP Mainnet uses a single centralized sequencer for fast confirmations. Users can bypass it with one Ethereum transaction to the OptimismPortal. Rollup nodes derive the deposited transaction from Ethereum, including it after at most one sequencing window.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) Sequencer value: **“Centralized, Raft HA”**. “The OP Mainnet operator controls real-time ordering.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) Permissions identifies **“EOA 1”**, `0x6887246668a3b87F54DeB3b94Ba47a6f63F32985`: “Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain”. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#EOA-1) A named legal sequencer operator is **NOT FOUND**. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#operator) [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) **Sequencer Failure**, verbatim: **“Self sequence”**. “In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#risk-analysis) **Proposer Failure**, verbatim: **“Self propose”**. “Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#risk-analysis) Forced inclusion value: **“Automatic derivation, 1 L1 tx: portal deposit”**; inclusion delay: **“12 hours, 3,600 L1 blocks”**. “The user submits one Ethereum transaction to the OptimismPortal which is automatically derived by conforming nodes.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) “Forced inclusion creates an L1-originated deposit transaction rather than submitting the original signed L2 transaction.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) “The centralized sequencer provides no real-time censorship resistance. The Ethereum deposit path provides eventual censorship resistance, assuming the deposit is included on Ethereum.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) Forced messaging: “If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2.” [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#exit-mechanisms-2) Worst-case exit delay, separately: **“21 days 3 hours, 12h inclusion + 20d 15h state”**. This is the sequencing table’s exit duration, not the 12-hour inclusion delay or the upgrade exit-window rating. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) ## Stage history since 2026-04-27 **No OP Mainnet stage change found from 2026-04-27 through 2026-10-27; displayed stage: Stage 1.** [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) [Project-file history checked](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/commits/main/packages/config/src/projects/optimism/optimism.ts?since=2026-04-27&until=2026-10-27) - **Milestones:** “OP Mainnet becomes Stage 1”, **2024-06-10**: “OP Mainnet introduces fraud proofs and updates permissions.” Newest milestone: **2025-11-25**, “Upgrade 17 - Jovian Hardfork and Fusaka Readiness”. No milestone falls in the requested window. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#milestones-and-incidents) - **Banners:** No active stage-downgrade or under-review banner found. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#stage) - **Actual stage field/history:** `optimism.ts` has no explicit `stage` override: it delegates to `opStackL2`. Its **10** in-window revisions and **2026-04-21** baseline keep `isNodeAvailable: true` and `hasProperSecurityCouncil: true`. [Project history](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/commits/main/packages/config/src/projects/optimism/optimism.ts?since=2026-04-27&until=2026-10-27) [Baseline commit](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/commit/3face763132c2229de82df350b2a842382ecadcd) The inherited assignment is `stage: templateVars.stage ?? computedStage(templateVars)`; the rollup calculation keeps the two Stage 2 upgrade/council criteria false. [Template](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/blob/2c118ff3c189c4a7d77ff3842a3eecd9af736ed5/packages/config/src/templates/opStack.ts#L1692) - **Inherited changes checked:** **31** template revisions and **44** project-directory revisions were inspected with the baseline; no OP stage-rating change was found. [Template history](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/commits/main/packages/config/src/templates/opStack.ts?since=2026-04-27&until=2026-10-27) [Directory history](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/commits/main/packages/config/src/projects/optimism?since=2026-04-27&until=2026-10-27) - **Proof changes, not stage changes:** [2026-07-01 commit `cfafbf3`](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/commit/cfafbf3de953d9f519656c89c622fe51a04d547a) records type **0 → 8**; the **2026-06-30** page update says “Trust model is unchanged (still permissionless fault proofs).” [L2BEAT update](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet?update=60c3fc67) [2026-10-02 commit `da23cf3`](https://github.com/l2beat/l2beat/commit/da23cf33e845a8531717703d705f14a554436f89) records type **8 → 9**; the **2026-10-01** page update dates execution to **2026-09-24** and says “Proposing and challenging remain permissionless”. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#637b2364) ## Not found - **NOT FOUND — latest node/prover release and release date.** State derivation names `op-node` and `op-geth`; no latest version/date. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#state-derivation) Program Hashes lists deployed **“OP Kona interop absolute prestate v1.7.0-rc.2 (cannon64-kona-interop)”**, verification “successful”; it does not establish the newest release/date. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#program-hashes) Also checked Milestones, discovery updates and `optimism.ts`; no project-owned release sites were consulted. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#milestones-and-incidents) [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#updates) - **NOT FOUND — legal sequencer operator identity.** Checked Operator, Sequencing and Permissions; only a centralized operator/batch-submitter EOA is identified. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#sequencing) [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#EOA-1) - **NOT FOUND — explicit open proposer/challenger Permissions actor entry.** Checked Permissions; open participation is explicit in State validation (quoted above). [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#permissions) - **NOT FOUND — current OperationsSafe threshold/role or resolution of the inconsistent name.** Checked governance, Permissions and the historical config cited above. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#permissions) - **NOT FOUND — current numerical SaferSafes timelock, or token-only SafeL2/MintManagerOwner upgrade powers/delays.** Checked their Permissions entries; the core upgrade route explicitly has no delay. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#permissions) - **NOT FOUND — external DA/DAC threshold.** The checked DA section identifies Ethereum blobs/calldata. [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/op-mainnet#data-availability)