{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"a314c4b3-1375-445e-b141-b94d8d1cab2c","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f69e2a271585dde6a218d2528d9e97d5cac8ec42245051da5a3ecf33f79f4354","dependsOn":["implement_component","build_website"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","tools":[]},"key":"adversarial_review","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8fd40758f5ca554a9cce4ee7963b3e505014048182cf095ee207e9a9939e47b6","dependsOn":["implement_component"],"execution":{"mustProduce":["dist/index.html"],"network":true,"optionalTools":["browser"],"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"a60bc8b42446c13d993341179fe13c712a5addb118fc532fb2d15e71f912efc8","skillId":"build-website","tools":[]},"key":"build_website","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"a60bc8b42446c13d993341179fe13c712a5addb118fc532fb2d15e71f912efc8","skillId":"build-website","state":"failed"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"aee56bf682284c31ba055a7af89db07a2924037c2f8e76d23dfcf04b8e38f9de","dependsOn":["implement_component","build_website"],"execution":{"network":true,"optionalTools":["browser"],"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"fd33b6741366d364a55a4c0ba2bc4f5d329cec0b62f27a83289dc5b30ab03575","skillId":"design-critic","tools":[]},"key":"design_critic","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"fd33b6741366d364a55a4c0ba2bc4f5d329cec0b62f27a83289dc5b30ab03575","skillId":"design-critic","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6d5781366dc7cbbcd98ec4b45793cf188d05b691bc37e8eec2b0b22e136266c8","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":true,"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"15deecb0f930dd3c37b4e551121fe447b9d43818640ca22223cf3c7951e0db98","skillId":"implement-component","tools":[]},"key":"implement_component","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"15deecb0f930dd3c37b4e551121fe447b9d43818640ca22223cf3c7951e0db98","skillId":"implement-component","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"STRATOKS PHASE 1.1 — Repair the delivered shared-world prototype, preserve its features and publish the corrected client.\n\nContinue parent job f0d5f20d-3fa4-418d-855d-99e28f5c14e5 in its existing repository. Baseline: b57000a4c11af27369cce90d88f75d761a44ab9e. Fix the final adversarial review's five unresolved findings and the timing-sensitive test. Do not redesign the world, replace the learning system, create tokens/contracts/payments or reset existing worlds. Preserve the four already-fixed client findings.\n\nREQUIRED FIXES\n1. Bounded event history: GET /api/events must not synchronously read and JSON-parse all rotated event logs on the simulation thread. Implement bounded paginated reads using an index, asynchronous worker or equivalent. Validate after/limit; reject invalid, negative or excessive inputs. Preserve correct ordering and cursor semantics across rotation/restart, documenting retention gaps. Regression: three 5 MB logs, after=0 and limit=1, concurrent requests. Measure tick latency and work/memory per request; response work must not scale with the entire history on every call.\n\n2. Public API rate limits: /api/creatures/:id must pass the same intended limiter as other public reads before expensive serialization. Verify limits cannot be bypassed by spoofed forwarding headers in the documented proxy deployment. Test detail/list endpoints and subsequent recovery; return honest 429 responses.\n\n3. Crash-consistent world history: lifecycle and event records currently reach disk before their world snapshot. On SIGKILL/restart, a recorded dead creature can be alive again and later get another death record. Implement a consistent durability/recovery protocol (transactional state, WAL with replay, or equivalent) covering world state, RNG/learning state, lifecycle events and intervention acknowledgements. Do not just hide duplicate records. Acknowledged interventions must remain exactly-once. Test process termination at write boundaries, repeated recovery, births, deaths and intervention save failures. Provide a non-destructive migration and backup/rollback instructions for existing data; explicitly report irrecoverable historical inconsistencies.\n\n4. Learning configuration: changing LEARNING for an existing world must either apply by a documented policy without erasing weights/memory, or fail startup with a clear actionable error. Never silently ignore it. Test enabled/disabled restarts, status and whether updates occur.\n\n5. Actor-aware intervention idempotency: scope keys to world+authenticated actor+ID or explicitly reject ownership conflicts. Same actor/same payload retries apply once; changed payload conflicts; a second actor must never get a silent duplicate attributed to the first. Persist this across restart and document migration of existing IDs.\n\n6. Deterministic tests: fix the corrupt-snapshot fallback test's wall-clock dependence using controlled clocks or explicit catch-up assertions. Do not weaken recovery behavior merely to make tests pass. Re-run existing tests plus new regressions and the four previously fixed UI reproductions.\n\nDEPLOYMENT AND AUTHENTICATION\nBuild and run the delivered Docker/Compose service in isolation if your worker supports it. Target Ubuntu ARM64, 2 shared vCPUs/4 GB RAM. Verify persistent volumes, shutdown/restart, health, backup/restore, allowed origins and HTTPS/WSS proxy configuration. Cross-check wallet signature recovery against a maintained Ethereum library with independently generated valid/invalid signatures; no real wallet keys or fund transactions. Distinguish native ARM64, emulation, x86 and unperformed checks. If Docker/ARM64 is unavailable, supply runnable checks and report the exact blocker; never invent a pass.\n\nPUBLICATION\nRebuild the existing client and publish its corrected static export through IMD. The previous ENS URL returned a TLS error during requester checks. Verify an accessible HTTPS URL serves this release; report the final URL, CID and commit. If ENS/TLS is platform-controlled and cannot be repaired by source changes, state that clearly and provide a tested HTTPS gateway URL for the same CID. Do not claim deployment of the world backend: deliver its source and installation package for the owner's VPS.\n\nDELIVER\nOne repository update with code, tests and evidence. Include a finding-to-fix table listing files, reproductions before/after, measured results and outstanding items. The independent review must re-test each prior finding against this exact revision and identify unresolved issues. Keep root setup commands, configuration templates and operator migration instructions accurate. No owner infrastructure access required.","parentJobId":"f0d5f20d-3fa4-418d-855d-99e28f5c14e5","planHash":"71b0b87398702b8b8fbad87ea9bf32fbbec6c62258bcbf845327ad3d19d43e8e","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"f0d5f20d-3fa4-418d-855d-99e28f5c14e5","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2592-stratoks-phase-1-build"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52139","feedbackHash":"3178bdbf3a2c2820b6ff83ce629199b6e854fd9f89b93b9ac3adc62c8623f0a6","nodeKey":"adversarial_review","submissionHash":"f69e2a271585dde6a218d2528d9e97d5cac8ec42245051da5a3ecf33f79f4354","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51394","feedbackHash":"c7d77232661f48ee4dbee4dabae80ec5e6658c272c442709bab58220b266fd98","nodeKey":"build_website","submissionHash":"8fd40758f5ca554a9cce4ee7963b3e505014048182cf095ee207e9a9939e47b6","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51453","feedbackHash":"a8ea2ec75ed3eb2d8badb02bfa07a89288e5c91996c26914626bbfbfdb8ef600","nodeKey":"design_critic","submissionHash":"aee56bf682284c31ba055a7af89db07a2924037c2f8e76d23dfcf04b8e38f9de","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51317","feedbackHash":"e7e0aaaaf3d40784f642ce60f7535ce5e1ef14c750d6a077109d9a1ca23f4727","nodeKey":"implement_component","submissionHash":"f37c06c7c4d13bfc6fe9618a714f0a301bd4a4dc0e83276c336b7f453689122d","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51030","feedbackHash":"8282a2318d26dd60f9b32fb8ed98f7b4b412e8e73b1f75f9b3fef6f7026398cb","nodeKey":"implement_component","submissionHash":"6d5781366dc7cbbcd98ec4b45793cf188d05b691bc37e8eec2b0b22e136266c8","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"ca3102221a49b42347e66da54e76195e21a50ce1bd3804047cdcae792cceea84","state":"blocked","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":3,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dca8f60f0d611b2d","findings":[],"hash":"00f039ab9a5d9c9a22f2e34d83b2b9d6ccb126e51ac2bb3ff1192f3232b631ed","nodeId":"d28554a8-1f8d-4afa-a8fb-84e64fd542ed","outcome":"failed","summary":"could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency that changed the same files after it was accepted: Command failed: git -c user.name=IdentityMD Worker -c user.email=worker@identitymd.invalid merge --no-edit -m imd: reapply this node's accepted work 81dac75fa39a050f0d6fe12db214a49ec081b560\n","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":0,"wallClockMs":1770}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"b7f1fc143076cedc","findings":[],"hash":"63b42115560e9bb737f7350ef690480dd1ad55b5a68d8861847df092e826d275","nodeId":"d28554a8-1f8d-4afa-a8fb-84e64fd542ed","outcome":"failed","summary":"could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency that changed the same files after it was accepted: Command failed: git -c user.name=IdentityMD Worker -c user.email=worker@identitymd.invalid merge --no-edit -m imd: reapply this node's accepted work 81dac75fa39a050f0d6fe12db214a49ec081b560\n","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":0,"wallClockMs":2053}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"13d5462c8fbaa83e6f9dfdb7c914a916207062c7c10bfebdf0c59fbcdab5eb55","device":"06486f6fefb50394","findings":[],"hash":"6d5781366dc7cbbcd98ec4b45793cf188d05b691bc37e8eec2b0b22e136266c8","nodeId":"ea47aae9-f5aa-44ac-b367-e59224116eac","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the server revision and documented evidence in [REVISION-2.md](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/a314c4b3-1375-445e-b141-b94d8d1cab2c/ea47aae9-f5aa-44ac-b367-e59224116eac/docs/phase-1.1/REVISION-2.md).\n\nKey fixes:\n- Retried failed/short event and intervention-log appends safely before acknowledgement.\n- Refused ambiguous legacy lost-branch recovery pending non-destructive migration.\n- Preserved recovery evidence across repeated attempts.\n- Applied public-read limits to WebSocket upgrade/resync.\n- Restricted event cursors to committed sequences and added restart epochs.\n- Made container writer locks PID-namespace aware; updated offline Docker checks.\n\nValidation:\n- 23 durability/repair regressions passed.\n- 26 remaining service/simulation/client/auth tests passed.\n- Bounded-history metrics recorded in [event-bounds.json](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/a314c4b3-1375-445e-b141-b94d8d1cab2c/ea47aae9-f5aa-44ac-b367-e59224116eac/docs/phase-1.1/event-bounds.json).\n- `git diff --check` passed.\n- Docker was unavailable (`docker: command not found`); no Docker/ARM64/TLS claim is made. The updated [check-docker.sh](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/a314c4b3-1375-445e-b141-b94d8d1cab2c/ea47aae9-f5aa-44ac-b367-e59224116eac/deploy/check-docker.sh) is ready to run on the target host.\n\nReviewer responses were written to `.imd-responses.json`.","treeHash":"c0f6da28a2b27647cba19001e0c807df8858c328","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3017472,"inputTokens":129661,"model":null,"outputTokens":25939,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":1047515}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"ae3f5d6ea7917d4a0bf16a8c6e3b8bec4394708c4d5a9ad0977728893861125c","device":"3d800e8d8dc2fdc5","findings":[],"hash":"8fd40758f5ca554a9cce4ee7963b3e505014048182cf095ee207e9a9939e47b6","nodeId":"d28554a8-1f8d-4afa-a8fb-84e64fd542ed","outcome":"completed","summary":"Repaired the integration, preserved the four UI fixes, rebuilt `dist/`, and packaged the VPS service.\n\nPassed: 46 server tests, 14 client tests, 61 browser checks, 16 design checks, build, typecheck and file validation.\n\n[Fixes and evidence](artifacts/phase-1.1/VALIDATION.md) · [VPS package](artifacts/phase-1.1/stratoks-vps-source.tar.gz)\n\nPublication remains blocked: ENS HTTPS fails, and IMD publishing requires the protected operator identity. No release URL/CID/commit was verified. Docker/ARM64 and independent review remain unperformed.\n\nNot delivered: artifacts/browser-checks.json, artifacts/demo-desktop.png, artifacts/demo-mobile.png, artifacts/inspector-mobile.png, artifacts/interface-checks.json, artifacts/phase-1.1/PLAN.md, artifacts/phase-1.1/VALIDATION.md, artifacts/phase-1.1/VPS-PACKAGE.md and 53 more. Under artifacts/, only this step's named outputs leave the machine.","treeHash":"5694275e28720711d28f50b92c46d48aec6887a9","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":17612672,"inputTokens":189100,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":99567,"runtime":"codex","turns":15,"wallClockMs":3376732}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"77620edf9366f370","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: README links the current finding-to-fix table, raw regression evidence and source installation archive under artifacts/phase-1.1/, but that directory is absent from this exact revision. Only historical evidence under docs/ is present.\nChange to: include the referenced validation report, current before/after measurements and stratoks-vps-source.tar.gz, or deliver the package at a real path and update every link.\nWhy: the brief explicitly requires code, tests and evidence, a finding-to-fix table with measured results and outstanding items, and the backend installation package.","line":67,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"Viewport: not applicable (repository deliverable). At revision 81dac75, run test -f artifacts/phase-1.1/VALIDATION.md and test -f artifacts/phase-1.1/stratoks-vps-source.tar.gz: both exit 1. rg --files artifacts/phase-1.1 reports No such file or directory; git ls-files artifacts returns no files. Expected: both linked deliverables exist and the archive can be listed with tar -tzf; actual: all current evidence/package links are broken.","severity":"high","snippet":"The [Dockerfile](deploy/Dockerfile), [Docker Compose](deploy/docker-compose.yml), [installation commands](deploy/INSTALL.md), [backup script](deploy/backup.sh) and [restore script](deploy/restore.sh) are supplied. The source installation package is [stratoks-vps-source.tar.gz](artifacts/phase-1.1/stratoks-vps-source.tar.gz). The owner installs these on their own Ubuntu ARM64 VPS; no server access is requested. Target: 2 shared vCPUs, 4 GB RAM, 40 GB SSD. Routine CLI backups briefly stop the service to avoid races with a separate writer; the authenticated in-process backup endpoint can still run online.","title":"fidelity: the current validation report and VPS installation package are absent"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: #flushEvents drains the pending queue before appendEvents succeeds. If that write throws (for example transient ENOSPC), the HTTP request returns 503, but the same-ID retry commits and acknowledges the changed world without ever writing its event. A failed intervention-ledger append has the analogous problem: the ID/effect already exist in memory, so a retry returns 200 duplicate without repairing the absent ledger record. Both survive restart.\nChange to: retain and retry failed event/record writes, or roll back/fail-stop the uncommitted mutation; only advance the snapshot commit once every required record is present, including on the duplicate path. Add regressions for log-write errors and short writes, in addition to snapshot-save failures.\nWhy: required fix 3 demands one consistent durability protocol covering world, lifecycle/event history and intervention acknowledgements, including save failures. A 200 acknowledgement currently commits permanently incomplete history.","line":97,"path":"server/src/service.js","reproduction":"Viewport: not applicable (HTTP/storage). Start a temporary Service with manual ticks and an authenticated developer. Make fs.writeSync throw ENOSPC once when fd===service.store.fds[\"events.jsonl\"]. POST /api/dev/interventions with {\"id\":\"append-failure-001\",\"type\":\"add_food\",\"x\":28,\"y\":28,\"radius\":4,\"intensity\":0.5}: actual 503 not_durable_retry_same_id. Restore normal writes and POST the identical body: actual 200 duplicate:true. Snapshot totals.interventions=1 and events contains the intervention, but events.jsonl contains only seq 1 world_created; restart preserves that mismatch. Repeat fault on interventions.jsonl instead: first 500, retry 200 duplicate:true, interventions.jsonl remains empty even after restart. Expected: the successful retry persists exactly one event and one intervention ledger record before acknowledgement. Verified independently against revision 81dac75 using a one-shot write fault in /tmp/stratoks-review-event-fail.mjs and /tmp/stratoks-review-append-fail.mjs. Running node server/bin/check-history.js on either recovered directory also reports irrecoverable:[] despite the missing committed record. Repeated with the real nonce/signature login via tests/helpers.js: events append fault -> 503 then 200, recovered event/intervention lines 1/1; intervention append fault -> 500 then 200, recovered lines 2/0; totals.interventions=1 in both.","severity":"high","snippet":"  #flushEvents() { const evs = this.world.drainEvents(); if (evs.length) { this.store.appendEvents(evs); this.outEvents.push(...evs); } }","title":"bug: a retried intervention commits state after its log write has been lost"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: offline tools decide whether the writer is alive by process.kill(pid, 0). The world writes PID 1 in its container; after SIGKILL that stale lock survives in the volume. In docker compose run/docker run, the offline tool is itself PID 1, so it falsely treats the stopped service as running. check-history --apply and restoreBackup use the same namespace-unsafe check.\nChange to: use a writer lock that distinguishes the actual service across container PID namespaces, and provide a safe stale-lock recovery procedure for stopped volumes. Cover offline backup, restore and history migration immediately after a killed container, before restarting it.\nWhy: existing-data backup/migration and crash recovery must work through the delivered Docker installation without first starting or modifying the old world.","line":13,"path":"server/bin/backup.js","reproduction":"Viewport: not applicable (Docker CLI). Build the delivered Dockerfile for linux/amd64 from an ordinary-readable copy of this Git revision. Create a fresh named volume; docker run -d --name stratoks-review-stale -v stratoks-review-stale-data:/data stratoks-world:check; wait for /health; docker kill -s KILL stratoks-review-stale. With that original container stopped, docker run --rm -v stratoks-review-stale-data:/data stratoks-world:check node bin/backup.js exits 1: \"Stop the world service before running the backup CLI\". node bin/check-history.js /data --apply in another one-shot container also exits 1: \"server is running: stop it before --apply\". Expected: both recognize there is no live writer; actual: server.lock=1 matches each tool's own PID 1. Reproduced with Node 22.23.4 in native x86 Docker; ordinary graceful restart/backup/restore smoke passes. No native/emulated ARM64 pass claimed.","severity":"medium","snippet":"  try { process.kill(Number(fs.readFileSync(lock, 'utf8')), 0); alive = true; } catch { /* stale lock */ }","title":"bug: stale container PID locks block offline backup and migration after a crash"}],"hash":"aee56bf682284c31ba055a7af89db07a2924037c2f8e76d23dfcf04b8e38f9de","nodeId":"23b0c951-406b-4a5d-9d82-24696c77c697","outcome":"completed","summary":"| Area | Result |\n|---|---:|\n| Requirements, grouped below | 19 met · 3 missing · 0 faked · 1 after review · 1 needs requester |\n| Broken features | 2 |\n| Product/action on first screen at 390 | Yes |\n| taste@1 | 16/16 passed |\n| Copy findings | 0 |\n| Share card | Present; assets resolve |\n\n**Three verified findings: two high, one medium.** Saved in [.imd-findings.json](/home/imdc/.identitymd/work/a314c4b3-1375-445e-b141-b94d8d1cab2c/23b0c951-406b-4a5d-9d82-24696c77c697/.imd-findings.json). Source files remain unchanged.\n\nReviewed commit: `81dac75fa39a050f0d6fe12db214a49ec081b560`.\n\n| Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|\n| High | **bug:** After an event-log write fails, the identical intervention retry returns 200 but permanently omits the event. A failed intervention-ledger append similarly leaves an empty ledger after acknowledgement and restart. |\n| High | **fidelity:** The linked current validation report, evidence directory and VPS installation archive are absent. |\n| Medium | **bug:** After Docker SIGKILL, offline backup and history migration mistake stale PID 1 for their own process and refuse to run. |\n\nEach JSON finding includes an exact source citation, reproduction, measured result and requested change.\n\n| Requirement | Status and evidence |\n|---|---|\n| Continue the existing repository and preserve features | **Met:** existing client/service retained. |\n| Avoid redesign, replacement learning, contracts, payments and automatic resets | **Met:** source inspection. |\n| Bounded asynchronous event history | **Met:** indexed reads in `server/src/store.js`. |\n| Validate cursors; preserve ordering, rotation/restart semantics and retention gaps | **Met:** repair and event-boundary regressions. |\n| Three 5 MB logs, concurrent requests and measurements | **Met:** 40 requests, concurrency 4; 65,536 bytes and one parsed event/request. Tick p50/p99: 1.21/4.92 ms; total heap delta: +1.7 MB. |\n| Detail endpoint uses public limiter before serialization | **Met:** `server/src/http.js:131`. |\n| Spoof resistance, detail/list limits, honest 429 and recovery | **Met:** actual Caddy proxy returned `200,200,200,429,429,429`; list shared the limit and recovered. |\n| Consistent state, RNG, learning and event/lifecycle durability | **Missing:** log-write failures can commit incomplete history. |\n| Acknowledged intervention effects remain exactly-once | **Met:** retry/restart regressions preserve one application. |\n| Non-destructive migration, backup/rollback and inconsistency reporting | **Missing:** crash-stale Docker locks block offline operations; the checker also misses the reproduced absent committed records. |\n| Explicit learning restart policy preserves learned state | **Met:** enabled/disabled/unset restart tests. |\n| Actor/world-scoped IDs, payload conflicts and restart persistence | **Met:** server and browser regressions. |\n| Existing intervention-ID migration documented | **Met:** migrations and durability documentation. |\n| Deterministic corrupt-snapshot fallback without weakened recovery | **Met:** frozen clock and explicit catch-up assertions. |\n| Existing/new tests and four prior UI reproductions | **Met:** 46 server, 14 client, 22 UI and 10 Phase 1.1 browser checks passed. |\n| Isolated Docker/Compose persistence, health, restart and ordinary backup/restore | **Met:** native x86 checks passed. Crash-specific defect reported above. |\n| ARM64 distinction and runnable fallback checks | **Met:** supplied checks; attempted ARM64 build failed with `exec format error`. No ARM64/emulation pass claimed. |\n| Allowed origins and HTTPS/WSS proxy configuration | **Met:** isolated Caddy, trusted test CA, hostname verification, allowed/rejected CORS and WSS checks. |\n| Independent Ethereum signature cross-check | **Met:** fresh viem signatures; 12 valid and 48 invalid cases passed. No transactions. |\n| Existing client integration and rebuilt export | **Met:** temporary rebuild matched all 13 delivered files byte for byte. |\n| IMD publication, acce","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":4744448,"inputTokens":154820,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":24111,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":750951}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6407a9ab49278517","findings":[],"hash":"e45db53648f1b310e2ab5aabf343c4609e59bbc38a3fb5c2df580403e0afa608","nodeId":"d28554a8-1f8d-4afa-a8fb-84e64fd542ed","outcome":"failed","summary":"could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency that changed the same files after it was accepted: Command failed: git -c user.name=IdentityMD Worker -c user.email=worker@identitymd.invalid merge --no-edit -m imd: reapply this node's accepted work 81dac75fa39a050f0d6fe12db214a49ec081b560\n","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":0,"wallClockMs":1569}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"eb7bdc2a0b76931092f74f14e379794ba2a40dd12cac1a00bfadd86683dbfd9a","device":"0476c44a80aa9574","findings":[],"hash":"f37c06c7c4d13bfc6fe9618a714f0a301bd4a4dc0e83276c336b7f453689122d","nodeId":"ea47aae9-f5aa-44ac-b367-e59224116eac","outcome":"completed","summary":"All five server findings and the clock-dependent test are fixed and committed as `2bb2676`. All 42 server tests pass: the 23 existing ones, three of them updated on purpose, plus 19 new regressions. Docker and ARM64 checks were not run, and the client was not rebuilt or published, because that was outside this assignment's file scope.\n\n| # | Finding | Before (baseline code, reproduced) | After |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | Event history | One `after=0&limit=1` request read 15 MB, parsed 64,752 lines and blocked the simulation for 95–296 ms (+139 MB memory) | An in-memory index plus small asynchronous reads: at most 64 KiB and one line parsed per request. With 4 concurrent requests, tick p99 stayed under 4 ms. `after`/`limit` are validated (bad input → 400). Paging works in order across log rotation and restart, and missing older history is reported as a `gap`. Too many concurrent reads get a 503 |\n| 2 | Rate limits | The creature detail route skipped the limiter; a client could dodge it by changing the first entry of a forwarded-IP header | Every public GET except `/health` uses one limiter, checked before any lookup. Forwarded IPs are trusted only from proxy addresses, using the last entry, and Caddy now overwrites the header. 429s carry `Retry-After`; tested for detail, list and recovery after the window |\n| 3 | Crash consistency | Killed the process after a logged birth and death: after restart creature 12 was recorded dead but alive, then got a duplicate death and a duplicate birth record | The snapshot is now the commit point. Logs are flushed to disk before each snapshot, and on startup any log lines newer than the snapshot are moved to `recovery/`, not deleted. Interventions are confirmed only after their snapshot is saved; a failed save returns 503 and a retry with the same ID is safe. Real processes were killed at 7 write points plus a lost-confirmation case: no duplicate records, and running recovery again changes nothing |\n| 4 | LEARNING | Ignored for existing worlds | `LEARNING=0`/`1` applies on restart and keeps weights and memories (logged and recorded as an event); unset keeps the stored setting; an invalid value stops startup with a clear message. `/api/status` shows the policy |\n| 5 | Intervention IDs | A second developer reusing an ID got the first developer's record back | IDs are now per developer wallet. Same wallet and same request applies once; a changed request gets 409; another wallet gets its own intervention. Survives restart, and existing IDs are migrated to their original owner |\n| 6 | Flaky test | Failed if the machine paused for more than about 100 ms | Uses a controlled clock: asserts tick 50 exactly, then exactly 30 catch-up ticks |\n\n**Migrating existing data:** `server/bin/check-history.js` reports history problems in Phase 1 data, and its `--apply` mode repairs them, keeping copies of the original files. Run on the duplicated data from the baseline reproduction, it moved aside 14 event lines and 2 lifecycle lines and found nothing it couldn't repair. Backup, migration and rollback steps are in `server/docs/DURABILITY.md` and `deploy/INSTALL.md`. Rolling the code back to Phase 1 requires restoring the pre-upgrade backup, because the old server refuses the new snapshot format.\n\n**Deployment and authentication:**\n- **Docker / Compose / ARM64: not run.** This machine is x86_64 with no Docker. `deploy/check-docker.sh` is ready for the owner to run on the VPS; it checks health, restarts, crash recovery, backup/restore, origins, and whether the image is running natively on ARM64. I only syntax-checked it.\n- **Server process on x86_64: run.** `deploy/smoke-process.sh` covered health, graceful and forced restarts, allowed origins, invalid input, LEARNING and backup; output is in `docs/phase-1.1/process-smoke.txt`.\n- **HTTPS/WSS proxy:** the Caddyfile was reviewed and updated, but not run (no Docker, no domain).\n- **Wallet signatures: checked.** I generated 12 valid and 5 invalid signatures with ethers 6.1","treeHash":"095bc74a93e4aa5125ae86851390dc21c36b4891","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":5295632,"inputTokens":107,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":79254,"runtime":"claude","turns":58,"wallClockMs":1128881}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"079b3bf4557d8811","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"recover() cuts each log at the FIRST line whose seq > S. Phase-1 data contains a lost branch: seqs that run past the old snapshot, then rewind and continue as the surviving branch. In that data the first line with seq > S is inside the lost branch, so everything after it is moved to recovery/ and the log is truncated. That includes the whole surviving branch that the committed snapshot actually describes. Lost-branch records for creatures that never existed in the committed world stay in lifecycle.jsonl. The upgrade path makes this easy to hit: DURABILITY.md step 4 (check-history --apply) is marked optional, and step 5 says that just starting the server 'moves logs ahead of the snapshot'. Required fix 3 forbids a recorded dead creature reviving with a second record, and asks for a non-destructive migration of existing data. This start keeps wrong records and removes right ones from the live logs.","line":188,"path":"server/src/store.js","reproduction":"Create a world, tick 300, stop (snapshot seq S=14). Overwrite lifecycle.jsonl with birth lines seq 11..17 tagged branch:'lost' (ids 9011..9017), followed by seq 11..14 tagged branch:'surviving' (ids 8011..8014). This is the Phase-1 crash-then-rewind layout. Start and stop a Service. Observed: lifecycle.jsonl holds only lost,lost,lost,lost (seqs 11-14 of the lost branch), and the surviving records are in recovery/lifecycle.jsonl.after-14.orphaned. Expected: the surviving branch (seq 11..14, ids 8011..) stays in the log. Alternatively, startup should refuse to run while check-history reports a lost branch, with an error telling the operator to run check-history --apply.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (s !== null && s > committedSeq) { cut = start; break; }","title":"Startup recovery on Phase-1 data with a lost branch keeps the lost branch and moves the surviving records into recovery/"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The orphan file name depends only on (file, committedSeq) and is opened with 'w'. The design assumes a second recovery at the same S finds the same tail. That does not hold when the startup commit fails. start() runs recover(), then catch-up/learning-policy emit new events with seq S+1.., and snapshot(true) flushes them to events.jsonl before writing the snapshot. If that save fails (disk full, I/O error, or SIGKILL at snapshot-tmp-written), the next start recovers at the same S. It then truncates the new tail (only the startup events) into the SAME orphan path, overwriting the first recovery's lines. DURABILITY.md says recovery/ lines are 'never deleted automatically' and that repeated recovery 'gives the same result'. Neither holds here, and the uncommitted lifecycle/intervention evidence an operator needs is destroyed.","line":194,"path":"server/src/store.js","reproduction":"cfg tickMs 1000, fixed clock t. Start a Service, tick 400 with no snapshot (committed seq 1, in-memory seq 20), then release the lock without stop() (SIGKILL). Set t += 60 s, new Service with store.failNextSaves = 1, start() throws 'injected save failure'. recovery/events.jsonl.after-1.orphaned now has 19 lines. Set t += 60 s and start again. Observed: the same orphan file now has 2 lines [shelter_started, downtime], so the 19 recovered events are gone. Expected: the earlier orphan content is kept (append, or a unique name per recovery attempt).","severity":"medium","snippet":"      const fd = fs.openSync(orphan, 'w'); fs.writeSync(fd, tail); fs.fsyncSync(fd); fs.closeSync(fd);","title":"Repeated recovery at the same snapshot seq overwrites the earlier orphan file, deleting the recovered records"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Required fix 2 says expensive public reads must go through the shared limiter before serialization, and protocol.md says every public GET shares one per-client limit. The WS upgrade and each 'resync' message run service.snapshotMessage(). That is the same full world + tiles + entities + 300 history rows + 200 events JSON that GET /api/world builds, but it runs on the simulation thread for every message with no limiter. One connection that has already been throttled on HTTP can keep forcing full serializations. Each 33-byte frame costs about 17 KB of output plus a JSON.stringify of the world, so amplification is about 500x. The maxWsBufferBytes backlog check only runs in broadcast(), not on resync sends.","line":157,"path":"server/src/http.js","reproduction":"startApp({server:{rateLimit:{publicGet:5}}}). Six GET /api/world calls: the 6th returns 429. From the same IP, open /ws with Origin https://client.test and send 2000 masked text frames '{\"type\":\"resync\",\"after\":0}' (66,000 bytes total). Observed: the server replies with 33.8 MB of snapshot messages and never sends a 429/close. Expected: resync (and the upgrade) count against the same per-IP 'get' bucket, or are throttled per connection (e.g. at most 1 per second), and the server closes or refuses once the limit is hit.","severity":"medium","snippet":"      if (m.type === 'resync') conn.send(service.snapshotMessage(Number(m.after) || 0));","title":"WebSocket 'resync' gets full-world serialization with no rate limit, bypassing the public-read limiter"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"readEvents (and broadcast()) serve events straight from the in-memory ring, including seqs above the last committed snapshot. After SIGKILL, recovery rewinds world.seq to the snapshot seq S and the same seq numbers are re-issued to different events. The response carries no epoch or committed boundary, so a client cannot detect the rewind. A client that already advanced its cursor past S silently skips the new events with those seqs. The task requires 'correct ordering and cursor semantics across rotation/restart'. DURABILITY.md documents only the loss of simulation work, not cursor reuse.","line":131,"path":"server/src/service.js","reproduction":"startApp with manualTicks and fixed clock; tick 50, snapshot(true) (S=2); tick 50 more. GET /api/events?after=2&limit=5 -> [3:shelter_stage], nextAfter=3. Simulate SIGKILL (release lock without stop()), start a new Service on the same dataDir, apply intervention {id:'abcdefgh1',type:'storm',x:20,y:20,radius:3,intensity:0.5}, tick 60. GET /api/events?after=2 -> [3:intervention, 4:shelter_stage, ...]. A client resuming with after=3 (the nextAfter it was given) never sees the intervention event seq 3, and gap is null. Expected: either serve only committed seqs (<= snapshot seq), or return a world/boot epoch plus a rewind signal so clients reset the cursor.","severity":"medium","snippet":"    if (ring.length && after + 1 >= ring[0].seq) {","title":"Event cursors are not stable across crash/restart: /api/events and WS deltas serve uncommitted seqs that are later re-assigned to different events"}],"hash":"f69e2a271585dde6a218d2528d9e97d5cac8ec42245051da5a3ecf33f79f4354","nodeId":"0ebcb962-50e7-4325-a931-7a298533bdae","outcome":"completed","summary":"The revision's own tests all pass (46/46), but I found four medium defects that I reproduced on this exact revision. Two are in crash recovery, so prior finding 3 is only partly resolved. They are in `.imd-findings.json`, ranked by severity. None is high or critical, and none carries a Foundry proof because there is no Solidity in this project. I changed no files.\n\n## Prior findings, re-tested\n\n| Prior finding | Outcome |\n|---|---|\n| 1. Bounded event history | **Resolved.** `after` and `limit` are validated, and reads use an in-memory index with async positioned reads and a cap on concurrent reads (`server/src/store.js:131`). Cursors are not stable across a crash (below). |\n| 2. Rate limit on `/api/creatures/:id` | **Resolved for HTTP.** It now goes through the shared limiter before serialization. In the documented Caddy setup, spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` doesn't get around it: Caddy overwrites the header and the server only trusts the right-most entry. The WebSocket `resync` message still bypasses the limiter (below). |\n| 3. Crash-consistent world history | **Partly resolved.** The normal SIGKILL cases are handled. Two recovery defects remain (below). |\n| 4. LEARNING on an existing world | **Resolved.** An explicit value applies on restart without erasing weights or memories, invalid values abort startup, and the change shows in the status. |\n| 5. Intervention idempotency per actor | **Resolved.** Keys are actor + ID, a changed payload returns 409, and the v1→v2 migration keeps each old ID with the wallet that created it. |\n| 6. Corrupt-snapshot test timing | **Resolved.** The test uses an injected clock and asserts exactly 30 catch-up ticks. |\n\n## New findings, most severe first\n\n1. **Startup keeps the wrong history on old data** (`server/src/store.js:188`). Phase 1 crashes left a \"lost branch\": records that run past the snapshot, then a rewind where the surviving branch continues. Recovery cuts at the first record past the snapshot, so it keeps the lost records and moves the surviving ones to `recovery/`. In my reproduction (snapshot seq 14, lost births 11–17 followed by surviving births 11–14), `lifecycle.jsonl` ended up holding only lost-branch records. The upgrade guide marks the repair step (`check-history --apply`) as optional, so a plain restart hits this.\n2. **A second recovery overwrites the first one's saved records** (`server/src/store.js:194`). If the snapshot saved during startup fails, the next start recovers at the same seq and writes to the same `recovery/` file. In my test that file went from 19 recovered events to 2, contradicting the documented \"never deleted automatically\".\n3. **WebSocket `resync` has no rate limit** (`server/src/http.js:157`). Each 33-byte message makes the server build the full world snapshot, the same work as `GET /api/world`. From a client already getting 429 on HTTP, 2000 frames (66 KB) produced 33.8 MB of replies and no throttling.\n4. **Event cursors are reused after a crash** (`server/src/service.js:131`). The server hands out event seqs that were never saved. After a restart the same numbers go to different events, and responses carry nothing that signals the rewind. In my test, seq 3 was `shelter_stage` before the kill and an `intervention` after. A client resuming from its old cursor skipped the intervention, with `gap: null`.\n\n## Not checked\n\n- **Docker, ARM64, and the HTTPS/WSS proxy:** I didn't build or run them.\n- **Publication:** I didn't check the published URL or CID.\n- **Client and signature tests:** I didn't re-run the four client UI reproductions or the ethers signature cross-check.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":6308239,"inputTokens":11841,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":46439,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":609732}}],"verification":[{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"6d5781366dc7cbbcd98ec4b45793cf188d05b691bc37e8eec2b0b22e136266c8","verifiedTreeHash":"c0f6da28a2b27647cba19001e0c807df8858c328","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+260efc41"},{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"8fd40758f5ca554a9cce4ee7963b3e505014048182cf095ee207e9a9939e47b6","verifiedTreeHash":"5694275e28720711d28f50b92c46d48aec6887a9","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+260efc41"},{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f37c06c7c4d13bfc6fe9618a714f0a301bd4a4dc0e83276c336b7f453689122d","verifiedTreeHash":"095bc74a93e4aa5125ae86851390dc21c36b4891","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+260efc41"}]}