{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"05133460-b212-456d-9c21-b255d179c866","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["audit_imported_code"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"2d7d84a1a9972f1497e5bc68a704cbf42294d08c62d2868f102ffe3b909b9b51","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"adapt_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"2d7d84a1a9972f1497e5bc68a704cbf42294d08c62d2868f102ffe3b909b9b51","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","state":"failed"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1d71ce245464e6d44b657c9c61758afdaa079e2103804c05d33610245bc5a021","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","tools":[]},"key":"audit_imported_code","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"waiting"}],"objective":"BLACKOUT SwarmDesk bootstrap on Robinhood Chain (4663). Deploy exactly one contract, SwarmDesk, with these twelve static constructor words in this order, produced by tools/swarm_constructor_args.mjs from docs/oracle-v37/oracle-config.json and the binding file (factory 0x9c9d2fcb75c2c132c0ac0c42df3819a42347265e, registry/params launch 0 until bind, heartbeat 200 bps, cap 1e18): [\"0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82\", \"0xce0e6a670aa75e161d02aca3c7f00b94ca428ccb\", \"0x5598aa9146215bc13eb26f2c692ad1461fd32982\", \"0x5f7bb59365ce557c26dbcaa4ee9d39a4b95b7127\", \"0x6f7261636c652e72657175657374406f7261636c652d31000000000000000000\", \"5391989333430298100116863486635657822062725418115979424500284366258177\", \"0x2fc5a57f2c5f7bc083ea8ac5016234f1a0b1c68a514e5d921956cc57948534ef\", \"0xc13efed8438aab53ea052a4507def2dc4ce9856765520dfa28c66daa59cfc11d\", \"0x00e69e4445c7ca7256338293f9f9cea439fd2beb1959d1d43ebec7b14493e2f6\", \"0xc0ae7511b06744cf7ccadc6b60ff9ff96cb7234cf32988850df33324861cc8df\", \"0x9c9d2fcb75c2c132c0ac0c42df3819a42347265e\", \"0x11ed7438974e96ecc962201e9c46422c7bf239d725876863fa25a56c734b20d3\"]. The last word is GAME_CONFIG_HASH. SwarmDesk is the swarm role of the game: it acts only on IMD oracle answers signed by attester 0x5598aa9146215bc13eb26f2c692ad1461fd32982 for its own EIP-712 domain, within hard-coded bounds. It binds once, permissionlessly, to the game registry proven through the ProjectFactory (see docs/m2-trust-assumption.md). The constructor makes no external call. Deploy unbound. Record and return the deployed address and check registry() == 0x0 and bindingConfig() gameConfigHash == the last word.\n\nSource: identity-md-launches/launch-1544-blackout-swarmdesk-bootstrap-robinhood at commit 24bfb1d (BLACKOUT v3.13: review finding 6d1287b0 fixed, FeeRouter reads Params.HeartbeatBps, everything re-pinned). Build exactly with the repo foundry.toml: solc 0.8.26, optimizer true, 200 runs, evm cancun, viaIR false, bytecode_hash none, and deploy the creation code as built. The contracts authenticate each other by creation-code hash (src/lib/SwarmCode.sol, ModuleCode.launchHash); the SwarmDesk creation hash must be 0x65968358bcf87aa8839b8bce6b2d339493deac3f77d75a3ff0b3ad4f35955745, else stop and report. Reserved Params keys with no reader are documented in docs/params-keys-v313.md and are not defects of this launch. Chain: Robinhood Chain (4663). Platform proofs use the ProjectFactory 0x9c9d2fcb75c2c132c0ac0c42df3819a42347265e (predictContract) and its launch registry 0xf52bbe066b7ad2d28c2195d066ea08dcbca88406 (isRecorded). No owner, admin key, upgrade, withdrawal, token action, mint or placeholder: every constructor value is listed above. Known trust assumption: docs/m2-trust-assumption.md (twin front-run of SwarmDesk.bind, griefing only, mitigated by binding right after job A). Project: https://playblackout.xyz · https://x.com/IMDBlackout","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"598ba1165b24de06c5062a787923472f3ee7ba6692f8af51d1a853cbc103eb7b","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"05133460-b212-456d-9c21-b255d179c866","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1553-blackout-swarmdesk-bootstrap-robinhood"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52616","feedbackHash":"060ed70523c9eafda2da1f2c4367093dcfb0f2f7c5d8c518e3806ed16eed6e13","nodeKey":"audit_imported_code","submissionHash":"1d71ce245464e6d44b657c9c61758afdaa079e2103804c05d33610245bc5a021","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"d0aa7a0685b46fd4b0a84a39780d72fff00ab15124714bb6fe2758202716f6a0","state":"blocked","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e89087c02a1681bf","findings":[],"hash":"174fdf8f0cbf30025a23bc1b67f8363effbe4e6e17450af5534629146d06d155","nodeId":"e6d33e21-be6a-4c23-8f59-9a903eb28cff","outcome":"failed","summary":"needs input: The requirement to fix reproduced audit findings conflicts with the exact SwarmDesk creation-code pin. The unchanged project builds with its own foundry.toml and produces the required 0x65968358bcf87aa8839b8bce6b2d339493deac3f77d75a3ff0b3ad4f35955745; the constructor generator also reproduces all twelve supplied words. Audit finding b2ccff161ae44616a60d99094e55b0e792c4a6baa95be8050d2ffe27f9eb3301 reproduces in a local Foundry test: when the bound market reports initializedAt() == 0, a valid regulator answer with a cap announcement is accepted, execute(1) reverts NotConfigured, its parameter update/feature notice/letter roll back, and a second answer for the same week is ignored. Correcting the unguarded announceCap call and unavailable-module paths requires changing executable code and therefore the pinned creation hash. No production source or configuration has been changed and nothing has been broadcast. — Should the next attempt fix the reproduced SwarmDesk liveness finding and repl","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2217984,"inputTokens":122134,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":10013,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":488148}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a7979f925df7a720","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_regulate wraps the optional duties (grantDistrictBoost, pause, startWar, startCollapse, listLot) in try/catch so one busy module cannot block the rest, but Enhancement.announceCap is called bare. announceCap reads registry.launchTime(), which reverts NotConfigured while the market hook's initializedAt() is 0 (the Desk is bound after job A, before the token/hook launch M3) or if the bound registry's market has no initializedAt(). The same holds for the unconditional registry.module(12)/module(11)/module(4) resolutions in _regulate and module(7)/module(12) in _event, which revert NotConfigured until job B registers roles 6-13. Because _accept already set acceptedSlotPlusOne[1] = s+1 and consumed the UUID, no second answer for that week slot is accepted and execute keeps reverting until validUntil passes; the eight Params updates, the feature notice and the letter of that week are lost. Nothing is stolen; this is a liveness gap in the one-answer-per-slot design. Suggested minimal fix: wrap announceCap (and the module resolutions it depends on) in the same try/catch pattern, or resolve module(11)/module(12)/module(4) through registeredModule and skip when zero, so one unavailable duty cannot strand the whole vector.","line":430,"path":"src/SwarmDesk.sol","reproduction":"State: Desk bound to a registry whose market returns initializedAt()==0 (pre-M3), Enhancement registered with cap()==8 and announcedCap()==0. Input: a correctly signed regulator attestation for the current week slot with values[10]=1 and every other word 0 except the letter, delivered by IntakeDelivery. Expected: the answer executes, skipping the cap step the way the try/catch duties are skipped. Actual: onOracleResult stores it (consumed==true, acceptedSlotPlusOne[1]==slot+1); desk.execute(1, answer) reverts NotConfigured from GameRegistry.launchTime via Enhancement.announceCap; a second signed answer for the same week is then ignored (AnswerIgnored reason 2, consumed stays false). Reproduced in Foundry on the repository fixture with vm.mockCall(market, initializedAt(), 0): test test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::testRegulatorExecuteRevertsOnCapStepBeforeMarketInit passes, i.e. the revert and the lockout both occur.","severity":"low","snippet":"            enhancement.announceCap(enhancement.cap() == 8 ? 12 : 16, notice);","title":"execute(1) has uncaught revert paths that strand the week's regulator answer"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The documented M-2 race (docs/m2-trust-assumption.md section 2, item 3) says a twin needs its own Params and GameRegistry launched through the ProjectFactory, i.e. at least a three-contract launch. The code only requires that r.params() equal the factory's CREATE2 result of the pinned Params code with (Desk, 200, 1e18) at some coordinates; it does not require those coordinates to be in the same launch as the registry. The honest Params from job A satisfies that proof for any registry, so a twin is a single pinned GameRegistry whose constructor names the honest Params, the public roots/snapshot/endowment and any token and market the attacker likes. The outcome is the documented griefing (honest game orphaned, no funds movable by the attacker), but the attacker's cost and admission surface are one contract, not three to eight, which changes the likelihood input of the documented severity. No funds are at risk through the Desk; this is reported so the trust document and the keeper's bind-right-after-job-A mitigation are sized against the real cost. A code fix would require requiring paramsLaunch == registryLaunch (one job deploys both), which changes the pinned Desk creation code and is the requester's decision.","line":200,"path":"src/SwarmDesk.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh unbound Desk D with gameConfigHash H; honest job A deployed through the factory as Params(D,200,1e18) at (1,0) and GameRegistry(token, Params, market, roots, snapshot, endowment, factory) at (1,1). Input: attacker deploys through the same factory a single GameRegistry at (2,0) with constructor (attackerToken, honestParams, attackerMarket, same roots, same snapshot, same endowment, factory) and calls D.bind(twin, registryCode, paramsCode, 2, 0, 1, 0). Expected per the trust document: bind needs the attacker's own Params launch. Actual: bind succeeds, D.registry()==twin, and the honest registry can never bind (AlreadyDone). Reproduced in Foundry with the repository's LocalApplicationFactory: test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::testTwinReusingHonestParamsBinds passes.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (r.params() != p) revert InvalidProof();","title":"bind accepts a twin registry that reuses the honest Params: a one-contract launch captures the Desk, cheaper than docs/m2-trust-assumption.md states"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The repository's under-200k tests run after oracleConfig()/slot()/attestationDigest() have warmed the Desk's storage in the same transaction, and the Robinhood variant mocks ArbSys with vm.mockCall, which makes Foundry's frame gas unreliable (the frame reports 0 or 214k depending on the limit). Measured through a plain relay contract with no cheatcodes, chain id 4663, a real stub at address 100 and every Desk slot cold (first touch in the transaction, first answer ever for the stream): event stream 186.1k, regulator stream 181.1k, paid backup via the intake 187.2k, all succeed at 190k and fail at 180k. The real IntakeDelivery/Intake give exactly 200k, so the design holds, but any addition to _accept (one more cold SSTORE is 22.1k) breaks every delivered answer and wastes each 0.5 IMD backup. Not a defect; recorded for the adapter so _accept is not extended.","line":345,"path":"src/SwarmDesk.sol","reproduction":"State: Desk bound, chain id 4663, address 100 holds a contract returning a constant arbBlockNumber(), no prior call to the Desk in the transaction. Input: a correctly signed event-stream attestation for the current slot delivered by a relay contract etched at the delivery address with target.call{gas: G}. Expected: success for G=200000. Actual: success for G>=190000 (relay-side cost 189,138 including ~3k relay overhead), out-of-gas for G<=180000. test/scratch/Gas2.t.sol (GasTest/Gas2Test).","severity":"info","snippet":"        lastAnswer[stream] = Result(","title":"Oracle callback fits the 200k stipend with about 13k gas to spare when the Desk's storage is cold"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"submit() accepts any attestation the attester signed for this Desk's domain, and the question hash excludes panelSize, quorum, validForSeconds and allowAmbiguous (tools/oracle_question_hash.mjs). Anyone can therefore pay 0.5 IMD for the committed question naming the Desk as consumer, with panelSize 5 and quorum 4 (the Desk's and the committed bodies' minimum), and relay the result before the schedule's answer; the first accepted answer fixes the slot (acceptedSlotPlusOne) and later ones are ignored. The relayer cannot alter the signed vector, so the exposure is the oracle platform's panel integrity at the smallest panel the Desk admits, which the oracle-consumer reference flags as cheap to fill with seats one holder controls. The Desk's levers are bounded (kind 0-7/9, severity 5000-7000, Params +-10%/day within hard bounds, pack pause <=72h, war/collapse/lot gated by Civic features), so the impact is bounded game steering, not funds. This is the requester's chosen design (no owner, static minimums); it is recorded as the residual trust assumption, not a defect.","line":308,"path":"src/SwarmDesk.sol","reproduction":"Input: an attestation for questions[0] with panelSize=5, quorum=4, agreed=4, correct chainId/window, current slot and epoch, signed by 0x5598...2982 for this Desk, sent via submit() by any address. Expected per the reference's guidance: a panel sized to the value at stake. Actual: accepted and stored (test/SwarmDeskV37.t.sol::testSubmitRelayAcceptsAttestedAnswerFromAnyoneOnce shows the relay path; the panel floor is lines 306-310).","severity":"info","snippet":"                || a.panelSize < 5 || a.quorum < 4 || a.agreed < a.quorum || a.agreed > a.panelSize","title":"Trust surface: first valid answer per slot wins and anyone can buy and relay one with a five-seat panel"}],"hash":"1d71ce245464e6d44b657c9c61758afdaa079e2103804c05d33610245bc5a021","nodeId":"b023249b-8bf9-4968-807d-e0593096906f","outcome":"completed","summary":"Findings file validates: all four snippets match their lines. The working tree shows no tracked changes (the findings file and scratch tests are untracked/ignored, as intended).\n\n## Review result\n\n**Verdict.** SwarmDesk as it arrived has no critical or high defects. Build, pins and constructor words all check out, and the two low findings are liveness and trust-document issues, not fund loss. Findings are in `.imd-findings.json` at the repo root.\n\n**Verified against the brief**\n- Creation-code hash with the repo `foundry.toml` equals the pinned `0x6596…5745`. Registry and Params pins in `SwarmCode` equal the built code.\n- The policy word decodes to chain 1, window 26122900–26122901, price 0.5 IMD, 200 bps, no stray high bits. Constructing with the twelve words on chain 4663 yields `registry() == 0`, `bindingConfig().gameConfigHash` equal to the last word, heartbeat 200 bps / 1e18, signer `0x5598…2982`.\n- The protected floor test passes on the real initcode through an etched factory: constructor runs on an empty chain, runtime 20,797 bytes, no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT.\n- Attestation struct, type string, domain and callback selectors match the oracle reference. The existing 20-test Desk suite passes.\n\n**Findings**\n1. **Low.** `execute(1)` calls `Enhancement.announceCap` outside the try/catch its sibling duties use. It reverts via `registry.launchTime()` while the market hook is uninitialized (post-bind, pre-M3), and the unconditional `module(4/11/12)` resolutions revert until job B registers. The accepted answer is already locked in for the week, so that week's regulator vector is lost. Reproduced in `test/scratch/Probe.t.sol`.\n2. **Low.** `bind` accepts a twin registry that reuses the honest Params, so the documented M-2 twin costs a one-contract launch, not the three-to-eight the trust document states. Griefing only, as documented, but the likelihood input is wrong. Reproduced in the same scratch file.\n3. **Info.** Cold-storage callback gas is about 181k–187k of the 200k stipend on chain 4663, measured through a plain relay (the repo's tests measure warm, and `vm.mockCall` on ArbSys distorts Foundry's frame gas). It fits, but `_accept` cannot grow.\n4. **Info.** Residual trust surface: first valid answer per slot wins, and anyone can buy and relay one at the five-seat/four-quorum floor the Desk and both committed bodies use.\n\n**Coverage.** Read fully: SwarmDesk, OracleAttestation, SignatureCheckerCompat, SwarmCode, ModuleCode, Params, GameRegistry, GridOperator, Civic, Enhancement, PackSale, Economy, ChainClock, Errors, the interfaces, SwarmArgs, Deploy script, the constructor-args and question-hash tools, the committed bodies, the Desk and conformance tests, and the M-2 and Params-keys docs. Read only for the symbols the Desk touches: FarmRewards. Not reached in this budget: FeeRouter, FarmCore, FarmEngine, FarmItems, FarmRewards internals, RewardPool, Season, StarterClaim, Billboards, EndowmentEscrow, V4Market, MarketFactory, StandardMarket/Adapter, the keeper and Python tooling. These are not in this launch's deployable set.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3519392,"inputTokens":642,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":64936,"runtime":"claude","turns":57,"wallClockMs":951177}}],"verification":[]}