{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"044913fb-4465-4c2c-bfda-2d75d43a9659","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"473bfe01e89bcc1f5f991fba1a8bef1e4561f3c417d96dffb92b54672b444f0a","dependsOn":["audit_imported_code"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"ea5db8ea23a93d7611f9ab749d6255ad6596ee76a985c1261d43e63612dfc3cf","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"adapt_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"ea5db8ea23a93d7611f9ab749d6255ad6596ee76a985c1261d43e63612dfc3cf","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"working"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"working"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8870670cac01260275d50f965f3ae113761aa032dee846323992f136b8b5cac7","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b72293c3366fff3f0b93151bca72cc6cbd189dad31d1ccd1d34dd483f2165a36","skillId":"audit-imported-code","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_imported_code","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b72293c3366fff3f0b93151bca72cc6cbd189dad31d1ccd1d34dd483f2165a36","skillId":"audit-imported-code","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"bb87dd2927a093fc295b7029fa112ce906675c90731d48a29b9c2f3089804309","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8f5eedb7709a6ecad913e45ea11437c155745b985d0b6b68b677323ce1e310e0","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"failed"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"working"}],"objective":"Repository: https://github.com/Bradymck/imd-beacon (main branch). Read docs/SPEC.md first, especially §4 (cryptographic design), §8.2 (chain API and permissionless relay) and §10.3 \"Job 2\". Also read docs/reviews/spec-v1-review.md. The spec is the contract; where this text and the spec differ, the spec wins. Report any conflict instead of guessing.\n\nBuild Job 2: the on-chain verifier for imd-beacon rounds. Do not deploy anything.\n\nFiles to produce:\n- src/BeaconVerifier.sol: immutable network descriptor and group key, installed once at a verified genesis and never changeable afterwards. It verifies one round's BLS12-381 group signature with the EIP-2537 precompiles and stores R(r) = SHA256(compressed G1 signature) as in §4.3.\n- src/interfaces/IBeacon.sol: already drafted from §8.2; freeze the final ABI and adjust it if needed (§8.2, §8.3).\n- Reviewed BLS, hash-to-curve and encoding libraries under lib/. Vendor them as ordinary files with licence notices. If you adapt randa-mu/bls-solidity, record the source revision and review every line you keep. Add strict canonical-encoding checks it lacks.\n- test/contracts/BeaconVerifier.t.sol, test/vectors/bls12.json, docs/verification-gas.md, and a Makefile target that runs the whole suite offline.\n\nCryptography, exactly as specified in §4.3:\n- Message M(r) = \"IMD_BEACON_ROUND_V1\" || networkId || U64BE(E(r)) || U64BE(r). Reject r = 0, overflow, epoch mismatch and the wrong network.\n- RFC 9380 BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_ with the DST BLS_SIG_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_NUL_. Compute expand_message_xmd on-chain, then map two field elements with the EIP-2537 MAP_FP_TO_G1 precompile and add them. Never implement H(M) = hash(M)·G1.\n- Signatures in G1, group key in G2. Submit form is 96-byte uncompressed x || y with canonical 48-byte big-endian coordinates. Rebuild the standard 48-byte compressed encoding internally; that is the only input to the output hash.\n- Reject infinity, non-canonical field elements, wrong lengths, off-curve and non-subgroup points, wrong G2 coefficient order and extra bytes. Every precompile call must succeed with the exact return length and expected value; empty returndata from a missing precompile is a failure.\n\nRequired tests (names from §10.3): test_Rfc9380Vectors, test_IndependentBlsVectors, test_CanonicalCompressionHash, test_RejectInfinity, test_RejectNonSubgroup, test_RejectNonCanonicalField, test_RejectMalformedLength, test_RejectWrongNetworkEpochRound, test_RejectMissingPrecompile, test_OutOfOrderRound, test_NoDuplicateFee, test_ZeroRandomnessAvailability (mock allowed only for this one), testFuzz_EncodingCannotChangeOutput (at least 10,000 runs) and testFuzz_ModifiedSignatureFails.\n- Vectors must come from RFC 9380 plus an independent implementation (blst or another reviewed BLS12-381 library) run offline. Do not check the Solidity code only against itself. Include one deterministic threshold fixture and at least 100 independent valid signatures, with generation provenance recorded in test/vectors. Test keys are test-only and labelled non-production.\n\nGas budgets: testGas_VerifySingleRound at most 170,000 execution gas; testGas_SubmitFirstWrite at most 250,000 receipt gas, including intrinsic and calldata, without rewards. Record the measured numbers, storage writes and compiler profile in docs/verification-gas.md. If a budget cannot be met, report the measurement and the cause. Do not weaken a check to fit.\n\nConstraints: foundry.toml is fixed (workers cannot edit it): solc 0.8.30, EVM prague, bytecode_hash none, ffi off, read access to test/vectors only, so commit generated vectors as files and set the 10,000-run fuzz count with inline forge-config comments. Contracts go under src/ (IMD convention; SPEC §10.2 says contracts/). No admin setter for randomness, group key or config after genesis; early-round submission reverts; anyone may submit a valid round; a duplicate submission never pays twice. No network access needed to build or test. No private keys or real addresses in the tree. Leave rewards (Job 7), the registry (Job 3) and deployment (Job 9) out of scope. Update docs/SPEC.md only if you find an error in it, and explain the change in the pull request.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"24aa7ae7c3f3324d03edd6fce43e462113243d7fc35a9b4f78ec9b263e5575bf","previousHash":"00f8b36ecd47f4da2e14b0d922ea718214414adbeeb36c5e19c2a39580a4c0b2","projectId":"044913fb-4465-4c2c-bfda-2d75d43a9659","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2586-repository-https-github-com-bradymck-imd"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52222","feedbackHash":"ad2b644aea3fb1f0c76f7516c9e8f391a9f8b9c02e1a93490115c60557ad8de4","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"bb87dd2927a093fc295b7029fa112ce906675c90731d48a29b9c2f3089804309","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51465","feedbackHash":"e05ea73b90120daef79c66cf3cec083a49814e6d4d7eaed88246a68c1bc6148c","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"8f5eedb7709a6ecad913e45ea11437c155745b985d0b6b68b677323ce1e310e0","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"9291ff96747e8a1dd6e7827af9bcd1e865deec7e5b113b6c747084091f67712c","state":"blocked","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3c9b660ee1938912","findings":[],"hash":"41045efa667d4b41aebeeb1b369c40cbb282f68b92e3f8ee985395fc7d1a4b1d","nodeId":"571e4aa4-9890-4cd2-a607-8b075e7d8470","outcome":"failed","summary":"needs input: BeaconVerifier's constructor (bytes32 networkId, uint64 genesisTime, GroupKeyWords key, address epochAuthority) needs four launch values that are not in the brief, the spec or the accepted tree, and that cannot be $owner or a placeholder: (1) networkId = keccak256(\"IMD_BEACON_NETWORK_V1\" || configHash) of the production network config (SPEC §4.1), non-zero; (2) genesisTime T0 in Unix seconds, non-zero; (3) the group public key from the DKG ceremony (Job 4), given as the 256-byte EIP-2537 affine G2 encoding pad64(x.c0)||pad64(x.c1)||pad64(y.c0)||pad64(y.c1), i.e. eight bytes32 words. The constructor reverts unless it is a canonical, non-infinity G2 subgroup point; (4) the epochAuthority contract address on Sepolia (the Job 3 CommitteeRegistry or EpochMirror implementing isEpochAuthorized), non-zero. That address is not an owner and must not be $owner. Job 3 is not in this repository, so $contract:<Name> cannot refer to it. — For the Sepolia BeaconVerifier, what are the production networ","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":157199,"inputTokens":12,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":2385,"runtime":"claude","turns":6,"wallClockMs":30019}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"fd65171aa0c66a2e75f2d509b19a139998ceef6ec2ea4ed01ef1b4750c2f7121","device":"829d84438fb3fdc8","findings":[],"hash":"473bfe01e89bcc1f5f991fba1a8bef1e4561f3c417d96dffb92b54672b444f0a","nodeId":"f1d658d3-480a-495f-bed4-22413bd39ad3","outcome":"completed","summary":"Job 2 is complete and committed on branch `job/02-verifier` (commit `60ec57b`). From a clean build, `forge build` and `forge test` pass offline with the verifier's fuzz seed: 19 tests, 0 failures, including the 10,000-run encoding fuzz. Both gas budgets are met.\n\n**What was built**\n\n- `src/BeaconVerifier.sol`: immutable descriptor and G2 group key set in a nonpayable constructor with 11 static words and no owner or setter. The constructor validates the key via G2MSM and runs a known-answer self-test of every precompile the verifier uses, so a missing precompile fails deployment. It calls no other contract, so it runs on the launch's empty chain.\n- `src/bls/BLS12381.sol` and `src/bls/HashToCurveG1.sol`: in-tree libraries with canonical-field, infinity, length and exact-return-length checks, RFC 9380 expand_message_xmd on chain, MAP_FP_TO_G1 twice plus G1ADD, and a pairing check against a constant negated G2 generator. Every precompile call forwards bounded gas, which SPEC §4.4 requires and which a failing non-subgroup input otherwise exploited to burn the caller's whole budget.\n- `src/interfaces/IBeacon.sol` frozen: `submit` returns `firstWrite`, the event carries the 48-byte compressed signature, and descriptor getters were added. `IEpochAuthority.sol` is new.\n- Tests, vectors from noble-curves 2.4.0 plus RFC 9380 appendix vectors, a 3-of-4 threshold fixture, `docs/verification-gas.md`, a Makefile, ADAPTATION.md and README updates.\n\n**Gas measured** (execution includes CALL overhead, so on-chain is slightly lower)\n\n| Test | Result | Budget |\n|---|---|---|\n| verify single round | 135,374 execution | 170,000 |\n| submit first write, epoch 0 | 230,401 receipt | 250,000 |\n| submit first write with epoch gate | 235,946 receipt | 250,000 |\n\n**Deviations you should know about**\n\n- Libraries are not under `lib/`. The task rules forbid touching `lib/` and `remappings.txt`, so the BLS libraries are in `src/bls/` and forge-std in `test/forge-std/` with relative imports. This conflicts with the brief and SPEC §10.2 and is recorded in ADAPTATION.md.\n- The epoch gate conflict (audit finding f8ef8bff) was resolved by an immutable `epochAuthority` constructor argument consulted by `submit` for epochs after genesis. Epoch 0 is authorized by genesis itself, and `verify` has no gate. If you want the gate in a Job 3 wrapper instead, the change is dropping one argument and one call.\n- `docs/SPEC.md` line 128 now says \"receipt budget\" instead of \"execution budget\" (audit finding c871e483). No other spec text changed.\n\nAll five audit findings reproduced and are fixed with tests. The launch manifest will need real values for the group key and the epoch authority, which do not exist until Jobs 3 and 4; neither is an owner, and neither should be filled with a stand-in. `make` is not installed on this machine, so I ran the Makefile recipe's command directly.","treeHash":"76d4261d9750a77b78a17000c50be758a8cd83e6","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":4294336,"inputTokens":1090,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":99087,"runtime":"claude","turns":52,"wallClockMs":1268125}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9e17b97b8ac7c97a","findings":[],"hash":"6b9aca9a35d8fc3ec47e68d20b9af483bd9235e3a108d999308fa6929cb35d9f","nodeId":"571e4aa4-9890-4cd2-a607-8b075e7d8470","outcome":"failed","summary":"needs input: BeaconVerifier's four constructor values for Sepolia. The constructor (bytes32 networkId, uint64 genesisTime, GroupKeyWords key, address epochAuthority) reverts on a zero networkId, zero genesisTime, zero epochAuthority or any G2 key that is not a canonical non-infinity subgroup point, and the contract is immutable with no setter by SPEC §4.4/§8.2, so nothing can be fixed after launch. None of the values is in the brief, the spec or the accepted tree: no genesis descriptor is frozen (SPEC §4.1), the DKG (Job 4) has not produced a group key, and the registry or EpochMirror (Job 3) is not in this repository, so $contract:<Name> cannot name it. The only key in the tree is the test fixture, derived from a public label and labelled non-production; using it would let anyone forge rounds. $owner is forbidden for epochAuthority because it is not an owner role, and an EOA there makes submit fail closed forever after epoch 0. — For the Sepolia BeaconVerifier, please give: (1) networkId (bytes32,","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":292315,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":7231,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":158659}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dc7103e773ea194a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"SPEC §8.2 (docs/SPEC.md:297) says `submit` \"additionally requires an authorized epoch and block.timestamp >= T(r)\", and §7.3 says rounds whose epochs have not been authorized locally cannot publish. The group key is retained across resharing (§6.4), so a signature for a round in a never-activated epoch verifies under the same PK; the epoch gate is the only on-chain control that stops a retired committee (or t retained old shares) from publishing outputs for an epoch whose handover failed (§6.3: 'do not activate the target epoch or invent an output for it'). The interface draft documents only the timestamp condition, so an implementer following this NatSpec builds a `submit` that accepts any epoch. Separately, the Job 2 brief says to 'reject epoch mismatch', but the ABI derives the epoch from `round` (E(r) = floor((r-1)/2880)) and carries no epoch argument, so there is nothing to mismatch unless the gate is meant; and the brief puts the registry (Job 3) out of scope, which is what the gate depends on. This is a spec-versus-brief conflict to resolve explicitly rather than guess: either the interface documents the gate and the verifier takes an immutable epoch-authorization source (registry on Ethereum, EpochMirror elsewhere), or the spec is amended to say the gate lives outside BeaconVerifier.","line":15,"path":"src/interfaces/IBeacon.sol","reproduction":"State: descriptor with T0, no epoch-1 handover certificate finalized (handover attempts failed per §6.3). Input: submit(2881, sig) where 2881 is the first round of epoch 1 and sig is a valid group signature on M(2881) under the retained PK, at block.timestamp >= T(2881). Expected per SPEC §8.2/§7.3: revert (epoch not authorized). Actual per the interface's documented contract: succeeds and stores R(2881). Fix: add the authorized-epoch requirement to the NatSpec (and a getter or dependency through which the verifier learns the activation state), or record in SPEC.md that the gate is enforced by a wrapper contract delivered in Job 3.","severity":"low","snippet":"    /// @notice Verify and store a round. Anyone may call once block.timestamp >= T(round).\n    ///         A matching duplicate is a no-op; a mismatching one reverts.\n    function submit(uint64 round, bytes calldata affineG1Signature) external;","title":"IBeacon.submit NatSpec drops the §8.2 'authorized epoch' precondition; the frozen ABI has no epoch gate and the Job 2 brief's 'epoch mismatch' has no input to mismatch"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The interface freezes only verify/submit/get. SPEC §8.3 requires a consumer to 'choose the smallest r whose T(r) is at least the chain timestamp plus [3,600 s]' and to derive W(counter) = keccak256(abi.encode(..., networkId, chainId, consumer, requestId, r, R, counter)). Both need T0, the 30-second period (and epoch length for the epoch check) and networkId, which the Job 2 brief says are immutables of BeaconVerifier. R3 (§1) also says anyone 'with the immutable network descriptor' verifies. None of these are readable through IBeacon, so DemoRaffle (Job 9) and any third-party consumer must hardcode descriptor values that only the deployed verifier knows, defeating the single-source-of-truth intent and inviting a consumer that binds requests to the wrong round or wrong network id.","line":7,"path":"src/interfaces/IBeacon.sol","reproduction":"Write a consumer `contract Raffle { IBeacon b; function request() external { uint64 r = ...; } }` that must pick r with T(r) >= block.timestamp + 3600: there is no `b.T0()`, `b.period()` or `b.roundAt(uint64 ts)` to call, and `b.networkId()` for W(counter) does not exist, so the consumer cannot compile against the interface as frozen and has to duplicate descriptor constants. Expected per §8.3/R3: the descriptor is readable from the verifier. Actual: not in the ABI. Fix before freezing: add view getters `networkId()`, `groupKey()` (affine G2 in EIP coefficient order), `genesisTime()`/`T0`, `period()`, `epochLength()` and a pure `roundTime(uint64 r)`; all are immutables, so this costs no storage.","severity":"low","snippet":"interface IBeacon {","title":"IBeacon exposes no descriptor getters, so a consumer holding only the interface cannot compute its target round or the §8.3 expansion W(counter)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"SPEC §8.2 emits RoundVerified(networkId,epoch,round,R,signature) without saying which serialization `signature` is, and §4.3 defines R = SHA256 of the 48-byte compressed G1 encoding while the submit form is 96-byte affine x||y. The interface's docstring does not resolve this. Off-chain verifiers and indexers that hash the event payload to reproduce R (R3 public verifiability) will disagree with the contract if the event carries the affine form. Since this file is the ABI being frozen, the choice should be stated here. Indexing the constant `networkId` also spends a topic on a value identical for every event of one deployment; it is harmless but not useful for filtering.","line":9,"path":"src/interfaces/IBeacon.sol","reproduction":"Two conforming implementations of this interface, one emitting the 96-byte submitted bytes and one emitting the reconstructed 48-byte compressed bytes, both satisfy the interface and the spec text. An indexer doing SHA256(event.signature) == event.value gets true for the second and false for the first. Expected: one encoding frozen in the ABI docstring. Recommendation: emit the 48-byte compressed encoding, which is exactly the hash preimage, and say so in the NatSpec.","severity":"info","snippet":"    event RoundVerified(bytes32 indexed networkId, uint64 indexed epoch, uint64 indexed round, bytes32 value, bytes signature);","title":"RoundVerified event's `bytes signature` encoding is not frozen (96-byte affine vs 48-byte compressed hash preimage)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"foundry.toml points library resolution at lib/, which contains only .gitkeep. SPEC §10.1 requires all dependencies vendored as ordinary files that build offline (no submodules, no network download), and the Job 2 brief requires every proof/test file to import \"forge-std/Test.sol\". As the tree arrived, `forge build` succeeds (one interface file) but any test file fails at import resolution, so the required test suite, the 10,000-run fuzz tests, the gas tests and any reviewer proof test cannot run until forge-std is committed as plain files with its licence. This also means a reviewer cannot attach a failing proof test for any higher-severity finding against this tree.","line":8,"path":"foundry.toml","reproduction":"Create test/scratch/Probe.t.sol containing `import {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";` and run `forge test --match-path test/scratch/Probe.t.sol`. Actual: `Error (6275): Source \"forge-std/Test.sol\" not found: File not found.` Expected: compiles. Fix: vendor forge-std (pinned revision, LICENSE files kept) under lib/forge-std as ordinary files, with a remappings.txt entry if the auto-detected remapping is not wanted; do not add it as a git submodule.","severity":"low","snippet":"libs = [\"lib\"]","title":"No Foundry test can compile in the tree: forge-std is not vendored under lib/ and tests must build offline"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The spec is the contract and the brief says to report conflicts rather than guess. docs/SPEC.md:20 (R6) says 'Receipt gas <= 250,000 for ordinary single-round publication', docs/SPEC.md:127 says '210k-250k full first-write receipt, including 21k base transaction, calldata', and docs/SPEC.md:400 says 'testGas_SubmitFirstWrite <=250,000 receipt gas including intrinsic/calldata'. Line 128 alone calls the same number an 'execution budget'. Execution gas excludes the 21,000 intrinsic cost and roughly 1,500-2,000 gas of calldata for a 96-byte signature plus selector and round, so the two readings differ by about 23,000 gas, enough to change whether testGas_SubmitFirstWrite passes. The implementer should treat 250k as receipt gas (three of four mentions, and the brief) and fix the wording at line 128 in the Job 2 PR.","line":128,"path":"docs/SPEC.md","reproduction":"A verifier whose submit first-write measures 240,000 execution gas passes under the line-128 wording and fails under R6/§10.3 (240,000 + 21,000 intrinsic + ~1,700 calldata ≈ 262,700 receipt gas > 250,000). Expected: one definition. Fix: change 'execution budget' to 'receipt budget' at docs/SPEC.md:128 and explain the edit in the pull request as the brief permits.","severity":"info","snippet":"| Ethereum / Base / Robinhood | Same nominal EIP arithmetic schedule is the starting assumption. | Use the 250k execution budget on each EVM profile. Base and Robinhood charge additional data and/or chain-specific fees: no USD or total-fee parity claim. [Base fees](https://docs.base.org/base-chain/network-information/network-fees), [Robinhood gas](https://docs.robinhood.com/chain/gas-and-fees/). |","title":"SPEC §4.4 says '250k execution budget' while R6 and §10.3 Job 2 define the 250k budget as receipt gas including intrinsic and calldata"}],"hash":"8870670cac01260275d50f965f3ae113761aa032dee846323992f136b8b5cac7","nodeId":"2a680a1d-d244-4426-beab-828a37aa7277","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated.\n\n**What arrived.** The repository at `main` (71252e8) contains one Solidity file, the `IBeacon` interface draft. `BeaconVerifier.sol`, the vendored BLS, hash-to-curve and encoding libraries, `test/contracts/BeaconVerifier.t.sol`, `test/vectors/bls12.json` and `docs/verification-gas.md` do not exist yet, so they could not be read. There is no state-changing code, no owner role, no value flow and no forbidden opcode to assess. The interface compiles under the pinned solc 0.8.30 and Prague profile. No critical or high defects exist in this tree, so no proof tests were attached.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`** (five entries, each with path, line, exact snippet and reproduction):\n\n- **Low. Submit NatSpec omits the authorized-epoch gate.** SPEC §8.2 requires `submit` to check an authorized epoch as well as the release time. The draft documents only the timestamp, and the ABI carries no epoch input, so the brief's \"reject epoch mismatch\" has nothing to act on. This is a spec-versus-brief conflict, since the registry the gate depends on is out of Job 2 scope. Reproduction: a valid signature for round 2881 with no epoch-1 certificate is accepted as documented, but must revert per spec.\n- **Low. No descriptor getters.** Consumers need networkId, T0 and the period to pick a target round and compute W(counter) under §8.3. None is readable through the interface, so a consumer must hardcode descriptor values.\n- **Info. Event signature encoding not frozen.** The event's `bytes signature` could be the 96-byte affine input or the 48-byte compressed hash preimage. An indexer recomputing R from the event disagrees with one of the two conforming choices. Recommend the compressed form.\n- **Low. No test can compile.** `lib/` holds only a `.gitkeep`. Any test importing `forge-std/Test.sol` fails with a file-not-found error, which I confirmed with a scratch test and then removed. The spec requires offline, vendored dependencies, so forge-std must be committed as plain files.\n- **Info. Spec gas wording conflict.** SPEC line 128 calls the 250k budget \"execution\" gas while R6, §4.4 and §10.3 call it receipt gas including intrinsic and calldata. The readings differ by roughly 23,000 gas and can flip the result of `testGas_SubmitFirstWrite`.\n\n**For the adapter.** The interface is close to §8.2 but should be frozen with the epoch-gate decision made explicit, descriptor getters added, the event encoding named, and forge-std vendored before any of the fourteen required tests or the gas budgets can be exercised. The rest of Job 2's acceptance list cannot be audited until the verifier and vectors exist.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":507441,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":16019,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":256040}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"f0c4ae5b8ada215c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between the two branches of submit(). The first-write branch (line 143, _verify) runs parseAffineG1 and then the pairing precompile, which rejects off-curve and non-subgroup points. The already-available branch (lines 133-136) runs only parseAffineG1 (length, canonical field elements, infinity), rebuilds the 48-byte compressed form and compares SHA256 of it with the stored value. The compressed form is x plus one sign bit, so any point (x, y') with the stored x and a y' in the same sign class as the stored y produces the same hash, whether or not (x, y') is on the curve. Such a submission is therefore classified as a matching duplicate: no revert, return false. SPEC §4.3 requires 'points outside the curve/subgroup' to be rejected 'before hashing', and IBeacon.submit NatSpec (src/interfaces/IBeacon.sol:43-44) says 'a mismatching submission for an available round reverts'. verify() on the same input reverts with PrecompileFailure(0x0f). Impact: no state is written, nothing is emitted and firstWrite is false, so no fee can be paid and the stored value cannot change; the defect is a spec deviation and an inconsistency between verify and submit that a relayer or escrow might misread as 'this encoding was accepted as the round signature'. Minimal fix preserving the cheap duplicate path: also require that the resubmitted point is on the curve (e.g. run the pairing only when the hash matches, or check y^2 == x^3 + 4 mod p before hashing), or simply run _verify on duplicates and accept the gas cost. Note for whoever runs the proof: this tree has no forge-std remapping (forge-std is vendored under test/forge-std/ and imported by relative path), so the proof uses relative imports.","line":133,"path":"src/BeaconVerifier.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.30;\n\n// NOTE: this tree has no forge-std remapping (forge-std is vendored under test/forge-std), so the\n// imports below are relative. With a standard `forge-std/` remapping they become\n// \"forge-std/Test.sol\" and \"src/...\".\nimport {Test} from \"../forge-std/src/Test.sol\";\nimport {BeaconVerifier} from \"../../src/BeaconVerifier.sol\";\nimport {IEpochAuthority} from \"../../src/interfaces/IEpochAuthority.sol\";\nimport {BLS12381} from \"../../src/bls/BLS12381.sol\";\n\ncontract AlwaysAuthorized is IEpochAuthority {\n    function isEpochAuthorized(bytes32, uint64) external pure returns (bool) {\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Fails on the current code: submit() on an already-available round accepts an off-curve point whose\n/// x and sign class match the stored signature as a \"matching duplicate\" (returns false, no revert).\n/// SPEC §4.3 requires off-curve / non-subgroup points to be rejected before hashing; IBeacon says a\n/// mismatching submission for an available round reverts. Passes once the duplicate branch rejects it.\ncontract OffCurveDuplicateTest is Test {\n    BeaconVerifier internal verifier;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        string memory json = vm.readFile(\"test/vectors/bls12.json\");\n        bytes32 networkId = vm.parseJsonBytes32(json, \".network.networkId\");\n        uint64 genesisTime = uint64(vm.parseJsonUint(json, \".network.genesisTime\"));\n        bytes32[] memory w = vm.parseJsonBytes32Array(json, \".key.groupKeyWords\");\n        BeaconVerifier.GroupKeyWords memory k =\n            BeaconVerifier.GroupKeyWords(w[0], w[1], w[2], w[3], w[4], w[5], w[6], w[7]);\n        verifier = new BeaconVerifier(networkId, genesisTime, k, address(new AlwaysAuthorized()));\n        vm.warp(uint256(genesisTime) + 1 days);\n    }\n\n    function test_OffCurvePointIsRejectedOnAvailableRound() public {\n        string memory json = vm.readFile(\"test/vectors/bls12.json\");\n        bytes memory sig = vm.parseJsonBytes(json, \".rounds[0].signatureAffine\"); // round 1\n        assertTrue(verifier.submit(1, sig), \"first write\");\n\n        // Same x, lowest bit of y flipped: canonical coordinates, same compressed sign class, off-curve.\n        bytes memory bogus = sig;\n        bogus[95] = bytes1(uint8(bogus[95]) ^ 0x01);\n\n        // The pure check rejects it.\n        vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(BLS12381.PrecompileFailure.selector, address(0x0f)));\n        verifier.verify(1, bogus);\n\n        // The store path must reject it too (any revert). Today it returns false instead.\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        verifier.submit(1, bogus);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: BeaconVerifier deployed with the fixture descriptor (test/vectors/bls12.json .network.networkId, .network.genesisTime, .key.groupKeyWords), block.timestamp >= genesisTime. Step 1: submit(1, rounds[0].signatureAffine) -> returns true (round 1 stored). Step 2: take the same 96 bytes and XOR byte 95 (lowest byte of y) with 0x01; x is unchanged, y stays canonical and in the same sign class, the point is no longer on the curve. verify(1, bogus) -> reverts PrecompileFailure(0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000f) (expected). submit(1, bogus) -> expected: revert (off-curve point / mismatching submission for an available round); actual: returns false with no revert, no write, no event. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/OffCurveDuplicate.t.sol (fails on the current code with 'next call did not revert as expected').","severity":"low","snippet":"            bytes memory sigEip = BLS12381.parseAffineG1(affineG1Signature);\n            bytes32 resubmitted = BLS12381.sha256Strict(BLS12381.compressG1(sigEip));\n            if (resubmitted != _values[round]) revert RoundValueMismatch(round);\n            return false;","title":"submit() duplicate branch accepts an off-curve point as a 'matching duplicate' instead of rejecting it (branch asymmetry with the first-write path)"}],"hash":"8f5eedb7709a6ecad913e45ea11437c155745b985d0b6b68b677323ce1e310e0","nodeId":"abb98e58-fb97-4cca-9934-a71b3f8fc279","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` with one substantiated finding and a 12-row coverage record covering the single state-changing entry point plus the invariants and trust assumptions I checked.\n\n**What I found**\n\n- **Low: `submit()` treats an off-curve point as a matching duplicate.** On a round that is already stored, the duplicate branch at `src/BeaconVerifier.sol:133` only parses the encoding, rebuilds the compressed form and compares its SHA-256 with the stored value. It never runs the pairing. Any point with the stored x and a y in the same sign class hashes identically, so an off-curve point is accepted as a duplicate and the call returns false instead of reverting. The spec requires off-curve points to be rejected before hashing, and the interface says a mismatching submission on an available round reverts. Impact is limited: nothing is written or emitted, and no fee can be paid. The attached proof test fails on the current tree and passes once the duplicate branch rejects the point.\n\n**What holds in my area**\n\n- No owner, admin, initializer, proxy or setter exists. The descriptor and group key are immutables validated at genesis, and the only storage writes are the two lines in the first-write branch.\n- Submission is permissionless, reverts before the round's release time, and a round can return a first write exactly once. Bitmap positions above bit 7 store correctly.\n- The epoch authority is reached through a static call to an immutable address. A re-entering authority cannot write, and an authority with no code fails closed. Whoever controls that Job 3 contract controls publication of epochs after the genesis epoch on that chain, with no fallback. That is the specified design and is recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect.\n- The genesis inputs are deployer-supplied. The contract checks the key mathematically but cannot verify the DKG certificate, so that remains a launch-review responsibility.\n\n**Static-analysis leads dismissed**\n\n- The aderyn reentrancy claim is not reachable because the external call is a static call.\n- The slither divide-before-multiply is the intentional RFC 9380 buffer sizing, and the timestamp comparison is the specified release gate.\n\n**Notes for the author**\n\n- The tree has no `forge-std` remapping, since forge-std is vendored under `test/forge-std`. The proof therefore uses relative imports, and a reviewer with a standard remapping should switch them to `forge-std/Test.sol` and `src/...`.\n- The scratch tests live under `test/scratch/` and are not part of the submission.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1443569,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":28669,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":455028}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"357c46e3781993d4","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seam: boundary x invariant. Once a round is available, submit() takes an early-return path that only runs parseAffineG1 (length, canonical field elements, non-infinity) and then compares SHA256(compressG1(point)) with the stored value. compressG1 depends only on x and on whether y > (p-1)/2, so any 96-byte input whose x equals the stored signature's x and whose y lies in the same half of the field passes the comparison, including y values that put the point off the curve or outside the subgroup. The pairing (and therefore the on-curve / subgroup check) is never run on this path. SPEC 4.3 requires rejecting 'points outside the curve/subgroup ... before hashing', and SPEC 8.2 / IBeacon.submit require that 'a mismatching submission for an available round reverts'. Here a mismatching (non-signature) submission is reported as a matching duplicate (returns false, no revert). No storage is written and no event is emitted, so there is no fund or value impact; the defect is a contract-guarantee violation and an inconsistency with verify(), which rejects the same input with PrecompileFailure(0x0f). Minimal fix: on the duplicate path, either run _verify(round, sig) and compare, or at least check the submitted y against the stored signature (store the 48-byte x||sign is not enough; store the full y or re-run the pairing).","line":133,"path":"src/BeaconVerifier.sol","reproduction":"State: BeaconVerifier deployed with the fixture key; block.timestamp >= T(9). 1) submit(9, rounds[8].signatureAffine) -> true (round 9 stored). 2) Take the same 96 bytes and flip the lowest bit of the last byte (y ^= 1, same half of the field, point now off-curve). verify(9, mutated) reverts with PrecompileFailure(0x0f) as expected. 3) submit(9, mutated) -> returns false, no revert. 4) Replace y entirely by 1 (or by p-1 when the stored y is the larger root): verify reverts with PrecompileFailure(0x0f), submit(9, garbage) again returns false. Expected per SPEC 8.2 / IBeacon: revert (RoundValueMismatch or a verification error). Actual: silent false. Reproduced in test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::test_DuplicatePathAcceptsNonSignature (passes on current code, i.e. demonstrates the behaviour).","severity":"low","snippet":"            bytes memory sigEip = BLS12381.parseAffineG1(affineG1Signature);\n            bytes32 resubmitted = BLS12381.sha256Strict(BLS12381.compressG1(sigEip));\n            if (resubmitted != _values[round]) revert RoundValueMismatch(round);\n            return false;","title":"submit() duplicate fast path hashes an unvalidated point: off-curve / arbitrary-y inputs for an available round return false instead of reverting"}],"hash":"bb87dd2927a093fc295b7029fa112ce906675c90731d48a29b9c2f3089804309","nodeId":"0c9f6bbf-cc51-405b-998f-c1e9fe733222","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, and the tree is otherwise unchanged apart from my scratch probes under test/scratch.\n\n**Outcome:** one low-severity defect in my area, no medium or higher. The math, boundaries and encodings of the verifier hold against the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap checklists.\n\n**Finding (low), `src/BeaconVerifier.sol:133`.** The duplicate fast path in `submit` only parses the 96-byte input and compares the hash of the rebuilt compressed form. The compressed form depends on x and the sign half of y alone, so an off-curve or arbitrary y in the same half is accepted as a \"matching duplicate\" and returns false. The pure verifier rejects the same bytes with a pairing failure. The spec requires a mismatching submission for an available round to revert and off-curve points to be rejected before hashing. No storage write, event or payment results, so impact is a broken guarantee rather than loss.\n\n**What I verified and found sound:**\n- expand_message_xmd, hash_to_field and the MODEXP reduction match RFC 9380 step by step, including non-block-multiple lengths against a Python reference.\n- Field constants, half-p, and the negated G2 generator recompute correctly. Compression sign bit convention matches noble for all 109 signatures.\n- maxRound, roundTime, roundAt and epochOf arithmetic are exact at every uint64 edge. The availability bitmap behaves correctly at bit positions 0, 64, 128 and large words.\n- Gas report numbers re-measured and match. Budgets are met with margin.\n- Static-analysis leads: the divide-before-multiply is the intended block allocation. The reentrancy lead is not exploitable because the authority call is a STATICCALL, which I confirmed by making a re-entering authority revert the transaction.\n\n**Coverage record:** the single listed entry point `BeaconVerifier.submit(uint64,bytes)` is marked `finding`, with ten further rows for the library functions, arithmetic helpers, constructor and gas budgets, all `holds`.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1891617,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":32837,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":557897}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":2106,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 38 files with Solc 0.8.30\nSolc 0.8.30 finished in 2.02s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":960,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 19 tests for test/contracts/BeaconVerifier.t.sol:BeaconVerifierTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_EncodingCannotChangeOutput(uint8,uint8,uint8,uint8,uint8) (runs: 10000, μ: 144145, ~: 169837)\n[PASS] testFuzz_ModifiedSignatureFails(uint8,uint256,bool,uint64,uint8) (runs: 2000, μ: 246146, ~: 308089)\n[PASS] testGas_SubmitFirstWrite() (gas: 331648)\nLogs:\n  case: epoch 0, fresh availability word\n  calldata bytes: 196\n  calldata gas: 2008\n  execution gas (incl. CALL overhead): 207393\n  receipt gas (21000 + calldata + execution): 230401\n\n[PASS] testGas_SubmitFirstWriteWarmWord() (gas: 544531)\nLogs:\n  case: epoch 0, availability word already non-zero\n  calldata bytes: 196\n  calldata gas: 2008\n  execution gas (incl. CALL overhead): 190294\n  receipt gas (21000 + calldata + execution): 213302\n\n[PASS] testGas_SubmitFirstWriteWithEpochGate() (gas: 549796)\nLogs:\n  case: epoch 1, authority consulted\n  calldata bytes: 196\n  calldata gas: 2020\n  execution gas (incl. CALL overhead): 212926\n  receipt gas (21000 + calldata + execution): 235946\n\n[PASS] testGas_VerifySingleRound() (gas: 206613)\nLogs:\n  verify execution gas (incl. CALL overhead): 135374\n\n[PASS] test_CanonicalCompressionHash() (gas: 3784259)\n[PASS] test_DescriptorGetters() (gas: 158852)\n[PASS] test_IndependentBlsVectors() (gas: 102896083)\n[PASS] test_NoDuplicateFee() (gas: 7928780)\n[PASS] test_OutOfOrderRound() (gas: 737254)\n[PASS] test_RejectInfinity() (gas: 13979278)\n[PASS] test_RejectMalformedLength() (gas: 464738)\n[PASS] test_RejectMissingPrecompile() (gas: 3213358)\n[PASS] test_RejectNonCanonicalField() (gas: 20714974)\n[PASS] test_RejectNonSubgroup() (gas: 22268711)\n[PASS] test_RejectWrongNetworkEpochRound() (gas: 25364931)\n[PASS] test_Rfc9380Vectors() (gas: 179313821)\n[PASS] test_ZeroRandomnessAvailability() (gas: 350859)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 848.44ms (995.31ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 849.51ms (848.44ms CPU time): 19 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (19 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":59,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"BeaconVerifier.submit(uint64,bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"ADAPTATION.md\":87,\"LICENSE\":21,\"Makefile\":29,\"README.md\":53,\"docs/PLAN.md\":81,\"docs/SPEC.md\":466,\"docs/chain-probes.json\":176,\"docs/reviews/spec-v1-review.md\":61,\"docs/verification-gas.md\":68,\"foundry.toml\":20,\"jobs/01-spec.objective.txt\":27,\"jobs/02-verifier.objective.txt\":22,\"scripts/committee_risk.py\":45,\"scripts/gen_bls12_vectors.mjs\":288,\"scripts/probe_precompiles.py\":67,\"src/BeaconVerifier.sol\":245,\"src/bls/BLS12381.sol\":297,\"src/bls/HashToCurveG1.sol\":70,\"src/interfaces/IBeacon.sol\":85,\"src/interfaces/IEpochAuthority.sol\":13,\"test/.gitkeep\":0,\"test/contracts/BeaconVerifier.t.sol\":614,\"test/forge-std/LICENSE-APACHE\":203,\"test/forge-std/LICENSE-MIT\":25,\"test/forge-std/src/Base.sol\":48,\"test/forge-std/src/Config.sol\":60,\"test/forge-std/src/LibVariable.sol\":477,\"test/forge-std/src/Script.sol\":30,\"test/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol\":1300,\"test/forge-std/src/StdChains.sol\":316,\"test/forge-std/src/StdCheats.sol\":923,\"test/forge-std/src/StdConfig.sol\":672,\"test/forge-std/src/StdConstants.sol\":30,\"test/forge-std/src/StdError.sol\":33,\"test/forge-std/src/StdInvariant.sol\":161,\"test/forge-std/src/StdJson.sol\":331,\"test/forge-std/src/StdMath.sol\":68,\"test/forge-std/src/StdSecp256k1.sol\":119,\"test/forge-std/src/StdStorage.sol\":612,\"test/forge-std/src/StdStyle.sol\":410,\"test/forge-std/src/StdToml.sol\":323,\"test/forge-std/src/StdUtils.sol\":247,\"test/forge-std/src/Test.sol\":34,\"test/forge-std/src/Vm.sol\":3000,\"test/forge-std/src/console.sol\":1599,\"test/forge-std/src/console2.sol\":4,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC1155.sol\":105,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC165.sol\":12,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC20.sol\":43,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC4626.sol\":190,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC6909.sol\":72,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC721.sol\":164,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC7540.sol\":145,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IERC7575.sol\":241,\"test/forge-std/src/interfaces/IMulticall3.sol\":68,\"test/forge-std/src/safeconsole.sol\":13248,\"test/vectors/.gitkeep\":0,\"test/vectors/README.md\":29,\"test/vectors/bls12.json\":1334},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":901,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/bls/HashToCurveG1.sol:23: HashToCurveG1.expandMessageXmd(bytes,bytes,uint256) (src/bls/HashToCurveG1.sol#23-50) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/BeaconVerifier.sol:124: BeaconVerifier.submit(uint64,bytes) (src/BeaconVerifier.sol#124-148) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":314,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/BeaconVerifier.sol:139: Reentrancy: State change after external call\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/bls/BLS12381.sol:81: Internal Function Used Only Once (3 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/bls/BLS12381.sol:35: Large Numeric Literal (4 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/bls/BLS12381.sol:76: Literal Instead of Constant (26 places)\n[low] push-zero-opcode at src/BeaconVerifier.sol:2: PUSH0 Opcode (5 places)\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/bls/HashToCurveG1.sol:41: Loop Contains `require`/`revert`\n[low] unspecific-solidity-pragma at src/BeaconVerifier.sol:2: Unspecific Solidity Pragma (3 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"473bfe01e89bcc1f5f991fba1a8bef1e4561f3c417d96dffb92b54672b444f0a","verifiedTreeHash":"76d4261d9750a77b78a17000c50be758a8cd83e6","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f3653923"}]}