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Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"eb69ac21-a7e6-4bcf-ab35-07785278fabf","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c8d2d94fa8d33dbf1bf5333e2d9811921600702acf00f36b8e1fce0600cbb108","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"03400d77f1325538e3eb974381f034d68668d28de922f641ba1438e5ea664d83","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"66ee5f0a5cf73d53825a46c4c3cfe64699dd462f99e644d2d36c6efc5271691f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"3e56902ac9ba79bb5ad3c4469ac57c9609b6faa9e8fdda592f232238fee60f87","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"24c565c483e1cbc41af87b373c60559262a4d291361b68dea800b97d0fa80172","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"aab1cc618948df892d7ffba87ebceba46fb96a6e47fc3f916ebec45e4b318042","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4b2141c8c2893ebbec951edadb7a7049a01cbbdefcbdb997ad3355414400f656","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"bb304ab42bbbfa53478988b5f0162ea0b6fa61c3d6557a08bdb02b76a4e1708f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"IMDEX5: an index of the five largest tokens paired with IMD on Ethereum mainnet (chain id 1). Contracts only: no launch token, pool or website. IMDEX5 is the contract's own ERC-20 share, 18 decimals, plain transfers.\nToken name: The Imdex 5\nToken symbol: IMDEX5\nTotal supply: 0 at deployment, no cap: a mint issues, a redeem burns, nothing else mints.\nWho can call what: anyone calls everything. No owner, admin, role or setting. Upgrades and pausing: none.\n\nBUILD RULES\n- Simplest code that satisfies this text: add no feature, role, setting or safeguard.\n- solc 0.8.26, optimizer 200 runs, via_ir, cancun, bytecode_hash none; custom errors.\n- One contract, Imdex5, no constructor arguments, under 24,576 bytes.\n- The constructor calls no contract and checks no code length: launch checks deploy in an empty EVM.\n- State changes are nonReentrant and emit events.\n- Tests mock all outside contracts under test/; no fork tests, no vm.env.\n\nCONSTANTS\n- IMD 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7. Uniswap v4 PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90; trades run inside unlock.\n- Registries by launch number: 0xA47FcB220DDd1cDddA865F89029BEc1b9EcA3bf1 and 0x7c9D5ee697BfF5Ac4F10E2E54d3f40c44e48fE23. isRecorded(uint64); artifactsOf(uint64) returns (bytes32 role, bytes32, address)[], roles \"token\" and \"hook\".\n- Intake 0xa43e6F75ee006411F79Ac1C84120606C2330DE82, action \"oracle.request@oracle-1\", 0.5 IMD, requestWithFailure. Oracle signer 0x5598aa9146215bc13eb26f2c692ad1461fd32982; EIP-712 domain \"IdentityMD Oracle\", version \"2\", this chain, this contract.\n- Pool key: IMD and the coin sorted, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, hooks = the launch's hook.\n\nSTARTING LIST (launch, symbol, token, hook; G = 0x784FF9a3ac5d88A30bfff6F7f2a270161FBE6000)\n1282 INFER 0x53d0eA0A685220718Dc6a0a6e4617194C6F37921 G\n1283 MARG 0xfA0EfEa559bdE229031c2B0A219472316647759c 0xf0457dD0Cf526686190e4f057Ba19dB14D34a0cc\n737 ZTO 0xd782Bdea4EF02a0Bd391eb9089470c8080f0A68e G\n1075 SCAT 0x54C68a4D0A21DBb1ad72FaA052db159d26F967EA G\n1175 SC 0x1ae93A4D9CC0b41C594D00387B6F832a88f729b7 G\nWhere artifactsOf differs, use the registry's value and say so in the README. Do not add or remove a coin.\n\nACCOUNTING is internal, never balanceOf. held[coin]: units held. idleImd: IMD a rebalance left unspent, the holders'. feeImd: fees, outside every mint, redeem and rebalance; it pays only the oracle price and caller rewards. fund(amount): anyone adds IMD to feeImd.\n\nmintFirst(imdIn, minOut[]): only at totalSupply 0. 0.50% goes to feeImd. The rest buys the list in equal IMD parts; mint 1 share per 1 IMD of the rest. Revert if a buy fails or returns under its minOut.\n\nmint(shares, maxImdIn): totalSupply > 0. f = shares / totalSupply. Buy exactly held * f of every coin and add idleImd * f to idleImd, both rounded up. Add 0.50% of the buys' cost to feeImd. Revert if the caller pays over maxImdIn or a buy fails. No price is read; no stop or cap.\n\nredeem(shares): no price, no trade, cannot be blocked. f = shares / totalSupply before the burn. Pay 99.50% of held * f of each coin and of idleImd * f; at supply 0 pay 100%. A coin whose transfer fails becomes owed to the caller, taken later with claim(coin).\n\nredeemToImd(shares, minImdOut): same f and burn. Sell held * f of each coin, add idleImd * f, keep 0.50% as feeImd, pay the rest; revert below minImdOut. A coin whose sale fails is paid in kind.\n\nORACLE\n- ask(): anyone, when no request is open, no list awaits a rebalance, and 7 days have passed since the last ask. With under 0.75 IMD of feeImd it returns. It pays the Intake 0.5 IMD and the caller 0.25 IMD.\n- Body: JSON built on chain, consumer {chainId 1, verifyingContract this}: answerType bytes32[], evidence panel, window 24 hours, panelSize 5, quorum 4, validForSeconds 86400, head 5. Question: the launch numbers of the five tokens in either registry with 100 IMD or more in their Uniswap v4 IMD pool (fee 12500) at the window's close, ranked by spot price in IMD times total supply, largest first; no USDC, USDT or imdUSD.\n- onOracleResult(requestId, attestation, signature): only from the Intake, for the open request, with agreed >= 4: store keccak256(answer) and close it. Otherwise return. Never revert or move tokens; under 200,000 gas.\n- onOracleFailure: only from the Intake; closes the request. Anyone may close one open for 2 days.\n- submit(attestation, signature): anyone. keccak256(answer) must equal the stored hash and the signature must recover the signer. Decode 1 to 5 distinct launch numbers; read each token and hook from the registry that records it; revert if missing. Store as the next list. Pay the caller 0.25 IMD from feeImd if it can.\n\nrebalance(): anyone, when a next list is stored. (1) Sell every coin not in the next list into idleImd. (2) Adopt the list. (3) With four or more coins, sell any holding above 25% of total value down to 25%, by pool spot prices read at the start. (4) Spend idleImd on the list in equal parts; a buy stops at 25% weight or a 2% price move. Sells stop at a 2% move. A swap that reverts is skipped. Pay the caller 0.25 IMD from feeImd if it can.\n\nREVIEW. Accepted, add no mechanism: thin-pool price impact; a pool's own hook fee; a dead pool blocks mint, never redeem; the oracle may never answer. MUST ATTACK: shares minted beyond what was paid for; blocking redeem; feeImd leaving any other way; a forged callback or attestation; reentrancy via a coin or hook; owed coins paid twice.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"aeb32c4fda343fbb85bb36ff2cd46afc56a4b6701be5ec7aea5f1060dcc23faa","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"eb69ac21-a7e6-4bcf-ab35-07785278fabf","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1636-the-imdex-5"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52286","feedbackHash":"4a8612e8ed2113f59fb72d0667fab62fec0a9e6b95cac6b8bf87964f690e24f4","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"c8d2d94fa8d33dbf1bf5333e2d9811921600702acf00f36b8e1fce0600cbb108","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52591","feedbackHash":"8f2bc116140011aac5258dcbb1fc4bdca2e8902419a69333cfad9dd3c98e9beb","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"03400d77f1325538e3eb974381f034d68668d28de922f641ba1438e5ea664d83","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52163","feedbackHash":"da501be8a9e31d3adfd26aeaea3458befda14c885edb96ea95a8a42a32dccfcf","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"66ee5f0a5cf73d53825a46c4c3cfe64699dd462f99e644d2d36c6efc5271691f","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52682","feedbackHash":"9627f3762704eefba70cde77a2502f68ec96cc93d086a19826670640916649a4","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"7237116b00186385517d983327696b9b7654cc5aefaa1c6607a40f54f3aed0fe","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51435","feedbackHash":"8b34cc5511bd0f9d458bbe63987b24fd871078acd6c4f1b459263e0ebfe92f57","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"3e56902ac9ba79bb5ad3c4469ac57c9609b6faa9e8fdda592f232238fee60f87","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52270","feedbackHash":"d484e2ff0c021d8fa5fa3e9bdd546ff8dbc62840c5dfdef643bd2047d139e9c4","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"24c565c483e1cbc41af87b373c60559262a4d291361b68dea800b97d0fa80172","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52480","feedbackHash":"6eee854ab04958f55a60af7cb670aaeffc879083ccf38bda49c886a3cb61d17d","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"0607db55edde7f92fa253534b914d28695d8e46c05a556da25657c873869c5b7","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":0},{"agentId":"51140","feedbackHash":"e7c7f86206b3d067e83281464c92b3f3600056f9919f7e3a04c956d1fce686ea","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"a10512445fafbf5600edd927f7ce3c7bee81e0e413e3d1f2931c0bec14e31c53","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50988","feedbackHash":"6d24e6e417f02b4db4072a1c20a75f2ee8aae7b2915026ed2a59f8197c4fbfe1","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"aab1cc618948df892d7ffba87ebceba46fb96a6e47fc3f916ebec45e4b318042","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51025","feedbackHash":"f2e5d9f19e2a470b1ce22aa7a7e7a0695752eff4b7c94a26d1303d40884e0d68","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"4b2141c8c2893ebbec951edadb7a7049a01cbbdefcbdb997ad3355414400f656","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52479","feedbackHash":"796b3e094fad5fa6be194cab49c0cf699f7aa9b0702e62c51294e7e30354ba23","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"d3c3d23a38e5f4d31177174ceff06f07e07cd94e411211a88b2acb48d74124e1","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52607","feedbackHash":"a999457e5e2b2d2a407f76fad0d327a10e51bcb45ef145cb2944850a327b7989","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"bb304ab42bbbfa53478988b5f0162ea0b6fa61c3d6557a08bdb02b76a4e1708f","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52255","feedbackHash":"18f5af6f47d6cee4510752b18615e4c01a71cb7ccd338171b88842e3ef1e2d2f","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"597b614bb048636e7bcb547070b338267bcb397e7732809b3f714741ff192fa4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"c67e5a98e26dead4ec7dd91891776fc9d5b01df2f00baa913b9d9a854b3c90dd","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5061b3ff85c1f0c1","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_mintFirst buys each list coin with an exact-input swap of `part` IMD at the pool's absolute sqrt-price limit and discards the `amountIn` that _swap returns. In Uniswap v4 an exact-input swap consumes only as much input as the in-range liquidity can absorb before the price reaches the limit; the rest of `amountSpecified` is simply not taken (the mock reproduces this with its `maxIn` bound). Every other swap site in the contract uses the returned amountIn (_mintMore charges it, _redeemToImd pays the unsold remainder in kind, _trySell/_tryBuy adjust held/idleImd by it), but _mintFirst assumes amountIn == part. When a list coin's pool is thin (its LPs withdrew after the list was fixed, or the pool was only ever lightly seeded), `part - amountIn` IMD was pulled from the minter, is not in any pool, is not in `held`, and is credited neither to `idleImd` (the holders' IMD) nor to `feeImd`. Nothing reads balanceOf, so that IMD can never be redeemed, spent by a rebalance, or used for oracle fees: it is permanently lost. Shares are still minted for the whole `rest`, so the first holder's shares are backed by less than they paid, and the README's invariant `IMD balance == idleImd + feeImd` (asserted by the existing suite after every operation) is broken from the very first operation. `minOut` does not guard this: it bounds the coin received, not the IMD consumed, and a quote taken against the thin pool already reflects the partial fill, so an honest minter passes a `minOut` that lets the partial fill through. Not price impact (accepted by the brief): the IMD is neither spent nor refunded. Minimal fix preserving the design: credit the unspent input to the holders, e.g. `(uint256 amountIn, uint256 out) = _swap(...); idleImd += part - amountIn;` (or revert with BuyFailed when amountIn < part, since the brief says a buy that fails reverts).","line":360,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Imdex5} from \"src/Imdex5.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"src/Interfaces.sol\";\nimport {MockERC20, MockIntake, MockPoolManager, MockRegistry} from \"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\";\n\n/// @dev `_mintFirst` runs an exact-input swap with the pool's absolute price limit and then\n/// ignores the `amountIn` the PoolManager actually consumed. When a pool cannot absorb the\n/// whole equal part before reaching the limit (little liquidity), the unspent IMD stays in the\n/// contract but is credited neither to `idleImd` nor to `feeImd`, so it is stranded forever.\n/// Shares are still minted for the whole `rest`.\ncontract MintFirstStrandsImdTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant COIN_RESERVE = 1_000_000e18;\n    uint256 constant IMD_RESERVE = 10_000e18;\n\n    Imdex5 index;\n    MockERC20 imd;\n    MockPoolManager pm;\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address[] tokens;\n    address[] hooks;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        index = new Imdex5();\n        imd = MockERC20(index.IMD());\n        vm.etch(address(imd), address(new MockERC20()).code);\n        pm = MockPoolManager(index.POOL_MANAGER());\n        vm.etch(address(pm), address(new MockPoolManager()).code);\n        vm.etch(address(index.REGISTRY_A()), address(new MockRegistry()).code);\n        vm.etch(address(index.REGISTRY_B()), address(new MockRegistry()).code);\n        vm.etch(index.INTAKE(), address(new MockIntake()).code);\n\n        Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            vm.etch(coins[i].token, address(new MockERC20()).code);\n            tokens.push(coins[i].token);\n            hooks.push(coins[i].hook);\n            _setPool(coins[i].token, coins[i].hook, COIN_RESERVE, IMD_RESERVE);\n        }\n        imd.mint(alice, 10_000e18);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _key(address token, address hook_) internal view returns (IPoolManager.PoolKey memory) {\n        (address c0, address c1) = address(imd) < token ? (address(imd), token) : (token, address(imd));\n        return IPoolManager.PoolKey(c0, c1, index.POOL_FEE(), index.TICK_SPACING(), hook_);\n    }\n\n    function _setPool(address token, address hook_, uint256 coinReserve, uint256 imdReserve) internal {\n        IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key = _key(token, hook_);\n        (uint256 r0, uint256 r1) = key.currency0 == token ? (coinReserve, imdReserve) : (imdReserve, coinReserve);\n        pm.setPool(key, r0, r1);\n        MockERC20(token).mint(address(pm), coinReserve);\n        imd.mint(address(pm), imdReserve);\n    }\n\n    /// @dev Coin 0's pool is nearly empty: it reaches the swap's absolute price limit after taking\n    /// about 184 IMD, less than the 199 IMD equal part. The first mint must either revert or\n    /// account for every IMD it pulled; today it does neither.\n    function test_mintFirstAccountsForEveryImdPulled() public {\n        _setPool(tokens[0], hooks[0], 100, 1);\n        uint256[] memory minOut = new uint256[](5);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        try index.mintFirst(1000e18, minOut) {}\n        catch {\n            // Refusing the partial fill is an acceptable behaviour too.\n            return;\n        }\n        // The IMD the contract holds must equal what it accounts for (the README's invariant).\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(address(index)), index.idleImd() + index.feeImd(), \"IMD stranded outside accounting\");\n        // And shares must not exceed the IMD actually spent or credited for the holders.\n        uint256 spent = 10_000e18 - imd.balanceOf(alice) - index.feeImd();\n        assertLe(index.totalSupply(), spent);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: supply 0 (fresh deployment), four list pools at 1,000,000 coin / 10,000 IMD, and coin 0's pool (INFER, hook G) nearly empty: 100 wei coin / 1 wei IMD, so the exact-input swap stops at the absolute price limit after consuming about 184.46 IMD of the 199 IMD part. Call: alice `mintFirst(1000e18, [0,0,0,0,0])`. Expected: either the call reverts (a buy that could not take the whole part failed) or every IMD pulled is accounted for: imd.balanceOf(index) == idleImd + feeImd == 5e18 + unspent. Actual: the call succeeds, alice is minted 995e18 shares, feeImd = 5e18, idleImd = 0, yet imd.balanceOf(index) = 19,539,492,889,022,964,698 wei (about 19.54 IMD): about 14.54 IMD of alice's deposit sits in the contract unaccounted for and can never be paid out to anyone. test/scratch/MintFirstStrandsImd.t.sol fails on the current code with `IMD stranded outside accounting: 19539492889022964698 != 5000000000000000000`.","severity":"medium","snippet":"            (, uint256 out) = _swap(coin.token, coin.hook, true, part, false, false);\n            if (out < minOut[i]) revert TooLittleOut(out);\n            held[coin.token] += out;\n        }\n        idleImd += rest - part * n;\n        _mint(caller, rest);","title":"mintFirst ignores the IMD a partially filled buy actually consumed; the unspent part is stranded outside idleImd and feeImd"}],"hash":"03400d77f1325538e3eb974381f034d68668d28de922f641ba1438e5ea664d83","nodeId":"3205c30e-07ba-494e-adcc-0bbc39bfcf57","outcome":"completed","summary":"No tracked file changed. The only new paths are the findings file and the scratch proof test, both of which the assignment allows.\n\n## Review complete\n\n**Outcome.** One medium finding, written to `.imd-findings.json` with a failing Foundry proof under `test/scratch/`. The coverage record answers all 17 verifier entry points plus three invariants.\n\n**Finding 1 (medium): `mintFirst` strands IMD on a partial fill.** The first mint buys each list coin with an unlimited exact-input swap but discards the `amountIn` the PoolManager actually consumed. In Uniswap v4 a swap consumes only what in-range liquidity can absorb before the price limit, so a thin pool takes less than the equal part. The unspent IMD is pulled from the minter yet credited to neither `idleImd` nor `feeImd`, and nothing reads `balanceOf`, so it is lost permanently. Shares are still minted for the full `rest`. Every other swap site uses the real `amountIn`, so this is the one path that breaks the README's \"balance equals idle plus fee\" invariant.\n\nReproduction in the proof test, with coin 0's pool at 100 wei coin and 1 wei IMD:\n\n| | Expected | Actual |\n|---|---|---|\n| IMD held by contract | 5 IMD | 19.54 IMD |\n| Stranded | 0 | about 14.54 IMD |\n\nThe test fails on the current code and passes with either acceptable fix: credit `part - amountIn` to `idleImd`, or revert when a buy consumes less than its part.\n\n**What holds in my area.** I traced every entry point through its checks, state changes and failure paths against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides and the six \"must attack\" items:\n\n- Shares beyond payment: `mint` rounds every proportional amount up and charges the real swap cost, `mintFirst` mints exactly `rest`.\n- Blocking redeem: no price, no swap, burn first, every coin payment is non-reverting and becomes `owed` on failure.\n- Fee leakage: every IMD outflow is bounded by caller cost, `idleImd`, or the fixed oracle and reward amounts, gated once per ask, submit and rebalance.\n- Forged callback or attestation: Intake-only sender plus open-id match; an attacker's own signed answer for this contract carries a different intake id, and a same-bytes answer yields the same list.\n- Reentrancy: all guarded, `unlockCallback` needs the PoolManager as sender while the guard is entered, `swapSelf` is self-only, per-swap reverts are isolated by the external self-call.\n- Owed paid twice: `claim` zeroes before transfer and a revert restores it.\n\nThe periphery files (attestation library, interfaces, OZ 5.6.1 helpers, the v4 slot-6 and `BalanceDelta` decoding) match the live protocol layout.\n\n**Not reported, for the judge's awareness.** The request body carries a `\"head\":5` key the brief requires but the oracle-consumer reference does not list as a valid key. If the live Intake rejects unknown keys, every `ask` would spend 0.5 IMD and fail. I could not verify this against the live service, so it is not in the findings. Also by design but worth knowing: a leaver coin whose pool dies stays in the holdings and blocks `mint` until a later rebalance can sell it, which the brief's \"dead pool blocks mint\" acceptance covers.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1226823,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":48270,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":672687}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4bd1550f418879af5f519979e4b082102a7487d552128888d8264b9cd38459a8","device":"b0b4e7bbc84f9d80","findings":[],"hash":"0607db55edde7f92fa253534b914d28695d8e46c05a556da25657c873869c5b7","nodeId":"17624343-cf52-485f-a806-3630035d902e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The deliverable is complete and verified locally.\n\n**What was built**\n\n- `src/Imdex5.sol`: the single `Imdex5` contract. ERC-20 share \"The Imdex 5\" / IMDEX5, no constructor arguments, no owner or settings. It implements mintFirst, mint, redeem, redeemToImd, claim, fund, ask, onOracleResult, onOracleFailure, closeRequest, submit and rebalance as the brief specifies, with internal accounting (`held`, `idleImd`, `feeImd`, `owed`), transient reentrancy guards on every state change, and events throughout. Swaps run inside PoolManager `unlock` through a self-call so one failing swap can be skipped or paid in kind.\n- `src/OracleAttestation.sol`: the protocol's library and consumer base, copied from the pinned reference. One adjustment: the vendored OpenZeppelin 5.4.0 has no calldata variant of the signature check, so the memory variant is used.\n- `src/Interfaces.sol`: minimal PoolManager, registry and Intake interfaces.\n- `lib/`: OpenZeppelin 5.4.0 and forge-std 1.9.7 as plain files, git metadata stripped.\n- `README.md`: accounting, every function, open choices, accepted limits, attack coverage, and operations.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build (solc 0.8.26, via_ir, cancun, bytecode_hash none) | passes |\n| forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed | 51 passed, 0 failed |\n| forge fmt --check | passes |\n| runtime size / forbidden opcodes | 20,443 bytes, none |\n| live registries vs starting list | identical, nothing substituted |\n\nThe tests mock every outside contract at its fixed mainnet address, include the protocol's conformance vector (digest, signature, selectors), and cover each item in the brief's attack list: over-minting, blocking redeem with four kinds of hostile coin, fee leakage, forged callbacks and tampered attestations, hook reentrancy, and double claims.\n\n**Choices worth knowing**\n\n- The 25% weight cap on buys applies only with four or more coins, matching step 3, so a short list does not strand idle IMD.\n- Coins dropped from the list but only partly sold at the 2% limit stay tracked after the list until sold.\n- Redeem gives each coin transfer 200,000 gas and reads return data in place, which is what makes \"cannot be blocked\" hold.\n- The body includes `\"head\":5` as the brief asks, although the oracle reference does not list that key. If the door refuses it, the failure callback closes the request and the next ask follows 7 days later.\n\nNothing was committed, since the rules put `.git/` off limits. The working tree holds all files as ordinary untracked paths with no submodules.","treeHash":"bf5db8a5ed79f2ec129fe4ec41182b9f302d8dd1","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3695281,"inputTokens":930,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":102712,"runtime":"claude","turns":70,"wallClockMs":1628616}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"f9a12c57a094ca8d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief's guarantee is 'A swap that reverts is skipped'. _trySell/_tryBuy rely on try/catch around this.swapSelf, but a try call forwards 63/64 of the remaining gas, and PoolManager.swap forwards 63/64 again to the pool's hook. A hook that consumes all of its gas (assembly invalid(), or any loop) when msg.sender of the swap is the index therefore burns ~95% of whatever gas rebalance() still has, each time it is reached. The index swaps the same coin twice in one rebalance when it leaves the list (step 1 sale) and is still over a quarter of value (step 3 trim, listCount >= 4): after two burned calls only ~1/64 of 1/64 of the gas is left and the step 4 buys (or any second burning hook) run out of gas, so the whole call reverts. The state that triggers it persists: the leftover coin keeps held > 0 because its sale never succeeds, and its share of value stays above 25% as long as the hook's owner holds the pool price up, so every later rebalance() fails the same way for any gas a block allows. While _nextList is non-empty, ask() reverts with ListAwaitsRebalance (line 234), so the index can never ask the oracle or change its list again. mint() is also blocked (its exact-out buy of the leftover coin is not in a try), which the brief accepts for a dead pool; redeem() and redeemToImd() still work. Precondition: a launch whose registry-recorded hook reverts by exhausting gas gets listed by the oracle once (the question ranks by spot price times supply with a 100 IMD pool, cheap to reach for a thin self-made pool) and then is dropped or stays over a quarter of value. This is a hook behaviour the brief does not accept (only 'a pool's own hook fee' is), and it defeats the stated skip-on-revert guarantee. Minimal fix that keeps the design: cap the gas given to each try call (this.swapSelf{gas: X}) so a burning hook cannot take more than a fixed slice, and/or do not attempt a coin whose sale was just skipped in the same rebalance.","line":472,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"State: MARG (launch 1283, hook 0xf0457d...) is held after mintFirst(1000e18) with all five pools at 1,000,000 coin / 10,000 IMD. Its hook is a contract that executes invalid() when beforeSwap's sender is the index. MARG's pool price then rises 5x (reserves 1,000,000 / 50,000) so MARG is ~56% of index value. fund(2e18); ask(); the Intake delivers an answer [1282, 737, 1075, 2000] (2000 a new recorded coin); submit(). Call rebalance{gas: 30_000_000}(). Expected: MARG's two swaps are skipped (SwapSkipped events), listCount becomes 4, nextList is empty, the new coin is bought with SC's proceeds. Actual: both MARG swaps burn their gas, the step 4 buys run out of gas and rebalance() reverts (EvmError: Revert / out of gas) for any gas limit. Afterwards, after 8 days, ask() reverts ListAwaitsRebalance. Proof: test/scratch/RebalanceGasBurn.t.sol (self-contained mocks).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        try this.swapSelf(coin.token, coin.hook, false, amount, false, true) returns (uint256 amountIn, uint256 out) {\n            held[coin.token] -= amountIn;","title":"A gas-burning hook on a coin the index swaps twice makes rebalance() revert out of gas, which then blocks ask() forever (ListAwaitsRebalance)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between the two mint paths. _mintMore reads the swap's actual amountIn and charges cost += amountIn (line 379), but _mintFirst ignores the amountIn that _swap returns (line 360: `(, uint256 out) = _swap(coin.token, coin.hook, true, part, false, false);`) and assumes every buy spent exactly `part`. A Uniswap v4 exact-input swap that reaches its sqrt price limit (here MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1 / MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1, i.e. when the pool's in-range liquidity is exhausted, as in a pool whose liquidity is concentrated or nearly empty) consumes only part of the input and returns a smaller delta; the minOut check only looks at the output. The unspent IMD stays in the contract but is neither idleImd nor feeImd, and because accounting is internal and never reads balanceOf, no function (redeem, redeemToImd, rebalance, ask, claim) can ever move it: it is lost to the holders who paid for the shares (the minter is minted `rest` shares as if everything were invested). Minimal fix in the brief's own terms: credit idleImd with rest minus the sum of the actual amountIn values (as _mintMore already does), or revert when amountIn < part.","line":364,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh index; four pools at 1,000,000 coin / 10,000 IMD, SC's pool (launch 1175) set to 1 wei / 1 wei of reserves (the constant-product mock caps the input at the price limit exactly as v4 does when it hits sqrtPriceLimitX96). alice calls mintFirst(1000e18, [0,0,0,0,0]). Expected: IMD balance of the index == idleImd + feeImd (5e18 fee, 0 idle) and 995 IMD worth of coins held, or a revert. Actual: the SC buy spends ~18.4 IMD of its 199 IMD part; the index's IMD balance is 185.55e18 while idleImd + feeImd is 5e18; 180.55 IMD is unaccounted and unreachable by any call. Proof: test/scratch/MintFirstStranded.t.sol.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        idleImd += rest - part * n;","title":"mintFirst credits idleImd with rest - part*n although a buy may spend less than part, stranding IMD that no accounting entry can ever pay out"}],"hash":"24c565c483e1cbc41af87b373c60559262a4d291361b68dea800b97d0fa80172","nodeId":"3becd7d4-cccf-4e72-81b6-0140aa2cb2d6","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is written and parses. Final state:\n\n**Outcome:** two substantiated findings, both medium, both with a self-contained failing Foundry proof under `test/scratch/`. The access-control surface itself holds: every state change is `nonReentrant`, the two callbacks are Intake-only and bound to the open request id, `unlockCallback` requires the PoolManager plus an entered guard, `swapSelf` is self-only, and `feeImd` only leaves through `ask` and the two 0.25 IMD rewards.\n\n**Findings in `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n1. **Gas-exhausting hook defeats \"a swap that reverts is skipped\"** (`src/Imdex5.sol:472`). A hook that burns all its gas when the index swaps takes about 95% of the remaining gas per attempt. A coin that leaves the list while over a quarter of value is tried twice in one `rebalance()`, after which the step 4 buys run out of gas and the whole call reverts at any gas limit. The pending list then blocks `ask()` with `ListAwaitsRebalance` forever. Redeems still work. Proof: `test/scratch/RebalanceGasBurn.t.sol`.\n\n2. **`mintFirst` strands unspent IMD** (`src/Imdex5.sol:364`). It credits `idleImd` with `rest - part*n` while ignoring each swap's actual `amountIn`, unlike `_mintMore`. A pool whose liquidity cannot absorb its part spends less, and the difference sits in the contract with no accounting entry that any function can pay out. In the repro the index holds 185.55 IMD against 5 IMD accounted. Proof: `test/scratch/MintFirstStranded.t.sol`.\n\n**Coverage:** all 17 listed entry points have a row (15 `holds`, 2 `finding`), plus three invariant rows for the must-attack items: fee leakage, reentrancy via coin or hook, and shares minted beyond payment. Nothing was left `unreached`.\n\n**Not reached in depth:** real Uniswap v4 slot layout for `_sqrtPrice` and the oracle body's `head` key were checked only by reading, not executed. The oracle question's ranking by spot price times supply is manipulable with a thin pool, but the brief accepts thin-pool effects, so it is noted only as the precondition of finding 1.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1142802,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":57206,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":899979}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5fdca4f96f37a80d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary x invariant seam. `_mintFirst` accepts a buy that returns zero coins (only `out < minOut[i]` is checked, and the caller chooses `minOut`), and still mints `rest` shares. On the real Uniswap v4 PoolManager an exact-input swap of 1 wei yields 0 output because SwapMath floors `amountIn * (1e6 - 12500) / 1e6 = 0` before pricing, so `mintFirst(6, [0,0,0,0,0])` sets totalSupply = 5 wei with held == 0 for all five coins and idleImd == 0. From then on: (a) `mintFirst` reverts `NotFirstMint` forever; (b) `_mintMore` computes `need = ceil(0 * shares / 5) = 0` for every coin and hits `if (need == 0) continue;` (line 376), `idlePart = 0`, `fee = 0`, so `total == 0` and any `mint(shares, 0)` mints an arbitrary number of shares for 0 IMD (shares minted beyond what was paid for); (c) nothing can ever put value into the index again: `fund` only credits feeImd, `rebalance` spends only idleImd (0) and sells only held (0). One holder of a single wei of shares (the griefer, or anyone who free-minted) keeps the index bricked indefinitely. The attack costs 6 wei of IMD plus gas and can be run at deployment before any honest first mint. The same mechanism, without an attacker, permanently excludes from the index any coin whose first buy rounds to zero while the others do not. Minimal fix that keeps the spec: treat a zero-output buy in `_mintFirst` as a failed buy (`if (out == 0) revert BuyFailed(coin.token);`), and/or refuse a mint whose `total == 0` when supply > 0.","line":360,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, pools healthy. 1) attacker: imd.approve(index, 6); index.mintFirst(6, [0,0,0,0,0]). fee = ceil(6*50/10000) = 1, rest = 5, part = 1 wei per coin; each swap returns out = 0 (real PM fee rounding; in the proof's pool mock the same floor is applied); held[coin] = 0 for all 5, idleImd = 0, totalSupply = 5. 2) bob: index.mint(1000e18, 2000e18). Expected: bob pays about 1000 IMD and the index holds every listed coin. Actual: every coin hits `need == 0 -> continue`, total = 0, bob receives 1000e18 shares and the full 2000e18 refund; held stays 0 for every coin; index.mintFirst(...) by anyone reverts NotFirstMint. The proof test asserts that after the dust mint a 1000 IMD entry costs more than 0 and leaves every coin held > 0; it fails on this code with 'shares were minted for nothing: 0 <= 0'.","severity":"high","snippet":"            (, uint256 out) = _swap(coin.token, coin.hook, true, part, false, false);\n            if (out < minOut[i]) revert TooLittleOut(out);\n            held[coin.token] += out;","title":"Dust first mint (6 wei) buys nothing yet mints shares: index is permanently bricked and every later mint is free"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Branch comparison (Boundary guide). `redeem` pays floor(held * shares * 9950 / (supply * 10000)) of every coin, keeping 0.5% in `held` for the remaining holders. `_redeemToImd` removes `amount = floor(held * shares / supply)` (100% of the proportional holding) from `held` and, when the sale reverts or fills partially, pays the whole unsold part in kind with no 0.5% retained and no fee credited. Whenever a coin's pool is dead or thin, `redeemToImd` is strictly better than `redeem` for the redeemer by 0.5% of that coin, and the remaining holders receive less than the `redeem` path would leave them. No funds are lost outright; it is an inconsistency between two paths the spec describes as sharing `f` and the fee.","line":405,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"State: alice mintFirst(1000e18) so held[coin2] = h, supply = 995e18; the pool of coin2 is dead (existing test test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails). alice redeemToImd(199e18, 0): coin2 paid in kind = h * 199e18 / 995e18 (100% of f). The same alice calling redeem(199e18) instead would receive h * 199e18 * 9950 / (995e18 * 10000) (99.5% of f). Expected per the brief: both redeem paths apply the same 0.5% to the proportional holding; actual: the in-kind fallback of redeemToImd applies none.","severity":"low","snippet":"                if (amountIn < amount) _pay(coin.token, caller, amount - amountIn);\n            } catch {\n                emit SwapSkipped(coin.token, false, amount);\n                _pay(coin.token, caller, amount);","title":"redeemToImd pays 100% in kind when a sale fails while redeem pays 99.5%: fee branch asymmetry"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Zero x invariant seam, reported separately from finding 1 because it needs no attacker. `mint` buys `ceil(held * f)` of each coin, so a coin with `held == 0` is skipped. A coin enters the list with held == 0 whenever its step-4 buy in `_rebalance` is skipped (pool dead or uninitialised at that moment, revert caught in `_tryBuy`) or when idleImd is 0 because the new list added coins without removing any (e.g. the previous answer had 4 launches and the next has 5: step 1 sells nothing, part = 0, nothing is bought). Every later mint then charges and buys only the other coins, so the index of five tracks four (or fewer) until a future rebalance happens to sell something. The brief defines mint proportionally, so this is a design gap rather than a code deviation; it is recorded so the author can decide whether a list coin at zero should be bought with an equal share of the mint instead of skipped.","line":376,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"State (mocks of the project's test suite): alice mintFirst(1000e18). Round 1: oracle answers [1282, 1283, 737, 1075]; rebalance sells coin 1175 into idle and buys the four. Round 2 (7 days later): oracle answers [1282, 1283, 737, 1075, 2000]; the pool of launch 2000 (NEW_TOKEN) is unavailable at that moment (dead/uninitialised), so the step-4 buy is skipped: after rebalance held[NEW_TOKEN] = 0, idleImd = 19402000000000000003, listCount = 5. The pool then recovers. bob mint(1000e18, 3000e18): bob pays 1052802042930172401787 wei IMD, held[coin0] rises to 47738131912377772108718, held[NEW_TOKEN] stays 0 because need = ceil(0 * 1000e18 / supply) = 0 -> continue. Expected per the brief's index of five: the fifth list coin is bought; actual: never by any mint, and only a later rebalance that happens to sell something can buy it. Variant without a dead pool: same rounds with the pool healthy give held[NEW_TOKEN] = 1936442913459306254005 (about 2% weight from the round-1 idle residue) and every later mint preserves that 2% instead of moving toward 20%.","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (need == 0) continue;","title":"A list coin whose holding is zero is never bought by mint; only idle IMD at a later rebalance can add it"}],"hash":"3e56902ac9ba79bb5ad3c4469ac57c9609b6faa9e8fdda592f232238fee60f87","nodeId":"aa880834-7500-48d4-a9ed-8fc945ee2da5","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. Findings are in `.imd-findings.json` with a 20-row coverage record, and the proof test under `test/scratch/` fails on the current code for the stated reason.\n\n**Findings**\n\n- **High. Dust first mint bricks the index and makes every later mint free** (`src/Imdex5.sol:360`). A first mint of 6 wei spends 1 wei per coin. On the real PoolManager a 1-wei exact-input swap returns 0 because the fee floor zeroes the input before pricing. The code accepts a zero-output buy when the caller passes zero minOut and still mints 5 wei of shares. From then on `mintFirst` is closed, `mint` skips every coin at `need == 0`, so `mint(1000e18, 0)` returns 1000e18 shares for nothing, and no path can ever put value back in. One wei of shares held by anyone keeps it bricked. The proof uses a v4-style fee-rounding pool mock and fails with \"shares were minted for nothing\". Minimal fix within the brief: treat a zero-output buy in `_mintFirst` as a failed buy.\n- **Low. Fee asymmetry between the two redeem paths** (`src/Imdex5.sol:405`). When a sale fails, `redeemToImd` pays the whole proportional holding in kind, while `redeem` pays 99.5%. Numbers are in the repro.\n- **Low. A list coin held at zero is never bought by mint** (`src/Imdex5.sol:376`). Verified with the project mocks: a coin whose rebalance buy was skipped stays at zero through a 1000 IMD mint, and a coin that entered with only idle residue stays at about 2% weight forever. This follows the brief's proportional definition, so it is recorded as a design gap for the author's decision.\n\n**What held in my area.** Rounding directions are right everywhere: mint costs round up, both redeem payouts round down, fees round up, the last redeemer's 100% is exact. The IMD balance invariant and the feeImd-only-leaves-via-oracle invariant trace cleanly. The 2% sqrt limit math, the BalanceDelta sign decode, the slot-6 price read, and both orientations of the spot-value formula are correct and overflow-safe under mulDiv. Every listed entry point has a coverage row. Static-analysis leads checked: the divide-before-multiply is correct dust handling, the encodePacked line is not hashed, and the state-after-call in `ask` is protected by the guard.\n\n**Not reached.** Hook-delta edge cases on the real PoolManager, where a hook charges more than the specified amount and the unchecked `held -= amountIn` would revert a rebalance, were reasoned about but not reproduced since the brief accepts hook fees.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2293840,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":48253,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":811335}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"aa59747e0b53d22cdac63fbd6a41df16cb1e49ef431244a110d59b77f70caa87","device":"b273d407784470b4","findings":[],"hash":"4b2141c8c2893ebbec951edadb7a7049a01cbbdefcbdb997ad3355414400f656","nodeId":"b4832bd5-1db6-4a08-a8fb-2c6ac0d4f84d","outcome":"completed","summary":"The manifest is already correct and needs no change. The working tree is clean apart from my scratch directory, which is discarded before submission.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- `launch.json` has exactly the three schema keys: kind \"evm_contracts\", contracts and notes. The notes string is 1,868 characters, under the 4,000 limit.\n- It names one contract, Imdex5, with an empty constructorArgs list. That matches the accepted source, whose constructor at `src/Imdex5.sol:134` takes no parameters and only passes constants to its ERC20 and oracle-consumer bases.\n- No owner argument exists because the brief grants no owner, admin or role, so nothing resolves to the factory or to IMD. This satisfies the protected owners check.\n- The README records that every token and hook on the starting list equals the brief's value in the registries, so the notes correctly state that nothing was substituted.\n- `forge build` compiles cleanly under the pinned toolchain. `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passes all 47 tests.\n- The Imdex5 runtime is 22,011 bytes, under the 24,576-byte EIP-170 ceiling that the protected deployment probe enforces.\n\nNo findings were attached to this revision round, and the accepted manifest already describes the accepted implementation exactly, so the only file in scope is left as it was. No other file was created or modified.","treeHash":"8ac1a10587254a3fe0388beed557ec72b41ae979","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":273148,"inputTokens":130,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":1985,"runtime":"claude","turns":5,"wallClockMs":89526}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f8ec71700779f83f9bc822ae46c41c3bf79a32621fb5c32c694ccc0bda3d3a03","device":"e06554fd2816f9d7","findings":[{"description":"_mintMore computes total = cost + idlePart + fee and only checks total > maxImdIn. When every held[coin] is 0 and idleImd is 0 while totalSupply > 0, every need is 0, cost is 0, idlePart is 0, so total is 0 and mint(shares, 0) mints any number of shares for free. That state is reachable by anyone as the first minter: mintFirst(6) takes fee = 1 and rest = 5, so each of the five buys is a 1-wei exact-input swap. In a real Uniswap v4 pool the 1.25% fee is rounded up and consumes the whole wei, so the swap returns 0 coin; in any thin or expensive pool the same happens. Nothing goes to idleImd because rest is divisible by 5. Result: supply 5, nothing held, idle 0. The attacker then calls mint(1e30, 0) and owns the supply. From then on no IMD can enter the holders' accounting: mintFirst reverts NotFirstMint, mint buys 0 of each coin and adds 0 idle (so honest deposits cost 0 and buy nothing), fund only feeds feeImd, and rebalance has no idle to spend. The index stays dead as long as the attacker keeps one share. The same root cause in a milder form: mintFirst(10) (rest 9, idle 4) leaves an index with zero coins whose later mints only add idle IMD until the next weekly rebalance. Suggested minimal fix consistent with the brief: revert in _mintMore when total == 0 (a mint must pay for something), and/or revert in _mintFirst when every buy returned 0.","line":386,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Imdex5} from \"src/Imdex5.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager, IUnlockCallback} from \"src/Interfaces.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal ERC-20.\ncontract Coin {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 a) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address s, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][s] = a;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= a;\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address f, address t, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[f][msg.sender] -= a;\n        balanceOf[f] -= a;\n        balanceOf[t] += a;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev A PoolManager stand-in: every pool is a constant-product pool in which the coin is\n/// expensive (1 coin unit costs 1e4 IMD units), so a 1-wei IMD swap returns 0 coin, exactly as a\n/// real Uniswap v4 pool does when its 1.25% fee rounds a 1-wei input up to 1 wei of fee.\ncontract ExpensivePoolManager {\n    uint256 constant COIN_R = 1e18;\n    uint256 constant IMD_R = 1e22;\n    address immutable imd;\n    mapping(address => int256) delta;\n    address synced;\n    uint256 syncedBal;\n\n    constructor(address imd_) {\n        imd = imd_;\n    }\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory r) {\n        r = IUnlockCallback(msg.sender).unlockCallback(data);\n    }\n\n    function swap(IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key, IPoolManager.SwapParams memory p, bytes calldata)\n        external\n        returns (int256)\n    {\n        require(p.amountSpecified < 0, \"exact in only here\");\n        uint256 amountIn = uint256(-p.amountSpecified);\n        address inCur = p.zeroForOne ? key.currency0 : key.currency1;\n        require(inCur == imd, \"buys only\");\n        uint256 amountOut = COIN_R * amountIn / (IMD_R + amountIn); // 0 for tiny inputs\n        delta[inCur] -= int256(amountIn);\n        int256 a0 = p.zeroForOne ? -int256(amountIn) : int256(amountOut);\n        int256 a1 = p.zeroForOne ? int256(amountOut) : -int256(amountIn);\n        return int256((uint256(a0) << 128) | uint256(uint128(int128(a1))));\n    }\n\n    function sync(address c) external {\n        synced = c;\n        syncedBal = Coin(c).balanceOf(address(this));\n    }\n\n    function settle() external payable returns (uint256 paid) {\n        paid = Coin(synced).balanceOf(address(this)) - syncedBal;\n        delta[synced] += int256(paid);\n    }\n\n    function take(address c, address to, uint256 a) external {\n        Coin(c).transfer(to, a);\n    }\n\n    function extsload(bytes32) external pure returns (bytes32) {\n        return bytes32(0);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @title A 6-wei first mint followed by a free mint bricks the index\n/// @notice Expected: `mint` never issues shares for nothing; or `mintFirst` refuses to leave the\n/// index with no holdings. Actual: after `mintFirst(6)` every holding is 0 and `idleImd` is 0, so\n/// `mint(1e30, 0)` costs 0 and succeeds; from then on no IMD can ever enter the holders'\n/// accounting (`mintFirst` reverts `NotFirstMint`, `mint` buys nothing), so the index is dead for\n/// as long as the attacker keeps one share.\ncontract FreeMintProofTest is Test {\n    Imdex5 index;\n    Coin imd;\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n    address victim = makeAddr(\"victim\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        index = new Imdex5();\n        imd = Coin(index.IMD());\n        vm.etch(address(imd), address(new Coin()).code);\n        vm.etch(index.POOL_MANAGER(), address(new ExpensivePoolManager(address(imd))).code);\n        // the immutable `imd` lives in code; the etched copy was built with the right address\n        Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            vm.etch(coins[i].token, address(new Coin()).code);\n            Coin(coins[i].token).mint(index.POOL_MANAGER(), 1e30);\n        }\n        imd.mint(attacker, 1e18);\n        imd.mint(victim, 1_000e18);\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(victim);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_sixWeiFirstMintThenFreeMintBricksTheIndex() public {\n        // 6 wei in: fee = 1, rest = 5, one wei per coin, every buy returns 0 coin\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        index.mintFirst(6, new uint256[](5));\n        assertEq(index.totalSupply(), 5);\n        assertEq(index.idleImd(), 0);\n        Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            assertEq(index.held(coins[i].token), 0);\n        }\n\n        // shares minted beyond what was paid for: 1e30 shares for 0 IMD\n        uint256 before = imd.balanceOf(attacker);\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        index.mint(1e30, 0);\n        uint256 paid = before - imd.balanceOf(attacker);\n        assertEq(index.balanceOf(attacker), 1e30 + 5);\n\n        // the victim can neither start the index nor put value in: their mint costs 0 and buys 0\n        vm.prank(victim);\n        vm.expectRevert(Imdex5.NotFirstMint.selector);\n        index.mintFirst(1_000e18, new uint256[](5));\n        uint256 victimBefore = imd.balanceOf(victim);\n        vm.prank(victim);\n        index.mint(1_000e18, 1_000e18);\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(victim), victimBefore, \"the victim's deposit went nowhere\");\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            assertEq(index.held(coins[i].token), 0, \"still nothing held\");\n        }\n        assertEq(index.idleImd(), 0);\n\n        // the defect: a mint that cost nothing issued shares. Fixed code reverts the free mint.\n        assertGt(paid, 0, \"mint issued 1e30 shares for 0 IMD\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"mintFirst(6, [0,0,0,0,0]) against pools where a 1-wei IMD buy yields 0 coin (any real v4 pool with the 1.25% fee, or the stand-in in the proof). Expected: either mintFirst refuses to leave the index with no holdings, or the following mint(1e30, 0) reverts because it pays for nothing. Actual: mintFirst succeeds with totalSupply 5, held 0 for all coins, idleImd 0; mint(1e30, 0) succeeds and pulls 0 IMD; a victim's mint(1000e18, 1000e18) then also pulls 0 IMD and buys nothing; mintFirst reverts NotFirstMint forever.","severity":"high","title":"mint issues shares for nothing once a dust first mint leaves the index with no holdings; one 6-wei transaction bricks the index"},{"description":"_pay uses token.call with no gas cap. One coin whose transfer burns all gas leaves the caller 1/64 of the gas supplied, so a redeem that would need 300k gas needs about 20M to complete (test_oneGasBurningCoinDoesNotBlockRedeemGivenGas shows it completes with 30M and records the burner as owed). With two such coins in the holdings the caller keeps 1/4096 of the gas and redeem cannot complete inside a block. The coins come from the registry's token artifacts, so this needs a hostile or broken launch token to be selected by the oracle. The README lists it as accepted; it is recorded here because the brief says redeem cannot be blocked. A bounded gas stipend on the payment call (for example 100k) would close it without adding a mechanism.","line":551,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"Etch a token whose transfer() loops forever at two of the five coin addresses after mintFirst(1000e18); call redeem(995e18) with 30,000,000 gas. Expected: redeem completes and both coins become owed. Actual: out of gas; with a single such coin it completes only when given about 20M gas.","severity":"low","title":"redeem forwards all gas to each coin; a coin that burns gas makes redeem cost up to 64x and two such coins make it impossible"}],"hash":"597b614bb048636e7bcb547070b338267bcb397e7732809b3f714741ff192fa4","nodeId":"66c1ab96-f12c-4e9e-a28a-1ce7d9fd534e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Both claims in the low finding hold: with one gas-burning coin a redeem completes given 20M gas, with two it runs out of gas at 30M. Everything is in place.\n\n## Recap\n\n**Delivered** (all under `test/`, full suite green with the verifier's fuzz seed: 73 tests in 4 suites, 8 invariants over 96 sequences of depth 40 with zero handler reverts):\n\n- `test/Imdex5Base.sol`: shared setup etching mocks at every hard-coded mainnet address, plus helpers.\n- `test/mocks/AttackMocks.sol`: a coin that re-enters the index during `transfer`, a gas-burning coin, and an Intake that refuses requests.\n- `test/Imdex5Edges.t.sol` (33 tests): fee threshold at exactly 0.75 IMD and that a returned ask does not start the interval; ask reverting whole when the Intake refuses; closing a request not resetting the interval; forged callbacks fuzzed over caller, id and agreement; late answers after close ignored; five-entry answer under the 200k stipend; attestation signed for another consumer or another chain rejected; a signed attestation with a spliced-in answer rejected; malformed answer bytes not bricking the round; rewards skipped when fees cannot pay and never dipping into idle IMD; redeem to a no-code token and failed IMD payments becoming owed and claimable; a re-entering coin blocked in `redeem`, `claim`, `mint` and `rebalance` with the debt paid once; pro-rata and split-redeem bounds fuzzed; mint buying exactly the rounded-up share; 2% sell and buy limits; 25% buy cap and trim; no trim under four coins; residual coins redeemable while blocking mint; the share behaving as a plain ERC-20.\n- `test/Imdex5.invariant.t.sol`: a handler driving three actors through every function plus pool deaths, coin failure modes, time, and the full oracle round. Invariants: IMD balance equals idle plus fee plus owed; each coin's balance equals held plus owed; zero supply means nothing held; actors as a group never extract more IMD than they put in and pools never lose IMD; `feeImd` leaves only as 0.75 per ask and 0.25 per reward; no free mint while value is held; list shape and no orphaned holding; request state consistency.\n\n**Reported, not tested around** (`.imd-findings.json`):\n\n- **High**: a 6-wei first mint leaves every holding and idle IMD at zero while supply is 5, after which `mint(1e30, 0)` issues shares for nothing, and no IMD can ever re-enter the holders' accounting. The proof test in `test/scratch/FreeMintProof.t.sol` fails on the current code at the \"mint issued shares for 0 IMD\" assertion and is embedded in the findings file.\n- **Low**: `_pay` forwards all gas, so one gas-burning coin makes redeem need about 20M gas and two make it impossible. Verified in scratch.\n\n**Not done**: the README is outside my write scope, so the new test files are not listed there.","treeHash":"7281a80496833a91a5e7e5dfb0b568bfbd88427b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2778508,"inputTokens":674,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":68860,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":1057595}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"52c98c0dc01791cd","findings":[],"hash":"66ee5f0a5cf73d53825a46c4c3cfe64699dd462f99e644d2d36c6efc5271691f","nodeId":"7fe34c36-28af-4453-a27b-b7ed0ca595ed","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list, a settlement record for each prior item, and a coverage row for all 17 entry points plus two invariants. The scratch tests I used were removed, so the tree is as it was.\n\n**Outcome of the settlement**\n\n- **Six-wei free mint (high): fixed.** A first buy returning zero now reverts, and a mint whose total charge is zero reverts. Both attached proofs pass on the revised code.\n- **Hostile hook blocking rebalance (high): fixed.** Every skippable swap gets a 1,000,000 gas cap, and the swap reverts inside the try when the manager's transient nonzero-delta count is not zero after settlement. I confirmed the slot constant equals keccak of \"NonzeroDeltaCount\" minus one, that the real PoolManager exposes that read, and that a reverted sub-call rolls transient storage back with it.\n- **Stranded IMD on a partial first fill (medium): fixed.** The real amount spent is summed and the remainder credited to idle IMD. All three attached proofs pass.\n- **Redeem blocked by gas-burning coins (medium): fixed.** Coin payments run under a 300,000 gas cap and a failure is recorded as owed. I also measured five return-bombing coins, which cost a redeem about 1.7M gas, so the capped call opens no new block.\n- **In-kind fee asymmetry (low): fixed** through the shared in-kind payment rule.\n- **Weekly re-ask and zero-held list coin (advisory): dropped.** The author's reasoning holds in both cases. Gating ask on an unsubmitted answer could lock the oracle loop on an unstorable answer, and the mint rule is the brief's own definition.\n\n**No new defect** was reproduced. The full project suite passes with 112 tests including the invariant suite, the runtime is 22,010 bytes, the manifest is schema-valid with no constructor arguments, and the two specialist notes this round, a one-wei rounding in the holders' favour and the registry lookup order, are not defects.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1631852,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":22905,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":464889}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a0f4c3f900dedd4a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics, write_foundry_tests and audit_math (one root cause). _mintFirst accepts a buy that returns zero coins (line 360-361 only check `out < minOut[i]`, and the caller chooses minOut) and still mints `rest` shares; _mintMore prices a mint purely as sum(ceil(held*f)) + ceil(idleImd*f) + fee and never requires that total to be positive (line 386-387). mintFirst(6, [0,0,0,0,0]) gives fee = ceil(6*50/10000) = 1, rest = 5, part = 1 wei per coin. On the real Uniswap v4 PoolManager an exact-input swap of 1 wei is wholly consumed as LP fee: SwapMath computes amountRemainingLessFee = floor(1 * (1e6 - 12500) / 1e6) = 0, the price does not move, amountOut = 0, and the swap returns a delta of (-1, 0) without reverting (SwapAmountCannotBeZero only guards amountSpecified == 0). The result is totalSupply = 5, held[coin] = 0 for all five coins, idleImd = 0. From then on every mint computes need = 0 for every coin (`if (need == 0) continue;`, line 376), idlePart = 0, fee = 0, total = 0, so mint(shares, 0) issues any number of shares for no IMD (the brief's first MUST ATTACK: shares minted beyond what was paid for). The state is permanent: mintFirst reverts NotFirstMint while supply > 0, a mint can only buy held*f = 0, fund only credits feeImd, rebalance only spends idleImd (0), so no IMD can ever enter the holders' accounting again. Anyone can front-run the first honest mintFirst with 6 wei of IMD plus gas and disable the product; the same end state is reached by accident whenever every first buy returns zero. The README's stated invariant 'shares are minted only against IMD actually spent' is false. Minimal fix in the brief's terms: in _mintFirst treat `out == 0` as a failed buy (revert BuyFailed(coin.token)), and in _mintMore revert when `total == 0` so a share is never issued for nothing.","line":387,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Imdex5} from \"src/Imdex5.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager, IUnlockCallback} from \"src/Interfaces.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Plain ERC-20 used for IMD and every coin.\ncontract ScratchToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev A PoolManager stand-in with a fixed price of 100 coin per IMD and Uniswap's 1.25% fee\n/// floor: an exact-input swap first strips the fee (`amountIn * 987500 / 1e6`, which is 0 for a\n/// one-wei input, exactly as Uniswap v4's SwapMath does), then pays 100 coin per remaining IMD.\n/// The whole specified input is consumed, as the real manager does (the dust is the LP fee).\ncontract ScratchPoolManager {\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    bool public unlocked;\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory result) {\n        require(!unlocked, \"AlreadyUnlocked\");\n        unlocked = true;\n        result = IUnlockCallback(msg.sender).unlockCallback(data);\n        unlocked = false;\n    }\n\n    function swap(IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key, IPoolManager.SwapParams memory params, bytes calldata)\n        external\n        returns (int256)\n    {\n        require(unlocked, \"ManagerLocked\");\n        require(params.amountSpecified != 0, \"SwapAmountCannotBeZero\");\n        address inCur = params.zeroForOne ? key.currency0 : key.currency1;\n        uint256 amountIn;\n        uint256 amountOut;\n        if (params.amountSpecified < 0) {\n            amountIn = uint256(-params.amountSpecified);\n            uint256 lessFee = amountIn * 987_500 / 1_000_000;\n            amountOut = inCur == IMD ? lessFee * 100 : lessFee / 100;\n        } else {\n            amountOut = uint256(params.amountSpecified);\n            uint256 raw = inCur == IMD ? (amountOut + 99) / 100 : amountOut * 100;\n            amountIn = (raw * 1_000_000 + 987_499) / 987_500;\n        }\n        int256 a0 = params.zeroForOne ? -int256(amountIn) : int256(amountOut);\n        int256 a1 = params.zeroForOne ? int256(amountOut) : -int256(amountIn);\n        return int256((uint256(a0) << 128) | uint256(uint128(int128(a1))));\n    }\n\n    function sync(address) external {}\n\n    function settle() external payable returns (uint256) {\n        return 0;\n    }\n\n    function take(address currency, address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        ScratchToken(currency).mint(to, amount);\n    }\n\n    function extsload(bytes32) external pure returns (bytes32) {\n        return bytes32(uint256(2 ** 96));\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice A six-wei first mint leaves `totalSupply = 5` with every `held` and `idleImd` at zero;\n/// from then on `mint` charges nothing, so shares are issued for free and the index can never\n/// take value again (every mint buys `held * f = 0` of everything).\ncontract FreeMintTest is Test {\n    Imdex5 index;\n    ScratchToken imd;\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n    address bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        index = new Imdex5();\n        imd = ScratchToken(index.IMD());\n        vm.etch(address(imd), address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        vm.etch(index.POOL_MANAGER(), address(new ScratchPoolManager()).code);\n        Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            vm.etch(coins[i].token, address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        }\n        imd.mint(attacker, 1e18);\n        imd.mint(bob, 10_000e18);\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_sharesCannotBeMintedForNothing() public {\n        // The attacker front-runs the first honest mint with six wei: fee 1, rest 5, part 1 per\n        // coin. One wei of input is entirely swallowed by the pool fee, so every buy returns 0.\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool firstOk,) = address(index).call(abi.encodeCall(index.mintFirst, (6, new uint256[](5))));\n        if (firstOk) {\n            assertEq(index.totalSupply(), 5, \"dust supply\");\n            Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n            for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n                assertEq(index.held(coins[i].token), 0, \"nothing was bought\");\n            }\n            assertEq(index.idleImd(), 0, \"nothing idle\");\n        }\n\n        // Bob now mints one million shares and pays nothing: no IMD is pulled (maxImdIn = 0).\n        uint256 before = imd.balanceOf(bob);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        (bool mintOk,) = address(index).call(abi.encodeCall(index.mint, (1_000_000e18, 0)));\n\n        bool freeShares = mintOk && index.balanceOf(bob) == 1_000_000e18 && imd.balanceOf(bob) == before;\n        assertFalse(freeShares, \"shares were minted for zero IMD\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh deployment, pools with ordinary liquidity. (1) attacker: IMD.approve(index, 6); index.mintFirst(6, new uint256[](5)) -> succeeds: feeImd 1, totalSupply 5, held[*] 0, idleImd 0. (2) bob: index.mint(1_000_000e18, 0). Expected: revert, since nothing is bought and nothing is paid. Actual: succeeds; bob holds 1_000_000e18 IMDEX5, his IMD balance is unchanged, the index holds no coin and no idle IMD. (3) any later mint(x, y) pulls y and refunds all of it, buys nothing; mintFirst reverts NotFirstMint forever. Proof test/scratch (attached) fails on this code with 'shares were minted for zero IMD'.","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (total > maxImdIn) revert TooExpensive(total);","title":"A six-wei first mint buys nothing yet mints shares; every later mint is then free and the index is bricked for good"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_permissions, reproduced and extended with a gas-independent variant. The brief's guarantee is 'A swap that reverts is skipped'. _trySell/_tryBuy implement it with try/catch around this.swapSelf (lines 472, 481), which isolates only a revert of that call. A pool's hook is code the launch chose (the registry's 'hook' artifact); it runs inside PoolManager.swap with the index as the swap's sender and can misbehave only for the index. Two ways defeat the skip: (a) Gas: a try call forwards 63/64 of the remaining gas and the manager forwards 63/64 again to the hook; a hook that burns everything (invalid()) leaves the index about 1/64 of what it had, so two such swaps in one rebalance (a leaver sold in step 1 and trimmed again in step 3 because it is still over a quarter of value) leave 1/4096 and the step 4 buys run out of gas; the whole call reverts at any block gas limit. (b) Unsettled delta, no gas needed: the hook calls PoolManager.take(IMD, hook, 1) in beforeSwap and never settles it. The swap returns normally, there is nothing to catch, and at the end of unlock the manager reverts CurrencyNotSettled, undoing the whole rebalance. A hostile coin only has to be listed once by the oracle (the question ranks by spot price times total supply among pools holding 100 IMD, both of which a launcher sets for its own thin pool): as soon as it is in the next list and idleImd > 0, step 4 tries to buy it, so the very first rebalance after that answer fails. While _nextList is non-empty, ask() reverts ListAwaitsRebalance (line 234) and submit() cannot run without a new answer, so the index can never rebalance or ask again; mint() is also blocked once the coin is held (not in a try). redeem() and redeemToImd() still work, so holders can only exit. This is a hook behaviour the brief does not accept (only 'a pool's own hook fee' is) and it breaks the stated skip-on-revert guarantee and the oracle loop permanently. The author must decide the fix (e.g. a gas cap on each swapSelf call plus a check of the manager's nonzero-delta count after the call, or a way to abandon a stored list whose rebalance cannot complete); note any fix changes rebalance semantics.","line":472,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"Proof test/scratch/HostileHookRebalance.t.sol (self-contained mocks; the PoolManager stand-in calls the pool's hook before a swap and, like the real one, reverts unlock when a currency delta is unsettled). test_hookLeavingAnUnsettledDeltaBlocksRebalanceAndAskForever: alice mintFirst(1000e18) with MARG's hook (0xf0457d..) passive; fund(2e18); ask(); the Intake delivers [1282, 1283, 737, 1075, 2000] (agreed 5), submit(); the hook is armed to take 1 wei of IMD when the swap sender is the index. bob rebalance{gas: 30M}(). Expected: MARG's buy is skipped (SwapSkipped), nextList empties, rebalance succeeds, ask() works 8 days later. Actual: rebalance reverts CurrencyNotSettled; 8 days later ask() reverts ListAwaitsRebalance. test_gasBurningHookMakesRebalanceRevertWhole: same start, list [1282, 737, 1075, 2000] drops MARG, MARG's pool is repriced 5x so it is over a quarter of value, the hook executes invalid() for the index. rebalance{gas: 30M}() reverts: both MARG swaps are caught (SwapSkipped emitted) but the step 4 buys then run out of gas. Both tests fail on this code.","severity":"high","snippet":"        try this.swapSelf(coin.token, coin.hook, false, amount, false, true) returns (uint256 amountIn, uint256 out) {","title":"A launch hook that misbehaves only for the index's swaps makes rebalance() revert whole, for any gas, and then blocks ask() forever (ListAwaitsRebalance)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics, audit_permissions and audit_flow (one root cause). _swap returns the amounts the manager actually settled, and every other swap site uses amountIn (_mintMore charges it, _tryBuy/_trySell adjust idleImd and held by it, _redeemToImd pays the unsold remainder in kind). _mintFirst alone discards it, assumes every coin consumed exactly `part`, credits idleImd only with the division remainder (`idleImd += rest - part * n;`, line 364) and mints `rest` shares. A Uniswap v4 exact-input swap does not revert when in-range liquidity runs out before the sqrt price limit: once liquidity is zero the price jumps to the limit with zero amounts and the loop ends, so only the consumed input is reported in the delta. Then `part - amountIn` IMD was pulled from the minter, is in the contract's balance, but is in neither idleImd nor feeImd. Accounting never reads balanceOf and nothing sweeps, so redeem, redeemToImd, rebalance and ask can never move it: it is lost to every holder, while the first minter received `rest` shares for it. The README's invariant 'the IMD the contract holds always equals idleImd + feeImd' is broken by the first operation. minOut does not guard it (it bounds the coin received, and a quote against the thin pool already reflects the partial fill). This is not the accepted thin-pool price impact: no value moved to the pool, it is frozen in the index. Minimal fix: `(uint256 amountIn, uint256 out) = _swap(...)`, accumulate `spent += amountIn` and set `idleImd += rest - spent` (or revert BuyFailed when amountIn < part, matching 'revert if a buy fails').","line":360,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Imdex5} from \"src/Imdex5.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager, IUnlockCallback} from \"src/Interfaces.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Plain ERC-20 used for IMD and every coin.\ncontract ScratchToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev A PoolManager stand-in whose pools run out of liquidity: an exact-input swap consumes at\n/// most `maxFill` of the input (Uniswap v4 stops at the last tick and reports the real delta) and\n/// pays 100 coin per IMD consumed. `settle` credits exactly what was transferred in, as the real\n/// manager does; the unconsumed input simply stays with the caller.\ncontract ScratchPoolManager {\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint256 public constant maxFill = 10e18;\n    bool public unlocked;\n    address private synced;\n    uint256 private syncedBalance;\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory result) {\n        require(!unlocked, \"AlreadyUnlocked\");\n        unlocked = true;\n        result = IUnlockCallback(msg.sender).unlockCallback(data);\n        unlocked = false;\n    }\n\n    function swap(IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key, IPoolManager.SwapParams memory params, bytes calldata)\n        external\n        returns (int256)\n    {\n        require(unlocked, \"ManagerLocked\");\n        require(params.amountSpecified < 0, \"exact input only\");\n        address inCur = params.zeroForOne ? key.currency0 : key.currency1;\n        require(inCur == IMD, \"buys only\");\n        uint256 amountIn = uint256(-params.amountSpecified);\n        if (amountIn > maxFill) amountIn = maxFill;\n        uint256 amountOut = amountIn * 100;\n        int256 a0 = params.zeroForOne ? -int256(amountIn) : int256(amountOut);\n        int256 a1 = params.zeroForOne ? int256(amountOut) : -int256(amountIn);\n        return int256((uint256(a0) << 128) | uint256(uint128(int128(a1))));\n    }\n\n    function sync(address currency) external {\n        synced = currency;\n        syncedBalance = ScratchToken(currency).balanceOf(address(this));\n    }\n\n    function settle() external payable returns (uint256) {\n        return ScratchToken(synced).balanceOf(address(this)) - syncedBalance;\n    }\n\n    function take(address currency, address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        ScratchToken(currency).mint(to, amount);\n    }\n\n    function extsload(bytes32) external pure returns (bytes32) {\n        return bytes32(uint256(2 ** 96));\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice `_mintFirst` ignores the swap's `amountIn`. When a pool fills only part of `part`, the\n/// unspent IMD stays in the contract but is in neither `idleImd` nor `feeImd`, so no holder can\n/// ever redeem it, while the minter still receives `rest` shares as if all of it had been spent.\ncontract StrandedImdTest is Test {\n    Imdex5 index;\n    ScratchToken imd;\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        index = new Imdex5();\n        imd = ScratchToken(index.IMD());\n        vm.etch(address(imd), address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        vm.etch(index.POOL_MANAGER(), address(new ScratchPoolManager()).code);\n        Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            vm.etch(coins[i].token, address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        }\n        imd.mint(alice, 10_000e18);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_firstMintAccountsForEveryImdItHolds() public {\n        // 100 IMD: fee 0.5, rest 99.5, part 19.9 per coin; each pool can only absorb 10 IMD.\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        (bool ok,) = address(index).call(abi.encodeCall(index.mintFirst, (100e18, new uint256[](5))));\n        if (!ok) return; // a build that refuses a short fill also keeps the invariant\n\n        uint256 balance = imd.balanceOf(address(index));\n        uint256 accounted = index.idleImd() + index.feeImd();\n        emit log_named_uint(\"IMD the contract holds\", balance);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"IMD the accounting owns\", accounted);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"shares minted\", index.totalSupply());\n        assertEq(balance, accounted, \"IMD held but owned by nobody\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh index; each of the five pools can absorb only 10 IMD before its liquidity ends (the stand-in caps the input at the price limit exactly as v4 does). alice: mintFirst(100e18, [0,0,0,0,0]). Expected: either a revert, or feeImd 0.5e18 plus the 49.5e18 unspent IMD kept as idleImd so IMD balance == idleImd + feeImd. Actual: feeImd 0.5e18, idleImd 0, totalSupply 99.5e18, contract IMD balance 50e18; 49.5e18 IMD belongs to no accounting entry, and redeem(all shares) returns the coins plus 0 IMD. The attached proof fails on this code with 'IMD held but owned by nobody: 50000000000000000000 != 500000000000000000'. The same result with the project's own constant-product mock and one near-empty pool: mintFirst(1000e18) leaves about 14.5 IMD unaccounted (audit_flow's proof, also run and failing).","severity":"medium","snippet":"            (, uint256 out) = _swap(coin.token, coin.hook, true, part, false, false);","title":"mintFirst ignores the swap's real amountIn: IMD a partially filled buy leaves unspent is stranded outside idleImd and feeImd and can never be paid out"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From write_foundry_tests, reproduced. The brief says redeem 'cannot be blocked' and a coin whose transfer fails becomes owed. _pay isolates a revert but gives the coin all remaining gas (no gas cap on token.call). A coin whose transfer consumes everything it is given leaves the caller 1/64 of the gas supplied; after two such coins only 1/4096 remains, which cannot finish the loop, so redeem reverts out of gas at any block gas limit and the holder's exit is blocked. With one such coin redeem completes only with about 20M gas. The coins come from launch tokens the oracle lists, so it takes two hostile (or broken) launch tokens in the holdings at once; the README lists the one-coin case as accepted, but the brief's text does not, and the two-coin case is a hard block. The same unbounded forward exists in _redeemToImd's in-kind payments (line 405/408) and in claim (safeTransfer). A bounded stipend on the payment call (for example 100,000 gas, with the shortfall recorded as owed) keeps the design.","line":551,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/TwoBurners.t.sol (uses the project's Imdex5Base and GasBurnerERC20 mock): alice mintFirst(1000e18); etch a token whose transfer loops forever at two of the five coin addresses (tokens[2], tokens[3]); alice redeem(500e18) with 30,000,000 gas and again with 100,000,000 gas. Expected: redeem completes and both coins are recorded as owed. Actual: both calls fail (out of gas). With one such coin the same redeem fails at 5,000,000 gas and completes at 30,000,000 (test_oneBurnerNeedsHugeGas; the suite's test_oneGasBurningCoinDoesNotBlockRedeemGivenGas shows the same).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        (bool ok, bytes memory ret) = token.call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));","title":"redeem forwards all gas to each coin transfer: two coins whose transfer burns gas make redeem impossible, one makes it cost about 64x"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics, reproduced by trace and by the suite's own test_aLaterAskReplacesAnUnsubmittedAnswer. onOracleResult closes the request (openSince = 0) and stores answerHash, but ask() gates only on an open request, a stored next list and the 7-day interval, never on answerHash != 0. If nobody calls submit for 7 days after the first ask, anyone may ask again: 0.5 IMD goes to the Intake and 0.25 IMD to the caller, and when the second result arrives it overwrites answerHash, so the first attestation, already paid for, can never be submitted (WrongAnswer). The code matches the brief's letter for ask(), and the author tests this as intended, so this is reported low: feeImd leaves only through its two permitted channels, but for a request whose answer is then thrown away, and anyone can repeat it weekly for the 0.25 IMD reward while submit is neglected. Minimal fix if unwanted: in ask() revert when answerHash != 0.","line":233,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"fund(2e18); ask() at t0 (feeImd 1.25e18, request R1 open). Intake calls onOracleResult(R1, a1 with agreed 5): openSince 0, answerHash = keccak(a1.answer). Nobody submits. At t0 + 7 days anyone calls ask(). Expected (if an answer awaiting submission should block): revert. Actual: succeeds, feeImd 0.5e18, request R2 open. Intake calls onOracleResult(R2, a2): answerHash = keccak(a2.answer); submit(a1, sig1) reverts WrongAnswer. Exactly the sequence of test/Imdex5Edges.t.sol test_aLaterAskReplacesAnUnsubmittedAnswer, which passes.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (openSince != 0) revert RequestOpen();","title":"ask() re-asks while a paid-for answer is delivered but not yet submitted, spending 0.75 IMD of fees and discarding that answer"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math, reproduced by trace. redeem pays floor(held * shares * 9950 / (supply * 10000)) of every coin and leaves 0.5% in held for the remaining holders. _redeemToImd removes amount = floor(held * shares / supply) (100% of f) from held (line 400) and, when the sale reverts (line 408) or fills short (line 405), pays the whole unsold part in kind with no 0.5% retained and no fee credited. Whenever a coin's pool is dead or thin, redeemToImd hands the redeemer 0.5% more of that coin than redeem would, at the remaining holders' expense. No funds are lost outright and the brief's text for the in-kind fallback does not say which rule applies, so low; the author should pick one.","line":408,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"alice mintFirst(1000e18) so held[coin2] = h, supply = 995e18; coin2's pool is dead (the suite's test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails state). alice redeemToImd(199e18, 0): coin2 paid in kind = h * 199e18 / 995e18 (100% of f). The same redeem(199e18) pays h * 199e18 * 9950 / (995e18 * 10000) (99.5% of f). Expected: both paths apply the same 0.5% to the proportional holding; actual: the in-kind fallback applies none.","severity":"low","snippet":"                _pay(coin.token, caller, amount);","title":"redeemToImd pays 100% of a coin in kind when its sale fails while redeem pays 99.5%: the two redeem paths disagree on the fee"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math, reproduced by trace; a design gap rather than a code deviation, since the brief defines mint as 'buy exactly held * f of every coin'. A coin enters the list with held == 0 when its step-4 buy is skipped (pool dead or uninitialised at that moment) or when idleImd was 0 (a list that adds coins without removing any). Every later mint then buys only the other coins, so the index of five tracks four until a rebalance happens to sell something. Recorded so the author can decide whether a list coin at zero should receive an equal share of a mint instead of being skipped.","line":376,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"Mocks of the project's suite: alice mintFirst(1000e18). Round 1: answer [1282, 1283, 737, 1075]; rebalance sells 1175 into idle and buys the four. Round 2 (7 days later): answer [1282, 1283, 737, 1075, 2000] with launch 2000's pool dead at that moment, so its buy is skipped: held[NEW_TOKEN] = 0, listCount = 5. The pool recovers. bob mint(1000e18, 3000e18): bob pays for the four coins, held[NEW_TOKEN] stays 0 because need = ceil(0 * f) = 0 -> continue. Expected per 'index of five': the fifth coin is bought; actual: never by any mint.","severity":"info","snippet":"            if (need == 0) continue;","title":"A list coin whose holding is zero is never bought by mint; only idle IMD at a later rebalance can add it"}],"hash":"7237116b00186385517d983327696b9b7654cc5aefaa1c6607a40f54f3aed0fe","nodeId":"7fe34c36-28af-4453-a27b-b7ed0ca595ed","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is complete: 7 findings, all snippets verified against the tree, 21 coverage rows (all 17 entry points plus 4 invariant/manifest rows), and three embedded proofs that each fail on the current code.\n\n## Review outcome\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`** (ranked by severity):\n\n1. **High. Six-wei first mint bricks the index and makes every later mint free.** Merged from three specialists (economics, tests, math). A 1-wei exact-input swap on real Uniswap v4 is wholly eaten as LP fee and returns zero, so `mintFirst(6, zeros)` leaves supply 5 with nothing held. From then on `mint` computes a total of zero and issues unlimited shares for no IMD, and no path can ever put value back. Proof: the economics specialist's self-contained test, re-run and failing.\n\n2. **High. A hostile launch hook permanently blocks rebalance and ask.** The permissions specialist reported the gas-burn variant without a proof file. I reproduced it and added a gas-independent variant: a hook that takes 1 wei of IMD in beforeSwap and never settles makes the manager revert the whole unlock with CurrencyNotSettled, which try/catch cannot isolate. The stored next list then blocks `ask()` forever. Proof: my test `test/scratch/HostileHookRebalance.t.sol`, two tests, both failing for the stated reasons.\n\n3. **Medium. mintFirst discards the swap's real amountIn**, stranding partially filled IMD outside both accounting buckets. Merged from three specialists. Proof attached and failing.\n\n4. **Medium. redeem forwards unbounded gas to coin transfers.** I confirmed two gas-burning coins block redeem even at 100M gas (one coin needs about 20M). The README accepts the one-coin case, but the brief says redeem cannot be blocked.\n\n5. **Low.** `ask()` can re-ask while a delivered answer awaits submit, discarding it. The author's own test shows this is intended, so kept low.\n6. **Low.** redeemToImd's in-kind fallback pays 100% where redeem pays 99.5%.\n7. **Info.** A list coin at zero holding is never bought by mint, by the brief's own definition.\n\n**Dropped nothing**: every specialist finding reproduced. Duplicates merged into findings 1 and 3.\n\n**My own pass** found no additional defects in the oracle callback, submit, claim, swapSelf, unlockCallback, fee accounting, or the manifest. The feeImd exit paths, owed-once rule and reentrancy guards hold. Runtime is 21,375 bytes, under the limit, and the constructor calls no contract.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1457893,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":40371,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":645734}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"54ee61f1f73417fc90189a400072e2f45798dcf34fe8e823569fea502f19ea5c","device":"ddc5542bddcad225","findings":[],"hash":"a10512445fafbf5600edd927f7ce3c7bee81e0e413e3d1f2931c0bec14e31c53","nodeId":"17624343-cf52-485f-a806-3630035d902e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The IMDEX5 index is implemented, tested and committed on `main` with a clean working tree.\n\n**What was built**\n\n- `src/Imdex5.sol`: one contract, no constructor arguments, no owner or setting. Runtime is 21,375 bytes. It covers fund, mintFirst, mint, redeem, redeemToImd, claim, ask, onOracleResult, onOracleFailure, closeRequest, submit and rebalance, with every state change behind `nonReentrant` and an event.\n- `src/OracleAttestation.sol` is the reference's canonical library and consumer copied verbatim. `src/Interfaces.sol` holds the PoolManager, registry and Intake slices.\n- `lib/` vendors OpenZeppelin 5.6.1 and forge-std 1.9.6 as ordinary files, with no git metadata or submodules.\n- `README.md` documents the accounting, every flow, the constants, the starting list, the open numbers I chose, the accepted risks and the operational duties.\n\n**The rejected fault is gone.** IMD is pulled only from `msg.sender` before entering the PoolManager unlock. The pool is paid with plain `transfer` from the contract's own balance, so no `transferFrom` has an arbitrary payer. Locals are initialised and the divide-then-multiply in redeem became a single `mulDiv`.\n\n**Checks**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build (solc 0.8.26, via_ir, cancun, bytecode_hash none) | passes |\n| forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed | 39 passed, 0 failed |\n| forge fmt --check | passes |\n| Protocol digest and callback selector vectors | match |\n\nTests mock the PoolManager as a constant-product pool with price limits and deltas, plus mock coins, registries, Intake and an ERC-1271 wallet etched at the constant signer address. They cover equal-part first mints, proportional mints with refund and rounding, both redeem paths, a dead pool, coins that revert or return false, forged callbacks and signatures, bad lists, the seven-day and two-day timers, rebalance sell, adopt, trim and buy, residual leavers, hook re-entry attempts, and a fee-conservation invariant.\n\n**Two things worth knowing**\n\n- Both registries were read through a public RPC. Every starting token and hook matches the brief, so nothing was substituted.\n- Slither is not on this machine, so the static-analysis pass could not be repeated locally. I removed every pattern the report named by inspection.","treeHash":"0f277fd35cd2f91a60b94a85f3132a4f72f8b1c5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3908082,"inputTokens":1026,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":94241,"runtime":"claude","turns":48,"wallClockMs":1287909}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"771b5a170e4797ad6df5821d8a494b00ce322e28db6fa598c6ea91d61d239f2a","device":"fa2b0b9c7ebc1547","findings":[],"hash":"aab1cc618948df892d7ffba87ebceba46fb96a6e47fc3f916ebec45e4b318042","nodeId":"17624343-cf52-485f-a806-3630035d902e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The file is in place; the harness's own exclude list hides it from status, which is expected.\n\n## Recap\n\nAll four reproducible findings are fixed, both attached proofs now pass, and the two advisory findings I judged wrong to \"fix\" are answered as disputed with reasons. The suite is 49 tests, all passing with the verifier's fuzz seed. `forge build`, `forge test` and `forge fmt --check` are clean, and the runtime stays under the size cap at 22,010 bytes.\n\n**What changed in `src/Imdex5.sol`** (the rest of the accepted code is untouched):\n\n- **Free shares (a7974294):** the first mint reverts when a buy returns zero coins, and a later mint reverts with a new `NothingToPay` error when it would charge nothing.\n- **Stranded IMD (364a9319):** the first mint now sums each swap's real input and credits the unspent remainder to the holders' idle IMD, so the contract's IMD balance always equals idle plus fees.\n- **Hostile hook (05fa57a9):** every skippable self-swap is called with a 1,000,000 gas cap, and after settling, each swap reads Uniswap v4's transient nonzero-delta count and reverts if a hook left a delta unsettled. That turns both the gas-burn and unsettled-delta attacks into a skipped swap instead of a reverted rebalance.\n- **Blocked redeem (52c8fa45):** each coin payment gets a 300,000 gas cap, so a coin that burns gas becomes owed rather than starving the next payment.\n- **In-kind fee (3d5ed1f0):** an unsold coin in `redeemToImd` is now paid under the same 99.5% rule as `redeem`, with 100% for the last redeemer.\n\n**Disputed, no code change:** gating `ask()` on an unsubmitted answer would let an unsubmittable answer (unrecorded launch, missing artifact) freeze the oracle loop forever, and a list coin at zero holding is not bought by `mint` because the brief defines mint as exactly `held * f`. Both are documented in the README.\n\n**Tests and docs:** nine new or updated tests cover each fix, and I confirmed every one fails on the previous contract for the reported reason. The mocks gained a gas-burning token mode, a per-pool fill cap, a zero-output mode, the delta-count read, and a hook that takes an unsettled delta or burns gas for one sender only. The README documents the two new gas constants, the changed mint and redeem semantics, the hook defence, and the gas callers should supply.\n\nOne caveat worth knowing: the two attached proofs use their own PoolManager stand-ins that lack `exttload`, so against those mocks the first mint reverts at the delta read rather than at the new guards. They pass as required, but the genuine behaviour is proven by the new tests in `test/Imdex5.t.sol`, whose mock implements the slot.\n\nI did not commit; the tree is left modified for the harness to pick up, as in the previous round.","treeHash":"bdcb725d935455e19a486469e800399b3e06b28c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1996260,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":47668,"runtime":"claude","turns":64,"wallClockMs":758946}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"35d9fc2c3349403cda710b8efbc8fa6dca771e0a6b602370dd9cae4acab156df","device":"dc176559ff153c37","findings":[{"description":"redeem computes floor(held * shares * 9950 / (supply * 10000)) in one mulDiv. redeemToImd first takes amount = floor(held * shares / supply), then _payInKind pays floor(amount * 9950 / 10000): two floors, so the in-kind payment is at most 1 wei under redeem's for the same shares, and the extra wei stays in held for the remaining holders. The direction favours the index and nothing is lost (test/Imdex5Revised.t.sol testFuzz_redeemToImdPaysADeadCoinExactlyAsRedeemDoes asserts the difference is at most 1 wei and the residual accounts for it). Only the README sentence 'Both redeem paths therefore pay the same amount of a coin that cannot be sold' is imprecise.","line":573,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"mintFirst(1000e18) with the base mocks; mark MARG's pool dead; redeem(9861) pays 192405 wei of MARG, while redeemToImd(9861, 0) from the same state pays 192404 wei and leaves the extra wei in held[MARG]. Expected per README: equal; actual: 1 wei apart, in the holders' favour.","severity":"info","title":"redeemToImd's in-kind payment can be 1 wei under what redeem pays for the same coin; the README says the two paths pay the same"},{"description":"_lookup picks REGISTRY_A whenever it records the launch and never consults REGISTRY_B afterwards. If A records a launch with an incomplete artifact list while B records it with both roles, submit reverts ArtifactMissing and that answer can never be stored; the round is recoverable only by asking again after 7 days. The brief's 'the registry that records it' does not say which wins when both do, so this is an interpretation to confirm, not a defect. test/Imdex5Revised.t.sol test_submitUsesTheRegistryArtifactsNotTheStartingList pins the A-first order.","line":603,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"Record launch 1282 in registry A with only a 'token' artifact and in registry B with 'token' and 'hook'; deliver an answer [1282]; submit reverts ArtifactMissing(1282) although B has a complete record. Expected under the other reading: the list is stored from B.","severity":"info","title":"A launch recorded in both registries is read from registry A only, even when A lacks the token or hook artifact that B has"}],"hash":"bb304ab42bbbfa53478988b5f0162ea0b6fa61c3d6557a08bdb02b76a4e1708f","nodeId":"66c1ab96-f12c-4e9e-a28a-1ce7d9fd534e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The revision is complete and verified: `forge build` succeeds and `forge test` passes all 108 tests with the verifier's fuzz seed and with a second seed.\n\n**What changed in the implementation since my last round** The implementer added the fixes my previous findings asked for: a first mint that buys nothing now reverts, a mint that would cost nothing reverts, a coin that cannot be sold in `redeemToImd` is paid under the same 99.5% rule as `redeem`, every skippable swap and every coin payment gets a fixed gas budget, and a hook that leaves a delta unsettled makes that one swap fail instead of the whole call. They also changed the mock pool struct, which broke my base harness.\n\n**What I did**\n- Repaired the compile break in the shared harness and re-bounded one fuzz test whose dust input is now a deliberate revert.\n- Added `test/Imdex5Revised.t.sol`, 26 tests over the revised paths: dust and zero-output buys, partial fills kept as idle IMD and redeemed pro rata, the in-kind redeem rule including the last redeemer taking 100%, five gas-burning coins under ordinary gas, hooks that burn gas or leave a delta during mint, mintFirst, redeemToImd and rebalance, re-entry attempts through the hook into the self-swap and the oracle callbacks, owed debts accumulating and paying once, a failed claim keeping its debt, the exact agreed, ask and close boundaries, replayed submissions, registry precedence and missing artifacts.\n- Extended the invariant handler with partial-fill caps, the gas-burning coin mode and the misbehaving hook, tightened the free-mint ghost so any zero-cost mint fails the invariant, and confirmed the campaign runs with no reverts.\n- Verified the hard-coded transient slot equals `keccak256(\"NonzeroDeltaCount\") - 1`, which the mock alone could not prove.\n\n**What I probed and ruled out** A caller cannot starve the swaps in `rebalance` with a low gas limit to consume the list for free. The 1M cap plus the 63/64 rule leaves too little for the rest of the call, so it reverts whole. No critical or high defect was found, so no proof file was needed.\n\n**Reported as informational** in `.imd-findings.json`: the in-kind payment in `redeemToImd` floors twice and can be 1 wei under what `redeem` pays, in the holders' favour, where the README says the two are equal. A launch recorded in both registries is read from registry A only, which the brief leaves open.\n\nStill owed, as before: fork runs against the live PoolManager, registries and Intake, which this machine and the verifier cannot make.","treeHash":"1132addc2b14009e89595429425eea78df781a8e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2783141,"inputTokens":770,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":46896,"runtime":"claude","turns":33,"wallClockMs":749471}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fcb71e606c933181","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"mint prices shares purely as held*f of every coin plus idleImd*f. Nothing requires that cost to be positive, and nothing in mintFirst requires a buy to return at least one unit. mintFirst(6, [0,0,0,0,0]) gives fee 1, rest 5, part 1 wei per coin: Uniswap v4 strips the 1.25% fee from a 1-wei input as floor(1*987500/1e6)=0, so each swap consumes the wei as LP fee and returns 0 (SwapMath keeps the price and sets amountOut 0). The result is totalSupply 5, held[coin]=0 for all five, idleImd 0. From then on every mint computes need 0 for every coin, idlePart 0 and fee 0, so total is 0 and any number of shares is minted for free with maxImdIn 0 (shares minted beyond what was paid for, the brief's first MUST ATTACK item). Worse, the state is permanent: a mint can only buy held*f, which is 0, so no later mint ever puts value into the index, mintFirst is locked out by totalSupply>0, and recovery would need every share burned while anyone can mint more for nothing. An attacker front-running the first honest mintFirst with 6 wei of IMD plus gas disables the product for good. The same end state is reached whenever all five first buys return 0 (empty pools and minOut all 0). The invariant 'shares are minted only against IMD actually spent' (README, Security notes) is broken.","line":388,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Imdex5} from \"src/Imdex5.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager, IUnlockCallback} from \"src/Interfaces.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Plain ERC-20 used for IMD and every coin.\ncontract ScratchToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev A PoolManager stand-in with a fixed price of 100 coin per IMD and Uniswap's 1.25% fee\n/// floor: an exact-input swap first strips the fee (`amountIn * 987500 / 1e6`, which is 0 for a\n/// one-wei input, exactly as Uniswap v4's SwapMath does), then pays 100 coin per remaining IMD.\n/// The whole specified input is consumed, as the real manager does (the dust is the LP fee).\ncontract ScratchPoolManager {\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    bool public unlocked;\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory result) {\n        require(!unlocked, \"AlreadyUnlocked\");\n        unlocked = true;\n        result = IUnlockCallback(msg.sender).unlockCallback(data);\n        unlocked = false;\n    }\n\n    function swap(IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key, IPoolManager.SwapParams memory params, bytes calldata)\n        external\n        returns (int256)\n    {\n        require(unlocked, \"ManagerLocked\");\n        require(params.amountSpecified != 0, \"SwapAmountCannotBeZero\");\n        address inCur = params.zeroForOne ? key.currency0 : key.currency1;\n        uint256 amountIn;\n        uint256 amountOut;\n        if (params.amountSpecified < 0) {\n            amountIn = uint256(-params.amountSpecified);\n            uint256 lessFee = amountIn * 987_500 / 1_000_000;\n            amountOut = inCur == IMD ? lessFee * 100 : lessFee / 100;\n        } else {\n            amountOut = uint256(params.amountSpecified);\n            uint256 raw = inCur == IMD ? (amountOut + 99) / 100 : amountOut * 100;\n            amountIn = (raw * 1_000_000 + 987_499) / 987_500;\n        }\n        int256 a0 = params.zeroForOne ? -int256(amountIn) : int256(amountOut);\n        int256 a1 = params.zeroForOne ? int256(amountOut) : -int256(amountIn);\n        return int256((uint256(a0) << 128) | uint256(uint128(int128(a1))));\n    }\n\n    function sync(address) external {}\n\n    function settle() external payable returns (uint256) {\n        return 0;\n    }\n\n    function take(address currency, address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        ScratchToken(currency).mint(to, amount);\n    }\n\n    function extsload(bytes32) external pure returns (bytes32) {\n        return bytes32(uint256(2 ** 96));\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice A six-wei first mint leaves `totalSupply = 5` with every `held` and `idleImd` at zero;\n/// from then on `mint` charges nothing, so shares are issued for free and the index can never\n/// take value again (every mint buys `held * f = 0` of everything).\ncontract FreeMintTest is Test {\n    Imdex5 index;\n    ScratchToken imd;\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n    address bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        index = new Imdex5();\n        imd = ScratchToken(index.IMD());\n        vm.etch(address(imd), address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        vm.etch(index.POOL_MANAGER(), address(new ScratchPoolManager()).code);\n        Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            vm.etch(coins[i].token, address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        }\n        imd.mint(attacker, 1e18);\n        imd.mint(bob, 10_000e18);\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_sharesCannotBeMintedForNothing() public {\n        // The attacker front-runs the first honest mint with six wei: fee 1, rest 5, part 1 per\n        // coin. One wei of input is entirely swallowed by the pool fee, so every buy returns 0.\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool firstOk,) = address(index).call(abi.encodeCall(index.mintFirst, (6, new uint256[](5))));\n        if (firstOk) {\n            assertEq(index.totalSupply(), 5, \"dust supply\");\n            Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n            for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n                assertEq(index.held(coins[i].token), 0, \"nothing was bought\");\n            }\n            assertEq(index.idleImd(), 0, \"nothing idle\");\n        }\n\n        // Bob now mints one million shares and pays nothing: no IMD is pulled (maxImdIn = 0).\n        uint256 before = imd.balanceOf(bob);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        (bool mintOk,) = address(index).call(abi.encodeCall(index.mint, (1_000_000e18, 0)));\n\n        bool freeShares = mintOk && index.balanceOf(bob) == 1_000_000e18 && imd.balanceOf(bob) == before;\n        assertFalse(freeShares, \"shares were minted for zero IMD\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh deployment, pools with ordinary liquidity. (1) attacker: IMD.approve(index, 6); mintFirst(6, new uint256[](5)) -> succeeds: feeImd 1, totalSupply 5, held[*]=0, idleImd 0. (2) bob: mint(1_000_000e18, 0) -> expected: revert (nothing is bought, nothing is paid); actual: succeeds, bob holds 1_000_000e18 IMDEX5, his IMD balance is unchanged, the index holds no coin and no idle IMD. (3) any later mint(x, y) also costs 0 and buys nothing; mintFirst reverts NotFirstMint forever. Proof test: test/scratch/FreeMint.t.sol fails with 'shares were minted for zero IMD'. Minimal fix: in _mintFirst revert BuyFailed when out == 0 (a buy that returns nothing has failed), and in _mintMore revert when total == 0 so a share can never be issued for nothing.","severity":"high","snippet":"        uint256 total = cost + idlePart + fee;\n        if (total > maxImdIn) revert TooExpensive(total);\n        _mint(caller, shares);","title":"mint issues shares for zero IMD once every holding is zero; a 6-wei first mint reaches that state and bricks the index"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"_swap returns the real amounts the PoolManager settled (amountIn, amountOut). _mintFirst discards amountIn and assumes every coin consumed exactly `part`: it credits idleImd only with the division remainder (`idleImd += rest - part * n;`, line 364) and mints `rest` shares. A Uniswap v4 exact-input swap with the limit at MIN/MAX sqrt price does not revert when liquidity runs out; it stops at the last initialised tick (or, in a pool with no liquidity, moves the price with zero amounts) and reports the smaller delta. Every wei of `part - amountIn` then stays in the contract's IMD balance but is in neither idleImd nor feeImd: redeem and redeemToImd pay only from idleImd, rebalance spends only idleImd, and no function sweeps a balance, so the IMD is lost to all holders while the first minter still received `rest` shares for it. The README's stated invariant 'The IMD the contract holds always equals idleImd + feeImd' is broken by the very first operation. This is distinct from the accepted thin-pool price impact: a bad price moves value to the pool, this leaves value inside the index unreachable. Every other swap site (_mintMore, _tryBuy, _trySell, _redeemToImd) uses amountIn; only this one does not.","line":360,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Imdex5} from \"src/Imdex5.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager, IUnlockCallback} from \"src/Interfaces.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Plain ERC-20 used for IMD and every coin.\ncontract ScratchToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev A PoolManager stand-in whose pools run out of liquidity: an exact-input swap consumes at\n/// most `maxFill` of the input (Uniswap v4 stops at the last tick and reports the real delta) and\n/// pays 100 coin per IMD consumed. `settle` credits exactly what was transferred in, as the real\n/// manager does; the unconsumed input simply stays with the caller.\ncontract ScratchPoolManager {\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint256 public constant maxFill = 10e18;\n    bool public unlocked;\n    address private synced;\n    uint256 private syncedBalance;\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory result) {\n        require(!unlocked, \"AlreadyUnlocked\");\n        unlocked = true;\n        result = IUnlockCallback(msg.sender).unlockCallback(data);\n        unlocked = false;\n    }\n\n    function swap(IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key, IPoolManager.SwapParams memory params, bytes calldata)\n        external\n        returns (int256)\n    {\n        require(unlocked, \"ManagerLocked\");\n        require(params.amountSpecified < 0, \"exact input only\");\n        address inCur = params.zeroForOne ? key.currency0 : key.currency1;\n        require(inCur == IMD, \"buys only\");\n        uint256 amountIn = uint256(-params.amountSpecified);\n        if (amountIn > maxFill) amountIn = maxFill;\n        uint256 amountOut = amountIn * 100;\n        int256 a0 = params.zeroForOne ? -int256(amountIn) : int256(amountOut);\n        int256 a1 = params.zeroForOne ? int256(amountOut) : -int256(amountIn);\n        return int256((uint256(a0) << 128) | uint256(uint128(int128(a1))));\n    }\n\n    function sync(address currency) external {\n        synced = currency;\n        syncedBalance = ScratchToken(currency).balanceOf(address(this));\n    }\n\n    function settle() external payable returns (uint256) {\n        return ScratchToken(synced).balanceOf(address(this)) - syncedBalance;\n    }\n\n    function take(address currency, address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        ScratchToken(currency).mint(to, amount);\n    }\n\n    function extsload(bytes32) external pure returns (bytes32) {\n        return bytes32(uint256(2 ** 96));\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice `_mintFirst` ignores the swap's `amountIn`. When a pool fills only part of `part`, the\n/// unspent IMD stays in the contract but is in neither `idleImd` nor `feeImd`, so no holder can\n/// ever redeem it, while the minter still receives `rest` shares as if all of it had been spent.\ncontract StrandedImdTest is Test {\n    Imdex5 index;\n    ScratchToken imd;\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        index = new Imdex5();\n        imd = ScratchToken(index.IMD());\n        vm.etch(address(imd), address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        vm.etch(index.POOL_MANAGER(), address(new ScratchPoolManager()).code);\n        Imdex5.Coin[] memory coins = index.coins();\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < coins.length; ++i) {\n            vm.etch(coins[i].token, address(new ScratchToken()).code);\n        }\n        imd.mint(alice, 10_000e18);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        imd.approve(address(index), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_firstMintAccountsForEveryImdItHolds() public {\n        // 100 IMD: fee 0.5, rest 99.5, part 19.9 per coin; each pool can only absorb 10 IMD.\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        (bool ok,) = address(index).call(abi.encodeCall(index.mintFirst, (100e18, new uint256[](5))));\n        if (!ok) return; // a build that refuses a short fill also keeps the invariant\n\n        uint256 balance = imd.balanceOf(address(index));\n        uint256 accounted = index.idleImd() + index.feeImd();\n        emit log_named_uint(\"IMD the contract holds\", balance);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"IMD the accounting owns\", accounted);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"shares minted\", index.totalSupply());\n        assertEq(balance, accounted, \"IMD held but owned by nobody\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Each of the five pools can absorb only 10 IMD before liquidity ends (e.g. a thin launch pool). alice: mintFirst(100e18, [0,0,0,0,0]). Expected: fee 0.5e18 to feeImd, 5 x 10e18 spent, the 49.5e18 unspent kept as idleImd (or the call reverts), so IMD balance 50e18 == idleImd + feeImd. Actual: feeImd 0.5e18, idleImd 0, totalSupply 99.5e18, contract IMD balance 50e18; 49.5e18 IMD is owned by no accounting variable and redeem(all shares) returns only the coins plus 0 IMD. Proof test: test/scratch/StrandedImd.t.sol fails with 'IMD held but owned by nobody: 50e18 != 0.5e18'. Minimal fix: keep amountIn (`(uint256 amountIn, uint256 out) = _swap(...)`), accumulate `spent += amountIn`, and set `idleImd += rest - spent` so the unspent IMD stays the holders' (or revert BuyFailed when amountIn < part, matching 'revert if a buy fails').","severity":"medium","snippet":"            (, uint256 out) = _swap(coin.token, coin.hook, true, part, false, false);","title":"_mintFirst ignores the swap's amountIn: IMD a partial fill leaves unspent belongs to nobody and can never be redeemed"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"onOracleResult closes the request (openSince = 0) and stores answerHash, but ask() only gates on an open request and on a stored next list. In the window between the Intake's callback and someone's submit(), ask() is allowed again once 7 days have passed since the previous ask (the oracle may take hours, submit may lag). The second ask pays the Intake 0.5 IMD and the caller 0.25 IMD from feeImd and, when its result arrives, overwrites answerHash, so the first attestation that was already paid for can never be submitted (WrongAnswer). Anyone can trigger this to collect the 0.25 IMD caller reward and burn 0.5 IMD of holder-funded fees per repetition, and a list the oracle already produced is thrown away. The brief's gate list for ask() does not mention the delivered-but-unsubmitted state, so this may be intended; it is reported because feeImd leaves for a request whose answer is then discarded.","line":234,"path":"src/Imdex5.sol","reproduction":"fund(2e18); ask() at t0 (feeImd 1.25e18, request R1 open). Intake calls onOracleResult(R1, a1 with agreed 5, sig): openSince 0, answerHash = keccak(a1.answer). Nobody calls submit. At t0 + 7 days anyone calls ask(): expected revert (an answer awaits submission); actual: succeeds, feeImd 0.5e18, request R2 opened. Intake calls onOracleResult(R2, a2): answerHash now keccak(a2.answer); submit(a1, sig1) reverts WrongAnswer although a1 was paid for. Reproduced in test/scratch/AskOverwrite.t.sol (passes, showing the behaviour). Minimal fix: in ask() revert when answerHash != 0.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (openSince != 0) revert RequestOpen();\n        if (_nextList.length != 0) revert ListAwaitsRebalance();","title":"ask() can re-ask while a paid-for answer is delivered but not yet submitted, spending 0.75 IMD of fees and discarding that answer"}],"hash":"c8d2d94fa8d33dbf1bf5333e2d9811921600702acf00f36b8e1fce0600cbb108","nodeId":"d1a7c535-fdfd-4f8b-94dc-aa5e4aca4ce0","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds three findings, two with failing proof tests, plus a coverage row for every one of the 17 entry points and four invariants.\n\n**Findings**\n\n- **High. Shares can be minted for zero IMD, and the index can be bricked for 6 wei.** `mintFirst(6, zeros)` leaves supply 5 with every `held` and `idleImd` at zero, because Uniswap v4 floors the 1.25% fee on a 1-wei input to the whole wei and returns nothing. After that every `mint` costs 0 at `src/Imdex5.sol:388`, so anyone takes unlimited shares for free and no later mint can ever put value in. Proof: `test/scratch/FreeMint.t.sol` fails with \"shares were minted for zero IMD\". Suggested fix: revert in the first mint when a buy returns 0, and revert in `mint` when the total is 0.\n- **Medium. The first mint strands IMD on a partial fill.** `_mintFirst` discards the swap's `amountIn` at `src/Imdex5.sol:360`. When a pool runs out of liquidity, the unspent IMD stays in the contract but belongs to neither `idleImd` nor `feeImd`, so no holder can ever redeem it. Proof: `test/scratch/StrandedImd.t.sol` fails with the contract holding 50 IMD while accounting owns 0.5. Fix: credit `rest - spent` to `idleImd`.\n- **Low. `ask()` re-asks while a delivered answer awaits `submit`.** After 7 days a new request spends 0.75 IMD of fees and overwrites the stored hash, discarding the paid-for answer. Reproduced with the project's mocks in `test/scratch/AskOverwrite.t.sol`. Possibly by design since the brief's gate list omits this state.\n\n**What held in my area.** Fee custody is tight: every IMD outflow traces to `idleImd`, pulled `maxImdIn`, swap proceeds, or the two sanctioned fee payments. Redeem settles effects before transfers, cannot be blocked by a coin, and owed amounts are zeroed before `claim` pays. Rebalance uses real settled deltas, and the 2% limit against a 1.25% pool fee makes sandwiching unprofitable. Forged callbacks and attestations are rejected by sender, request id and signer checks. Reentrancy through a hook or coin hits the guard or the self-only check on `swapSelf` and `unlockCallback`.\n\n**Not substantiated, for the judge's awareness.** The request body includes a `head` key the oracle-consumer reference does not list among accepted keys. If the Intake refuses it, every ask burns 0.75 IMD and never answers. The brief mandates that key, so I left it out of the findings.\n\nThe project's own 39 tests still pass. Scratch tests live only under `test/scratch/` and modify nothing else.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1494476,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":54487,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":860596}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"32918363b3d64735f21accb1b469b2b271d618c2b8ab57603ae843b0e35241dc","device":"dfa08759ca0424de","findings":[],"hash":"d3c3d23a38e5f4d31177174ceff06f07e07cd94e411211a88b2acb48d74124e1","nodeId":"b4832bd5-1db6-4a08-a8fb-2c6ac0d4f84d","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. I wrote `launch.json` for the accepted `Imdex5` contract and verified the tree.\n\n**What the manifest contains**\n- Kind `evm_contracts`, one contract entry named `Imdex5` with an empty constructor argument list.\n- The accepted constructor takes no parameters, calls no contract and checks no code length, so there is nothing to reference and no owner argument. The brief forbids any owner or role, so `$owner` does not appear.\n- Notes describe the token, the seeded starting list, the hard-coded chain constants, the open permission model, the fee accounting, and the compiler profile.\n\n**Checks run**\n- The manifest parses as JSON with exactly the keys kind, contracts and notes, and the notes are well under the character limit.\n- `forge build` compiles cleanly under the pinned profile.\n- `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passed all 39 tests across both suites.\n- Git status shows `launch.json` as the only new file. No other file was touched.","treeHash":"acf1ddfeb85db433b198e1fe66af17f07ce20ab1","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":292421,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":3070,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":86691}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":18580,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 55 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 18.48s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":175,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorsAreCanonical() (gas: 4454)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 13379)\n[PASS] test_protocolSignatureRecoversOverTheConsumersDigest() (gas: 16907)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 872.32µs (494.66µs CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/Rebalance.t.sol:RebalanceTest\n[PASS] test_mintAndRedeemFollowTheNewList() (gas: 3055580)\n[PASS] test_rebalance_fewerThanFourCoins_noWeightCap() (gas: 2387643)\n[PASS] test_rebalance_limitedSellKeepsRemainderTracked() (gas: 2913281)\n[PASS] test_rebalance_revertsWithoutAList() (gas: 32621)\n[PASS] test_rebalance_sellsDroppedBuysNew_equalParts_andRewards() (gas: 2800185)\n[PASS] test_rebalance_skipsARevertingSwap() (gas: 2607155)\n[PASS] test_rebalance_trimsHoldingsAbove25Percent() (gas: 2570426)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.22ms (8.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Oracle.t.sol:OracleTest\n[PASS] test_ask_paysIntakeAndCaller() (gas: 1319237)\n[PASS] test_ask_returnsWithoutEnoughFees() (gas: 191843)\n[PASS] test_ask_revertsWhileAListIsPending() (gas: 1439678)\n[PASS] test_ask_revertsWhileOpenThenTooSoon() (gas: 1385905)\n[PASS] test_closeRequest_onlyAfterTwoDays() (gas: 1153946)\n[PASS] test_onOracleFailure_closes_onlyFromIntake() (gas: 1230967)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResult_ignoredAfterTheRequestClosed() (gas: 1158576)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResult_ignoresWrongSender_wrongId_lowAgreement() (gas: 1267558)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResult_storesHashAndCloses_under200kGas() (gas: 1173773)\n[PASS] test_submit_paysNoRewardWithoutFees() (gas: 1734039)\n[PASS] test_submit_rejectsBadLists() (gas: 3805526)\n[PASS] test_submit_rejectsExpired() (gas: 1194515)\n[PASS] test_submit_rejectsWrongAnswer_badSignature_replay() (gas: 1614723)\n[PASS] test_submit_storesNextListFromBothRegistries_andRewards() (gas: 1583758)\n[PASS] test_submit_usesTheRegistryValueNotTheAnswer() (gas: 1419490)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.03ms (12.40ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/Imdex5.t.sol:Imdex5Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_imdConservedAcrossMintAndRedeem(uint96,uint96,uint16) (runs: 64, μ: 2394273, ~: 2395024)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99990000000000000001507\n  Bound result 99999000000000000019830\n  Bound result 2500\n\n[PASS] test_bodyIsTheRequestedJson() (gas: 64786)\n[PASS] test_claim_paysOnceOnly() (gas: 1188354)\n[PASS] test_claim_revertsWhileCoinStillFails_andKeepsTheDebt() (gas: 1103731)\n[PASS] test_deployment() (gas: 79929)\n[PASS] test_fund() (gas: 131050)\n[PASS] test_mintFirst() (gas: 1004599)\n[PASS] test_mintFirst_revertsOnBadMinOutLength() (gas: 39419)\n[PASS] test_mintFirst_revertsUnderMinOut() (gas: 633738)\n[PASS] test_mintFirst_revertsWhenABuyFails() (gas: 868160)\n[PASS] test_mintFirst_revertsWhenSupplyExists() (gas: 838475)\n[PASS] test_mint_buysExactFractionAndChargesFee() (gas: 1605904)\n[PASS] test_mint_cannotMintMoreThanPaidFor() (gas: 921785)\n[PASS] test_mint_revertsAtZeroSupply() (gas: 35610)\n[PASS] test_mint_revertsOverMaxImdIn() (gas: 1513193)\n[PASS] test_mint_revertsWhenBuyShort() (gas: 1200208)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImd_paysInKindWhenASaleFails() (gas: 1424416)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImd_revertsUnderMinOut() (gas: 1510523)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImd_sellsAndKeepsFee() (gas: 2114581)\n[PASS] test_redeem_cannotBeBlockedByACoin() (gas: 1664507)\n[PASS] test_redeem_lastSharesPayEverything() (gas: 1093606)\n[PASS] test_redeem_paysInKindLess50bps() (gas: 1840704)\n[PASS] test_redeem_revertsOnZeroOrTooMany() (gas: 864725)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyThroughAHookIsBlocked() (gas: 2250055)\n[PASS] test_swapSelf_onlySelf() (gas: 35993)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallback_onlyPoolManager() (gas: 35846)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 72.10ms (96.16ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 73.05ms (82.22ms CPU time): 51 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (51 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":49,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Imdex5.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.ask()\",\"Imdex5.claim(address)\",\"Imdex5.closeRequest()\",\"Imdex5.fund(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[])\",\"Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.rebalance()\",\"Imdex5.redeem(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.submit((bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool,address)\",\"Imdex5.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"README.md\":202,\"foundry.toml\":17,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/Imdex5.sol\":640,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":61,\"src/OracleAttestation.sol\":222,\"test/Harness.sol\":152,\"test/Imdex5.t.sol\":342,\"test/Oracle.t.sol\":304,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":74,\"test/Rebalance.t.sol\":134,\"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\":270},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":4826,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/high] arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/Imdex5.sol:407: Imdex5._mintFirst(address,uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#407-426) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(IMD).safeTransferFrom(caller,address(this),imdIn) (src/Imdex5.sol#410)\n[high/high] arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/Imdex5.sol:428: Imdex5._mintMore(address,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#428-450) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(IMD).safeTransferFrom(caller,address(this),idlePart + fee) (src/Imdex5.sol#445)\n[high/high] arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/Imdex5.sol:360: Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool,address) (src/Imdex5.sol#360-394) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(inCur).safeTransferFrom(payer,POOL_MANAGER,amountIn) (src/Imdex5.sol#389)\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/Imdex5.sol:208: Imdex5.redeem(uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#208-225) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/Imdex5.sol:452: Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#452-483) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/Imdex5.sol:208: Imdex5.redeem(uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#208-225) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:452: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#452-483):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:485: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#485-553):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:485: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#485-553):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:485: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#485-553):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:407: Reentrancy in Imdex5._mintFirst(address,uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#407-426):\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Imdex5.sol:430: Imdex5._mintMore(address,uint256,uint256).cost (src/Imdex5.sol#430) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Imdex5.sol:456: Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256).proceeds (src/Imdex5.sol#456) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Imdex5.sol:414: Imdex5._mintFirst(address,uint256,uint256[]).spent (src/Imdex5.sol#414) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:229: Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#229-232) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.RedeemToImd,msg.sender,shares,_one(minImdOut))) (src/Imdex5.sol#231)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:200: Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#200-204) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.Mint,msg.sender,shares,_one(maxImdIn))) (src/Imdex5.sol#203)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:360: Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool,address) (src/Imdex5.sol#360-394) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).settle() (src/Imdex5.sol#390)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:335: Imdex5.rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#335-340) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.Rebalance,msg.sender,uint256(0),new uint256[](0))) (src/Imdex5.sol#337)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:191: Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#191-196) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.MintFirst,msg.sender,imdIn,minOut)) (src/Imdex5.sol#195)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:396: Imdex5._trySwap(Imdex5.Coin,bool,uint256,bool,bool,address) (src/Imdex5.sol#396-405) has external calls inside a loop: (i,o) = this.swapSelf(c.token,c.hook,buy,amount,exactOut,limited,payer) (src/Imdex5.sol#400-404)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:605: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#605-618) has external calls inside a loop: ! reg.isRecorded(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#609)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:605: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#605-618) has external calls inside a loop: arts = reg.artifactsOf(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#611)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:605: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#605-618) has external calls inside a loop: ! reg.isRecorded(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#607)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:564: Imdex5._sqrtPrice(IPoolManager.PoolKey) (src/Imdex5.sol#564-567) has external calls inside a loop: uint256(uint160(uint256(IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).extsload(slot)))) (src/Imdex5.sol#566)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:452: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#452-483):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:335: Reentrancy in Imdex5.rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#335-340):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:485: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#485-553):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:249: Reentrancy in Imdex5.ask() (src/Imdex5.sol#249-270):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:452: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#452-483):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:360: Reentrancy in Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool,address) (src/Imdex5.sol#360-394):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:298: Imdex5.closeRequest() (src/Imdex5.sol#298-303) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:249: Imdex5.ask() (src/Imdex5.sol#249-270) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/OracleAttestation.sol:157: OracleAttestationConsumer._verifyAttestation(OracleAttestation.Attestation,bytes) (src/OracleAttestation.sol#157-166) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":false}],"detail":"static analysis found arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/Imdex5.sol:407; arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/Imdex5.sol:428; arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/Imdex5.sol:360: Imdex5._mintFirst(address,uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#407-426) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(IMD).safeTransferFrom(caller,address(this),imdIn) (src/Imdex5.sol#410)","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"rejected","submissionHash":"0607db55edde7f92fa253534b914d28695d8e46c05a556da25657c873869c5b7","verifiedTreeHash":"bf5db8a5ed79f2ec129fe4ec41182b9f302d8dd1","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7129bf9d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":17772,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 50 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 17.69s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":204,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 4542)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 13344)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 732.67µs (202.20µs CPU time)\n\nRan 45 tests for test/Imdex5.t.sol:Imdex5Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintThenRedeemNeverPaysMoreThanDeposited(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 2379059, ~: 2387392)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 703447278057658377140\n  Bound result 115867137334233789639\n\n[PASS] test_askPaysIntakeAndCaller() (gas: 1135679)\n[PASS] test_askReturnsWithoutFees() (gas: 155177)\n[PASS] test_askSevenDayInterval() (gas: 1185273)\n[PASS] test_bodyIsTheJsonTheBriefDescribes() (gas: 30515)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestAfterTwoDays() (gas: 1024939)\n[PASS] test_deployment() (gas: 94843)\n[PASS] test_feeImdOnlyLeavesForOracleAndRewards() (gas: 4888521)\n[PASS] test_fundAddsToFeeImd() (gas: 147774)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotReenter() (gas: 5096700)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysProportionallyAndRefunds() (gas: 1812805)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstBuysEqualPartsAndTakesFee() (gas: 1096424)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstKeepsWhatAPoolCouldNotTakeAsIdle() (gas: 1317168)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRequiresZeroSupplyAndRightLength() (gas: 1014376)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsOnMinOut() (gas: 721417)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyFails() (gas: 808786)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyReturnsNothing() (gas: 2097863)\n[PASS] test_mintNeverIssuesSharesForNothing() (gas: 327747)\n[PASS] test_mintRequiresSupply() (gas: 40136)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsOverMaxImdIn() (gas: 1715002)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWhenABuyFailsOrFillsShort() (gas: 1815994)\n[PASS] test_mintRoundsAgainstTheMinter() (gas: 1694093)\n[PASS] test_onOracleFailureOnlyFromIntake() (gas: 1062770)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultStoresOnlyTheOpenRequestFromTheIntake() (gas: 1296306)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceNeedsAList() (gas: 41260)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellsAdoptsAndBuys() (gas: 5218961)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsADeadPool() (gas: 2966322)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsAHookThatLeavesAnUnsettledDelta() (gas: 3851922)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSurvivesAHookThatBurnsAllGas() (gas: 5467906)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsAHoldingOverAQuarter() (gas: 3437118)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceWithNothingHeld() (gas: 2257939)\n[PASS] test_redeemCannotBeBlockedByACoin() (gas: 1568039)\n[PASS] test_redeemLastSharesPaysEverything() (gas: 2129141)\n[PASS] test_redeemPaysInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1339754)\n[PASS] test_redeemRejectsZeroAndTooMany() (gas: 978402)\n[PASS] test_redeemSurvivesCoinsThatBurnAllGas() (gas: 4391955)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysAShortFillInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1765532)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails() (gas: 2944881)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdRevertsBelowMinOut() (gas: 1769476)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSellsAndKeepsFee() (gas: 1738390)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSurvivesAHookThatBurnsGas() (gas: 2442447)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsBadLists() (gas: 4557195)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsWrongAnswerAndForgedSignature() (gas: 1635497)\n[PASS] test_submitStoresTheNextListAndRewards() (gas: 1523647)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackAndSwapSelfAreNotCallable() (gas: 103394)\nSuite result: ok. 45 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 105.09ms (192.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 106.15ms (105.83ms CPU time): 47 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (47 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":39,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Imdex5.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.ask()\",\"Imdex5.claim(address)\",\"Imdex5.closeRequest()\",\"Imdex5.fund(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[])\",\"Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.rebalance()\",\"Imdex5.redeem(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.submit((bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool)\",\"Imdex5.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":2,\"README.md\":212,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"launch.json\":10,\"src/Imdex5.sol\":613,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":61,\"src/OracleAttestation.sol\":221,\"test/Imdex5.t.sol\":1006,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\":337},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"4b2141c8c2893ebbec951edadb7a7049a01cbbdefcbdb997ad3355414400f656","verifiedTreeHash":"8ac1a10587254a3fe0388beed557ec72b41ae979","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7129bf9d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":30937,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 30.85s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1644,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 4542)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 13344)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 992.52µs (181.47µs CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/Imdex5.t.sol:Imdex5Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintThenRedeemNeverPaysMoreThanDeposited(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 2291869, ~: 2299058)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4954107906321442999899\n  Bound result 2809836851392336350245\n\n[PASS] test_askPaysIntakeAndCaller() (gas: 1135437)\n[PASS] test_askReturnsWithoutFees() (gas: 154957)\n[PASS] test_askSevenDayInterval() (gas: 1184921)\n[PASS] test_bodyIsTheJsonTheBriefDescribes() (gas: 30339)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestAfterTwoDays() (gas: 1024521)\n[PASS] test_deployment() (gas: 94777)\n[PASS] test_feeImdOnlyLeavesForOracleAndRewards() (gas: 4769226)\n[PASS] test_fundAddsToFeeImd() (gas: 147664)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotReenter() (gas: 4977152)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysProportionallyAndRefunds() (gas: 1754046)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstBuysEqualPartsAndTakesFee() (gas: 1066522)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRequiresZeroSupplyAndRightLength() (gas: 984562)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsOnMinOut() (gas: 698065)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyFails() (gas: 785342)\n[PASS] test_mintRequiresSupply() (gas: 40114)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsOverMaxImdIn() (gas: 1653686)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWhenABuyFailsOrFillsShort() (gas: 1762391)\n[PASS] test_mintRoundsAgainstTheMinter() (gas: 1635379)\n[PASS] test_onOracleFailureOnlyFromIntake() (gas: 1062462)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultStoresOnlyTheOpenRequestFromTheIntake() (gas: 1295822)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceNeedsAList() (gas: 41062)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellsAdoptsAndBuys() (gas: 5115067)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsADeadPool() (gas: 2925882)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsAHoldingOverAQuarter() (gas: 3372405)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceWithNothingHeld() (gas: 2233756)\n[PASS] test_redeemCannotBeBlockedByACoin() (gas: 1538164)\n[PASS] test_redeemLastSharesPaysEverything() (gas: 2069583)\n[PASS] test_redeemPaysInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1309891)\n[PASS] test_redeemRejectsZeroAndTooMany() (gas: 948500)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails() (gas: 1592477)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdRevertsBelowMinOut() (gas: 1702771)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSellsAndKeepsFee() (gas: 1679085)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsBadLists() (gas: 4555941)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsWrongAnswerAndForgedSignature() (gas: 1635167)\n[PASS] test_submitStoresTheNextListAndRewards() (gas: 1523383)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackAndSwapSelfAreNotCallable() (gas: 103196)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 127.57ms (196.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 33 tests for test/Imdex5Edges.t.sol:Imdex5EdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintBuysExactlyTheRoundedUpShare(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 1850330, ~: 1850155)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintFirstMintsExactlyTheRest(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 968119, ~: 978170)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1633155569440555955\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_onOracleResultForAnotherRequestIsIgnored(bytes32,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 1025346, ~: 1025441)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onOracleResultFromAStrangerChangesNothing(address,bytes32,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 1072122, ~: 1072337)\n[PASS] testFuzz_redeemNeverPaysAboveProRata(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 1523986, ~: 1524824)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4416522421666564023276\n  Bound result 3108831570242777394526\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splittingARedeemStaysUnderProRata(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1714790, ~: 1715113)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1283\n  Bound result 157198258\n\n[PASS] test_aLaterAskReplacesAnUnsubmittedAnswer() (gas: 1788116)\n[PASS] test_aReenteringCoinCannotReenterAndIsNotPaidTwice() (gas: 2634967)\n[PASS] test_aReenteringCoinCannotReenterMintOrRebalanceFromRedeem() (gas: 3823767)\n[PASS] test_askRevertsWholeWhenTheIntakeRefuses() (gas: 331872)\n[PASS] test_askThresholdIsExactlyThreeQuartersOfAnImd() (gas: 1099338)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestNeedsAnOpenOne() (gas: 1001398)\n[PASS] test_closingARequestDoesNotResetTheInterval() (gas: 1157304)\n[PASS] test_mintCannotBeFreeWhenTheIndexHoldsValue() (gas: 1690496)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultAfterCloseIsIgnored() (gas: 1095428)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultWithFiveEntriesFitsTheStipend() (gas: 1138272)\n[PASS] test_oneGasBurningCoinDoesNotBlockRedeemGivenGas() (gas: 30762908)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceBuyMovesAPoolAtMostTwoPercent() (gas: 3591136)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceBuyStopsAtAQuarterWeight() (gas: 3915646)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceDoesNotTrimWithFewerThanFourCoins() (gas: 3184965)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellMovesAPoolAtMostTwoPercent() (gas: 3205325)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsToAQuarterNotBelow() (gas: 3683087)\n[PASS] test_redeemHalfPercentStaysWithRemainingHolders() (gas: 1521885)\n[PASS] test_redeemIdleImdThatCannotBeSentIsOwed() (gas: 1360245)\n[PASS] test_redeemToATokenWithoutCodeBecomesOwedAndClaimableLater() (gas: 1232530)\n[PASS] test_residualsAreRedeemedAndBlockMintWhileTheirPoolIsDead() (gas: 5052300)\n[PASS] test_rewardsNeverDipIntoIdleImd() (gas: 2669583)\n[PASS] test_sharesTransferLikeAnyErc20AndMoveNoHoldings() (gas: 1429297)\n[PASS] test_submitAndRebalancePayNoRewardWithoutFees() (gas: 3165556)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsATamperedAnswerEvenWithAValidSignatureElsewhere() (gas: 1133133)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsAnAttestationSignedForAnotherChain() (gas: 1437838)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsAnAttestationSignedForAnotherConsumer() (gas: 1103741)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsMalformedAnswerBytes() (gas: 1341484)\nSuite result: ok. 33 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 134.33ms (757.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Imdex5.invariant.t.sol:Imdex5InvariantTest\n[PASS]\nImdex5InvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_actorsNeverExtractMoreImdThanTheyPutIn\n[PASS] invariant_coinBalancesAreHeldPlusOwed\n[PASS] invariant_feeImdLeavesOnlyForTheOracleAndRewards\n[PASS] invariant_imdBalanceIsIdlePlusFeePlusOwed\n[PASS] invariant_listShape\n[PASS] invariant_noFreeMintWhileValueIsHeld\n[PASS] invariant_requestStateIsConsistent\n[PASS] invariant_zeroSupplyMeansNothingHeld\n Imdex5InvariantTest invariants (runs: 96, calls: 3840, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| Imdex5Handler | ask             | 200   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | claim           | 232   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | closeRequest    | 219   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | deliverFailure  | 227   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | deliverResult   | 238   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | fund            | 243   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | mint            | 450   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | mintFirst       | 233   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | rebalance       | 214   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | redeem          | 209   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | redeemToImd     | 209   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | setCoinFailMode | 232   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | submit          | 249   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | togglePool      | 212   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | transferShares  | 230   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | warp            | 243   | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 13978\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 300\n  Bound result 420\n  Bound result 7033103315751633665192\n  Bound result 665600\n  Bound result 718\n  Bound result 9950000000000000000\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 223101\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 479\n  Bound result 4430297309315613420116\n  Bound result 246\n  Bound result 154\n  Bound result 14092\n  Bound result 15\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.55s (1.55s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.55s (1.81s CPU time): 73 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (73 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":39,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Imdex5.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.ask()\",\"Imdex5.claim(address)\",\"Imdex5.closeRequest()\",\"Imdex5.fund(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[])\",\"Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.rebalance()\",\"Imdex5.redeem(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.submit((bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool)\",\"Imdex5.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":2,\"README.md\":181,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"src/Imdex5.sol\":581,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":60,\"src/OracleAttestation.sol\":221,\"test/Imdex5.invariant.t.sol\":467,\"test/Imdex5.t.sol\":820,\"test/Imdex5Base.sol\":174,\"test/Imdex5Edges.t.sol\":673,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/AttackMocks.sol\":85,\"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\":286},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"597b614bb048636e7bcb547070b338267bcb397e7732809b3f714741ff192fa4","verifiedTreeHash":"7281a80496833a91a5e7e5dfb0b568bfbd88427b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7129bf9d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":13907,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 50 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 13.83s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":167,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 4542)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 13344)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 611.47µs (75.18µs CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/Imdex5.t.sol:Imdex5Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintThenRedeemNeverPaysMoreThanDeposited(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 2290796, ~: 2299044)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4999000000000000003108\n  Bound result 7\n\n[PASS] test_askPaysIntakeAndCaller() (gas: 1135437)\n[PASS] test_askReturnsWithoutFees() (gas: 154957)\n[PASS] test_askSevenDayInterval() (gas: 1184921)\n[PASS] test_bodyIsTheJsonTheBriefDescribes() (gas: 30339)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestAfterTwoDays() (gas: 1024521)\n[PASS] test_deployment() (gas: 94777)\n[PASS] test_feeImdOnlyLeavesForOracleAndRewards() (gas: 4769226)\n[PASS] test_fundAddsToFeeImd() (gas: 147664)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotReenter() (gas: 4977152)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysProportionallyAndRefunds() (gas: 1754046)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstBuysEqualPartsAndTakesFee() (gas: 1066522)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRequiresZeroSupplyAndRightLength() (gas: 984562)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsOnMinOut() (gas: 698065)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyFails() (gas: 785342)\n[PASS] test_mintRequiresSupply() (gas: 40114)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsOverMaxImdIn() (gas: 1653686)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWhenABuyFailsOrFillsShort() (gas: 1762391)\n[PASS] test_mintRoundsAgainstTheMinter() (gas: 1635379)\n[PASS] test_onOracleFailureOnlyFromIntake() (gas: 1062462)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultStoresOnlyTheOpenRequestFromTheIntake() (gas: 1295822)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceNeedsAList() (gas: 41062)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellsAdoptsAndBuys() (gas: 5115067)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsADeadPool() (gas: 2925882)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsAHoldingOverAQuarter() (gas: 3372405)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceWithNothingHeld() (gas: 2233756)\n[PASS] test_redeemCannotBeBlockedByACoin() (gas: 1538164)\n[PASS] test_redeemLastSharesPaysEverything() (gas: 2069583)\n[PASS] test_redeemPaysInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1309891)\n[PASS] test_redeemRejectsZeroAndTooMany() (gas: 948500)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails() (gas: 1592477)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdRevertsBelowMinOut() (gas: 1702771)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSellsAndKeepsFee() (gas: 1679085)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsBadLists() (gas: 4555941)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsWrongAnswerAndForgedSignature() (gas: 1635167)\n[PASS] test_submitStoresTheNextListAndRewards() (gas: 1523383)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackAndSwapSelfAreNotCallable() (gas: 103196)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 80.63ms (130.10ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 81.66ms (81.24ms CPU time): 39 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (39 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":37,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Imdex5.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.ask()\",\"Imdex5.claim(address)\",\"Imdex5.closeRequest()\",\"Imdex5.fund(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[])\",\"Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.rebalance()\",\"Imdex5.redeem(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.submit((bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool)\",\"Imdex5.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":2,\"README.md\":181,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"src/Imdex5.sol\":581,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":60,\"src/OracleAttestation.sol\":221,\"test/Imdex5.t.sol\":820,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\":286},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":5032,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/Imdex5.sol:352: Imdex5._mintFirst(address,uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#352-367) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:352: Reentrancy in Imdex5._mintFirst(address,uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#352-367):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:422: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#422-468):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:393: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#393-420):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:422: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#422-468):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:422: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#422-468):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:188: Reentrancy in Imdex5.redeem(uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#188-209):\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Imdex5.sol:570: Imdex5._lookup(uint64).registry (src/Imdex5.sol#570) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:178: Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#178-183) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.Mint,msg.sender,shares,maxImdIn,0,new uint256[](0))) (src/Imdex5.sol#182)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-518) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).settle() (src/Imdex5.sol#514)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:167: Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#167-173) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.MintFirst,msg.sender,imdIn,0,0,minOut)) (src/Imdex5.sol#172)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:321: Imdex5.rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#321-326) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.Rebalance,msg.sender,0,0,0,new uint256[](0))) (src/Imdex5.sol#323)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:213: Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#213-219) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.RedeemToImd,msg.sender,shares,minImdOut,supply,new uint256[](0))) (src/Imdex5.sol#217-218)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-518) has external calls inside a loop: IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).sync(inCur) (src/Imdex5.sol#512)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:548: Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#548-560) has external calls inside a loop: (ok,ret) = token.call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer,(to,amount))) (src/Imdex5.sol#551)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:569: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#569-580) has external calls inside a loop: REGISTRY_A.isRecorded(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#571)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-518) has external calls inside a loop: delta = IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).swap(key,IPoolManager.SwapParams(zeroForOne,- int256(amount),limit),) (src/Imdex5.sol#501-502)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:525: Imdex5._sqrtPrice(IPoolManager.PoolKey) (src/Imdex5.sol#525-528) has external calls inside a loop: uint256(uint160(uint256(IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).extsload(slot)))) (src/Imdex5.sol#527)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-518) has external calls inside a loop: delta = IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).swap(key,IPoolManager.SwapParams(zeroForOne,int256(amount),limit),) (src/Imdex5.sol#501-502)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-518) has external calls inside a loop: IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).settle() (src/Imdex5.sol#514)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-518) has external calls inside a loop: IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).take(outCur,address(this),amountOut) (src/Imdex5.sol#516)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:471: Imdex5._trySell(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#471-478) has external calls inside a loop: (amountIn,out) = this.swapSelf(coin.token,coin.hook,false,amount,false,true) (src/Imdex5.sol#472-477)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:480: Imdex5._tryBuy(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#480-487) has external calls inside a loop: (amountIn,out) = this.swapSelf(coin.token,coin.hook,true,imdAmount,false,true) (src/Imdex5.sol#481-486)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:569: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#569-580) has external calls inside a loop: artifacts = registry.artifactsOf(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#574)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:548: Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#548-560) has external calls inside a loop: (ok,ret) = token.call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer,(to,amount))) (src/Imdex5.sol#551)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:393: Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#393-420) has external calls inside a loop: (amountIn,sold) = this.swapSelf(coin.token,coin.hook,false,amount,false,false) (src/Imdex5.sol#401-409)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:569: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#569-580) has external calls inside a loop: REGISTRY_B.isRecorded(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#572)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:548: Reentrancy in Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#548-560):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:480: Reentrancy in Imdex5._tryBuy(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#480-487):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:471: Reentrancy in Imdex5._trySell(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#471-478):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:422: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#422-468):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:232: Reentrancy in Imdex5.ask() (src/Imdex5.sol#232-255):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:393: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#393-420):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:321: Reentrancy in Imdex5.rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#321-326):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:393: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#393-420):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:471: Reentrancy in Imdex5._trySell(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#471-478):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:422: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#422-468):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Reentrancy in Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-518):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:480: Reentrancy in Imdex5._tryBuy(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#480-487):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:422: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#422-468):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:548: Reentrancy in Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#548-560):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:273: Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes) (src/Imdex5.sol#273-280) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:232: Imdex5.ask() (src/Imdex5.sol#232-255) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:283: Imdex5.closeRequest() (src/Imdex5.sol#283-289) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:259: Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,OracleAttestation.Attestation,bytes) (src/Imdex5.sol#259-270) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/OracleAttestation.sol:157: OracleAttestationConsumer._verifyAttestation(OracleAttestation.Attestation,bytes) (src/OracleAttestation.sol#157-165) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":521,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] abi-encode-packed-hash-collision at src/Imdex5.sol:146: `abi.encodePacked()` Hash Collision\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/Imdex5.sol:242: Reentrancy: State change after external call\n[low] costly-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:195: Costly operations inside loop (11 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/OracleAttestation.sol:210: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Imdex5.sol:35: Large Numeric Literal\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:305: Loop Contains `require`/`revert` (4 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/Imdex5.sol:172: Unchecked Return (5 places)\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/Imdex5.sol:551: Unsafe ERC20 Operation","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"a10512445fafbf5600edd927f7ce3c7bee81e0e413e3d1f2931c0bec14e31c53","verifiedTreeHash":"0f277fd35cd2f91a60b94a85f3132a4f72f8b1c5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7129bf9d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":17656,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 50 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 17.58s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":171,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 4542)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 13344)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 629.78µs (159.62µs CPU time)\n\nRan 45 tests for test/Imdex5.t.sol:Imdex5Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintThenRedeemNeverPaysMoreThanDeposited(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 2379059, ~: 2387392)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 703447278057658377140\n  Bound result 115867137334233789639\n\n[PASS] test_askPaysIntakeAndCaller() (gas: 1135679)\n[PASS] test_askReturnsWithoutFees() (gas: 155177)\n[PASS] test_askSevenDayInterval() (gas: 1185273)\n[PASS] test_bodyIsTheJsonTheBriefDescribes() (gas: 30515)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestAfterTwoDays() (gas: 1024939)\n[PASS] test_deployment() (gas: 94843)\n[PASS] test_feeImdOnlyLeavesForOracleAndRewards() (gas: 4888521)\n[PASS] test_fundAddsToFeeImd() (gas: 147774)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotReenter() (gas: 5096700)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysProportionallyAndRefunds() (gas: 1812805)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstBuysEqualPartsAndTakesFee() (gas: 1096424)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstKeepsWhatAPoolCouldNotTakeAsIdle() (gas: 1317168)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRequiresZeroSupplyAndRightLength() (gas: 1014376)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsOnMinOut() (gas: 721417)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyFails() (gas: 808786)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyReturnsNothing() (gas: 2097863)\n[PASS] test_mintNeverIssuesSharesForNothing() (gas: 327747)\n[PASS] test_mintRequiresSupply() (gas: 40136)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsOverMaxImdIn() (gas: 1715002)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWhenABuyFailsOrFillsShort() (gas: 1815994)\n[PASS] test_mintRoundsAgainstTheMinter() (gas: 1694093)\n[PASS] test_onOracleFailureOnlyFromIntake() (gas: 1062770)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultStoresOnlyTheOpenRequestFromTheIntake() (gas: 1296306)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceNeedsAList() (gas: 41260)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellsAdoptsAndBuys() (gas: 5218961)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsADeadPool() (gas: 2966322)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsAHookThatLeavesAnUnsettledDelta() (gas: 3851922)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSurvivesAHookThatBurnsAllGas() (gas: 5467906)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsAHoldingOverAQuarter() (gas: 3437118)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceWithNothingHeld() (gas: 2257939)\n[PASS] test_redeemCannotBeBlockedByACoin() (gas: 1568039)\n[PASS] test_redeemLastSharesPaysEverything() (gas: 2129141)\n[PASS] test_redeemPaysInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1339754)\n[PASS] test_redeemRejectsZeroAndTooMany() (gas: 978402)\n[PASS] test_redeemSurvivesCoinsThatBurnAllGas() (gas: 4391955)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysAShortFillInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1765532)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails() (gas: 2944881)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdRevertsBelowMinOut() (gas: 1769476)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSellsAndKeepsFee() (gas: 1738390)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSurvivesAHookThatBurnsGas() (gas: 2442447)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsBadLists() (gas: 4557195)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsWrongAnswerAndForgedSignature() (gas: 1635497)\n[PASS] test_submitStoresTheNextListAndRewards() (gas: 1523647)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackAndSwapSelfAreNotCallable() (gas: 103394)\nSuite result: ok. 45 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 91.25ms (170.82ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 92.19ms (91.88ms CPU time): 47 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (47 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":37,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Imdex5.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.ask()\",\"Imdex5.claim(address)\",\"Imdex5.closeRequest()\",\"Imdex5.fund(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[])\",\"Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.rebalance()\",\"Imdex5.redeem(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.submit((bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool)\",\"Imdex5.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":2,\"README.md\":212,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"src/Imdex5.sol\":613,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":61,\"src/OracleAttestation.sol\":221,\"test/Imdex5.t.sol\":1006,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\":337},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":4996,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:410: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#410-438):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:364: Reentrancy in Imdex5._mintFirst(address,uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#364-383):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:198: Reentrancy in Imdex5.redeem(uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#198-219):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:440: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#440-486):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:440: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#440-486):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Imdex5.sol:440: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#440-486):\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Imdex5.sol:602: Imdex5._lookup(uint64).registry (src/Imdex5.sol#602) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:177: Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[]) (src/Imdex5.sol#177-183) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.MintFirst,msg.sender,imdIn,0,0,minOut)) (src/Imdex5.sol#182)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:188: Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#188-193) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.Mint,msg.sender,shares,maxImdIn,0,new uint256[](0))) (src/Imdex5.sol#192)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:332: Imdex5.rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#332-337) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.Rebalance,msg.sender,0,0,0,new uint256[](0))) (src/Imdex5.sol#334)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:224: Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#224-230) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).unlock(abi.encode(Op.RedeemToImd,msg.sender,shares,minImdOut,supply,new uint256[](0))) (src/Imdex5.sol#228-229)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542) ignores return value by IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).settle() (src/Imdex5.sol#536)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542) has external calls inside a loop: IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).take(outCur,address(this),amountOut) (src/Imdex5.sol#538)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542) has external calls inside a loop: IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).settle() (src/Imdex5.sol#536)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542) has external calls inside a loop: IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).exttload(NONZERO_DELTA_COUNT_SLOT) != 0 (src/Imdex5.sol#540)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:580: Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#580-592) has external calls inside a loop: (ok,ret) = token.call{gas: PAY_GAS}(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer,(to,amount))) (src/Imdex5.sol#583)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Imdex5._trySell(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-498) has external calls inside a loop: (amountIn,out) = this.swapSelf{gas: SWAP_GAS}(coin.token,coin.hook,false,amount,false,true) (src/Imdex5.sol#490-497)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542) has external calls inside a loop: delta = IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).swap(key,IPoolManager.SwapParams(zeroForOne,int256(amount),limit),) (src/Imdex5.sol#523-524)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:410: Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#410-438) has external calls inside a loop: (amountIn,sold) = this.swapSelf{gas: SWAP_GAS}(coin.token,coin.hook,false,amount,false,false) (src/Imdex5.sol#419-427)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542) has external calls inside a loop: IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).sync(inCur) (src/Imdex5.sol#534)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:580: Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#580-592) has external calls inside a loop: (ok,ret) = token.call{gas: PAY_GAS}(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer,(to,amount))) (src/Imdex5.sol#583)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:601: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#601-612) has external calls inside a loop: artifacts = registry.artifactsOf(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#606)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542) has external calls inside a loop: delta = IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).swap(key,IPoolManager.SwapParams(zeroForOne,- int256(amount),limit),) (src/Imdex5.sol#523-524)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:601: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#601-612) has external calls inside a loop: REGISTRY_B.isRecorded(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#604)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:500: Imdex5._tryBuy(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#500-509) has external calls inside a loop: (amountIn,out) = this.swapSelf{gas: SWAP_GAS}(coin.token,coin.hook,true,imdAmount,false,true) (src/Imdex5.sol#501-508)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:601: Imdex5._lookup(uint64) (src/Imdex5.sol#601-612) has external calls inside a loop: REGISTRY_A.isRecorded(launch) (src/Imdex5.sol#603)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:549: Imdex5._sqrtPrice(IPoolManager.PoolKey) (src/Imdex5.sol#549-552) has external calls inside a loop: uint256(uint160(uint256(IPoolManager(POOL_MANAGER).extsload(slot)))) (src/Imdex5.sol#551)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:332: Reentrancy in Imdex5.rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#332-337):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:243: Reentrancy in Imdex5.ask() (src/Imdex5.sol#243-266):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:410: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#410-438):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:500: Reentrancy in Imdex5._tryBuy(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#500-509):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:580: Reentrancy in Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#580-592):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Reentrancy in Imdex5._trySell(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-498):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Imdex5.sol:440: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#440-486):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:440: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#440-486):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:410: Reentrancy in Imdex5._redeemToImd(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#410-438):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:511: Reentrancy in Imdex5._swap(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool) (src/Imdex5.sol#511-542):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:440: Reentrancy in Imdex5._rebalance() (src/Imdex5.sol#440-486):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:500: Reentrancy in Imdex5._tryBuy(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#500-509):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:489: Reentrancy in Imdex5._trySell(Imdex5.Coin,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#489-498):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Imdex5.sol:580: Reentrancy in Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#580-592):\n[low/medium] return-bomb at src/Imdex5.sol:580: Imdex5._pay(address,address,uint256) (src/Imdex5.sol#580-592) tries to limit the gas of an external call that controls implicit decoding\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:284: Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes) (src/Imdex5.sol#284-291) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:294: Imdex5.closeRequest() (src/Imdex5.sol#294-300) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:270: Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,OracleAttestation.Attestation,bytes) (src/Imdex5.sol#270-281) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Imdex5.sol:243: Imdex5.ask() (src/Imdex5.sol#243-266) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/OracleAttestation.sol:157: OracleAttestationConsumer._verifyAttestation(OracleAttestation.Attestation,bytes) (src/OracleAttestation.sol#157-165) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":593,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] abi-encode-packed-hash-collision at src/Imdex5.sol:155: `abi.encodePacked()` Hash Collision\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/Imdex5.sol:253: Reentrancy: State change after external call\n[low] costly-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:205: Costly operations inside loop (11 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/OracleAttestation.sol:210: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Imdex5.sol:35: Large Numeric Literal (3 places)\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/Imdex5.sol:316: Loop Contains `require`/`revert` (4 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/Imdex5.sol:182: Unchecked Return (5 places)\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/Imdex5.sol:583: Unsafe ERC20 Operation","passed":true},{"durationMs":5256,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof a7974294a979","output":"Compiling 49 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.73s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n  --> test/imd-proof-6c6e2c9c/Proof_a7974294a979.t.sol:51:5:\n   |\n51 |     function swap(IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key, IPoolManager.SwapParams memory params, bytes calldata)\n   |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-6c6e2c9c/Proof_a7974294a979.t.sol:FreeMintTest\n[PASS] test_sharesCannotBeMintedForNothing() (gas: 213146)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 875.31µs (109.98µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 2.41ms (875.31µs CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":4294,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 364a93196938","output":"2026-10-13T21:44:54.742226Z ERROR foundry_compilers_artifacts_solc::sources: error=\"/tmp/imd-verify-wgn2wz/repo/test/imd-proof-6c6e2c9c/Proof_a7974294a979.t.sol\": No such file or directory (os error 2)\nCompiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.78s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n  --> test/imd-proof-16f954e6/Proof_364a93196938.t.sol:54:5:\n   |\n54 |     function swap(IPoolManager.PoolKey memory key, IPoolManager.SwapParams memory params, bytes calldata)\n   |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-16f954e6/Proof_364a93196938.t.sol:StrandedImdTest\n[PASS] test_firstMintAccountsForEveryImdItHolds() (gas: 196352)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.02ms (150.28µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 2.78ms (1.02ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"aab1cc618948df892d7ffba87ebceba46fb96a6e47fc3f916ebec45e4b318042","verifiedTreeHash":"bdcb725d935455e19a486469e800399b3e06b28c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7129bf9d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":38632,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 55 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 38.56s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1587,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 4542)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 13344)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 668.53µs (66.29µs CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/Imdex5Revised.t.sol:Imdex5RevisedTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintFirstKeepsAPartialFillIdle(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1096139, ~: 1096142)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4999999999999999999738\n  Bound result 344511575726860102831\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_redeemToImdPaysADeadCoinExactlyAsRedeemDoes(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1976831, ~: 1982283)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 263614848152212456724\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_redeemToImdPaysAShortFillInKindUnderTheRedeemRule(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1812134, ~: 1813729)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 994000000000000003447\n  Bound result 16\n\n[PASS] test_aCoinThatBurnsItsGasIsOwedAndTheIdleImdStillPaid() (gas: 1624960)\n[PASS] test_askAndCloseAtTheirExactBoundaries() (gas: 1201130)\n[PASS] test_askIsBlockedWhileAListAwaitsRebalance() (gas: 3265717)\n[PASS] test_claimThatFailsKeepsTheDebt() (gas: 1289313)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotCallSwapSelfOrTheOracleCallbacks() (gas: 3457442)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotCloseOrAnswerTheOpenRequestDuringASwap() (gas: 4101816)\n[PASS] test_lastRedeemerToImdTakesAllOfADeadCoin() (gas: 1739461)\n[PASS] test_margUsesItsOwnHookAndTheOthersShareG() (gas: 48921)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstPartialFillIsRedeemedProRataNotTwice() (gas: 1651201)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRefusesAPoolThatReturnsNothingOnALargeAmount() (gas: 740488)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRefusesDustThatBuysNothing() (gas: 2156779)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWholeWhenTheHookMisbehaves() (gas: 992464196)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWholeWhenTheHookBurnsGasForTheIndex() (gas: 993083533)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWholeWhenTheHookLeavesADeltaUnsettled() (gas: 1333102)\n[PASS] test_mintSkipsAListCoinHeldAtZeroAndTheNextRebalanceBuysIt() (gas: 5499254)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultNeedsExactlyFourAgreed() (gas: 1156026)\n[PASS] test_owedAccumulatesAcrossRedeemsAndIsPaidOnce() (gas: 2186524)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsEveryBurningSwapAndStillAdoptsTheList() (gas: 3710169)\n[PASS] test_redeemSurvivesFiveGasBurningCoinsWithOrdinaryGas() (gas: 5808082)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenTheHookLeavesADeltaUnsettled() (gas: 2214653)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsALaunchWithoutAHookOrAToken() (gas: 1831635)\n[PASS] test_submitTakesAnAttestationOnce() (gas: 1455798)\n[PASS] test_submitUsesTheRegistryArtifactsNotTheStartingList() (gas: 1556962)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 162.35ms (469.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 45 tests for test/Imdex5.t.sol:Imdex5Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintThenRedeemNeverPaysMoreThanDeposited(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 2380029, ~: 2387396)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 590729728539298689145\n  Bound result 16\n\n[PASS] test_askPaysIntakeAndCaller() (gas: 1135679)\n[PASS] test_askReturnsWithoutFees() (gas: 155177)\n[PASS] test_askSevenDayInterval() (gas: 1185273)\n[PASS] test_bodyIsTheJsonTheBriefDescribes() (gas: 30515)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestAfterTwoDays() (gas: 1024939)\n[PASS] test_deployment() (gas: 94843)\n[PASS] test_feeImdOnlyLeavesForOracleAndRewards() (gas: 4888521)\n[PASS] test_fundAddsToFeeImd() (gas: 147774)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotReenter() (gas: 5096700)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysProportionallyAndRefunds() (gas: 1812805)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstBuysEqualPartsAndTakesFee() (gas: 1096424)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstKeepsWhatAPoolCouldNotTakeAsIdle() (gas: 1317168)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRequiresZeroSupplyAndRightLength() (gas: 1014376)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsOnMinOut() (gas: 721417)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyFails() (gas: 808786)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyReturnsNothing() (gas: 2097863)\n[PASS] test_mintNeverIssuesSharesForNothing() (gas: 327747)\n[PASS] test_mintRequiresSupply() (gas: 40136)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsOverMaxImdIn() (gas: 1715002)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWhenABuyFailsOrFillsShort() (gas: 1815994)\n[PASS] test_mintRoundsAgainstTheMinter() (gas: 1694093)\n[PASS] test_onOracleFailureOnlyFromIntake() (gas: 1062770)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultStoresOnlyTheOpenRequestFromTheIntake() (gas: 1296306)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceNeedsAList() (gas: 41260)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellsAdoptsAndBuys() (gas: 5218961)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsADeadPool() (gas: 2966322)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsAHookThatLeavesAnUnsettledDelta() (gas: 3851922)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSurvivesAHookThatBurnsAllGas() (gas: 5467906)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsAHoldingOverAQuarter() (gas: 3437118)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceWithNothingHeld() (gas: 2257939)\n[PASS] test_redeemCannotBeBlockedByACoin() (gas: 1568039)\n[PASS] test_redeemLastSharesPaysEverything() (gas: 2129141)\n[PASS] test_redeemPaysInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1339754)\n[PASS] test_redeemRejectsZeroAndTooMany() (gas: 978402)\n[PASS] test_redeemSurvivesCoinsThatBurnAllGas() (gas: 4391955)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysAShortFillInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1765532)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails() (gas: 2944881)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdRevertsBelowMinOut() (gas: 1769476)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSellsAndKeepsFee() (gas: 1738390)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSurvivesAHookThatBurnsGas() (gas: 2442447)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsBadLists() (gas: 4557195)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsWrongAnswerAndForgedSignature() (gas: 1635497)\n[PASS] test_submitStoresTheNextListAndRewards() (gas: 1523647)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackAndSwapSelfAreNotCallable() (gas: 103394)\nSuite result: ok. 45 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 162.70ms (223.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 33 tests for test/Imdex5Edges.t.sol:Imdex5EdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintBuysExactlyTheRoundedUpShare(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 1900879, ~: 1900701)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2024508882037988\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintFirstMintsExactlyTheRest(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 1000055, ~: 1003964)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3131237845883026868823\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_onOracleResultForAnotherRequestIsIgnored(bytes32,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 1025523, ~: 1025617)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onOracleResultFromAStrangerChangesNothing(address,bytes32,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 1072401, ~: 1072601)\n[PASS] testFuzz_redeemNeverPaysAboveProRata(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 1549822, ~: 1550677)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 533165429539791962799\n  Bound result 16\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splittingARedeemStaysUnderProRata(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 1740995, ~: 1741283)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 737\n  Bound result 277955461422410365442\n\n[PASS] test_aLaterAskReplacesAnUnsubmittedAnswer() (gas: 1788380)\n[PASS] test_aReenteringCoinCannotReenterAndIsNotPaidTwice() (gas: 2660939)\n[PASS] test_aReenteringCoinCannotReenterMintOrRebalanceFromRedeem() (gas: 3849937)\n[PASS] test_askRevertsWholeWhenTheIntakeRefuses() (gas: 332004)\n[PASS] test_askThresholdIsExactlyThreeQuartersOfAnImd() (gas: 1099602)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestNeedsAnOpenOne() (gas: 1001574)\n[PASS] test_closingARequestDoesNotResetTheInterval() (gas: 1157502)\n[PASS] test_mintCannotBeFreeWhenTheIndexHoldsValue() (gas: 1747202)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultAfterCloseIsIgnored() (gas: 1095692)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultWithFiveEntriesFitsTheStipend() (gas: 1138426)\n[PASS] test_oneGasBurningCoinDoesNotBlockRedeemGivenGas() (gas: 1658895)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceBuyMovesAPoolAtMostTwoPercent() (gas: 3658664)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceBuyStopsAtAQuarterWeight() (gas: 3989825)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceDoesNotTrimWithFewerThanFourCoins() (gas: 3237277)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellMovesAPoolAtMostTwoPercent() (gas: 3262089)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsToAQuarterNotBelow() (gas: 3750491)\n[PASS] test_redeemHalfPercentStaysWithRemainingHolders() (gas: 1547865)\n[PASS] test_redeemIdleImdThatCannotBeSentIsOwed() (gas: 1386203)\n[PASS] test_redeemToATokenWithoutCodeBecomesOwedAndClaimableLater() (gas: 1258310)\n[PASS] test_residualsAreRedeemedAndBlockMintWhileTheirPoolIsDead() (gas: 5158045)\n[PASS] test_rewardsNeverDipIntoIdleImd() (gas: 2704077)\n[PASS] test_sharesTransferLikeAnyErc20AndMoveNoHoldings() (gas: 1455303)\n[PASS] test_submitAndRebalancePayNoRewardWithoutFees() (gas: 3217877)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsATamperedAnswerEvenWithAValidSignatureElsewhere() (gas: 1133265)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsAnAttestationSignedForAnotherChain() (gas: 1438036)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsAnAttestationSignedForAnotherConsumer() (gas: 1103895)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsMalformedAnswerBytes() (gas: 1341770)\nSuite result: ok. 33 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 162.92ms (893.24ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Imdex5.invariant.t.sol:Imdex5InvariantTest\n[PASS]\nImdex5InvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_actorsNeverExtractMoreImdThanTheyPutIn\n[PASS] invariant_coinBalancesAreHeldPlusOwed\n[PASS] invariant_feeImdLeavesOnlyForTheOracleAndRewards\n[PASS] invariant_imdBalanceIsIdlePlusFeePlusOwed\n[PASS] invariant_listShape\n[PASS] invariant_noFreeMintWhileValueIsHeld\n[PASS] invariant_requestStateIsConsistent\n[PASS] invariant_zeroSupplyMeansNothingHeld\n Imdex5InvariantTest invariants (runs: 96, calls: 3840, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| Imdex5Handler | ask              | 199   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | claim            | 200   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | closeRequest     | 210   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | deliverFailure   | 202   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | deliverResult    | 224   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | fund             | 222   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | mint             | 421   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | mintFirst        | 200   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | rebalance        | 197   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | redeem           | 197   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | redeemToImd      | 210   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | setCoinFailMode  | 197   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | setHookMisbehave | 188   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | setPoolMaxIn     | 196   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | submit           | 192   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | togglePool       | 196   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | transferShares   | 184   | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| Imdex5Handler | warp             | 205   | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 3189\n  Bound result 3125\n  Bound result 614400\n  Bound result 10205\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.49s (1.48s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 1.50s (1.98s CPU time): 107 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (107 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":64,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Imdex5.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.ask()\",\"Imdex5.claim(address)\",\"Imdex5.closeRequest()\",\"Imdex5.fund(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[])\",\"Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.rebalance()\",\"Imdex5.redeem(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.submit((bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool)\",\"Imdex5.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":2,\"README.md\":212,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"src/Imdex5.sol\":613,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":61,\"src/OracleAttestation.sol\":221,\"test/Imdex5.invariant.t.sol\":484,\"test/Imdex5.t.sol\":1006,\"test/Imdex5Base.sol\":174,\"test/Imdex5Edges.t.sol\":673,\"test/Imdex5Revised.t.sol\":503,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/AttackMocks.sol\":85,\"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\":337},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"bb304ab42bbbfa53478988b5f0162ea0b6fa61c3d6557a08bdb02b76a4e1708f","verifiedTreeHash":"1132addc2b14009e89595429425eea78df781a8e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7129bf9d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":14017,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 50 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 13.94s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":179,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 4542)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 13344)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 609.58µs (168.06µs CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/Imdex5.t.sol:Imdex5Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintThenRedeemNeverPaysMoreThanDeposited(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 2290796, ~: 2299044)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4999000000000000003108\n  Bound result 7\n\n[PASS] test_askPaysIntakeAndCaller() (gas: 1135437)\n[PASS] test_askReturnsWithoutFees() (gas: 154957)\n[PASS] test_askSevenDayInterval() (gas: 1184921)\n[PASS] test_bodyIsTheJsonTheBriefDescribes() (gas: 30339)\n[PASS] test_closeRequestAfterTwoDays() (gas: 1024521)\n[PASS] test_deployment() (gas: 94777)\n[PASS] test_feeImdOnlyLeavesForOracleAndRewards() (gas: 4769226)\n[PASS] test_fundAddsToFeeImd() (gas: 147664)\n[PASS] test_hookCannotReenter() (gas: 4977152)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysProportionallyAndRefunds() (gas: 1754046)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstBuysEqualPartsAndTakesFee() (gas: 1066522)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRequiresZeroSupplyAndRightLength() (gas: 984562)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsOnMinOut() (gas: 698065)\n[PASS] test_mintFirstRevertsWhenABuyFails() (gas: 785342)\n[PASS] test_mintRequiresSupply() (gas: 40114)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsOverMaxImdIn() (gas: 1653686)\n[PASS] test_mintRevertsWhenABuyFailsOrFillsShort() (gas: 1762391)\n[PASS] test_mintRoundsAgainstTheMinter() (gas: 1635379)\n[PASS] test_onOracleFailureOnlyFromIntake() (gas: 1062462)\n[PASS] test_onOracleResultStoresOnlyTheOpenRequestFromTheIntake() (gas: 1295822)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceNeedsAList() (gas: 41062)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSellsAdoptsAndBuys() (gas: 5115067)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceSkipsADeadPool() (gas: 2925882)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceTrimsAHoldingOverAQuarter() (gas: 3372405)\n[PASS] test_rebalanceWithNothingHeld() (gas: 2233756)\n[PASS] test_redeemCannotBeBlockedByACoin() (gas: 1538164)\n[PASS] test_redeemLastSharesPaysEverything() (gas: 2069583)\n[PASS] test_redeemPaysInKindLessHalfPercent() (gas: 1309891)\n[PASS] test_redeemRejectsZeroAndTooMany() (gas: 948500)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdPaysInKindWhenASaleFails() (gas: 1592477)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdRevertsBelowMinOut() (gas: 1702771)\n[PASS] test_redeemToImdSellsAndKeepsFee() (gas: 1679085)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsBadLists() (gas: 4555941)\n[PASS] test_submitRejectsWrongAnswerAndForgedSignature() (gas: 1635167)\n[PASS] test_submitStoresTheNextListAndRewards() (gas: 1523383)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackAndSwapSelfAreNotCallable() (gas: 103196)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 93.39ms (135.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 94.12ms (94.00ms CPU time): 39 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (39 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":42,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Imdex5.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.ask()\",\"Imdex5.claim(address)\",\"Imdex5.closeRequest()\",\"Imdex5.fund(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.mintFirst(uint256,uint256[])\",\"Imdex5.onOracleFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"Imdex5.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.rebalance()\",\"Imdex5.redeem(uint256)\",\"Imdex5.redeemToImd(uint256,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.submit((bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"Imdex5.swapSelf(address,address,bool,uint256,bool,bool)\",\"Imdex5.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Imdex5.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":2,\"README.md\":181,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"launch.json\":10,\"src/Imdex5.sol\":581,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":60,\"src/OracleAttestation.sol\":221,\"test/Imdex5.t.sol\":820,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":74,\"test/mocks/Mocks.sol\":286},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d3c3d23a38e5f4d31177174ceff06f07e07cd94e411211a88b2acb48d74124e1","verifiedTreeHash":"acf1ddfeb85db433b198e1fe66af17f07ce20ab1","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7129bf9d"}]}