{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"5e569a31-ee5f-44e6-ab31-eff054268003","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"441e03fa6563034a8a750dccb10327eb0eaa9a7fdb63c29285fc06581570461e","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"bcd6d509820fa3d9f993737c133fe45a0687577269d5088227b7eb3b9604f5ee","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0069c4ddbf4a9b3a1ab0f5b5f31c6f4d3d2c5a3bdb8f169c48b897125347e273","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b35827d98bda7f81ac0dd803825b7e29e31884ef29513e060d7936ca1bbf638e","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f68ed431914b8775f00d511d05e74c4dbb994a099f3754234c4259667700b35f","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4873f0dae14e2a0477c751b089e080e7878f07734ebc15dcb6b18512381a962b","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"failed"}],"objective":"Launch Panic Monkeys ($PANIC, ERC-20 name \"Panic Monkeys\", symbol \"PANIC\") with a Uniswap v4 hook. The hook punishes selling while the price is down and makes dip buying cheap.\n\nREFERENCE PRICE: the hook keeps its own 1-hour time-weighted average price (TWAP) of this pool. It records at most one observation per block, using the pool price before the first swap of that block, so trades in the current block can never move the reference. Drawdown = how far the price is below the reference, in percent. \"Down\" means drawdown of 5% or more.\n\nHOOK FEE (on top of the pool's base fee), taken in the paired currency (the non-PANIC side): from the input on buys (beforeSwap return delta), from the output on sells (afterSwap return delta).\n- Buys, judged on the price before the buy: 0% when drawdown < 5%; 1% when drawdown >= 5%.\n- Sells, judged on the price AFTER the sell: 2% when drawdown < 5%; 10% when 5% <= drawdown < 15%; 20% when 15% <= drawdown < 30%; 30% when drawdown >= 30%.\n- No exemptions for any address. Hook fee never exceeds 30%.\n\nFEE SPLIT of every hook fee: 60% accrues to a Panic Oracle Fund claimable only to a fixed oracle budget address (the paying wallet); 30% is donated to in-range liquidity providers with PoolManager.donate; 10% accrues to a burn bucket: a permissionless buybackAndBurn() swaps it for PANIC in this pool and sends the PANIC to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD; it reverts if it would receive less than 98% of the PANIC implied by the 1-hour reference price, and spends at most a capped amount per call. Claim, donate and buybackAndBurn are permissionless functions anyone can call. No dust may stay stuck.\n\nADMIN: nobody can change fees, thresholds, splits or the reference window after deployment. No owner, no pause, no upgrade.\n\nREQUIRED TESTS: tiers switch exactly at 5%, 15%, 30% drawdown; a sell moving price from not-down to 20% down pays 20%; splitting one large sell into 10 small sells pays at least as much total tax; a buy and a sell in the same block cannot move the reference; after the price sits down but flat for 1 hour the panic tier no longer applies; the fee split sums to exactly 100%; hook fee capped at 30%; buybackAndBurn reverts when the price is more than 2% above the reference and all PANIC it buys ends at 0x...dEaD.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"0b24892e9f33213c2fad25162dade4c32219cff800d62774fafd1c90b9a2c5dd","previousHash":"7822fdacd4fbefc3b12153c1c993108850250fc0f714c2f72b777d6af6a1237b","projectId":"5e569a31-ee5f-44e6-ab31-eff054268003","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-898-launch-panic-monkeys-panic"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51154","feedbackHash":"57f22cf858b66d603dd53cbe3ba1e51009b57e23bed919e325afd0ce2b7c4d95","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"441e03fa6563034a8a750dccb10327eb0eaa9a7fdb63c29285fc06581570461e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52251","feedbackHash":"111e6a8a6cb5d2d37165143dc946ae707e04a5873a44d820f1b6f368434f5e46","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"bcd6d509820fa3d9f993737c133fe45a0687577269d5088227b7eb3b9604f5ee","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51027","feedbackHash":"81a1900360dd2b765a0a82f6eaa9357049ca2b06ef8c07c39179936a01a365bd","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"0069c4ddbf4a9b3a1ab0f5b5f31c6f4d3d2c5a3bdb8f169c48b897125347e273","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52100","feedbackHash":"eede5ebc20c5536619ae92313c15a4593bedc415093d723039ef6eb02aab737c","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"b35827d98bda7f81ac0dd803825b7e29e31884ef29513e060d7936ca1bbf638e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51194","feedbackHash":"c87658ce1017ab3e8a61738313b255a594ec80f855c35be0946f478e78b9ec5e","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"4873f0dae14e2a0477c751b089e080e7878f07734ebc15dcb6b18512381a962b","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"f70a2ad72082bb1ced825bb2144bb0425e94c163c1ab966542934f9ef2ad9f32","state":"blocked","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"61b4050710026370","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief requires that 'splitting one large sell into 10 small sells pays at least as much total tax'. The sell fee is a flat tier rate chosen from the post-sell price and applied only to that sell's own output. Because the tier is non-decreasing along the price path, every early piece of a split sell ends in a lower tier than the final piece, so the sum of the per-piece fees is strictly less than the single-sell fee whenever the whole sell crosses a tier boundary. The repository documents this as an unresolved specification conflict (docs/SPECIFICATION-CONFLICT.md) and ships a test that asserts the OPPOSITE of the requirement (test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell asserts splitTax < largeTax). The author's analysis is correct: with (a) a flat tier on each sell's whole output judged on its post price, (b) a sell from not-down to 20% down paying exactly 20%, and (c) a per-sell cap of 30%, split-neutrality is not achievable in general, because any catch-up charge on earlier output would have to exceed the cap on a sufficiently small final piece, and a marginal/integrated schedule would violate (b). This is therefore a defect against the acceptance criteria rather than an arithmetic bug, and it needs an economic decision before the immutable contract ships. Seam: boundary x invariant (tier boundary crossing x 'splitting pays at least as much'). Options, each a documented trade-off: (1) per-block cumulative catch-up: fee_i = tier(post_i) * cumulativeBlockSellOutput - feesAlreadyChargedThisBlock, which makes a same-block split pay exactly the single-sell amount but can exceed 30% of the final small piece unless the cap is restated as a cap on cumulative block output; (2) an integrated marginal schedule, which is split-neutral by construction but charges a crossing sell the path-weighted rate rather than a flat 20%; (3) keep the current schedule and drop the split-resistance requirement explicitly. Whichever is chosen, the required test must pass rather than assert its negation.","line":185,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, PANIC/paired pool at 1:1 (sqrtPriceX96 = 2^96), LP fee 12500, 1,000,000e18 liquidity in [-60000, 60000], reference frozen at 2^96. Case A: one sell of 120,000e18 PANIC in one block. Post price ~0.80 of reference -> 20% tier on the whole output; hook tax = 21,189,092,534,644,613,321,412 paired wei. Case B: from the same snapshot, ten sells of 12,000e18 PANIC in the same block (same final price within 1e9). Hook tax = 11,677,354,016,981,352,100,772 paired wei. Expected per the brief: tax(B) >= tax(A). Actual: tax(B) is 55% of tax(A). Run: forge test --match-test test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell -vv (prints both numbers).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 bps = PanicMath.sellBps(postPrice, blockReference);\n        uint256 fee = uint256(uint128(pairDelta)) * bps / 10_000;","title":"Required split-resistance guarantee is not met: ten small sells pay ~55% of the tax of one equivalent sell"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The 'one observation per block' rule and the reference freeze key on block.number. The TWAP integrates the interval between two observations at the pre-swap price of the later observation, which is correct only if no trade happened inside the interval, i.e. if every block with a swap writes an observation. On Arbitrum (and Arbitrum-stack chains) block.number returns the L1 block number, which stays constant across many L2 blocks with increasing timestamps. Swaps in those later L2 blocks hit this early return: no observation is written and no time is integrated, so the price a legitimate trader left for most of the window is discarded and the price left by whoever trades LAST before block.number changes is charged for the entire ~12 second window. The reference also stays frozen across those timestamps although trades have happened in earlier blocks. Boundary: the chain's block.number semantics; assumption: block.number increments every block; actual: on Arbitrum it increments roughly every 12 seconds. Impact is a weaker-than-intended manipulation resistance of the reference on such chains (the attacker only has to be last in each window instead of holding the price), and a divergence from the brief's 'one observation per block' semantics; no funds are at risk on chains where block.number advances per block. Minimal fix that preserves behaviour on normal chains: freeze and record per block.timestamp instead of block.number (store referenceTimestamp; `if (block.timestamp == referenceTimestamp) return blockReference;`). Two blocks sharing a timestamp already produce an identical reference today because zero seconds are integrated between them, so the result on per-block chains is unchanged, while on Arbitrum every distinct timestamp records its own observation. If the launch chain is not an Arbitrum-stack chain this is informational.","line":38,"path":"src/HourOracle.sol","reproduction":"Harness exposing _observe. Init at price 100e18 at t=10_000, block 10. Warp to 13_600, roll 11, observe(100e18) -> 100e18 (bootstrap hour done, flat). Warp 13_601, roll 12, observe(100e18) -> observation written. Keep block.number = 12 (as Arbitrum does across L2 blocks), warp 13_612, observe(100e18): early return, observationCount stays 3, reference frozen. Suppose the trade at 13_612 is the last in the window and leaves price 50e18. Warp 13_613, roll 13, observe(50e18). Expected (price weighted by the time it held, 100 for 3599 s and 50 for 1 s): 99.986111e18. Actual: 99.833333e18, which equals (100*3588 + 50*12)/3600, i.e. the whole 12-second window charged at the last trade's price. Scratch test: test/scratch/BlockNumber.t.sol.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.number == referenceBlock) return blockReference;","title":"Oracle freezes on block.number; on chains where block.number is the L1 block (Arbitrum) prices set in intermediate blocks get zero weight and the last trade before the number changes is weighted for t"}],"hash":"0069c4ddbf4a9b3a1ab0f5b5f31c6f4d3d2c5a3bdb8f169c48b897125347e273","nodeId":"1f8e5729-410d-444f-9183-a94dbab94395","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. No source files were changed; the findings file and coverage record are written to `.imd-findings.json`, and my probes live only under `test/scratch/`.\n\n**Outcome.** The arithmetic in my area holds up. I found no rounding, overflow, cast, threshold or accounting defect in the hook, oracle or math library. Two findings are recorded, neither of them an arithmetic error.\n\n**Findings**\n- **Medium, split resistance.** The brief requires ten small sells to pay at least as much tax as one large sell. The implementation charges a flat tier on each sell's own output, judged on its post price, so a split pays less. The repo's own test shows ten sells of 12,000e18 PANIC paying about 55% of what one sell of 120,000e18 pays, and that test asserts the opposite of the requirement. The author documents this as a specification conflict, and the analysis is correct: a flat post-price tier, an exact 20% on a crossing sell, and a 30% per-sell cap cannot all coexist with split neutrality. The finding lists the three resolutions and their trade-offs. It needs an economic decision before the immutable contract ships.\n- **Low, chain-conditional.** The oracle freezes and records once per `block.number`. On Arbitrum-stack chains that value is the L1 block number, so prices set in intermediate L2 blocks get zero weight and the last trade before the number changes is charged for the whole window. My scratch test shows the reference landing at 99.833 instead of the time-weighted 99.986. Keying the freeze on `block.timestamp` is behaviour-preserving on per-block chains and fixes it. Informational if the launch chain is not Arbitrum-based.\n\n**What I verified in depth**\n- A differential fuzz of the ring-buffer TWAP against a naive integral matched exactly across irregular gaps, same-timestamp blocks and ring wrap past 3,602 entries.\n- Tier switches through the real pool at the largest representable price at or below 95% of the reference, and the buyback's 102% guard trips within 1 ppm above the line.\n- The fee split sums exactly, the sell fee never exceeds 30% of gross output, claim minting nets every hook delta to zero on all four unlock paths, and `PanicMath.price` cannot overflow for any valid sqrt price.\n\n**Coverage.** All 13 listed entry points have a row, plus six invariant rows. Two entry points carry findings, the rest hold. Nothing was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1979323,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":72707,"runtime":"claude","turns":52,"wallClockMs":1025231}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"27168b1ff68f84d2","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The LP share of every hook fee is held in lpAccrued and paid out only when someone calls donate(), which hands it to PoolManager.donate for the liquidity in range at that moment (src/PanicHook.sol:263). Nothing ties the payout to the liquidity that carried the taxed trades. Anyone can therefore, in one transaction, add a narrow position straddling the current tick, call donate(), and remove the position. v4 credits the donation pro rata to in-range liquidity, and a +-60-tick position has roughly 300x the liquidity per unit of capital of the honest wide range, so the attacker's share approaches 100% while they give up nothing but gas (1 wei of PANIC rounding in the reproduction). The economic intent of the brief, 30% of fees to the liquidity providers of this pool, is defeated: every donation becomes an MEV auction won by a bot, and the LPs who actually absorbed the panic selling receive the remainder only. The README records this as a known limitation; the exposure is the whole LP bucket, continuously, with no cost or risk to the taker. A spec-preserving fix is to donate the LP share at fee time inside afterSwap (the hook already holds claims and the manager is unlocked; mint only the non-LP part and call poolManager.donate for the LP part so the hook delta still nets to zero), which pays the liquidity that was actually in range for the taxed trade and leaves donate() as a no-op or remainder sweep. If a separate permissionless donate() must stay, it should at least be callable only when no liquidity change happened in the same block, which v4 cannot observe without liquidity callbacks, so the in-swap donation is the practical route.","line":218,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {PoolSwapTest} from \"v4-core/src/test/PoolSwapTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolModifyLiquidityTest} from \"v4-core/src/test/PoolModifyLiquidityTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PanicMonkeys} from \"src/PanicMonkeys.sol\";\nimport {PanicHook} from \"src/PanicHook.sol\";\n\ncontract PairToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Paired\", \"PAIR\") {\n        _mint(msg.sender, 1e30);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice The 30% LP bucket is paid to whoever is in range when the permissionless donate() runs,\n/// so a just-in-time position added and removed around the call, with no trade in between,\n/// takes almost all of it from the LPs who actually served the taxed trades.\ncontract JitDonateProof is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    PanicMonkeys token;\n    PairToken pair;\n    PanicHook hook;\n    PoolKey key;\n    PoolSwapTest router;\n    PoolModifyLiquidityTest lp;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 1 << 96;\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = (1 << 13) | (1 << 7) | (1 << 6) | (1 << 3) | (1 << 2);\n    address constant ATTACKER = address(0xA77);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(10_000);\n        vm.roll(100);\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new PanicMonkeys();\n        pair = new PairToken();\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(\n            type(PanicHook).creationCode,\n            abi.encode(\n                manager, address(token), Currency.wrap(address(pair)), address(0xB0D6E7), uint128(1 ether), int24(60)\n            )\n        );\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(creation);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 500_000; ++i) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address p = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, h)))));\n            if (uint160(p) & ((1 << 14) - 1) != FLAGS) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 32), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"create2 failed\");\n            hook = PanicHook(at);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt\");\n        bool p0 = address(token) < address(pair);\n        key = PoolKey(\n            p0 ? Currency.wrap(address(token)) : Currency.wrap(address(pair)),\n            p0 ? Currency.wrap(address(pair)) : Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            12500,\n            60,\n            IHooks(address(hook))\n        );\n        router = new PoolSwapTest(manager);\n        lp = new PoolModifyLiquidityTest(manager);\n        token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        token.approve(address(lp), type(uint256).max);\n        pair.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        pair.approve(address(lp), type(uint256).max);\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        // The honest LP: wide range, serves every trade below.\n        lp.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60000, 60000, 1_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        token.transfer(ATTACKER, 10_000_000 ether);\n        pair.transfer(ATTACKER, 10_000_000 ether);\n    }\n\n    function test_jitPositionCapturesLpDonation() public {\n        // A taxed sell against the honest LP's liquidity accrues the LP bucket.\n        bool zfo = hook.panicIs0(); // sell: PANIC in\n        router.swap(\n            key,\n            SwapParams(zfo, -int256(120_000 ether), zfo ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1),\n            PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false),\n            \"\"\n        );\n        uint256 bucket = hook.lpAccrued();\n        assertGt(bucket, 0, \"no LP bucket accrued\");\n\n        // Attacker: add a narrow position at the current tick, call donate(), remove. No trade happens.\n        (, int24 tick,,) = manager.getSlot0(key.toId());\n        int24 lo = (tick / 60) * 60 - 60;\n        int24 hi = lo + 120;\n        vm.startPrank(ATTACKER);\n        token.approve(address(lp), type(uint256).max);\n        pair.approve(address(lp), type(uint256).max);\n        uint256 pairBefore = pair.balanceOf(ATTACKER);\n        uint256 panicBefore = token.balanceOf(ATTACKER);\n        lp.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lo, hi, 10_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        hook.donate();\n        lp.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lo, hi, -10_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        uint256 captured = pair.balanceOf(ATTACKER) - pairBefore;\n        emit log_named_uint(\"LP bucket donated\", bucket);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"captured by JIT position\", captured);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"captured bps\", captured * 10_000 / bucket);\n        // The attacker gave up nothing but gas (at most a few wei of rounding).\n        assertLe(panicBefore - token.balanceOf(ATTACKER), 10);\n        // The bucket exists to pay the LPs that carried the taxed trading; a position that served\n        // no trade must not take the majority of it.\n        assertLt(captured * 2, bucket, \"JIT position captured the majority of the LP donation\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: pool at 1:1, honest LP holds 1e24 liquidity over ticks [-60000,60000]. (1) Sell 120,000 PANIC (price ends ~20% down); lpAccrued = 6,356,727,760,393,383,996,423 paired wei. (2) Attacker (any EOA, 17,915 paired + 44,583 PANIC, flash-loanable) in one transaction: modifyLiquidity(+1e25) over [tick-60, tick+120] around the current tick, hook.donate(), modifyLiquidity(-1e25). Expected: the bucket goes to the LP that served the sell. Actual: attacker's paired balance rises by 5,778,843,418,539,439,996,747 (90.90% of the bucket) and their PANIC falls by 1 wei; the honest LP collects 577,884,341,853,943,999,674 (9.1%). With 1e27 attacker liquidity the share is 99.90%. forge test --match-path test/scratch/JitDonate.t.sol fails with 'JIT position captured the majority of the LP donation'.","severity":"high","snippet":"    function donate() external maintenance returns (uint256 amount) {\n        amount = lpAccrued;\n        if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n        if (amount == 0) return 0;\n        if (poolManager.getLiquidity(poolId) == 0) revert NoLiquidity();\n        lpAccrued -= amount;\n        poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), amount));\n        emit LiquidityDonated(amount);","title":"Permissionless donate() pays the 30% LP bucket to whoever is in range at call time, so a just-in-time position with no trade in between takes almost all of it"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The sell tier is a flat rate chosen from the post-sell price and applied to the sell's entire paired output. A seller who splits an order so that the early tranches end above the 5%/15%/30% lines pays 2% and 10% on those tranches, and only the last tranches pay the crossing tier. Because the reference is frozen for the block and the pool curve is path-independent, the split route reaches the same end price with the same PANIC sold and strictly less tax whenever any tier line is crossed. The brief lists 'splitting one large sell into 10 small sells pays at least as much total tax' as a required test; the delivered suite instead contains test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell asserting the opposite and docs/SPECIFICATION-CONFLICT.md explains that the flat post-price schedule cannot satisfy it. The analysis there is correct: under rules 'post-price tier on the whole output' and 'a crossing sell pays 20%', the split total is always <= the single-sell total. This is reported so the judge and author resolve it explicitly rather than ship an immutable hook whose headline anti-dump property is defeated by any router that chunks orders (most aggregators do). Candidate resolutions, each changing one of the three rules: an integrated marginal schedule (tax = integral of the tier over the price path of this sell, path-independent, so splits pay exactly the same; a 0%->20% crossing sell then pays a blend rather than a flat 20%), or a per-block cumulative catch-up (later sells in the same block pay tier(post) * cumulative block output minus tax already paid, capped at 30% of own output so the per-swap ceiling survives). The oracle fund, LPs and burn bucket lose the difference under the current rule.","line":185,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {PoolSwapTest} from \"v4-core/src/test/PoolSwapTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolModifyLiquidityTest} from \"v4-core/src/test/PoolModifyLiquidityTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PanicMonkeys} from \"src/PanicMonkeys.sol\";\nimport {PanicHook} from \"src/PanicHook.sol\";\n\ncontract PairToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Paired\", \"PAIR\") {\n        _mint(msg.sender, 1e30);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice Required test from the brief: splitting one large sell into 10 small sells pays at\n/// least as much total hook tax. Same block, same reference, same start and end price.\ncontract SplitSellProof is Test {\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    PanicMonkeys token;\n    PairToken pair;\n    PanicHook hook;\n    PoolKey key;\n    PoolSwapTest router;\n    PoolModifyLiquidityTest lp;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 1 << 96;\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = (1 << 13) | (1 << 7) | (1 << 6) | (1 << 3) | (1 << 2);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(10_000);\n        vm.roll(100);\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new PanicMonkeys();\n        pair = new PairToken();\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(\n            type(PanicHook).creationCode,\n            abi.encode(\n                manager, address(token), Currency.wrap(address(pair)), address(0xB0D6E7), uint128(1 ether), int24(60)\n            )\n        );\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(creation);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 500_000; ++i) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address p = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, h)))));\n            if (uint160(p) & ((1 << 14) - 1) != FLAGS) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 32), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"create2 failed\");\n            hook = PanicHook(at);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt\");\n        bool p0 = address(token) < address(pair);\n        key = PoolKey(\n            p0 ? Currency.wrap(address(token)) : Currency.wrap(address(pair)),\n            p0 ? Currency.wrap(address(pair)) : Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            12500,\n            60,\n            IHooks(address(hook))\n        );\n        router = new PoolSwapTest(manager);\n        lp = new PoolModifyLiquidityTest(manager);\n        token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        token.approve(address(lp), type(uint256).max);\n        pair.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        pair.approve(address(lp), type(uint256).max);\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        lp.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60000, 60000, 1_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n    }\n\n    function _sell(uint256 amount) internal {\n        bool zfo = hook.panicIs0();\n        router.swap(\n            key,\n            SwapParams(zfo, -int256(amount), zfo ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1),\n            PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false),\n            \"\"\n        );\n    }\n\n    function test_tenSmallSellsPayAtLeastAsMuchAsOneLargeSell() public {\n        uint256 snap = vm.snapshotState();\n        _sell(120_000 ether);\n        uint256 oneSellTax = hook.totalFees();\n        uint256 endPrice = hook.spotPrice();\n        vm.revertToState(snap);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {\n            _sell(12_000 ether);\n        }\n        uint256 splitTax = hook.totalFees();\n        emit log_named_uint(\"one sell hook tax\", oneSellTax);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"ten sells hook tax\", splitTax);\n        // Same reference (same block), same end price, same PANIC sold.\n        assertApproxEqAbs(hook.spotPrice(), endPrice, 1e9);\n        // Allow one basis point of integer rounding across ten fee computations.\n        assertGe(splitTax, oneSellTax - oneSellTax / 10_000, \"ten small sells pay less total hook tax than one large sell\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: pool at 1:1 with 1e24 liquidity over [-60000,60000], reference = 1.0, all swaps in block 100. Route A: one sell of 120,000 PANIC. Price ends ~0.80 (20% down), hook tax = 21,189,092,534,644,613,321,412 paired wei (20% of output). Route B (snapshot restored): ten sells of 12,000 PANIC each, same block. Sells 1-2 end above 0.95 (2%), sells 3-6 end between 0.85 and 0.95 (10%), sells 7-10 end below 0.85 (20%). Total hook tax = 11,677,354,016,981,352,100,772, end price equal to route A within 1e9. Expected (brief): B >= A. Actual: B is 55.1% of A; the seller keeps 9,511,738,517,663,261,220,640 paired wei. forge test --match-path test/scratch/SplitSell.t.sol fails.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 bps = PanicMath.sellBps(postPrice, blockReference);\n        uint256 fee = uint256(uint128(pairDelta)) * bps / 10_000;","title":"Required split-resistance test fails: ten sells pay 44.9% less hook tax than one sell of the same size in the same block"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeSwap charges 1% on the whole gross input when the pre-swap price is 5% or more below the reference, and 0% otherwise. A buy that lifts the price back above 95% of reference pays 1% on all of it, but the same total split into a first chunk that just crosses the 95% line and a second chunk at 0% pays 1% only on the first chunk. The same step-function-on-whole-amount structure as the sell split, with a much smaller rate, so the loss is bounded by 1% of the portion above the line. It is a fee-avoidance path, not a fund loss, and follows the brief's 'judged on the price before the buy' literally; reported so the author decides whether buys should also integrate over the price path if the sell rule is changed.","line":160,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","reproduction":"State: after a 120,000 PANIC sell in block 100 the price is ~0.80 of reference; move to block 101 (reference ~0.9993). Route A: one buy of 115,000 paired: hook fee 1,150 ether (1%). Route B (snapshot restored): buy 100,000 paired (fee 1,000 ether, price ends at 98% of reference), then buy 15,000 paired (pre-price 98%, fee 0). Total fee 1,000 ether vs 1,150 ether, 13% less for the same spend. Reproduced in test/scratch/Econ.t.sol::test_dipBuySplit (logged amounts; no assertion).","severity":"low","snippet":"            uint256 bps = PanicMath.buyBps(prePrice, ref);\n            fee = gross * bps / 10_000;","title":"Dip-buy fee is judged only on the pre-buy price, so a buyer avoids most of the 1% by splitting one buy into a lifting buy and a 0% buy"}],"hash":"441e03fa6563034a8a750dccb10327eb0eaa9a7fdb63c29285fc06581570461e","nodeId":"2b3ed8ce-f764-4d11-bbdd-a0c6eba17845","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Findings are in `.imd-findings.json` with coverage rows for all 13 verifier-listed entry points plus four economic invariants. The working tree is otherwise untouched apart from the scratch proofs, which are not kept.\n\n**What I found**\n\n- **High: just-in-time capture of the LP donation.** The 30% LP bucket is paid out only by the permissionless `donate()`, to whoever is in range at that moment. An attacker adds a narrow position at the current tick, calls donate, and removes it in one transaction with no trade in between. In the reproduction a position worth about 2% of the honest LP's capital captures 90.9% of the bucket, and a larger one captures 99.9%, at a cost of 1 wei of PANIC. The README calls this a known limitation, but it means the LP share is a continuous MEV auction rather than a payment to the liquidity that served the taxed trades. Proof test attached; a spec-preserving fix is to donate the LP share inside the taxed swap's afterSwap.\n- **Medium: the brief's split-resistance test fails.** Ten 12,000 PANIC sells in one block pay 55.1% of the tax of one 120,000 PANIC sell reaching the same end price. The author documented this as a specification conflict, and that analysis is correct: a flat post-price tier on whole output can never make splits pay at least as much. I reported it so the judge forces an explicit economic decision before an immutable hook ships. Proof test attached.\n- **Low: dip-buy fee avoidance by splitting.** One buy at 1% versus a lifting buy plus a 0% buy pays 13% less in the reproduction. Bounded by 1% of the portion above the 95% line.\n\n**What held**\n\nOracle integration, ring wrap, same-block freeze, tier boundaries, 30% cap, 60/30/10 split, claim accounting in the PoolManager, buyback slippage and the 102% guard, fundBurn settlement checks, and the no-stuck-dust requirement all traced clean against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides. Cross-block closing-price manipulation of the reference was costed and found unprofitable. Static-analysis leads (strict equalities, unused returns, locked ether, packed-hash collision) were checked and are false positives here.\n\n**Not reached**\n\nA fork rehearsal against a live PoolManager and production routers was out of scope; the exact-input-only and no-partial-buy restrictions remain integration caveats rather than defects.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1938495,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":66450,"runtime":"claude","turns":41,"wallClockMs":970936}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"5861ad6ad567d5ef46f00f5e22bccb1af3416822f53a0e6890c2083b5729d827","device":"2f1d693f218c1c18","findings":[],"hash":"4873f0dae14e2a0477c751b089e080e7878f07734ebc15dcb6b18512381a962b","nodeId":"5c70f0c2-abe8-4985-aa2b-c80f6c227916","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/5e569a31-ee5f-44e6-ab31-eff054268003/5c70f0c2-abe8-4985-aa2b-c80f6c227916/launch.json), the only changed file.\n\nSchema checks and `forge build` passed; all 40 tests passed. Permissions match the implementation.\n\nDeployment remains blocked by the missing paying-wallet address, marked with a zero-address sentinel, and the documented split-selling requirement conflict.","treeHash":"aa9fb777e53755d2b168a74f920bb700d55b66a7","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":404224,"inputTokens":53577,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":5540,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":215248}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5095407bdf7ee98a","findings":[],"hash":"69934e340fc8e1fa33153375e95fe78daa1a4337cdad75d77dbad14e5d3d8d0e","nodeId":"35cc8e8b-cba0-44fa-a8e0-ca6c62900a12","outcome":"failed","summary":"the task produced no changes; the agent's last message was: The execution environment still blocks this task:\n\n- Every shell command fails with `bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace`.\n- File-editing attempts also fail.\n- Neither `forge build` nor `forge test` could start.\n\nNo deliverable files were changed. I couldn’t inspect the implementation or establish any contract findings. The sandbox must be repaired before I can implement and verify the tests.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":116480,"inputTokens":17200,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":1028,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":49737}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"14731ddbc51365d9","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust-gap seam (access x economics x asymmetry). The LP bucket (30% of every hook fee) is not distributed to the liquidity that served the taxed trade; it accumulates in lpAccrued and is paid out by donate(), which anyone may call at any moment, to whatever liquidity is active at that instant (PoolManager.donate credits feeGrowthGlobal / currently active liquidity, src/PanicHook.sol:263). The hook enables no liquidity callbacks, so a caller can, inside one transaction, (a) add a very large position in a single tick-spacing around the current tick, (b) call donate(), (c) remove the position. The capital is in and out atomically (flash-loanable) with zero market exposure, and because the position is 1 spacing wide it needs only a small fraction of the honest LPs' capital to hold ~99% of active liquidity. Two consequences: honest in-range LPs, the party the brief names for this 30%, receive effectively nothing from the LP share ever (a bot harvests every accrual); and a seller can run (sell -> JIT add -> donate -> remove) and recover 30% of the tax they just paid, so the effective sell tiers become 1.4% / 7% / 14% / 21% instead of 2% / 10% / 20% / 30%, defeating 'no exemptions for any address' and the required tier schedule in net terms. The README lists JIT exposure as a limitation, but the brief's required tier schedule and LP destination are not met. Minimal fix that preserves the design: perform the 30% donation inside afterSwap (the manager is unlocked and the pool state is committed there; call poolManager.donate for the LP share and net it against the fee claim), so the share goes to the liquidity that was actually in range for the taxed trade and no public timing window exists; keep lpAccrued only for amounts that cannot be donated (e.g. zero active liquidity) and donate those in the next afterSwap.","line":218,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {PoolSwapTest} from \"v4-core/src/test/PoolSwapTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolModifyLiquidityTest} from \"v4-core/src/test/PoolModifyLiquidityTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {PanicMonkeys} from \"../../src/PanicMonkeys.sol\";\nimport {PanicHook} from \"../../src/PanicHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"../../src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract PairToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Paired\", \"PAIR\") {\n        _mint(msg.sender, 1e30);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice A seller recovers the 30% LP share of their own sell tax (and any bot captures every LP bucket)\n/// by adding narrow in-range liquidity, calling the permissionless donate(), and removing it in one transaction.\ncontract JitDonateCaptureTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    PanicMonkeys token;\n    PairToken pair;\n    PanicHook hook;\n    PoolKey key;\n    PoolSwapTest router;\n    PoolModifyLiquidityTest liquidityRouter;\n    address constant BUDGET = address(0xB0D6E7);\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 1 << 96;\n    int256 constant HONEST_LIQUIDITY = 1_000_000 ether;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(10_000);\n        vm.roll(100);\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new PanicMonkeys();\n        pair = new PairToken();\n        Currency currency = Currency.wrap(address(pair));\n        hook = _deployHook(abi.encode(manager, address(token), currency, BUDGET, uint128(1 ether), int24(60)));\n        key = PoolKey(\n            hook.panicIs0() ? Currency.wrap(address(token)) : currency,\n            hook.panicIs0() ? currency : Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            12500,\n            60,\n            IHooks(address(hook))\n        );\n        router = new PoolSwapTest(manager);\n        liquidityRouter = new PoolModifyLiquidityTest(manager);\n        token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        token.approve(address(liquidityRouter), type(uint256).max);\n        pair.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        pair.approve(address(liquidityRouter), type(uint256).max);\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        // Honest LP: wide range.\n        _liquidity(-60000, 60000, HONEST_LIQUIDITY);\n    }\n\n    function test_sellerRecoversLpShareOfOwnTaxViaJitDonate() public {\n        // 1. A sell that moves the price from flat to ~20% down. Pays 20%; 30% of that accrues to lpAccrued.\n        _swap(false, 120_000 ether);\n        uint256 lpBucket = hook.lpAccrued();\n        assertGt(lpBucket, 0);\n\n        // 2. Same transaction: add narrow liquidity around the post-sell tick (100x the honest liquidity,\n        //    which in a one-spacing range costs only a fraction of the honest LP's capital).\n        (, int24 tick,,) = manager.getSlot0(key.toId());\n        int24 lower = (tick / 60) * 60;\n        if (lower > tick) lower -= 60;\n        int24 upper = lower + 60;\n        uint256 pairBefore = pair.balanceOf(address(this));\n        _liquidity(lower, upper, HONEST_LIQUIDITY * 100);\n\n        // 3. Permissionless donate() credits whoever is in range right now.\n        (bool ok,) = address(hook).call(abi.encodeWithSignature(\"donate()\"));\n        ok;\n\n        // 4. Remove the position; principal plus the captured donation comes back.\n        _liquidity(lower, upper, -(HONEST_LIQUIDITY * 100));\n        int256 gain = int256(pair.balanceOf(address(this))) - int256(pairBefore);\n\n        emit log_named_uint(\"lp bucket donated\", lpBucket);\n        emit log_named_int(\"captured by one-tx JIT position\", gain);\n\n        // The in-range LPs who served the sell should receive the LP share; a position that did not exist\n        // during the sell must not capture more than a rounding share of it.\n        assertLt(gain, int256(lpBucket / 100), \"JIT position captured the LP share of the seller's own tax\");\n    }\n\n    function _deployHook(bytes memory args) internal returns (PanicHook deployed) {\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(PanicHook).creationCode, args);\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(creation);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 300_000; ++i) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, hash)))));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.PANIC)) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 32), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"CREATE2 failed\");\n            return PanicHook(at);\n        }\n        revert(\"salt not found\");\n    }\n\n    function _liquidity(int24 lo, int24 hi, int256 amount) internal returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lo, hi, amount, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n    }\n\n    function _swap(bool buy, uint256 amount) internal returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        bool zeroForOne = buy != hook.panicIs0();\n        return router.swap(\n            key,\n            SwapParams(\n                zeroForOne, -int256(amount), zeroForOne ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1\n            ),\n            PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false),\n            \"\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: real PoolManager, PANIC/paired pool at 1:1, 12500 fee, spacing 60, honest LP with 1e24 liquidity in [-60000, 60000]. 1) Seller swaps 120_000e18 PANIC exact-input (price ends ~20% down, tier 20%). lpAccrued becomes 6_356_727_760_393_383_996_423 paired wei. 2) Same tx: seller adds 1e26 liquidity in the one-spacing range containing the post-sell tick. 3) Seller calls hook.donate(). 4) Seller removes the position. Expected per brief: the 30% LP share benefits the LPs who were in range for the sell; the seller's position that did not exist during the sell should receive at most rounding dust. Actual: the seller's paired balance rises by 6_293_789_861_775_627_719_229 wei, i.e. 99.0% of the donated bucket; the honest LP receives ~1%. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/JitDonateCapture.t.sol -vv","severity":"high","snippet":"    function donate() external maintenance returns (uint256 amount) {\n        amount = lpAccrued;\n        if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n        if (amount == 0) return 0;\n        if (poolManager.getLiquidity(poolId) == 0) revert NoLiquidity();\n        lpAccrued -= amount;\n        poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), amount));","title":"Permissionless donate() pays the 30% LP share to whoever is in range at call time; a one-transaction JIT position captures ~99% of it, so a seller refunds 30% of their own tax"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between the two ways a holder converts PANIC into the paired currency. A swap-sell is judged on the post-sell price and taxed 2-30% from its paired output (afterSwap). Converting the same PANIC by depositing it as a one-sided position one tick-spacing above spot and withdrawing the paired currency once the position has been crossed is not a swap, so it passes through no hook callback (getHookPermissions enables no liquidity callbacks, src/PanicHook.sol:105-111) and pays 0% hook fee; the holder additionally earns the 1.25% LP fee on their own exit. On its own this is the generic range-order loophole of swap-fee hooks, but here the hook also supplies the counterparty: buybackAndBurn() is callable by anyone, buys with the burn bucket at an unlimited price limit, and its guards (pre-price <= 102% of reference, output >= 98% of reference-implied, src/PanicHook.sol:286-287) pass precisely when the pool is down, i.e. when the brief says selling must be punished. So while the price is down a holder can park PANIC next to spot, call buybackAndBurn() (repeatedly, up to the cap per call, until the bucket is drained), and withdraw paired currency at ~spot plus LP fee, tax-free, using protocol money as the exit liquidity. The seam needs all three lenses: the access guard on buybackAndBurn is 'anyone', the economics of the swap are correct in isolation, and the LP path is untaxed. Fix options preserve the design but need a decision: (1) do not allow the burn bucket to be spent by arbitrary callers at arbitrary times (e.g. execute the buyback only from afterSwap with a per-block budget, or require the spot to be at or below the price before the last sell), which removes the forced-fill amplifier; (2) enable afterRemoveLiquidity/afterRemoveLiquidityReturnDelta and tax paired currency withdrawn in excess of what the position deposited at the sell tier of the current drawdown, which closes the range-order route itself (changes manifest permissions and the mined address).","line":233,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","reproduction":"State: real PoolManager, PANIC/paired 1:1, 12500 fee, spacing 60, honest LP 1e24 liquidity in [-60000, 60000], hook buybackCap = 2_000e18. A prior 120_000e18 PANIC sell leaves the price ~20% below the frozen reference and burnAccrued > 1_000e18. Holder wants to sell 1_000e18 PANIC. Route A (swap-sell, exact input): receives 630_916_454_617_093_783_879 paired wei net; hook tax 20% of gross. Route B: holder adds one-sided liquidity in the one-spacing range just above spot holding exactly ~1_000e18 PANIC; calls hook.buybackAndBurn(); removes the position. Result: 305_921_249_826_207_126_913 PANIC were taken from the position and the holder received 248_348_837_244_451_585_681 paired wei, i.e. 0.812 paired per PANIC versus 0.631 via route A (29% more); the only hook fee accrued is the buyback's own 1% buy fee (20e18), paid by the burn bucket, not the seller. Expected per brief: 'The hook punishes selling while the price is down' with 'no exemptions for any address'; a sell at 20% drawdown should net at most 80% of output. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/RangeOrderSell.t.sol -vv","severity":"medium","snippet":"    function buybackAndBurn(uint256 maxSpend) public maintenance returns (uint256 burned) {\n        uint256 amount = burnAccrued;\n        if (amount > buybackCap) amount = buybackCap;\n        if (amount > maxSpend) amount = maxSpend;\n        if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();\n        burnAccrued -= amount;\n        burned = abi.decode(poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(2), amount)), (uint256));","title":"Selling while down through a one-sided liquidity position pays no hook fee, and permissionless buybackAndBurn() lets the seller force the burn bucket to fill it"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Outside this reviewer's area (economics) and already disclosed by the author in README.md and docs/SPECIFICATION-CONFLICT.md, recorded here only so the judge has a row for the brief's required test 'splitting one large sell into 10 small sells pays at least as much total tax'. The sell tier is a flat rate chosen by the post-sell price and applied to that sell's whole output, so earlier pieces of a split sell land in lower tiers and the split route pays strictly less. The author argues the brief's three sell requirements cannot all hold with a per-sell 30% cap, and asks the requester for an economic decision; this reviewer agrees the general case is contradictory. A block-scoped catch-up charge (tax each sell so that the block's cumulative tax equals tier(post-price) x cumulative block output, capped at 30% of the current sell's output) would satisfy the same-block reading of the test for all but dust-sized final pieces, but it is a design change the requester must approve.","line":28,"path":"src/PanicMath.sol","reproduction":"State: the project's own fixture (1e24 liquidity, 1:1 price). Route 1: sell 120_000e18 PANIC once -> hook tax 21_189_092_534_644_613_321_412 paired wei. Route 2 (same block, same reference): sell 12_000e18 PANIC ten times -> total hook tax 11_677_354_016_981_352_100_772 paired wei, ending at the same price. Expected per brief: route 2 >= route 1. Actual: route 2 is 55% of route 1. Run: forge test --match-test test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell -vv","severity":"low","snippet":"    function sellBps(uint256 spot, uint256 referencePrice) internal pure returns (uint256) {\n        if (spot * 100 <= referencePrice * 70) return 3000;\n        if (spot * 100 <= referencePrice * 85) return 2000;\n        if (spot * 100 <= referencePrice * 95) return 1000;\n        return 200;\n    }","title":"Required split-resistance property is not met: ten small sells pay 55% of the tax of one equivalent sell (author-documented specification conflict)"}],"hash":"b35827d98bda7f81ac0dd803825b7e29e31884ef29513e060d7936ca1bbf638e","nodeId":"70d9ce36-d785-4ef2-bf4e-00455676f707","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and written to `.imd-findings.json`. No repository file was changed. The two scratch proofs under `test/scratch/` are the only other files and are ignored by git.\n\n**Findings (3, ranked):**\n\n1. **High, `donate()` at src/PanicHook.sol:218.** The 30% LP share accrues and is paid out by a permissionless call to whatever liquidity is in range at that instant. In one transaction a caller adds a one-spacing position, calls `donate()`, and removes it. The proof test shows a seller who just paid a 20% tax recovering 99% of the donated bucket, so honest LPs get nothing and effective sell tiers become 1.4/7/14/21% instead of 2/10/20/30%. Proof: `test/scratch/JitDonateCapture.t.sol`, fails now. Suggested fix: donate the LP share inside `afterSwap` so it reaches the liquidity that served the taxed trade.\n\n2. **Medium, `buybackAndBurn(uint256)` at src/PanicHook.sol:233.** Selling PANIC by parking it as a one-sided range order pays no hook fee because no liquidity callbacks are enabled, and the permissionless buyback supplies the counterparty exactly when the pool is down. Proof shows 0.81 paired per PANIC via the range order versus 0.63 via a taxed swap, with the only hook fee being the buyback's own 1%. Proof: `test/scratch/RangeOrderSell.t.sol`, fails now. Fix needs a design decision (restrict buyback timing, or tax paired withdrawals via liquidity callbacks, which changes the manifest permissions).\n\n3. **Low, `sellBps` at src/PanicMath.sol:28.** The required split-resistance test is not met. The author already documents this as a specification conflict with a counterexample. Recorded so the judge has the row.\n\n**Coverage:** all 13 listed entry points have rows plus 4 invariant rows. Every hook callback and `unlockCallback` checks the manager, maintenance functions are reentrancy-guarded with CEI, there is no admin surface, `fundBurn` cannot spend third-party approvals, and the deployer binds salt to caller and config. Nothing in my area was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2807924,"inputTokens":610,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":60755,"runtime":"claude","turns":46,"wallClockMs":960197}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":3,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a7785f55ff5b9988","findings":[],"hash":"b6d7362194f07af42c46f158f5d9cddf892fd43db40987d85e8d969e1dbfa7c9","nodeId":"35cc8e8b-cba0-44fa-a8e0-ca6c62900a12","outcome":"failed","summary":"the task produced no changes; the agent's last message was: Blocked by the execution environment: shell commands fail with `bwrap: setting up uid map: Permission denied`, and file edits also fail.\n\nI couldn’t read the implementation or add tests. Both `forge build` and `forge test` failed before starting. No files changed or contract findings established.\n\nThe sandbox must be repaired before this task can be completed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":88832,"inputTokens":16434,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":1116,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":51606}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"1731fbfe0c4574fb","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The pinned admission floor `.imd/reads/protected/univ4_hook/Hook.protected.t.sol` imports the delivered `../../../src/HookFlags.sol` and, in `test_permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags` (lines 133-136), composes the implemented mask from `HookFlags.BEFORE_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA`, `HookFlags.AFTER_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA`, `HookFlags.AFTER_ADD_LIQUIDITY_RETURN_DELTA` and `HookFlags.AFTER_REMOVE_LIQUIDITY_RETURN_DELTA`. The delivered library spells those four members `*_RETURNS_DELTA` (lines 16-19). Solidity has no aliasing, so the floor file does not compile against this tree, and none of its checks (declared flags vs implementation, no SELFDESTRUCT/DELEGATECALL, callbacks refuse non-manager callers) can run. The hook itself would pass all of those checks; it is the compile unit that is broken. This is in the Periphery area (a 30-line helper the toolchain trusts) and blocks admission rather than funds. Minimal fix: add the four `*_RETURN_DELTA` constants with the same bit values (keep the existing `*_RETURNS_DELTA` names so the repository's own tests and `HookFlags.PANIC` still compile), or rename and update the two local usages.","line":16,"path":"src/HookFlags.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\n/// @notice The admission floor (Hook.protected.t.sol) composes the implemented-flag mask from\n/// `HookFlags.BEFORE_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA`, `AFTER_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA`, `AFTER_ADD_LIQUIDITY_RETURN_DELTA`\n/// and `AFTER_REMOVE_LIQUIDITY_RETURN_DELTA`. On the current tree those members do not exist (the\n/// library spells them `*_RETURNS_DELTA`), so this file, like the floor, fails at compile time.\n/// Once the four names are exported it compiles and the assertions pass.\ncontract HookFlagsNamesTest is Test {\n    function test_floorSuiteFlagNamesExist() public pure {\n        assertEq(HookFlags.BEFORE_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA, uint160(1 << 3));\n        assertEq(HookFlags.AFTER_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA, uint160(1 << 2));\n        assertEq(HookFlags.AFTER_ADD_LIQUIDITY_RETURN_DELTA, uint160(1 << 1));\n        assertEq(HookFlags.AFTER_REMOVE_LIQUIDITY_RETURN_DELTA, uint160(1 << 0));\n        uint160 implemented = HookFlags.BEFORE_INITIALIZE | HookFlags.BEFORE_SWAP | HookFlags.AFTER_SWAP\n            | HookFlags.BEFORE_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA | HookFlags.AFTER_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA;\n        assertEq(implemented, uint160(0x20cc));\n    }\n}","reproduction":"mkdir -p test/x/y && cp .imd/reads/protected/univ4_hook/Hook.protected.t.sol test/x/y/ && forge build  ->  \"Error (9582): Member \\\"BEFORE_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA\\\" not found or not visible after argument-dependent lookup in type(library HookFlags). --> test/x/y/Hook.protected.t.sol:133:53\" (the same error repeats for the other three names). Expected: the floor compiles and its three tests run against the attested creation code. Actual: whole-project compilation fails. The proof file below fails identically at compile time on this tree and compiles and passes once the four members exist with values 1<<3, 1<<2, 1<<1, 1<<0.","severity":"high","snippet":"    uint160 internal constant BEFORE_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA = 1 << 3;\n    uint160 internal constant AFTER_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA = 1 << 2;\n    uint160 internal constant AFTER_ADD_LIQUIDITY_RETURNS_DELTA = 1 << 1;\n    uint160 internal constant AFTER_REMOVE_LIQUIDITY_RETURNS_DELTA = 1 << 0;","title":"Admission floor test cannot compile: HookFlags exports *_RETURNS_DELTA but Hook.protected.t.sol reads *_RETURN_DELTA"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief lists as a required test that \"splitting one large sell into 10 small sells pays at least as much total tax\". The sell fee is a flat tier chosen from the post-sell price and applied to that swap's own output, with no memory of earlier sells in the block. Pieces executed while the price is still above the 5% / 15% thresholds pay 2% or 10%, so the split route always pays strictly less than the single crossing sell. The author documents this in docs/SPECIFICATION-CONFLICT.md and ships `test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell`, which asserts the lower split tax. I checked the argument: with a per-swap rate capped at 30% and tiers fixed by post-price, no per-swap schedule can make the split pay at least 20% of total output while also charging the single crossing sell exactly 20%; a per-block catch-up charge would exceed 30% on the last piece, and an integrated marginal schedule would no longer charge the crossing sell a flat 20%. So the code is consistent with the tier table but does not satisfy the required property, and the contract is immutable. This needs a specification decision before launch (which of the three requirements yields), not a silent code change; reporting it so the judge can settle it rather than let the required test stay red.","line":185,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","reproduction":"forge test --match-test test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell -vv  (test/PanicHook.t.sol:312). Fixture: real PoolManager, 1,000,000e18 liquidity in [-60000,60000], 1:1 price, LP fee 12500. Route A: one sell of 120,000 PANIC -> post price ~80% of reference -> hook tax 21,189,092,534,644,613,321,412 paired wei (20% of gross output). Route B (same snapshot, same block): ten sells of 12,000 PANIC -> same end price within 1e9 -> total hook tax 11,677,354,016,981,352,100,772. Expected per brief: B >= A. Actual: B < A by ~45%.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 bps = PanicMath.sellBps(postPrice, blockReference);\n        uint256 fee = uint256(uint128(pairDelta)) * bps / 10_000;","title":"Required split-resistance property fails: ten same-block sells pay 45% less hook tax than one sell of the same size"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`donate()` pays the whole accumulated 30% bucket to whatever liquidity is active at the moment it is called. Because anyone can call it and the bucket accrues across many swaps, a searcher can add a large narrow position around the current tick, call donate() and remove the position in the same transaction, taking almost the entire bucket while contributing no liquidity to any trade. The passive LPs who absorbed the sells that generated the fee receive almost nothing. The README acknowledges JIT exposure in prose. The brief's intent (\"donated to in-range liquidity providers\") is still met literally, so this is a value-routing weakness rather than a broken invariant. Mitigation that keeps the spec's `PoolManager.donate` requirement: donate the LP share inside `afterSwap` of the swap that produced it (the hook may call `poolManager.donate` while the manager is unlocked; the resulting negative hook delta nets against the fee credit it is already owed), so a JIT LP would have to sandwich each individual swap like any other LP. If a separate permissionless `donate()` must stay, at least cap the amount per call or per block so the bucket cannot be harvested in a single transaction.","line":218,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture test/PanicHook.t.sol HookFixture (_setup(false,true,false)). 1) _swap(false, 120_000 ether) -> hook.lpAccrued() = 6,356,727,760,393,383,996,423 paired wei. 2) As address 0x1337 holding 10M PANIC and 10M PAIR: liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60, 60, 1e26, 0), \"\"); hook.donate(); liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60, 60, -1e26, 0), \"\"). Result: 0x1337's PAIR balance rises by 6,293,789,861,775,627,719,229 (99% of the bucket) and its PANIC balance changes by 1 wei; the 1e24 passive liquidity receives the remaining ~1%. Expected: the bucket rewards the liquidity that absorbed the taxed sells.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function donate() external maintenance returns (uint256 amount) {","title":"Permissionless donate() lets a just-in-time LP capture ~99% of the accumulated LP bucket in one transaction"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Every swap with `amountSpecified > 0` reverts in beforeSwap, for buys and sells alike. The README documents the restriction, but the brief does not ask for it and front ends and aggregators commonly issue exact-output buys (\"buy N PANIC\"). Exact-output buys can be supported within the brief's fee rules: the paired input is then the unspecified currency, so the 0%/1% fee (judged on the pre-swap price saved in beforeSwap) can be taken from the actual paired input through the afterSwap unspecified delta. Exact-output sells are harder (the paired output is the specified side and the post-price tier is unknown before the swap) and rejecting those is defensible. Low severity: no funds at risk, trades simply fail, but it narrows integrations for an immutable launch pool.","line":153,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture test/PanicHook.t.sol HookFixture. router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne = !hook.panicIs0(), amountSpecified = +1e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1 or MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1), TestSettings(false,false), \"\") -> reverts (WrappedError wrapping ExactInputOnly). Expected by integrators: receive 1 PANIC and pay the quoted paired input plus 0%/1% hook fee.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (params.amountSpecified >= 0) revert ExactInputOnly();","title":"Exact-output swaps revert, so routers' exact-out paths cannot trade the pool"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"With the standard MIN/MAX price limit, a sell larger than the paired reserves runs the pool price past the last initialized tick straight to the limit; afterSwap then calls spotPrice(), PanicMath.price returns 0 for that sqrt price and reverts with PriceOutOfRange, so the whole swap fails rather than filling what the pool could pay. Likewise a buy whose net input cannot be fully consumed (price limit reached or PANIC-side liquidity exhausted) reverts with PartialBuy at line 180. The README states \"Partial sells are permitted\", which holds only for a seller-chosen limit, not for liquidity exhaustion. At a one-sided launch (PANIC-only seed) the paired reserve is whatever buyers have paid in, so the first large dump is exactly the case that reverts; the seller must guess a smaller size. No value is lost and the guard does protect the oracle from a zero price, so this is low, but it should be either documented precisely or handled (e.g. clamp the oracle read to the range bounds instead of reverting the trade).","line":178,"path":"src/PanicHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture test/PanicHook.t.sol HookFixture: paired reserve in the manager is 950,205,463,509,656,376,492,403 wei. router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne = hook.panicIs0(), amountSpecified = -500_000_000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1 (PANIC is currency0)), TestSettings(false,false), \"\") -> revert data 0x90bfb865... = WrappedError(hook, afterSwap selector 0xa9e35b2f, PriceOutOfRange 0x37c8a83c). Expected: the seller receives the available paired output (minus the 30% tier) or a clear partial fill; actual: the entire trade reverts. Partial buy: router.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -100e18, getSqrtPriceAtTick(1)), ...) -> reverts PartialBuy.","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 postPrice = spotPrice();","title":"A sell that exhausts paired liquidity (or a buy that cannot fill fully) reverts instead of partially filling"}],"hash":"bcd6d509820fa3d9f993737c133fe45a0687577269d5088227b7eb3b9604f5ee","nodeId":"3d2bbc4e-ec46-4fff-8741-e72bdc028a36","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is at `.imd-findings.json` with five findings and 17 coverage rows, no source files were changed, and the scratch directory is removed.\n\n**What I found**\n\n1. **High. The admission floor cannot compile against this tree.** The pinned `Hook.protected.t.sol` reads `HookFlags.BEFORE_SWAP_RETURN_DELTA` and three sibling names, but `src/HookFlags.sol` spells them `*_RETURNS_DELTA`. Copying the floor into the repo and building fails with solc error 9582. The hook would pass every floor assertion, so this is a one-line naming fix, but as shipped the launch cannot be admitted. A proof test is attached that fails at compile time now and passes once the four names exist.\n\n2. **Medium. The required split-resistance test fails.** Ten same-block sells of 12,000 PANIC pay about 45% less hook tax than one sell of 120,000 PANIC. The author documents this as a specification conflict, and I verified their argument: a per-swap post-price tier capped at 30% cannot satisfy that property together with \"a crossing sell pays a flat 20%\". This needs a specification decision, not a silent code change, so I reported it for the judge.\n\n3. **Low. Just-in-time capture of the LP bucket.** A flash LP that adds a narrow position, calls `donate()`, and removes it in one transaction took 99% of the accumulated bucket in my probe. Donating the LP share inside `afterSwap` would remove the harvestable accumulation.\n\n4. **Low. Exact-output swaps revert.** Exact-output buys could be supported under the brief's fee rules via the afterSwap unspecified delta.\n\n5. **Low. Liquidity-exhausting fills revert.** A sell larger than the paired reserves with the standard price limit reverts with the hook's own `PriceOutOfRange`, and partial buys revert with `PartialBuy`, instead of filling what the pool can pay.\n\n**What held**\n\nThe control flow I traced behaves as specified: callback access, single-pool binding, delta orientation for both currency orders, claim-based fee settlement that nets to zero, the one-observation-per-block oracle including same-timestamp blocks and the flat-hour reset, the buyback guards and dead-address destination, reentrancy guards, and the deployer. I also fetched every vendored library file at its pinned commit. The differences are brace formatting only, and the OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical.\n\n**Not reached**\n\nI did not quantify cross-block TWAP manipulation economics beyond confirming the documented limitation, and I did not review a manifest since none exists yet.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2641892,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":77964,"runtime":"claude","turns":48,"wallClockMs":1046278}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"2122058046fede33","findings":[],"hash":"f68ae2462df64ff14f928b740404efa6920ce4aecbedde43e1b2ec7a73099100","nodeId":"35cc8e8b-cba0-44fa-a8e0-ca6c62900a12","outcome":"failed","summary":"the task produced no changes; the agent's last message was: Blocked by the execution environment: every shell command fails before running with `bwrap: No permissions to create a new namespace`.\n\nNo files were changed. I couldn’t read the supplied files, implement tests, or run `forge build` and `forge test`. The sandbox must be repaired before this assignment can be completed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":58112,"inputTokens":19270,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":513,"runtime":"codex","turns":2,"wallClockMs":38203}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"d193fb2ba6f4af529e09d55aec92cb43967abbdaa2bff299eaedaf73bfb9f2d6","device":"8df16409e9706163","findings":[],"hash":"f68ed431914b8775f00d511d05e74c4dbb994a099f3754234c4259667700b35f","nodeId":"af933276-4e5b-4e1b-bbe8-8622f02959c5","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the token, TWAP hook, fee allocation, buyback, deployment helper, tests, and documentation.\n\nVerified: `forge build`, `forge test` (**40 passed**), and `forge fmt --check`.\n\n**One requirement remains unresolved:** post-sell tier taxation conflicts with split resistance. The implementation follows the explicit tiers and includes a real-pool counterexample. See [README](./README.md) and [conflict analysis](./docs/SPECIFICATION-CONFLICT.md). Full compliance requires resolving that contradiction.","treeHash":"4532a116b9bfa2ef46ee10b4447745d169b820ad","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2070144,"inputTokens":114418,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":35244,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":1262860}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":3620,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 88 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.45s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:26:16\n   │\n26 │           return abi.encodePacked(\n   │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n27 │ ┃             type(PanicHook).creationCode,\n28 │ ┃             abi.encode(\n29 │ ┃                 config.manager,\n   ‡ ┃\n36 │ ┃         );\n   │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit Deployed(address(hook), msg.sender);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         address panicToken,\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:78:38\n   │\n78 │                 || cap == 0 || cap > uint128(type(int128).max) || spacing < TickMath.MIN_TICK_SPACING\n   │                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:28:25\n   │\n28 │         initializedAt = uint64(block.timestamp);\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:30:39\n   │\n30 │         observations[0] = Observation(uint64(block.timestamp), 0);\n   │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:34:48\n   │\n34 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), price);\n   │                                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:41:13\n   │\n41 │         if (block.timestamp > last.timestamp) {\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:49:9\n   │\n49 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), ref);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:43:17\n   │\n43 │                 uint64(block.timestamp), last.cumulative + preSwapPrice * (block.timestamp - last.timestamp)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:49:48\n   │\n49 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), ref);\n   │                                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (age < WINDOW) return (nowCumulative + initialPrice * (WINDOW - age)) / WINDOW;\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:60:13\n   │\n60 │         if (target >= last.timestamp) {\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:68:21\n   │\n68 │                 if (observations[mid % CAPACITY].timestamp <= target) lo = mid;\n   │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:34:9\n   │\n34 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), price);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:204:9\n    │\n204 │         emit FeeAccrued(buy, fee, bps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:159:29\n    │\n159 │             uint256 gross = uint256(-params.amountSpecified);\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:165:61\n    │\n165 │         return (this.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    │                                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:165:68\n    │\n165 │         return (this.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    │                                                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:180:34\n    │\n180 │             if (pairDelta > 0 || uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) != _expectedBuyInput) revert PartialBuy();\n    │                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:186:23\n    │\n186 │         uint256 fee = uint256(uint128(pairDelta)) * bps / 10_000;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:186:31\n    │\n186 │         uint256 fee = uint256(uint128(pairDelta)) * bps / 10_000;\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:188:42\n    │\n188 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:188:49\n    │\n188 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:213:9\n    │\n213 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:214:9\n    │\n214 │         emit OracleClaimed(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:210:22\n    │\n210 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:210:66\n    │\n210 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:213:9\n    │\n213 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:224:9\n    │\n224 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:225:9\n    │\n225 │         emit LiquidityDonated(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:220:22\n    │\n220 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:220:66\n    │\n220 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:224:9\n    │\n224 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:239:29\n    │\n239 │         burned = abi.decode(poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(2), amount)), (uint256));\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:240:9\n    │\n240 │         emit BoughtAndBurned(amount, burned);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(3), amount, msg.sender));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:253:9\n    │\n253 │         emit BurnFunded(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(3), amount, msg.sender));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:263:13\n    │\n263 │             poolManager.donate(_key, panicIs0 ? 0 : amount, panicIs0 ? amount : 0, \"\");\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:296:29\n    │\n296 │                 !panicIs0, -int256(net), panicIs0 ? TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1 : TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:302:31\n    │\n302 │         if (pairDelta >= 0 || uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) != net || panicDelta <= 0) revert PartialBuy();\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:303:20\n    │\n303 │         received = uint256(uint128(panicDelta));\n    │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:303:28\n    │\n303 │         received = uint256(uint128(panicDelta));\n    │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":562,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/PanicHook.t.sol:PanicCurrency1Test\n[PASS] test_reverseCurrencyOrderAndMaintenance() (gas: 1004859)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.96ms (879.11µs CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/PanicMonkeys.t.sol:PanicMonkeysTest\n[PASS] test_metadataAndSupply() (gas: 52601)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrMintEntryPoints() (gas: 152278)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 763055)\n[PASS] test_transferAndAllowance() (gas: 223271)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.63ms (2.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/PanicHook.t.sol:PanicNativeTest\n[PASS] test_feeBearingBuyOnFreshTokenOnlyManager() (gas: 1220593)\n[PASS] test_nativeBudgetReentryIsBlocked() (gas: 921662)\n[PASS] test_rejectingEthBudgetCannotHaltTrading() (gas: 875565)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.01ms (2.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/PanicHookDeployer.t.sol:PanicHookDeployerTest\n[PASS] test_deployAndInitializeAtomically() (gas: 1040792767)\n[PASS] test_initializationFailureRollsBackDeployment() (gas: 31801235)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 28.76ms (37.51ms CPU time)\n\nRan 21 tests for test/PanicHook.t.sol:PanicHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapsConserveClaims(bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 364573, ~: 418253)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 249999000000004392628730\n\n[PASS] test_buyAndSellCannotChangeSameBlockReference() (gas: 930702)\n[PASS] test_buyJudgedBeforeItRestoresPrice() (gas: 581884)\n[PASS] test_buybackActualOutputIncludesPoolFeeInMinimum() (gas: 442053)\n[PASS] test_buybackCallerLimitIsRespected() (gas: 475415)\n[PASS] test_buybackRevertsAboveReferenceAndRollsBack() (gas: 497103)\n[PASS] test_buybackSpendsLastBucketRemainderAndCanTopUpDust() (gas: 759860)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 152740)\n[PASS] test_donationWithoutLiquidityRevertsWithoutLosingBucket() (gas: 619320)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputAndPartialBuysRevert() (gas: 239823)\n[PASS] test_failedOrShortTokenFundingRollsBack() (gas: 274957)\n[PASS] test_flatHourResetsPanicTier() (gas: 642335)\n[PASS] test_initializationAndPermissions() (gas: 37442)\n[PASS] test_invalidConstructorAndUninitializedUse() (gas: 3970734)\n[PASS] test_oracleBudgetHasNoFeeExemption() (gas: 514562)\n[PASS] test_permissionlessClaimDonationAndBuyback() (gas: 924491)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeHatchesAndFitsSizeLimit() (gas: 5577822)\n[PASS] test_secondPoolAndWrongKeyRejected() (gas: 83163)\n[PASS] test_sellFromFlatToTwentyPercentDownUsesPostPrice() (gas: 454769)\n[PASS] test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell() (gas: 2443643)\nLogs:\n  one sell tax: 21189092534644613321412\n  ten sells tax: 11677354016981352100772\n\n[PASS] test_zeroBucketsAndInvalidFunding() (gas: 466722)\nSuite result: ok. 21 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 32.59ms (56.20ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/PanicMath.t.sol:PanicMathTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capAndSplitConservation(uint128,uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 7859, ~: 8045)\n[PASS] test_exactTierBoundaries() (gas: 12841)\n[PASS] test_oneUnitFeeHasNoUnallocatedDust() (gas: 4496)\n[PASS] test_priceOrientationAndDecimals() (gas: 7524)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 390.42ms (2.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/HourOracle.t.sol:HourOracleTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_weightedTwoIntervals(uint160,uint160,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 213204, ~: 213116)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 158456325028528675187087900672\n  Bound result 158456325028528675187087900672\n  Bound result 1988\n\n[PASS] test_arithmeticWindowAndInterpolation() (gas: 306460)\n[PASS] test_firstBlockFrozenAndFlatHour() (gas: 190746)\n[PASS] test_ringWrapRetainsWholeWindow() (gas: 377088028)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 390.67ms (396.74ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/PanicInvariant.t.sol:PanicInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nPanicInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsExactlyBackAllBuckets\n[PASS] invariant_conservationAcrossMaintenance\n PanicInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 209)\n\n╭--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================+\n| PanicHandler | buyback  | 415   | 209     | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | claim    | 404   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | donate   | 397   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | fund     | 430   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | trade    | 402   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3132\n  Bound result 119999999999999000001833\n  Bound result 2158\n  Bound result 264337593543950334\n  Bound result 57\n  Bound result 472747194\n  Bound result 576460752303423488\n  Bound result 233974286\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 119999999999999000009968\n  Bound result 4699\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 3753414292508\n  Bound result 264337593543952549\n  Bound result 1920422949309131808\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 85348060757\n  Bound result 2835717307\n  Bound result 1114277012\n  Bound result 189142682765158\n  Bound result 5371\n  Bound result 3778370338810786\n  Bound result 1999999999000005026\n  Bound result 1995\n  Bound result 119999999999999000008192\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 417.73ms (411.00ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 test suites in 420.53ms (1.28s CPU time): 40 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (40 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":56,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"PanicHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PanicHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PanicHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PanicHook.buybackAndBurn()\",\"PanicHook.buybackAndBurn(uint256)\",\"PanicHook.claim()\",\"PanicHook.donate()\",\"PanicHook.fundBurn(uint256)\",\"PanicHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PanicHookDeployer.deploy((address,address,address,address,uint128,int24,uint160),bytes32)\",\"PanicMonkeys.approve(address,uint256)\",\"PanicMonkeys.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"PanicMonkeys.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":122,\"docs/DEPENDENCIES.md\":10,\"docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md\":36,\"docs/SPECIFICATION-CONFLICT.md\":36,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":34,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":30,\"src/HourOracle.sol\":80,\"src/PanicHook.sol\":317,\"src/PanicHookDeployer.sol\":85,\"src/PanicMath.sol\":41,\"src/PanicMonkeys.sol\":11,\"test/HourOracle.t.sol\":78,\"test/PanicHook.t.sol\":536,\"test/PanicHookDeployer.t.sol\":73,\"test/PanicInvariant.t.sol\":110,\"test/PanicMath.t.sol\":51,\"test/PanicMonkeys.t.sol\":64,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":9},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"4873f0dae14e2a0477c751b089e080e7878f07734ebc15dcb6b18512381a962b","verifiedTreeHash":"aa9fb777e53755d2b168a74f920bb700d55b66a7","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+be003835"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3409,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 88 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.27s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:26:16\n   │\n26 │           return abi.encodePacked(\n   │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n27 │ ┃             type(PanicHook).creationCode,\n28 │ ┃             abi.encode(\n29 │ ┃                 config.manager,\n   ‡ ┃\n36 │ ┃         );\n   │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit Deployed(address(hook), msg.sender);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         address panicToken,\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:78:38\n   │\n78 │                 || cap == 0 || cap > uint128(type(int128).max) || spacing < TickMath.MIN_TICK_SPACING\n   │                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:28:25\n   │\n28 │         initializedAt = uint64(block.timestamp);\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:30:39\n   │\n30 │         observations[0] = Observation(uint64(block.timestamp), 0);\n   │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:34:48\n   │\n34 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), price);\n   │                                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:41:13\n   │\n41 │         if (block.timestamp > last.timestamp) {\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:49:9\n   │\n49 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), ref);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:43:17\n   │\n43 │                 uint64(block.timestamp), last.cumulative + preSwapPrice * (block.timestamp - last.timestamp)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:49:48\n   │\n49 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), ref);\n   │                                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (age < WINDOW) return (nowCumulative + initialPrice * (WINDOW - age)) / WINDOW;\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:60:13\n   │\n60 │         if (target >= last.timestamp) {\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:68:21\n   │\n68 │                 if (observations[mid % CAPACITY].timestamp <= target) lo = mid;\n   │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/HourOracle.sol:34:9\n   │\n34 │         emit ObservationRecorded(block.number, uint64(block.timestamp), price);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:204:9\n    │\n204 │         emit FeeAccrued(buy, fee, bps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:159:29\n    │\n159 │             uint256 gross = uint256(-params.amountSpecified);\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:165:61\n    │\n165 │         return (this.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    │                                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:165:68\n    │\n165 │         return (this.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    │                                                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:180:34\n    │\n180 │             if (pairDelta > 0 || uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) != _expectedBuyInput) revert PartialBuy();\n    │                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:186:23\n    │\n186 │         uint256 fee = uint256(uint128(pairDelta)) * bps / 10_000;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:186:31\n    │\n186 │         uint256 fee = uint256(uint128(pairDelta)) * bps / 10_000;\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:188:42\n    │\n188 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:188:49\n    │\n188 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:213:9\n    │\n213 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:214:9\n    │\n214 │         emit OracleClaimed(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:210:22\n    │\n210 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:210:66\n    │\n210 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:213:9\n    │\n213 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:224:9\n    │\n224 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:225:9\n    │\n225 │         emit LiquidityDonated(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:220:22\n    │\n220 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:220:66\n    │\n220 │         if (amount > uint256(int256(type(int128).max))) amount = uint256(int256(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:224:9\n    │\n224 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), amount));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:239:29\n    │\n239 │         burned = abi.decode(poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(2), amount)), (uint256));\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:240:9\n    │\n240 │         emit BoughtAndBurned(amount, burned);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_entered` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(3), amount, msg.sender));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:253:9\n    │\n253 │         emit BurnFunded(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(3), amount, msg.sender));\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:263:13\n    │\n263 │             poolManager.donate(_key, panicIs0 ? 0 : amount, panicIs0 ? amount : 0, \"\");\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:296:29\n    │\n296 │                 !panicIs0, -int256(net), panicIs0 ? TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1 : TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:302:31\n    │\n302 │         if (pairDelta >= 0 || uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) != net || panicDelta <= 0) revert PartialBuy();\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:303:20\n    │\n303 │         received = uint256(uint128(panicDelta));\n    │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PanicHook.sol:303:28\n    │\n303 │         received = uint256(uint128(panicDelta));\n    │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":525,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/PanicMath.t.sol:PanicMathTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capAndSplitConservation(uint128,uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 7852, ~: 7950)\n[PASS] test_exactTierBoundaries() (gas: 12841)\n[PASS] test_oneUnitFeeHasNoUnallocatedDust() (gas: 4496)\n[PASS] test_priceOrientationAndDecimals() (gas: 7524)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.33ms (2.53ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/PanicHook.t.sol:PanicCurrency1Test\n[PASS] test_reverseCurrencyOrderAndMaintenance() (gas: 1004859)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.27ms (1.55ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/PanicMonkeys.t.sol:PanicMonkeysTest\n[PASS] test_metadataAndSupply() (gas: 52601)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrMintEntryPoints() (gas: 152278)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 763055)\n[PASS] test_transferAndAllowance() (gas: 223271)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.34ms (2.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/PanicHook.t.sol:PanicNativeTest\n[PASS] test_feeBearingBuyOnFreshTokenOnlyManager() (gas: 1220593)\n[PASS] test_nativeBudgetReentryIsBlocked() (gas: 921662)\n[PASS] test_rejectingEthBudgetCannotHaltTrading() (gas: 875565)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.34ms (2.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/PanicHookDeployer.t.sol:PanicHookDeployerTest\n[PASS] test_deployAndInitializeAtomically() (gas: 1040792767)\n[PASS] test_initializationFailureRollsBackDeployment() (gas: 31801235)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 22.32ms (31.29ms CPU time)\n\nRan 21 tests for test/PanicHook.t.sol:PanicHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapsConserveClaims(bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 361844, ~: 418253)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 249999000000000000008871\n\n[PASS] test_buyAndSellCannotChangeSameBlockReference() (gas: 930702)\n[PASS] test_buyJudgedBeforeItRestoresPrice() (gas: 581884)\n[PASS] test_buybackActualOutputIncludesPoolFeeInMinimum() (gas: 442053)\n[PASS] test_buybackCallerLimitIsRespected() (gas: 475415)\n[PASS] test_buybackRevertsAboveReferenceAndRollsBack() (gas: 497103)\n[PASS] test_buybackSpendsLastBucketRemainderAndCanTopUpDust() (gas: 759860)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 152740)\n[PASS] test_donationWithoutLiquidityRevertsWithoutLosingBucket() (gas: 619320)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputAndPartialBuysRevert() (gas: 239823)\n[PASS] test_failedOrShortTokenFundingRollsBack() (gas: 274957)\n[PASS] test_flatHourResetsPanicTier() (gas: 642335)\n[PASS] test_initializationAndPermissions() (gas: 37442)\n[PASS] test_invalidConstructorAndUninitializedUse() (gas: 3970734)\n[PASS] test_oracleBudgetHasNoFeeExemption() (gas: 514562)\n[PASS] test_permissionlessClaimDonationAndBuyback() (gas: 924491)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeHatchesAndFitsSizeLimit() (gas: 5577822)\n[PASS] test_secondPoolAndWrongKeyRejected() (gas: 83163)\n[PASS] test_sellFromFlatToTwentyPercentDownUsesPostPrice() (gas: 454769)\n[PASS] test_specConflict_tenSmallSellsPayLessThanOneLargeSell() (gas: 2443643)\nLogs:\n  one sell tax: 21189092534644613321412\n  ten sells tax: 11677354016981352100772\n\n[PASS] test_zeroBucketsAndInvalidFunding() (gas: 466722)\nSuite result: ok. 21 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 35.40ms (56.56ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/HourOracle.t.sol:HourOracleTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_weightedTwoIntervals(uint160,uint160,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 213207, ~: 213122)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 79228162514264337593543950336\n  Bound result 1461501637330902918203684832716283019655932542975\n  Bound result 3082\n\n[PASS] test_arithmeticWindowAndInterpolation() (gas: 306460)\n[PASS] test_firstBlockFrozenAndFlatHour() (gas: 190746)\n[PASS] test_ringWrapRetainsWholeWindow() (gas: 377088028)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 406.25ms (414.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/PanicInvariant.t.sol:PanicInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nPanicInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsExactlyBackAllBuckets\n[PASS] invariant_conservationAcrossMaintenance\n PanicInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 214)\n\n╭--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================+\n| PanicHandler | buyback  | 427   | 214     | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | claim    | 407   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | donate   | 389   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | fund     | 414   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PanicHandler | trade    | 411   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 48368654805579\n  Bound result 6184\n  Bound result 17580\n  Bound result 1999999999000010854\n  Bound result 12582911\n  Bound result 1999999999000003114\n  Bound result 887272\n  Bound result 574568338633144607\n  Bound result 3600\n  Bound result 119999999999999000010152\n  Bound result 3974\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 36132041197741795082259\n  Bound result 359541238\n  Bound result 13534\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 119999999999999000003730\n  Bound result 2700\n  Bound result 2807011243\n  Bound result 96\n  Bound result 119999999999999000003726\n  Bound result 1999999999000000056\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 421.93ms (414.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 test suites in 423.47ms (912.18ms CPU time): 40 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (40 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":49,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"PanicHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PanicHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PanicHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PanicHook.buybackAndBurn()\",\"PanicHook.buybackAndBurn(uint256)\",\"PanicHook.claim()\",\"PanicHook.donate()\",\"PanicHook.fundBurn(uint256)\",\"PanicHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PanicHookDeployer.deploy((address,address,address,address,uint128,int24,uint160),bytes32)\",\"PanicMonkeys.approve(address,uint256)\",\"PanicMonkeys.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"PanicMonkeys.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":122,\"docs/DEPENDENCIES.md\":10,\"docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md\":36,\"docs/SPECIFICATION-CONFLICT.md\":36,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":30,\"src/HourOracle.sol\":80,\"src/PanicHook.sol\":317,\"src/PanicHookDeployer.sol\":85,\"src/PanicMath.sol\":41,\"src/PanicMonkeys.sol\":11,\"test/HourOracle.t.sol\":78,\"test/PanicHook.t.sol\":536,\"test/PanicHookDeployer.t.sol\":73,\"test/PanicInvariant.t.sol\":110,\"test/PanicMath.t.sol\":51,\"test/PanicMonkeys.t.sol\":64,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":9},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2137,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/PanicHook.sol:141: PanicHook.referencePrice() (src/PanicHook.sol#141-145) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/HourOracle.sol:52: HourOracle._reference(uint256) (src/HourOracle.sol#52-79) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/PanicHook.sol:195: PanicHook._accrue(uint256,bool,uint256,bool) (src/PanicHook.sol#195-205) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/HourOracle.sol:37: HourOracle._observe(uint256) (src/HourOracle.sol#37-50) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PanicHook.sol:256: PanicHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/PanicHook.sol#256-281) ignores return value by poolManager.donate(_key,amount,0,) (src/PanicHook.sol#263)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PanicHook.sol:135: PanicHook.spotPrice() (src/PanicHook.sol#135-139) ignores return value by (sqrtPriceX96,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(poolId) (src/PanicHook.sol#137)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PanicHook.sol:256: PanicHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/PanicHook.sol#256-281) ignores return value by poolManager.donate(_key,0,amount,) (src/PanicHook.sol#263)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PanicHook.sol:244: PanicHook.fundBurn(uint256) (src/PanicHook.sol#244-254) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(3),amount,msg.sender)) (src/PanicHook.sol#252)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PanicHook.sol:208: PanicHook.claim() (src/PanicHook.sol#208-215) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0),amount)) (src/PanicHook.sol#213)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PanicHook.sol:218: PanicHook.donate() (src/PanicHook.sol#218-226) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1),amount)) (src/PanicHook.sol#224)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:65: PanicHookDeployer.deploy(PanicHookDeployer.Config,bytes32) (src/PanicHookDeployer.sol#65-84) ignores return value by config.manager.initialize(key,config.sqrtPriceX96) (src/PanicHookDeployer.sol#82)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:65: Reentrancy in PanicHookDeployer.deploy(PanicHookDeployer.Config,bytes32) (src/PanicHookDeployer.sol#65-84):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PanicHook.sol:244: Reentrancy in PanicHook.fundBurn(uint256) (src/PanicHook.sol#244-254):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PanicHook.sol:208: Reentrancy in PanicHook.claim() (src/PanicHook.sol#208-215):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PanicHook.sol:218: Reentrancy in PanicHook.donate() (src/PanicHook.sol#218-226):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PanicHook.sol:195: Reentrancy in PanicHook._accrue(uint256,bool,uint256,bool) (src/PanicHook.sol#195-205):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PanicHook.sol:233: Reentrancy in PanicHook.buybackAndBurn(uint256) (src/PanicHook.sol#233-241):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/HourOracle.sol:37: HourOracle._observe(uint256) (src/HourOracle.sol#37-50) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PanicHook.sol:168: PanicHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/PanicHook.sol#168-189) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PanicHook.sol:283: PanicHook._buyback(uint256) (src/PanicHook.sol#283-308) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/HourOracle.sol:52: HourOracle._reference(uint256) (src/HourOracle.sol#52-79) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PanicHook.sol:195: PanicHook._accrue(uint256,bool,uint256,bool) (src/PanicHook.sol#195-205) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":462,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] abi-encode-packed-hash-collision at src/PanicHookDeployer.sol:26: `abi.encodePacked()` Hash Collision\n[high] contract-locks-ether at src/PanicHook.sol:22: Contract locks Ether without a withdraw function\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:23: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/PanicHook.sol:161: Large Numeric Literal (4 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/PanicHook.sol:161: Literal Instead of Constant (16 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/PanicHook.sol:213: Unchecked Return (6 places)\n[low] unused-public-function at src/PanicHook.sol:141: Public Function Not Used Internally","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f68ed431914b8775f00d511d05e74c4dbb994a099f3754234c4259667700b35f","verifiedTreeHash":"4532a116b9bfa2ef46ee10b4447745d169b820ad","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+be003835"}]}