{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"834c0e87-f40c-4a5d-9935-03d865b034ec","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1a5f0a4ae2cfa8d7bc193d926c55fca85458003d194ab9fe3f83f626491a301e","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"a890b17cd3cd836220881a2c5efe50cf2d8c303fffbba8f35c05765d4c2f3690","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2ba22d533cbff4d25b1bd7eeb262a7a04f4abee95ffa9ccb896a25aaad1d17fc","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"781175ad66e36c127f17199dcb38f2afb390933e2f79163408f8ff9146e79786","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"beefa6ad9c630ef2842e11a8411d55a4ef0b30fc7db631ace446fd6c5adb444f","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"587567a5ef71546b5973ceaf6ef1dbbd590f49503b5ac9a6973ed86b89584857","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"587567a5ef71546b5973ceaf6ef1dbbd590f49503b5ac9a6973ed86b89584857","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":null,"dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"failed"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"15d106f9f28a271c186c5d42688cbe7c23068fdf0ef829982fc47b21ebb253a4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"imd/place (x.com/imdplace): a pixel war on a Uniswap v4 hook, where your pixels earn: buying the token gives paint, painting pixels on a shared on-chain canvas earns a share of every trade, and each weekly canvas is auctioned as a 1/1 NFT with the proceeds paid to its artists. Launch kind univ4_hook on Robinhood Chain (4663), paired with IMD: the launch's standard token and pool with our hook, plus our canvas and season-NFT contracts. Deploy in the launch, then host a site on the live addresses. No owner, admin, upgrade or pause in our contracts.\n\nToken name: imd/place. Symbol: i/p (if the launch refuses the slash, use IP).\n\nPAINT\n- The hook credits paint on every buy (afterSwap): 1 drop per 0.05 IMD spent. The buyer is the address passed in hookData by our router; without hookData, tx.origin. Paint is not transferable and never expires.\n- Sells give no paint and take none away.\n\nCANVAS\n- 64x64 pixels, 16-colour palette (bright, classic pixel-art colours), stored in the contract. Per pixel, one packed slot: owner, colour, paints in the current 24 h window, window start.\n- paint(pixels[], colours[]): up to 50 pixels per call. An empty pixel costs 1 drop. Repainting costs 2^k drops, k = times that pixel was painted in its current 24 h window (cap 2^10). Spent paint is consumed.\n\nPIXELS EARN\n- Hook fee 2% on every buy and sell, taken in IMD (on top of the launch's pool fee). Split: 67% to pixel owners, 25% to the season pot, 8% to 0xA7e99BB7155D7477E0C838E201b16E62B9c0b5Ac.\n- The 67% is shared pro rata by pixels currently owned: a global accumulator per pixel, settled on every ownership change, so a pixel earns while it is yours and earnings already accrued stay claimable after it is painted over. claim() anytime. Fees with no painted pixels go to the season pot.\n- First 30 minutes after launch: the hook fee decays linearly from 35% to 2%; the extra goes to the season pot.\n\nSEASONS\n- A season lasts 7 days. After it, anyone calls endSeason(): the final canvas is frozen and minted as a 1/1 ERC-721 to the season contract (tokenURI: on-chain SVG of the canvas, crisp pixels, name \"imd/place season N\", external_url https://x.com/imdplace, attributes: season, painters, paints), and the canvas resets for the next season immediately.\n- The NFT is sold in a 24 h English auction in IMD (5% minimum raise, bids in the last 10 min extend by 10 min, outbid refunded at once). Winning bid + the season pot go to the final canvas's pixel owners, pro rata by pixels held at the freeze. No bids: the NFT goes to the top painter and the pot carries to the next season.\n\nSITE\nLive canvas (zoom, pan, palette, pixel info: owner, times painted, current repaint price), batch painting, buy paint (swap via our router with hookData), my pixels and my IMD earnings with claim, leaderboard, season timer, auction with bidding, gallery of past season NFTs, totals paid to painters. Header and footer link to x.com/imdplace and to every contract on the explorer. Look: dark background, the canvas's 16-colour palette, chunky pixel type, the i/p logo. Phones work.\n\nTESTS\nPaint credited only on buys and to the right address; repaint cost doubles inside 24 h and resets after; batch limit; fee split exactly 67/25/8 and the launch decay; owner earnings match accumulator math across many repaints (fuzz); claims never exceed fees received; endSeason only after 7 days, freezes the right canvas, resets; auction rules, refunds, extensions; payout sums equal pot + bid; no function moves IMD, NFTs or paint anywhere else. Robinhood fork: buy and sell through the real PoolManager with the hook. Independent review.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"3ff43247dc4b122834911d91fb6504067fa32f6ead33edf9a84b008a77186179","previousHash":"0ffc4e9df62ed723cc3fb5fa0219cba444e348aa450d905b476c8f8ae4cad2d7","projectId":"834c0e87-f40c-4a5d-9935-03d865b034ec","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1019-imd-place-symbol-i-p-if-the-launch-refus"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51382","feedbackHash":"e00b86cee655a211a2021e1c0c0717cc698798a86194d5ce06f5a05633fc4458","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"1a5f0a4ae2cfa8d7bc193d926c55fca85458003d194ab9fe3f83f626491a301e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51507","feedbackHash":"61bc771ed08f96de742df531eeecc0a3a0bb5a451a23404eca18f3f333fdf96e","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"a890b17cd3cd836220881a2c5efe50cf2d8c303fffbba8f35c05765d4c2f3690","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51039","feedbackHash":"8d904f74286c5017e1716e23779aa8c8b99c0fedce035a158b9bceb2defa4d35","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"2ba22d533cbff4d25b1bd7eeb262a7a04f4abee95ffa9ccb896a25aaad1d17fc","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52205","feedbackHash":"f55ffaa88adda8b1ae97cbf3fe39dae8dba29b8b555697ca03b64851126144da","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"781175ad66e36c127f17199dcb38f2afb390933e2f79163408f8ff9146e79786","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51246","feedbackHash":"f300daf3c2145040104fd0eb316943fd9a2663f9944930b235713bbb0dc0fae0","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"15d106f9f28a271c186c5d42688cbe7c23068fdf0ef829982fc47b21ebb253a4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"6bd8b69ee6cf5489f062a3da49443310883e93e939e66c37aa6c4019f41481c4","state":"blocked","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"21bd23ade8d0ab7f61ec02e764181ac0f229bd1eaad3357900302c4ca5a34916","device":"ef9a9f22916c0ddf","findings":[],"hash":"15d106f9f28a271c186c5d42688cbe7c23068fdf0ef829982fc47b21ebb253a4","nodeId":"e89af697-7931-4402-bee6-13bf53cb10b0","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added failure-path, fuzz, metadata, and multi-season invariant tests under `test/`.\n\n- `forge build`: passed.\n- `forge test`: 56 passed, 0 failed, 1 opt-in fork skip.\n- Invariants: 24,576 calls, zero unexpected reverts.\n- Robinhood fork: passed at block 83,189,645.\n\nNo confirmed implementation defects found. All changes are confined to `test/`.","treeHash":"ea7de24e415720563cd50c017988ea95d7555c00","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":4076416,"inputTokens":139708,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":30870,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":1415836}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"85f29f4c09dba910","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seasons.bid refunds the outbid bidder inside the new bidder's transaction. The paired currency on chain 4663 (IMD, 0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127) is an issuer-controlled token: it exposes blocked(address) and transfersEnabled() with an owner (verified by eth_call during this review). OpenZeppelin-style blocklists reject transfers to a blocked address, so once the current high bidder is blocked every later bid reverts at the refund line, regardless of how much higher it is. The auction then runs out its clock with the stale bid, finalize() hands the NFT to the blocked bidder, and the final canvas's pixel owners are paid pot + stale bid instead of pot + the refused higher bid. The same push pattern means a blocked Seasons contract (or transfersEnabled=false) blocks finalize() for any auction with a bid, because releasePot must deliver the pot before finalization completes. The README notes IMD issuer powers generally but the auction consequence is that artists lose the difference between the stale and refused bids and no unprivileged party can unstick it. A pull-based refund (record the outbid amount in a mapping and let the previous bidder withdraw) removes the dependency on the previous bidder's transferability from the bid path; finalize() can likewise record the pot release and let the pot be pulled.","line":107,"path":"src/Seasons.sol","reproduction":"State: season 1 frozen with one occupied pixel and pot 25 IMD; alice and bob funded with IMD and approved to Seasons. 1) alice: seasons.bid(1, 1) (one atomic unit, the allowed opening bid). 2) IMD owner blocks alice. 3) bob: seasons.bid(1, 500 ether) -> reverts in the refund transfer (\"blocked\"), although 500 IMD is far above minimumBid(1) == 2. 4) warp past a.end; anyone: seasons.finalize(1). Actual: ownerOf(1) == alice, auctions(1).payout == 25 ether + 1. Expected: a higher valid bid can always be placed; artists receive pot + 500 IMD or the auction remains open to competition. Executed as test/scratch/BlockedBidder.t.sol (passes on the current code, demonstrating the frozen state). The repository's own AuctionReentrancyTest.testRefundFailureRollsBackNewBidAndEscrow shows the same revert and treats it as intended rollback.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (refund > 0) token.safeTransfer(previous, refund);","title":"Auction push-refund lets an IMD-blocklisted high bidder freeze the auction and win at a stale price"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief says the paint recipient is the hookData address when the swap comes through the project router and tx.origin otherwise. afterSwap instead reverts whenever hookData is non-empty and the caller is not the project router, so swaps routed through aggregators or Uniswap's Universal Router that forward any hookData fail with InvalidBuyer. No funds are at risk (the whole swap reverts) and the router path is unaffected; this is a composability and spec-conformance note. Ignoring foreign hookData and crediting tx.origin, as the brief states, would be harmless because paint is only a benefit to the credited address.","line":161,"path":"src/PlaceHook.sol","reproduction":"PoolFixture setup; deploy ForeignRouter (test/helpers/PoolFixture.sol) funded with IMD. Call foreign.swap(key, SwapParams(buyDirection, -1 ether, limit), abi.encode(bob)). Actual: reverts with PlaceHook.InvalidBuyer. Expected per brief: the swap executes and 20 drops are credited to tx.origin. The repository test HookTest.testOriginFallbackAndSpoofedDataRefused asserts the revert.","severity":"info","snippet":"            if (sender != address(router) || data.length != 32) revert InvalidBuyer();","title":"Any non-empty hookData from a third-party router reverts the swap instead of falling back to tx.origin"}],"hash":"1a5f0a4ae2cfa8d7bc193d926c55fca85458003d194ab9fe3f83f626491a301e","nodeId":"7c62d647-bb9d-4dc9-a512-be9493c2a7b1","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is valid, both snippets match their cited lines, and all 28 entry points plus two invariants have coverage rows.\n\n**Outcome: the economics hold up.** I traced the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap checklists against the fee, paint, accumulator, season and auction flows and found no loss-of-funds defect. One low and one informational finding are recorded in `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**What I verified in depth**\n- Hook fee math for all four swap modes in both currency orders against the vendored v4 `Hooks.afterSwap` delta signs. Each fee is minted as an ERC-6909 claim equal to the recorded fee, so payouts are always backed, and `recordFee` can never revert on the `baseFee <= fee` guard.\n- The split: 67% and 8% of the 2% base, remainder and launch premium to the pot, artists' share to the pot when no pixel is occupied. Rounding dust is carried, so credited scaled units never exceed artist fees.\n- The accumulator: settlement happens before `owned` counts change, old-season accounts settle against the frozen endpoint, and cross-season skips preserve earnings. The hook's ERC-6909 balance plus all payouts equals total fees.\n- Seasons: the 7-day freeze, the unbid-pot rollover gate that forces the pot into season N+1, exact pot-plus-bid distribution by rank, escrow conservation, and the blank-season path.\n\n**Findings**\n- **Low, `Seasons.bid` push refund.** The real IMD token on chain 4663 exposes `blocked(address)` and `transfersEnabled()`. If the issuer blocks the current high bidder, every later bid reverts at the refund, the auction runs out with the stale bid, and artists lose the difference. Reproduced in `test/scratch/BlockedBidder.t.sol`: a 1 wei bid beats a refused 500 IMD raise. Pull-based refunds remove the dependency.\n- **Info, `PlaceHook.afterSwap`.** Any non-empty hookData from a non-project router reverts instead of falling back to `tx.origin` as the brief states. No funds at risk.\n\n**Not defects, noted for the judge.** Fee avoidance through a hookless pool, last-block pixel capture before a freeze or a large buy, and the 1 wei opening bid are all consequences of the specified \"pixel war\" rules rather than code errors. Exact-input buys that would partially fill revert by documented design.\n\n**Coverage gaps.** I did not audit the site or the deployment tooling, and I did not run the Robinhood fork suite. No proof file was attached since nothing reached high severity.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1852638,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":60724,"runtime":"claude","turns":37,"wallClockMs":1007169}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9ab27edcfd62be02","findings":[],"hash":"2ba22d533cbff4d25b1bd7eeb262a7a04f4abee95ffa9ccb896a25aaad1d17fc","nodeId":"8489e49f-6ac4-4ba1-a2c9-eca6d8d25863","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the working tree is otherwise unchanged.\n\n**Outcome: no reproducible math, boundary or numerical-gap defect found.** The file `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and a coverage record of 34 rows: all 28 listed entry points plus six invariants, every one marked `holds` with a one-line reason.\n\n**What I verified in my area**\n\n- **Fee arithmetic in all four swap modes.** Exact-input buy floors the fee from the specified input, exact-output buy and exact-output sell gross up with ceiling division, exact-input sell floors from the output. On the real PoolManager, fee divided by gross equals the basis-point rate within one wei in both currency orders at 3500, 201 and 200 bps. The base-fee precondition in Canvas.recordFee holds in every mode, so the 67/25/8 split and the decay premium to the pot are exact.\n- **Launch decay boundary.** The rate is 3500 at 0 s, 201 at 1799 s and 200 from 1800 s. A 100 IMD buy at 1799 s produced fee 2.01, treasury 0.16 and pot 1.85, as the formula predicts.\n- **Accumulator math.** Settlement happens before every ownership count change, per-season final accumulators keep old accrual claimable, and the remainder carry keeps whole-unit claims under artist fees. The only leak is the sub-unit remainder crossing a season boundary, at most 4095 scaled units or under 4e-21 IMD.\n- **Repaint pricing and windows.** The price view and the paint path use the same expiry comparison, so a repaint at exactly 24 hours costs 1 drop and starts a new window. The cap at 2^10 and the 50-pixel batch bound hold.\n- **Auction arithmetic.** Minimum raise is a ceiling 5 percent, escrow updates cannot underflow, the end extension cannot underflow, and rank-based remainder assignment makes claims sum exactly to bid plus pot, including the sole-occupant case.\n- **Casts and overflows.** Every narrowing cast is bounded by construction or uses a checked SafeCast; no intermediate product can exceed uint256 for the accepted decimals range of 2 to 36.\n\n**Dust-level effects I chose not to report as findings** because the validation gates demote them and they are self-inflicted: a 1-wei exact-output sell pays a 1-wei fee, and buys under 50 wei pay no fee. The push-payment refund in Seasons.bid can only be blocked by the external IMD issuer's blocklist, which the README already documents as an outside power.\n\n**Static-analysis leads** in my area were all checked and none reproduced as a defect: the timestamp comparisons implement the specified windows, the encodePacked line builds SVG text rather than a hash, and the flagged uninitialized local is a zero-initialized fixed array.\n\nI ran the existing 35 offline tests, which all pass, plus five scratch probes on the real PoolManager that I deleted afterwards since no finding needed a proof file.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2179925,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":53030,"runtime":"claude","turns":41,"wallClockMs":860127}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0b129ef2f81deead","findings":[],"hash":"50ee94388216877636b51060df35a900e6731e7a2ec7ee88c72d39e4b9e8cfbe","nodeId":"2168b2f4-6b59-4037-876d-043db8910037","outcome":"failed","summary":"needs input: The production pool.initialPrice (decimal sqrtPriceX96) and pool.tickSpacing are missing. The accepted deployment recipe delegates these values to the launch factory's standard pool configuration, but that configuration was not supplied. The values 79228162514264337593543950336 and 60 occur only in test fixtures; they do not establish the launch settings. The manifest schema requires concrete numeric values and provides no placeholder for either field. — What production pool.initialPrice (as a decimal sqrtPriceX96 integer) and pool.tickSpacing should launch.json use for the imd/place–IMD pool on Robinhood Chain (4663)?","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":754432,"inputTokens":62878,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3617,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":221829}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fa5c50e7abe46571","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry / trust gap (economics x asymmetry). Every bid placed in the last ten minutes pushes `a.end` out by ten minutes with no limit on the number of extensions, and `bid()` allows the current high bidder to outbid themselves (the refund goes straight back to `msg.sender`, so only the latest bid is ever locked). `minimumBid` starts at 1 wei and raises by `ceil(highBid/20)`, so the first 19 raises cost 1 wei each and the bid only compounds 5% per step afterwards. One address can therefore keep the auction perpetually 'in its last ten minutes' for the price of one transaction every ten minutes, and `finalize()` keeps reverting with `NotReady`, so the frozen pot (`Canvas.frozenPot[id]`, 25% of all season fees plus the launch premium) and the winning-bid payout stay locked away from the frozen pixel owners for as long as the griefer keeps going. Measured with the scratch test below: 800 extensions hold the auction open for more than 5 days beyond its original deadline while the griefer's outstanding bid is only about 1.008 IMD (1,007,937,265,902,764,629 wei); roughly 3.5 days cost under 1e12 wei. The griefer's final bid is eventually paid to the artists, so this is delay/griefing rather than theft, and `rolloverResolved` is true once a bid exists so season rollover is not blocked. The spec asks for ten-minute extensions but not for them to be unbounded; a cap on total extension time (or a 'hard close' after e.g. 24 extra hours) preserves anti-sniping while bounding how long artists can be kept from the pot.","line":103,"path":"src/Seasons.sol","reproduction":"State: season 1 ended with one occupied pixel (alice) and seasonPot = 250 IMD (recordFee(1000 ether, 1000 ether)). Call sequence: (1) endSeason() at seasonStart+7d opens auction 1 with end = now+1d. (2) griefer (holding ~1 IMD plus gas) loops: warp to end-1, bid(1, minimumBid(1)); the refund of their own previous bid returns to them in the same call and `a.end` grows by 10 minutes each time. After 800 iterations: end - originalEnd > 5 days, finalize(1) still reverts NotReady, canvas.frozenPot(1) == 250 ether, griefer net outlay 1,007,937,265,902,764,629 wei. Expected: auction closes within a bounded time after its deadline so artists can claim pot + bid. Actual: a single bidder can postpone finalize(1) indefinitely for dust (3.5 days for <1e12 wei, 5.5 days for ~1 IMD). Scratch test test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::testExtensionLoopHoldsPotForDays passes on the current code (demonstrating the hold) and logs the numbers above.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.timestamp >= uint256(a.end) - 10 minutes) a.end += 10 minutes;","title":"Uncapped last-10-minute extension lets one self-outbidding bidder hold a season auction (and the frozen pot) open for days at dust cost"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust gap (access x economics), reported as a documented trust assumption rather than a defect because the brief requires exactly this fallback. When a buy reaches the pool through any router other than `router` with empty hookData, the hook credits paint to `tx.origin`, which is the EOA that signed the outer transaction, not the account whose IMD was spent. For a smart-contract wallet (Safe, ERC-4337 account) buying through the Uniswap Universal Router, the paint goes to the Safe's executing signer or to the 4337 bundler, i.e. a third party, while the wallet pays the IMD and the 2% fee. The asymmetric branch is also worth noting: a foreign router that attaches any non-empty hookData does not fall back to tx.origin, it reverts the whole swap with InvalidBuyer (`sender != address(router) || data.length != 32`), so aggregators that always forward hookData cannot trade this pool at all. Neither path lets anyone spend, transfer or claim on another address's behalf (paint is non-transferable and `credit` is onlyHook), so there is no loss of funds; the README already states the behaviour. Kept here so the judge sees it was evaluated in the access/trust review.","line":159,"path":"src/PlaceHook.sol","reproduction":"Existing test test/Hook.t.sol::testOriginFallbackAndSpoofedDataRefused is the exact input: ForeignRouter (any IUnlockCallback contract) calls manager.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne=imd0, -1 ether, limit), hookData=\"\") in a transaction with tx.origin = alice and msg.sender = bob; result canvas.drops(alice) == 20 and canvas.drops(bob) == 0, i.e. the paint lands on the origin EOA regardless of who paid. Second input: the same swap with hookData = abi.encode(bob) reverts (InvalidBuyer) instead of ignoring the data. Expected per spec: identical. Actual: identical. No fix required unless the authors want smart-account buyers to be credited; then only PlaceRouter (hookData) is the supported path, as the README says.","severity":"info","snippet":"        address buyer = tx.origin;","title":"Paint attribution falls back to tx.origin for buys made through any router other than PlaceRouter (spec-mandated; relayers and ERC-4337 bundlers receive smart-account buyers' paint)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust gap (access x asymmetry) at the boundary with the paired asset. The live IMD token on Robinhood Chain (0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127, verified over RPC: chain 4663, symbol IMD, owner() = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7, runtime exposes blocked(address), transfersEnabled() and enableTransfers()) has an owner-controlled blocklist. Because outbid refunds are pushed inside `bid()`, if the current high bidder is (or becomes) blocked, every later `bid()` reverts at the refund transfer and the auction can no longer be outbid; `finalize()` still succeeds (the NFT moves with `_transfer`, no token transfer to the bidder), so the season NFT is sold at the blocked bidder's price. Likewise `Canvas.claim()`, `claimTreasury()`, `Seasons.claim()` and the pot release in `finalize()` depend on IMD transfers to the recipient succeeding. The project contracts cannot mitigate an external issuer's powers and the README names them; a pull-based refund (credit the outbid amount and let the bidder withdraw) would confine the impact of a blocked bidder to that bidder alone, which is the one design change within the project's reach.","line":107,"path":"src/Seasons.sol","reproduction":"Existing test test/Adversarial.t.sol::testRefundFailureRollsBackNewBidAndEscrow is the exact state: alice bids 100 ether, the token then blocks alice, bob's bid(1, 105 ether) reverts, minimumBid stays 105 ether and escrow stays 100 ether. Follow-on (not in the suite): warp to a.end, finalize(1) succeeds and transfers the NFT to alice at 100 ether even though bob was willing to pay 105 ether. Expected under the brief: outbid refunded at once (holds while the token cooperates). Actual: with a blocked high bidder the auction becomes un-outbiddable. Requires the IMD owner to act, so severity is informational.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (refund > 0) token.safeTransfer(previous, refund);","title":"External IMD owner powers (blocklist, transfer gate) can freeze bid refunds and payouts: trust assumption to document, not a contract defect"}],"hash":"781175ad66e36c127f17199dcb38f2afb390933e2f79163408f8ff9146e79786","nodeId":"fb3f3b52-00f0-4925-9703-45bcaf694e21","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is valid, every snippet matches its line, and all 28 entry points have a coverage row. Git status shows only the untracked, git-ignored findings file and scratch test; no repository file was changed.\n\n**Review complete.** I audited the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry failure modes against all five contracts and wrote the result to `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**What I found**\n\n- **No critical, high or medium defects** in the permission model. Every guard holds as intended: hook callbacks are manager-only and bound to the single factory-initialized pool, Canvas mutators are hook-only or Seasons-only, both unlock callbacks are hash-bound and manager-only, and the router pulls funds only from its caller. I traced the paired surfaces (paint/settle, endSeason/open, releasePot/rollPot, bid/finalize/claim, beforeSwap/afterSwap fee branches, router swap/callback direction logic) and found the writes and reads mirror each other correctly.\n- **Low: uncapped auction extension.** A single bidder can self-outbid once every ten minutes at the deadline and keep a season auction open indefinitely, locking the frozen pot away from pixel owners. A scratch test shows 800 extensions hold it open over 5 days for about 1 IMD of outstanding bid. Delay only, not theft.\n- **Info: tx.origin paint attribution.** Buys through third-party routers credit the origin EOA, so smart-account buyers via the Universal Router hand their paint to a signer or bundler, and any router that attaches hookData is rejected outright. This is what the brief asks for; recorded as a trust assumption.\n- **Info: external IMD powers.** The live IMD token has an owner, a blocklist and a transfer gate. Push refunds in `bid` mean a blocked high bidder makes the auction un-outbiddable. Outside the project's control and already documented.\n\n**Verification done**\n\n- Full offline suite: 35 passed. Stateful invariants and the independent fuzz model pass on the current tree.\n- Robinhood fork rehearsal re-run at block 83,184,213 against the real PoolManager and IMD: passed.\n- IMD token inspected over RPC on chain 4663 to confirm its owner and blocklist selectors.\n\n**Not covered:** the site and docs, which are outside the assigned contract-permission area.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1363109,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":55405,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":902555}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"2dc755dfe7bd177c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seasons.bid lets the current high bidder outbid themselves (previous == msg.sender is refunded in the same call), the first bid may be 1 wei (minimumBid returns 1 when highBid == 0, src/Seasons.sol:85), and every bid inside the last ten minutes pushes a.end out by another ten minutes with no cap on total extensions. The 5% raise rule rounds up from 1 wei, so the escalation is slow in absolute terms. A single address can therefore hold an auction open indefinitely with one transaction every ten minutes, paying only gas, while the capital it needs is refunded on each self-outbid. While the auction stays open, finalize() reverts NotReady, the NFT is not awarded, and the frozen pot plus bid are not released to the final pixel owners. Season rollover is not blocked (rolloverResolved is true once highBid > 0), so this is a liveness/griefing delay rather than a loss. Mitigation that preserves the brief: refuse a bid from the current high bidder, and/or cap the total extension (for example at 24 h beyond the original end) or use an absolute minimum increment.","line":103,"path":"src/Seasons.sol","reproduction":"State: season 1 frozen with at least one occupied pixel; auction 1 open. Attacker holds about 50 IMD of float. Sequence: warp to a.end - 10 minutes; Seasons.bid(1, minimumBid(1)) (1 wei) -> a.end += 10 min. Repeat each time block.timestamp reaches a.end - 10 minutes, bidding minimumBid(1) (self-outbid; previous bid refunded in the same call). After 864 iterations (test/scratch/AuctionStall.t.sol) a.end has moved 518,400 s (6 days) past the original end and highBid is 22.88 IMD, all refundable. Seasons.finalize(1) reverts NotReady throughout. Expected: the 24 h auction closes within a bounded time after its scheduled end; actual: closure is deferred as long as the attacker keeps transacting.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.timestamp >= uint256(a.end) - 10 minutes) a.end += 10 minutes;","title":"Auction deadline can be extended for days at negligible cost via tiny self-outbids"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"For exact-input buys and exact-output sells the hook takes its fee in beforeSwap on the specified (IMD) side. Because that delta cannot be refunded in afterSwap, the hook reverts the whole swap whenever the pool did not consume the full specified amount (price limit reached or liquidity exhausted in that direction). PlaceRouter always passes the extreme price limit, so its users only hit this when liquidity runs out, but any external router or aggregator that supplies a real sqrtPriceLimitX96 for an exact-input buy will get a hard revert rather than the partial fill v4 normally returns. This is documented in the README and is a design limitation, recorded here so the judge has a concrete input.","line":153,"path":"src/PlaceHook.sol","reproduction":"Pool initialised at sqrtPrice 1<<96 with liquidity in [-600, 600]. Through a foreign router (test/helpers/PoolFixture.sol ForeignRouter) call PoolManager.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne = (currency0 == imd), amountSpecified = -100 ether, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = (1<<96) - 1 when IMD is currency0, (1<<96) + 1 otherwise), \"\"). The pool stops at the limit after consuming a few wei of IMD, afterSwap computes expected = 100 ether - fee, poolIMD != expected, and the swap reverts with PartialFill. Expected by a generic v4 integrator: a partial fill with the fee charged on the filled amount.","severity":"info","snippet":"            if (poolIMD != expected) revert PartialFill();","title":"IMD-specified swaps through third-party routers revert instead of partially filling"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"svg() always loads all 4,096 packed pixel slots through Canvas.coloursOf (4,096 cold SLOADs, about 8.6M gas) and then scans the 4,096-byte buffer twice, so the metadata call has a high floor regardless of how sparse the frozen canvas is. Measured with test/scratch/SparseUriGas.t.sol: a season with a single painted pixel costs 12,551,190 gas for tokenURI (dense worst case is about 30.4M as the authors recorded). Public RPC eth_call caps below roughly 13M will fail to render any season NFT, not just dense ones. The README already requires at least 35M; this records the floor so the site/RPC requirement is not relaxed for sparse canvases.","line":158,"path":"src/Seasons.sol","reproduction":"Deploy Canvas via its hook (or directly in a test), credit 10 drops, paint one pixel (id 100, colour 5), warp 7 days, endSeason(). staticcall Seasons.tokenURI(1): gas used 12,551,190, returned 736 bytes. Expected by a consumer with a 10M eth_call cap: a rendered image; actual: out-of-gas.","severity":"info","snippet":"        bytes memory colours = canvas.coloursOf(id);","title":"tokenURI costs about 12.5M gas even for a one-pixel canvas"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"With empty hookData the paint recipient is tx.origin. When a smart-contract wallet, ERC-4337 account or meta-transaction relayer buys through a router other than PlaceRouter, the drops go to the bundler or relayer EOA rather than the buyer, and because paint is non-transferable they cannot be recovered. The brief mandates this fallback, and PlaceRouter always names its caller, so this is a trust/UX note rather than a defect; the README already tells smart wallets to use the project router.","line":159,"path":"src/PlaceHook.sol","reproduction":"vm.prank(bob, alice) (msg.sender bob = a contract wallet or router, tx.origin alice = relayer) then ForeignRouter.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -1 ether, limit), \"\"). canvas.drops(alice) == 20, canvas.drops(bob) == 0 (test/Hook.t.sol testOriginFallbackAndSpoofedDataRefused). The IMD was paid by bob's funds; the paint sits with alice.","severity":"info","snippet":"        address buyer = tx.origin;","title":"Paint for relayed or account-abstraction swaps through other routers is credited to tx.origin"}],"hash":"a890b17cd3cd836220881a2c5efe50cf2d8c303fffbba8f35c05765d4c2f3690","nodeId":"a4e54c72-1a32-46c1-acee-885af20f7d7c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and all four cited snippets match the tree line for line.\n\n**Outcome:** no critical, high or medium defects in the control flow of the hook, router, canvas or auction contracts. I traced every listed entry point from caller to final state, including the v4 delta semantics the hook relies on (fee taken on the specified side in `beforeSwap`, on the unspecified side in `afterSwap`, claims minted and burned so the hook's delta nets to zero), the accumulator settlement across season rollovers, the frozen-pot release path, and the escrow checks in the auction. The full suite passes locally (35 tests, fork suite skipped by design).\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n- **Low, auction stall.** `Seasons.bid` accepts self-outbids, the first bid may be 1 wei, and each late bid adds ten minutes with no cap. A scratch test held auction 1 open for six days with 864 bids and about 23 IMD of refundable float, while `finalize` kept reverting. No funds are lost and season rollover is not blocked, so the impact is delayed artist payouts.\n- **Info, partial-fill reverts.** IMD-specified swaps through third-party routers with a real price limit revert with `PartialFill` instead of partially filling. Documented design limitation, recorded with a concrete input.\n- **Info, metadata gas floor.** `tokenURI` costs about 12.5M gas even for a one-pixel canvas because all 4,096 slots are read. The README's 35M RPC requirement therefore applies to every season, not only dense ones.\n- **Info, tx.origin fallback.** Relayed or account-abstraction buys through other routers credit paint to the relayer. Mandated by the brief and documented, noted for the judge.\n\n**Coverage:** all 28 entry points have a row, plus two invariant rows. Two entry points reference findings (`Seasons.bid`, `PlaceHook.afterSwap`); the rest hold. Nothing was left unreached.\n\n**Not verified:** live Robinhood state (the fork suite is opt-in and I ran only the offline suite), the IMD token's transfer-restriction powers beyond what the README states, and browser rendering of the site beyond reading its logic and required links.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2163899,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":67675,"runtime":"claude","turns":54,"wallClockMs":965031}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"624e4be3dda1c33c6258619a53a63170bebcefca7c0890da5dcd5fa2a34cfac0","device":"a8f78934be011e4c","findings":[],"hash":"beefa6ad9c630ef2842e11a8411d55a4ef0b30fc7db631ace446fd6c5adb444f","nodeId":"ba3895aa-6ee4-4f16-a97e-6bb0642ce3ec","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented contracts, responsive site, deployment tooling, and independent review.\n\n- Build, formatting, and 35 tests pass.\n- Robinhood fork passes.\n- Slither reports no high/medium findings.\n\nLive deployment and hosting remain pending launch-operator access. Instructions are in [README.md](/home/identitymd/.identitymd/work/834c0e87-f40c-4a5d-9935-03d865b034ec/ba3895aa-6ee4-4f16-a97e-6bb0642ce3ec/README.md).","treeHash":"d53117dedd9461d6a4a13dd9d1a05134ec85ebd5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":7649280,"inputTokens":180237,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":71820,"runtime":"codex","turns":11,"wallClockMs":2961953}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"56f94f0d3dbe7a9f05a2f3347a76ffa75db375c7b17c957aa924bd209ade1376","device":"1fe90fcdee1e5d05","findings":[],"hash":"e623a6c8c5468859b307062ed217a7ed7c254d09cd0670f6d4b664ab8da65f48","nodeId":"ba3895aa-6ee4-4f16-a97e-6bb0642ce3ec","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented contracts, site, vendored dependencies and independent review.\n\nChecks passed: `forge build`, 44 local tests, `forge fmt --check`, Robinhood fork swaps and full browser flow.\n\nProduction deployment and hosting remain pending. Handoff: [README.md](/home/levi/imd/p6/work/834c0e87-f40c-4a5d-9935-03d865b034ec/ba3895aa-6ee4-4f16-a97e-6bb0642ce3ec/README.md).","treeHash":"7edca7fa3be3d3dda5656af475ce8ab975c7079a","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":7928448,"inputTokens":181015,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":62875,"runtime":"codex","turns":13,"wallClockMs":2657709}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":71451,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 106 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 71.27s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:82:16\n   │\n82 │         delete callbackHash;\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `paymentHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         paymentHash = keccak256(data);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:46:44\n   │\n46 │     constructor(IPoolManager poolManager_, address token_, address factory_) {\n   │                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:71:40\n   │\n71 │         (spent, received) = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (uint256, uint256));\n   │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:50:13\n   │\n50 │             block.timestamp > deadline || amount == 0 || limit == 0\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:74:9\n   │\n74 │         emit Swapped(msg.sender, buy, spent, received);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:51:29\n   │\n51 │                 || amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))\n   │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:51:37\n   │\n51 │                 || amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))\n   │                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:103:16\n    │\n103 │         return elapsed >= 30 minutes ? 200 : 200 + 3300 * (30 minutes - elapsed) / 30 minutes;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:111:25\n    │\n111 │         if (buy) return uint256(-specified) * bps / 10_000;\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:113:17\n    │\n113 │         return (uint256(specified) * bps + (10_000 - bps) - 1) / (10_000 - bps);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:87:41\n   │\n87 │         int256 amount = r.exactInput ? -int256(r.amount) : int256(r.amount);\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:87:60\n   │\n87 │         int256 amount = r.exactInput ? -int256(r.amount) : int256(r.amount);\n   │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:93:25\n   │\n93 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:94:28\n   │\n94 │         uint256 received = uint256(uint128(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:94:36\n   │\n94 │         uint256 received = uint256(uint128(outputDelta));\n   │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:172:9\n    │\n172 │         emit SwapFee(buy, buyer, gross, fee, paintDrops);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:143:33\n    │\n143 │         uint256 poolIMD = buy ? uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) : uint256(uint128(pairDelta));\n    │                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:143:63\n    │\n143 │         uint256 poolIMD = buy ? uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) : uint256(uint128(pairDelta));\n    │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:143:71\n    │\n143 │         uint256 poolIMD = buy ? uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) : uint256(uint128(pairDelta));\n    │                                                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:150:23\n    │\n150 │                 buy ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) - fee : uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:150:64\n    │\n150 │                 buy ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) - fee : uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee;\n    │                                                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-oz-erc721-mint]: `ERC721._mint` does not check that the recipient can receive the token; use `_safeMint`\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:77:9\n   │\n77 │         _mint(address(this), id);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-oz-erc721-mint\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:65:18\n   │\n65 │             end: uint64(block.timestamp + 1 days),\n   │                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:84:42\n   │\n84 │         if (a.end == 0 || a.finalized || block.timestamp >= a.end || a.occupied == 0) revert AuctionClosed();\n   │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:103:13\n    │\n103 │         if (block.timestamp >= uint256(a.end) - 10 minutes) a.end += 10 minutes;\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:121:32\n    │\n121 │             uint256 released = canvas.releasePot(id);\n    │                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:128:13\n    │\n128 │             canvas.rollPot(id);\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:113:42\n    │\n113 │         if (a.end == 0 || a.finalized || block.timestamp < a.end) revert NotReady();\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:143:53\n    │\n143 │             if (claimedBitmap[id][word] & bit != 0) revert AlreadyClaimed();\n    │                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:249:9\n    │\n249 │         require(pos + part.length <= dest.length, \"SVG buffer\");\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:115:20\n    │\n115 │     function start(address imd_) external onlyHook {\n    │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:256:29\n    │\n256 │           bytes memory json = abi.encodePacked(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n257 │ ┃             '{\"name\":\"imd/place season ',\n258 │ ┃             id.toString(),\n259 │ ┃             '\",\"external_url\":\"https://x.com/imdplace\",\"image\":\"data:image/svg+xml;base64,',\n    ‡ ┃\n267 │ ┃             \"}]}\"\n268 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:148:9\n    │\n148 │         emit FeeRecorded(artists, pot, treasury);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:154:38\n    │\n154 │         if (p.owner == address(0) || block.timestamp >= uint256(p.windowStart) + 1 days) return 1;\n    │                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:173:13\n    │\n173 │         if (block.timestamp >= seasonStart + DURATION) revert SeasonNotReady();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:198:43\n    │\n198 │             if (previous == address(0) || block.timestamp >= uint256(p.windowStart) + 1 days) {\n    │                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:178:53\n    │\n178 │             if (ids[i] >= 4096 || colours[i] >= 16) revert InvalidPixel();\n    │                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:181:39\n    │\n181 │                 if (ids[j] == ids[i]) revert InvalidBatch();\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:152:25\n    │\n152 │         if (id >= 4096) revert InvalidPixel();\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:199:33\n    │\n199 │                 p.windowStart = uint40(block.timestamp);\n    │                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint40' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:212:45\n    │\n212 │         uint64 newPaints = previousPaints + uint64(ids.length);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:214:21\n    │\n214 │         s.paints += uint64(ids.length);\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:248:25\n    │\n248 │         if (amount > 0) IPlaceHook(hook).pay(msg.sender, amount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:256:25\n    │\n256 │         if (amount > 0) IPlaceHook(hook).pay(TREASURY, amount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:272:9\n    │\n272 │         seasons.open(id, pot, s.occupied, s.painters, s.paints, s.topPainter);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:260:35\n    │\n260 │         if (currentSeason == 0 || block.timestamp < seasonStart + DURATION) revert SeasonNotReady();\n    │                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:279:25\n    │\n279 │         if (amount > 0) IPlaceHook(hook).pay(address(seasons), amount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:275:58\n    │\n275 │     function releasePot(uint256 id) external onlySeasons nonReentrant returns (uint256 amount) {\n    │                                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:282:55\n    │\n282 │     function rollPot(uint256 id) external onlySeasons nonReentrant {\n    │                                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:297:33\n    │\n297 │             if (ids[i] >= 4096) revert InvalidPixel();\n    │                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:299:60\n    │\n299 │             if (p.owner != artist || artist == address(0)) revert Unauthorized();\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":35741,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/fork/Robinhood.t.sol:RobinhoodForkTest\n[SKIP: skipped] setUp() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 1 skipped; finished in 377.32µs (0.00ns CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/contributor/CanvasFailures.t.sol:PaymentFailureTest\n[PASS] test_FailedArtistTreasuryAndPotPaymentsRemainClaimable() (gas: 2846672)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.01ms (1.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Hook.t.sol:FreshManagerTest\n[PASS] testFirstBuyTokenOnlyLiquidity() (gas: 24084409)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 20.38ms (19.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Adversarial.t.sol:RouterReentrancyTest\n[PASS] testTransferCallbackCannotReplaceSwapPayerOrSpendAgain() (gas: 24453273)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 23.81ms (23.26ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/review/IndependentSwapModes.t.sol:IndependentSwapModesTest\n[PASS] test_ReviewAllModesWhenIMDIsCurrencyOne() (gas: 25721301)\n[PASS] test_ReviewAllModesWhenIMDIsCurrencyZero() (gas: 26638252)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 23.83ms (43.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/contributor/MetadataContent.t.sol:MetadataContentTest\n[PASS] test_DecodedJSONAndSVGRepresentFrozenPixelsAndStats() (gas: 27231271)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 25.69ms (24.75ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/review/Metadata.t.sol:MetadataPerformanceReviewTest\n[PASS] test_ReviewDenseMetadataWithin32MillionGas() (gas: 30502251)\nLogs:\n  dense tokenURI gas: 30394991\n  dense tokenURI bytes: 99877\n\n[PASS] test_ReviewPackedColourExtractionAcrossWholeCanvas() (gas: 12384941)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 228.62ms (66.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/contributor/HookProperties.t.sol:HookPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_DecayAndSplitWithAnOwnerAtArbitraryLaunchSecond(uint32,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 917084, ~: 917125)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 155\n  Bound result 99951887379724963055\n\n[PASS] test_AllFourSwapModesRejectSlippageAndRollBackPaintAndFees() (gas: 2016618)\n[PASS] test_DropThresholdAndDustDoNotTransferOrReducePaintOnSell() (gas: 1529563)\n[PASS] test_InvalidBuyerDataAndUnsolicitedManagerCallbacksReject() (gas: 281647)\n[PASS] test_OurRouterCreditsContractCallerInsteadOfTransactionOrigin() (gas: 362212)\n[PASS] test_ZeroAmountsZeroLimitOversizedAndExpiredRequestsRejectBeforePull() (gas: 161102)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 769.04ms (753.19ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:PlaceInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nPlaceInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariantClaimsNeverExceedArtistAllocation\n[PASS] invariantExactFeeBacking\n PlaceInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 378)\n\n╭--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================+\n| PlaceHandler | claim    | 1032  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PlaceHandler | paint    | 1047  | 378     | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PlaceHandler | trade    | 1010  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PlaceHandler | treasury | 1007  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.07s (1.05s CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/Hook.t.sol:HookTest\n[PASS] testBaseSplitWithOwnedPixelAndClaims() (gas: 1161537)\n[PASS] testCannotInitializeAnotherPool() (gas: 46088)\n[PASS] testDeadlineSlippageAndPartialFillRollBack() (gas: 606727)\n[PASS] testFlagsAndCallbackAuthorization() (gas: 169954)\n[PASS] testFourSwapModesCreditOnlyBuysAndSettle() (gas: 1077408)\n[PASS] testFuzzBuySellConservation(uint96,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 615493, ~: 613925)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] testLaunchDecayAndNoPixelFeeSplit() (gas: 423514)\n[PASS] testOriginFallbackAndSpoofedDataRefused() (gas: 1096335)\n[PASS] testRouterNeverSpendsVictimAllowance() (gas: 419723)\n[PASS] testTokenSupplyAndTransfers() (gas: 90596)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.22s (173.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/contributor/CanvasFailures.t.sol:CanvasFailuresTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_RepaintWindowIsAnchoredAndSurvivesOwnerChanges(uint8,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 1763395, ~: 1476037)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3310\n\n[PASS] test_InsufficientPaintRollsBackSettlementThenExactBalanceWorks() (gas: 1005006)\n[PASS] test_LateInvalidPixelAndBudgetRevertAllOwnershipAndAccounting() (gas: 1643821)\n[PASS] test_PaintNeverExpiresAndCannotBeTransferredOrSwept() (gas: 495592)\n[PASS] test_UnstartedAndRestartedCanvasRefuseMutation() (gas: 264334)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.30s (898.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AuctionReentrancyTest\n[PASS] testBidCallbackCannotReenterAuction() (gas: 710433)\n[PASS] testRefundFailureRollsBackNewBidAndEscrow() (gas: 699167)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.35s (557.30µs CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/contributor/AuctionProperties.t.sol:AuctionPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_AllFrozenArtistsReceiveExactlyPotPlusBid(uint256,uint8,uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 4653574, ~: 3398589)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3016426843527\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_MinimumRaiseIsAtLeastFivePercentAndRefundIsImmediate(uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 765680, ~: 765653)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50852372086806923\n\n[PASS] test_ClaimBitmapAcrossWordsAndInvalidTailAreAtomic() (gas: 2540914)\n[PASS] test_ClaimBoundariesAndNonexistentAuctionReject() (gas: 1084575)\n[PASS] test_ExtensionBoundaryAndRepeatedSelfOutbid() (gas: 985545)\n[PASS] test_FailedTransferFromRestoresRefundAndExtensionState() (gas: 736429)\n[PASS] test_ZeroRoundedPayoutStillMarksClaimAndRemainingBatchGetsDust() (gas: 3448624)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58s (2.37s CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Canvas.t.sol:CanvasTest\n[PASS] testAuctionRefundRaiseExtensionAndExactPayout() (gas: 1862794)\n[PASS] testBatchValidationAndAtomicBudget() (gas: 3664127)\n[PASS] testBlankSeasonCarriesPotAndCannotAcceptBids() (gas: 432331)\n[PASS] testFrozenSVGAndMetadata() (gas: 38267145)\n[PASS] testFuzzAccumulatorAcrossManyRepaints(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 12342924, ~: 12344339)\n[PASS] testFuzzRoundingCannotOverclaim(uint128,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 3541022, ~: 3352276)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 96\n  Bound result 40\n\n[PASS] testNoBidTopPainterAndPotCarryCannotBeDelayedToThirdSeason() (gas: 1146014)\n[PASS] testNoUnauthorizedMoneyPaintOrNFTMovement() (gas: 553929)\n[PASS] testOverwritePreservesEarnedBalance() (gas: 1114210)\n[PASS] testPackedPixelWindowDoublingAndCap() (gas: 1372550)\n[PASS] testSeasonDeadlineFreezeAndReset() (gas: 39545545)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58s (2.36s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/review/IndependentAccounting.t.sol:IndependentAccountingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_ReviewPerPixelReferenceAccountingAcrossSeasons(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 21904497, ~: 21905628)\n[PASS] test_ReviewConcurrentAuctionEscrowsRemainIndependent() (gas: 1969550)\n[PASS] test_ReviewDelayedRolloverCannotChooseLaterSeason() (gas: 1282896)\n[PASS] test_ReviewFrozenOwnersAndExactRemainderPayout() (gas: 1867096)\n[PASS] test_ReviewOldAccrualSurvivesSkippedSeasons() (gas: 2010681)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58s (1.58s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/contributor/LifecycleInvariant.t.sol:LifecycleInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nLifecycleInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_AllIMDHasBackingAndOnlyEarnedAmountsLeave\n[PASS] invariant_FrozenOwnershipAndAuctionLiabilities\n LifecycleInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract         | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================+\n| LifecycleHandler | advance        | 2411  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | bid            | 2523  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | claimAuction   | 2481  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | claimTradeFees | 2478  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | claimTreasury  | 2476  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | donate         | 2503  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | endSeason      | 2514  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | finalize       | 2402  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | paint          | 2434  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LifecycleHandler | trade          | 2354  | 0       | 0        |\n╰------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999998\n  Bound result 101\n  Bound result 118784\n  Bound result 2959512977261063162\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2950000000000017491\n  Bound result 1499999999996610170\n  Bound result 576723722223354802\n  Bound result 2950000000000004078\n  Bound result 57\n  Bound result 2474\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2800\n  Bound result 2950000000000001593\n  Bound result 638212886\n  Bound result 4297\n  Bound result 999999999999999998\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5000\n  Bound result 2950000000000052249\n  Bound result 2950000000063299676\n  Bound result 2474\n  Bound result 2000\n  Bound result 9636\n  Bound result 999999999999999998\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 35.62s (35.59s CPU time)\n\nRan 16 test suites in 35.62s (46.39s CPU time): 56 tests passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped (57 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":90,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Canvas.claim()\",\"Canvas.claimTreasury()\",\"Canvas.credit(address,uint256)\",\"Canvas.endSeason()\",\"Canvas.paint(uint16[],uint8[])\",\"Canvas.paintWithLimit(uint16[],uint8[],uint256)\",\"Canvas.recordFee(uint256,uint256)\",\"Canvas.releasePot(uint256)\",\"Canvas.rollPot(uint256)\",\"Canvas.start(address)\",\"PlaceHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PlaceHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PlaceHook.pay(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PlaceRouter.swap(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint160,uint256)\",\"PlaceRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PlaceToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.bid(uint256,uint256)\",\"Seasons.claim(uint256,uint16[])\",\"Seasons.finalize(uint256)\",\"Seasons.open(uint256,uint256,uint16,uint32,uint64,address)\",\"Seasons.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"Seasons.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"Seasons.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":105,\"dependencies.json\":22,\"deployment/launch-recipe.json\":11,\"docs/INDEPENDENT_REVIEW.md\":59,\"docs/VERIFICATION.md\":46,\"docs/static-analysis.json\":18,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"site/abi.json\":1,\"site/app.js\":247,\"site/index.html\":29,\"site/logo.svg\":1,\"site/style.css\":1,\"site/vendor/ETHERS_LICENSE.md\":21,\"site/vendor/FONT_LICENSE.txt\":93,\"site/vendor/PixelifySans.ttf\":328,\"site/vendor/ethers.min.js\":1,\"site/vendor/provenance.json\":22,\"src/Canvas.sol\":334,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":30,\"src/PlaceHook.sol\":195,\"src/PlaceRouter.sol\":107,\"src/PlaceToken.sol\":10,\"src/Seasons.sol\":271,\"src/interfaces/IPlace.sol\":22,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":136,\"test/Canvas.t.sol\":338,\"test/Hook.t.sol\":185,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":74,\"test/contributor/AuctionProperties.t.sol\":233,\"test/contributor/CanvasFailures.t.sol\":241,\"test/contributor/CanvasFixture.sol\":68,\"test/contributor/HookProperties.t.sol\":142,\"test/contributor/LifecycleInvariant.t.sol\":337,\"test/contributor/MetadataContent.t.sol\":81,\"test/contributor/README.md\":58,\"test/fork/Robinhood.t.sol\":65,\"test/helpers/PoolFixture.sol\":181,\"test/helpers/TestDeployer.sol\":10,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":13,\"test/review/IndependentAccounting.t.sol\":199,\"test/review/IndependentSwapModes.t.sol\":80,\"test/review/Metadata.t.sol\":58,\"tools/configure-site.mjs\":27,\"tools/export-abi.py\":10,\"tools/mine-hook.mjs\":18},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"15d106f9f28a271c186c5d42688cbe7c23068fdf0ef829982fc47b21ebb253a4","verifiedTreeHash":"ea7de24e415720563cd50c017988ea95d7555c00","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ad90ce4c"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":37350,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 100 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 37.21s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:82:16\n   │\n82 │         delete callbackHash;\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `paymentHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         paymentHash = keccak256(data);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:46:44\n   │\n46 │     constructor(IPoolManager poolManager_, address token_, address factory_) {\n   │                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:71:40\n   │\n71 │         (spent, received) = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (uint256, uint256));\n   │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:50:13\n   │\n50 │             block.timestamp > deadline || amount == 0 || limit == 0\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:74:9\n   │\n74 │         emit Swapped(msg.sender, buy, spent, received);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:51:29\n   │\n51 │                 || amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))\n   │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:51:37\n   │\n51 │                 || amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))\n   │                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:103:16\n    │\n103 │         return elapsed >= 30 minutes ? 200 : 200 + 3300 * (30 minutes - elapsed) / 30 minutes;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:111:25\n    │\n111 │         if (buy) return uint256(-specified) * bps / 10_000;\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:113:17\n    │\n113 │         return (uint256(specified) * bps + (10_000 - bps) - 1) / (10_000 - bps);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:87:41\n   │\n87 │         int256 amount = r.exactInput ? -int256(r.amount) : int256(r.amount);\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:87:60\n   │\n87 │         int256 amount = r.exactInput ? -int256(r.amount) : int256(r.amount);\n   │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:93:25\n   │\n93 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:94:28\n   │\n94 │         uint256 received = uint256(uint128(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:94:36\n   │\n94 │         uint256 received = uint256(uint128(outputDelta));\n   │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:172:9\n    │\n172 │         emit SwapFee(buy, buyer, gross, fee, paintDrops);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:143:33\n    │\n143 │         uint256 poolIMD = buy ? uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) : uint256(uint128(pairDelta));\n    │                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:143:63\n    │\n143 │         uint256 poolIMD = buy ? uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) : uint256(uint128(pairDelta));\n    │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:143:71\n    │\n143 │         uint256 poolIMD = buy ? uint256(-int256(pairDelta)) : uint256(uint128(pairDelta));\n    │                                                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:150:23\n    │\n150 │                 buy ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) - fee : uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:150:64\n    │\n150 │                 buy ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) - fee : uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee;\n    │                                                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-oz-erc721-mint]: `ERC721._mint` does not check that the recipient can receive the token; use `_safeMint`\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:77:9\n   │\n77 │         _mint(address(this), id);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-oz-erc721-mint\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:65:18\n   │\n65 │             end: uint64(block.timestamp + 1 days),\n   │                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:84:42\n   │\n84 │         if (a.end == 0 || a.finalized || block.timestamp >= a.end || a.occupied == 0) revert AuctionClosed();\n   │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:103:13\n    │\n103 │         if (block.timestamp >= uint256(a.end) - 10 minutes) a.end += 10 minutes;\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:121:32\n    │\n121 │             uint256 released = canvas.releasePot(id);\n    │                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:128:13\n    │\n128 │             canvas.rollPot(id);\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:113:42\n    │\n113 │         if (a.end == 0 || a.finalized || block.timestamp < a.end) revert NotReady();\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:143:53\n    │\n143 │             if (claimedBitmap[id][word] & bit != 0) revert AlreadyClaimed();\n    │                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:249:9\n    │\n249 │         require(pos + part.length <= dest.length, \"SVG buffer\");\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:115:20\n    │\n115 │     function start(address imd_) external onlyHook {\n    │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:256:29\n    │\n256 │           bytes memory json = abi.encodePacked(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n257 │ ┃             '{\"name\":\"imd/place season ',\n258 │ ┃             id.toString(),\n259 │ ┃             '\",\"external_url\":\"https://x.com/imdplace\",\"image\":\"data:image/svg+xml;base64,',\n    ‡ ┃\n267 │ ┃             \"}]}\"\n268 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:148:9\n    │\n148 │         emit FeeRecorded(artists, pot, treasury);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:154:38\n    │\n154 │         if (p.owner == address(0) || block.timestamp >= uint256(p.windowStart) + 1 days) return 1;\n    │                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:173:13\n    │\n173 │         if (block.timestamp >= seasonStart + DURATION) revert SeasonNotReady();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:198:43\n    │\n198 │             if (previous == address(0) || block.timestamp >= uint256(p.windowStart) + 1 days) {\n    │                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:178:53\n    │\n178 │             if (ids[i] >= 4096 || colours[i] >= 16) revert InvalidPixel();\n    │                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:181:39\n    │\n181 │                 if (ids[j] == ids[i]) revert InvalidBatch();\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:152:25\n    │\n152 │         if (id >= 4096) revert InvalidPixel();\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:199:33\n    │\n199 │                 p.windowStart = uint40(block.timestamp);\n    │                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint40' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:212:45\n    │\n212 │         uint64 newPaints = previousPaints + uint64(ids.length);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:214:21\n    │\n214 │         s.paints += uint64(ids.length);\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:248:25\n    │\n248 │         if (amount > 0) IPlaceHook(hook).pay(msg.sender, amount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:256:25\n    │\n256 │         if (amount > 0) IPlaceHook(hook).pay(TREASURY, amount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:272:9\n    │\n272 │         seasons.open(id, pot, s.occupied, s.painters, s.paints, s.topPainter);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:260:35\n    │\n260 │         if (currentSeason == 0 || block.timestamp < seasonStart + DURATION) revert SeasonNotReady();\n    │                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:279:25\n    │\n279 │         if (amount > 0) IPlaceHook(hook).pay(address(seasons), amount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:275:58\n    │\n275 │     function releasePot(uint256 id) external onlySeasons nonReentrant returns (uint256 amount) {\n    │                                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:282:55\n    │\n282 │     function rollPot(uint256 id) external onlySeasons nonReentrant {\n    │                                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:297:33\n    │\n297 │             if (ids[i] >= 4096) revert InvalidPixel();\n    │                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:299:60\n    │\n299 │             if (p.owner != artist || artist == address(0)) revert Unauthorized();\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n    ╭▸ test/helpers/PoolFixture.sol:170:73\n    │\n170 │         return router.swap(buy, exactInput, amount, limit, _limit(buy), block.timestamp);\n    │                                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ⸬  test/Hook.t.sol:64:9\n    │\n 64 │         vm.warp(hook.launchTime() + 15 minutes);\n    │         ─────────────────────────────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n    │\n    ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n   ╭▸ test/Hook.t.sol:73:17\n   │\n73 │         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 30 minutes);\n   │         ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n   │\n   ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n   ╭▸ test/Hook.t.sol:93:17\n   │\n93 │         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 30 minutes);\n   │         ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n   │\n   ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n    ╭▸ test/Hook.t.sol:163:17\n    │\n163 │         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 30 minutes);\n    │         ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n    │\n    ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":712,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/fork/Robinhood.t.sol:RobinhoodForkTest\n[SKIP: skipped] setUp() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 1 skipped; finished in 402.78µs (0.00ns CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AuctionReentrancyTest\n[PASS] testBidCallbackCannotReenterAuction() (gas: 710433)\n[PASS] testRefundFailureRollsBackNewBidAndEscrow() (gas: 699167)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.16ms (487.84µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Hook.t.sol:FreshManagerTest\n[PASS] testFirstBuyTokenOnlyLiquidity() (gas: 24083617)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.58ms (14.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/review/IndependentSwapModes.t.sol:IndependentSwapModesTest\n[PASS] test_ReviewAllModesWhenIMDIsCurrencyOne() (gas: 25716295)\n[PASS] test_ReviewAllModesWhenIMDIsCurrencyZero() (gas: 26633246)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 18.78ms (33.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Adversarial.t.sol:RouterReentrancyTest\n[PASS] testTransferCallbackCannotReplaceSwapPayerOrSpendAgain() (gas: 24452880)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.38ms (18.97ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/Hook.t.sol:HookTest\n[PASS] testBaseSplitWithOwnedPixelAndClaims() (gas: 1160749)\n[PASS] testCannotInitializeAnotherPool() (gas: 46088)\n[PASS] testDeadlineSlippageAndPartialFillRollBack() (gas: 606727)\n[PASS] testFlagsAndCallbackAuthorization() (gas: 169954)\n[PASS] testFourSwapModesCreditOnlyBuysAndSettle() (gas: 1075828)\n[PASS] testFuzzBuySellConservation(uint96,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 615089, ~: 616608)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99950000000006834530\n\n[PASS] testLaunchDecayAndNoPixelFeeSplit() (gas: 423123)\n[PASS] testOriginFallbackAndSpoofedDataRefused() (gas: 1096335)\n[PASS] testRouterNeverSpendsVictimAllowance() (gas: 419723)\n[PASS] testTokenSupplyAndTransfers() (gas: 90596)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 52.08ms (44.42ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/review/Metadata.t.sol:MetadataPerformanceReviewTest\n[PASS] test_ReviewDenseMetadataWithin32MillionGas() (gas: 30502251)\nLogs:\n  dense tokenURI gas: 30394991\n  dense tokenURI bytes: 99877\n\n[PASS] test_ReviewPackedColourExtractionAcrossWholeCanvas() (gas: 12384941)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 155.55ms (44.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Canvas.t.sol:CanvasTest\n[PASS] testAuctionRefundRaiseExtensionAndExactPayout() (gas: 1862794)\n[PASS] testBatchValidationAndAtomicBudget() (gas: 3664127)\n[PASS] testBlankSeasonCarriesPotAndCannotAcceptBids() (gas: 432331)\n[PASS] testFrozenSVGAndMetadata() (gas: 38267145)\n[PASS] testFuzzAccumulatorAcrossManyRepaints(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 12361219, ~: 12358354)\n[PASS] testFuzzRoundingCannotOverclaim(uint128,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 3501214, ~: 3260520)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2996\n  Bound result 8\n\n[PASS] testNoBidTopPainterAndPotCarryCannotBeDelayedToThirdSeason() (gas: 1146014)\n[PASS] testNoUnauthorizedMoneyPaintOrNFTMovement() (gas: 553929)\n[PASS] testOverwritePreservesEarnedBalance() (gas: 1114210)\n[PASS] testPackedPixelWindowDoublingAndCap() (gas: 1372550)\n[PASS] testSeasonDeadlineFreezeAndReset() (gas: 39545545)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 376.30ms (557.53ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/review/IndependentAccounting.t.sol:IndependentAccountingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_ReviewPerPixelReferenceAccountingAcrossSeasons(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 21900379, ~: 21911461)\n[PASS] test_ReviewConcurrentAuctionEscrowsRemainIndependent() (gas: 1969550)\n[PASS] test_ReviewDelayedRolloverCannotChooseLaterSeason() (gas: 1282896)\n[PASS] test_ReviewFrozenOwnersAndExactRemainderPayout() (gas: 1867096)\n[PASS] test_ReviewOldAccrualSurvivesSkippedSeasons() (gas: 2010681)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 565.44ms (567.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:PlaceInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nPlaceInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariantClaimsNeverExceedArtistAllocation\n[PASS] invariantExactFeeBacking\n PlaceInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 527)\n\n╭--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================+\n| PlaceHandler | claim    | 1063  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PlaceHandler | paint    | 1015  | 527     | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PlaceHandler | trade    | 994   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PlaceHandler | treasury | 1024  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 619.95ms (605.15ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 test suites in 621.45ms (1.82s CPU time): 35 tests passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped (36 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":49,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Canvas.claim()\",\"Canvas.claimTreasury()\",\"Canvas.credit(address,uint256)\",\"Canvas.endSeason()\",\"Canvas.paint(uint16[],uint8[])\",\"Canvas.paintWithLimit(uint16[],uint8[],uint256)\",\"Canvas.recordFee(uint256,uint256)\",\"Canvas.releasePot(uint256)\",\"Canvas.rollPot(uint256)\",\"Canvas.start(address)\",\"PlaceHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PlaceHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PlaceHook.pay(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PlaceRouter.swap(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint160,uint256)\",\"PlaceRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PlaceToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.bid(uint256,uint256)\",\"Seasons.claim(uint256,uint16[])\",\"Seasons.finalize(uint256)\",\"Seasons.open(uint256,uint256,uint16,uint32,uint64,address)\",\"Seasons.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"Seasons.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"Seasons.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":105,\"dependencies.json\":22,\"deployment/launch-recipe.json\":11,\"docs/INDEPENDENT_REVIEW.md\":59,\"docs/VERIFICATION.md\":46,\"docs/static-analysis.json\":18,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"site/abi.json\":1,\"site/app.js\":247,\"site/index.html\":29,\"site/logo.svg\":1,\"site/style.css\":1,\"site/vendor/ETHERS_LICENSE.md\":21,\"site/vendor/FONT_LICENSE.txt\":93,\"site/vendor/PixelifySans.ttf\":328,\"site/vendor/ethers.min.js\":1,\"site/vendor/provenance.json\":22,\"src/Canvas.sol\":334,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":30,\"src/PlaceHook.sol\":195,\"src/PlaceRouter.sol\":107,\"src/PlaceToken.sol\":10,\"src/Seasons.sol\":271,\"src/interfaces/IPlace.sol\":22,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":136,\"test/Canvas.t.sol\":337,\"test/Hook.t.sol\":185,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":74,\"test/fork/Robinhood.t.sol\":65,\"test/helpers/PoolFixture.sol\":181,\"test/helpers/TestDeployer.sol\":10,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":13,\"test/review/IndependentAccounting.t.sol\":198,\"test/review/IndependentSwapModes.t.sol\":80,\"test/review/Metadata.t.sol\":58,\"tools/configure-site.mjs\":27,\"tools/export-abi.py\":10,\"tools/mine-hook.mjs\":18},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":8361,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/PlaceRouter.sol:41: Reentrancy in PlaceRouter.swap(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint160,uint256) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#41-76):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/PlaceRouter.sol:41: Reentrancy in PlaceRouter.swap(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint160,uint256) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#41-76):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PlaceHook.sol:130: Reentrancy in PlaceHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/PlaceHook.sol#130-174):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PlaceRouter.sol:41: PlaceRouter.swap(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint160,uint256) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#41-76) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:111: Seasons.finalize(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#111-130) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:95: Seasons.bid(uint256,uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#95-109) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Canvas.sol:259: Canvas.endSeason() (src/Canvas.sol#259-273) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PlaceHook.sol:130: PlaceHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/PlaceHook.sol#130-174) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:82: Seasons.minimumBid(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#82-87) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Canvas.sol:151: Canvas.price(uint16) (src/Canvas.sol#151-156) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PlaceHook.sol:100: PlaceHook.feeBps() (src/PlaceHook.sol#100-104) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Canvas.sol:170: Canvas._paint(uint16[],uint8[],uint256) (src/Canvas.sol#170-219) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":542,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] abi-encode-packed-hash-collision at src/Seasons.sol:205: `abi.encodePacked()` Hash Collision (2 places)\n[high] eth-send-unchecked-address at src/Seasons.sol:95: ETH transferred without address checks (2 places)\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/Canvas.sol:262: Reentrancy: State change after external call (7 places)\n[low] costly-loop at src/Canvas.sol:177: Costly operations inside loop (2 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:23: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/PlaceHook.sol:111: Large Numeric Literal (8 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/Canvas.sol:132: Literal Instead of Constant (51 places)\n[low] non-reentrant-not-first at src/Canvas.sol:275: `nonReentrant` is Not the First Modifier (2 places)\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/Canvas.sol:177: Loop Contains `require`/`revert` (5 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/PlaceHook.sol:177: State Change Without Event (3 places)\n[low] state-variable-could-be-constant at src/Canvas.sol:59: State Variable Could Be Constant\n[low] unchecked-return at src/Seasons.sol:157: Unchecked Return\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/Seasons.sol:160: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unsafe-oz-erc721-mint at src/Seasons.sol:77: Unsafe `ERC721::_mint()`","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"beefa6ad9c630ef2842e11a8411d55a4ef0b30fc7db631ace446fd6c5adb444f","verifiedTreeHash":"d53117dedd9461d6a4a13dd9d1a05134ec85ebd5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ad90ce4c"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":36566,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 105 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 36.43s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `launchedAt` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:85:9\n   │\n85 │         launchedAt = uint40(block.timestamp);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │             block.timestamp > deadline || amount == 0 || amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `seasonStart` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n   ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:73:9\n   │\n73 │         seasonStart = uint40(block.timestamp);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:47:67\n   │\n47 │             block.timestamp > deadline || amount == 0 || amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))\n   │                                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:47:75\n   │\n47 │             block.timestamp > deadline || amount == 0 || amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))\n   │                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:39:40\n   │\n39 │     constructor(IPoolManager manager_, address token_, address factory_) {\n   │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[arbitrary-send-erc20]: `transferFrom` uses an arbitrary `from`; require it to equal `msg.sender` or `address(this)`\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:79:9\n   │\n79 │         IERC20(Currency.unwrap(pay)).safeTransferFrom(r.payer, address(manager), spent);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/arbitrary-send-erc20\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:63:52\n   │\n63 │             SwapParams(zeroForOne, r.exactInput ? -int256(r.amount) : int256(r.amount), r.price),\n   │                                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:63:71\n   │\n63 │             SwapParams(zeroForOne, r.exactInput ? -int256(r.amount) : int256(r.amount), r.price),\n   │                                                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:69:25\n   │\n69 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(input));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceRouter.sol:70:28\n   │\n70 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(output));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:85:22\n   │\n85 │         launchedAt = uint40(block.timestamp);\n   │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint40' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:94:16\n   │\n94 │         return elapsed >= 30 minutes ? 200 : 200 + 3300 * (30 minutes - elapsed) / 30 minutes;\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:120:77\n    │\n120 │         return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    │                                                                             ━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:115:30\n    │\n115 │             uint256 amount = uint256(exactInput ? -params.amountSpecified : params.amountSpecified);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:117:23\n    │\n117 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert InvalidSwap();\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:117:31\n    │\n117 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert InvalidSwap();\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:120:63\n    │\n120 │         return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:120:70\n    │\n120 │         return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    │                                                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-oz-erc721-mint]: `ERC721._mint` does not check that the recipient can receive the token; use `_safeMint`\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:49:9\n   │\n49 │         _mint(address(this), id);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-oz-erc721-mint\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:163:44\n    │\n163 │         return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, returned);\n    │                                            ━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:47:38\n   │\n47 │             pot, 0, address(0), top, uint40(block.timestamp + 1 days), owned, painters, paints, false\n   │                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint40' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:135:29\n    │\n135 │         uint256 principal = uint256(buy ? -int256(pairDelta) : int256(pairDelta));\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:140:30\n    │\n140 │             uint256 amount = uint256(exactInput ? -params.amountSpecified : params.amountSpecified);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:149:23\n    │\n149 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert InvalidSwap();\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:149:31\n    │\n149 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert InvalidSwap();\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:150:24\n    │\n150 │             returned = int128(int256(fee));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:150:31\n    │\n150 │             returned = int128(int256(fee));\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:169:68\n    │\n169 │         if (poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), imd.toId()) != 0) poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n    │                                                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:60:42\n   │\n60 │         if (a.end == 0 || a.finalized || block.timestamp >= a.end || a.owned == 0 || amount < minimumBid(id)) revert InvalidAction();\n   │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:69:13\n   │\n69 │         if (a.end - block.timestamp < 10 minutes) a.end += 10 minutes;\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:169:13\n    │\n169 │         if (poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), imd.toId()) != 0) poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:64:13\n   │\n64 │         if (token.balanceOf(address(this)) != balance + amount) revert InvalidAction();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/PlaceHook.sol:169:68\n    │\n169 │         if (poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), imd.toId()) != 0) poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n    │                                                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:84:13\n   │\n84 │             canvas.carryPot(pot);\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:76:42\n   │\n76 │         if (a.end == 0 || a.finalized || block.timestamp < a.end) revert InvalidAction();\n   │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:89:9\n   │\n89 │         emit Finalized(id, winner, a.bid == 0 ? 0 : a.pot + a.bid);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:73:23\n   │\n73 │         seasonStart = uint40(block.timestamp);\n   │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint40' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:94:57\n   │\n94 │         if (a.end != 0 && !a.finalized && a.bid == 0 && block.timestamp >= a.end) finalize(id);\n   │                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:107:47\n    │\n107 │             (address owner,,,, uint16 rank) = canvas.pixels(id, pixel);\n    │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:106:32\n    │\n106 │             if (pixel >= 4096) revert InvalidAction();\n    │                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:110:77\n    │\n110 │             if (owner != msg.sender || claimedBitmap[id][word] & mask != 0) revert InvalidAction();\n    │                                                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:107:47\n    │\n107 │             (address owner,,,, uint16 rank) = canvas.pixels(id, pixel);\n    │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:125:17\n    │\n125 │ ┏                 abi.encodePacked(\n126 │ ┃                     '{\"name\":\"imd/place season ',\n127 │ ┃                     id.toString(),\n128 │ ┃                     '\",\"external_url\":\"https://x.com/imdplace\",\"image\":\"data:image/svg+xml;base64,',\n    ‡ ┃\n136 │ ┃                     \"}]}\"\n137 │ ┃                 )\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:178:66\n    │\n178 │             bytes memory rgb = bytes(Strings.toHexString(uint256(canvas.palette(colour)), 3));\n    │                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:197:48\n    │\n197 │         if (n >= 10) output[cursor++] = bytes1(uint8(48 + n / 10));\n    │                                                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint8' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:198:35\n    │\n198 │         output[cursor++] = bytes1(uint8(48 + n % 10));\n    │                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint8' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Seasons.sol:203:25\n    │\n203 │         for (uint256 i; i < part.length; i += 32) {\n    │                         ━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n   ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:91:28\n   │\n91 │             accPerPixel += artists * SCALE / painted;\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:102:21\n    │\n102 │         uint256 k = block.timestamp >= uint256(p.windowStart) + 1 days ? 0 : p.paints;\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:127:13\n    │\n127 │             spent += cost;\n    │             ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:119:28\n    │\n119 │             season == 0 || block.timestamp >= uint256(seasonStart) + 7 days || ids.length == 0\n    │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:141:17\n    │\n141 │             if (block.timestamp >= uint256(p.windowStart) + 1 days || p.paints == 0) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:125:53\n    │\n125 │             if (ids[i] >= 4096 || colours[i] >= 16) revert InvalidAction();\n    │                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:100:25\n    │\n100 │         if (id >= 4096) revert InvalidAction();\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:128:63\n    │\n128 │             if (spent > maxDrops || cost > drops[msg.sender]) revert InsufficientPaint();\n    │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:142:33\n    │\n142 │                 p.windowStart = uint40(block.timestamp);\n    │                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint40' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:151:19\n    │\n151 │         paints += uint64(ids.length);\n    │                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:178:9\n    │\n178 │         IPlaceHook(hook).collectFees();\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:180:9\n    │\n180 │         emit Claimed(msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:186:9\n    │\n186 │         IPlaceHook(hook).collectFees();\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `season` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:194:21\n    │\n194 │         if (id > 1) seasons.rollUnbid(id - 1);\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `season` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:197:9\n    │\n197 │         seasons.open(id, amount, painted, painters, paints, topPainter);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:208:9\n    │\n208 │         IPlaceHook(hook).collectFees();\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:191:28\n    │\n191 │         if (season == 0 || block.timestamp < uint256(seasonStart) + 7 days) revert InvalidAction();\n    │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:198:9\n    │\n198 │         emit SeasonEnded(id, amount, painted);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Canvas.sol:200:23\n    │\n200 │         seasonStart = uint40(block.timestamp);\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint40' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n    ╭▸ test/Hook.t.sol:70:13\n    │\n 70 │             block.timestamp + 1\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    ‡\n151 │         vm.warp(hook.launchedAt() + 15 minutes);\n    │         ─────────────────────────────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n    │\n    ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":810,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/RobinhoodFork.t.sol:RobinhoodForkTest\n[SKIP] test_realRobinhoodManagerBuySell() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 1 skipped; finished in 413.50µs (47.92µs CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_duplicatePixelAuctionClaimIsAtomic() (gas: 773386)\n[PASS] test_failedClaimRestoresCreditAndReentrancyBlocked() (gas: 498147)\n[PASS] test_failedImmediateRefundRollsBackBidAndFunds() (gas: 1019333)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.52ms (1.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_realCreate2DeploymentAndFactoryInitialization() (gas: 12437859)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.43ms (4.06ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/Hook.t.sol:ReverseCurrencyHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyFeeCredit(uint96,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 339305, ~: 341679)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 996995496653462481985\n\n[PASS] test_allFourSwapModesAndFeeBacking() (gas: 1185144)\n[PASS] test_buyCreditSmartWalletAndSellsUnchanged() (gas: 720025)\n[PASS] test_callbacksAndPoolBinding() (gas: 190184)\n[PASS] test_decayAndSplit() (gas: 975251)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithLaunchTokensOnly() (gas: 10448164)\n[PASS] test_noDataUsesOriginAndRejectsForgedIdentity() (gas: 453762)\n[PASS] test_slippageDeadlineAndPartialFillRevert() (gas: 468559)\n[PASS] test_tokenSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 130094)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 26.41ms (29.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/Hook.t.sol:HookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyFeeCredit(uint96,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 334201, ~: 337035)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999999999000000014375\n\n[PASS] test_allFourSwapModesAndFeeBacking() (gas: 1184330)\n[PASS] test_buyCreditSmartWalletAndSellsUnchanged() (gas: 713933)\n[PASS] test_callbacksAndPoolBinding() (gas: 190184)\n[PASS] test_decayAndSplit() (gas: 969297)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithLaunchTokensOnly() (gas: 10413479)\n[PASS] test_noDataUsesOriginAndRejectsForgedIdentity() (gas: 447125)\n[PASS] test_slippageDeadlineAndPartialFillRevert() (gas: 457380)\n[PASS] test_tokenSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 130094)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 380.03ms (29.27ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/Canvas.t.sol:CanvasTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_accumulatorAcrossRepaints(bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 14981997, ~: 14982808)\n[PASS] test_auctionRaiseRefundExtensionAndExactPayout() (gas: 1853392)\n[PASS] test_batchLimitsAndValidationAtomic() (gas: 847264)\n[PASS] test_feeSplitAndNoPixels() (gas: 852977)\n[PASS] test_freezeTimeSnapshotAndReset() (gas: 23423526)\n[PASS] test_noBidTopPainterAndCarryIntoCurrentSeason() (gas: 1342131)\n[PASS] test_privilegedEntrypointsRefuseOthers() (gas: 134000)\n[PASS] test_repaintWindowAndCap() (gas: 1464538)\n[PASS] test_rewardsSurviveRepaintAndManySeasons() (gas: 2150162)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 402.34ms (433.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/IndependentReview.t.sol:IndependentReviewTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_accumulatorAcrossRepaints(bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 14981979, ~: 14983042)\n[PASS] testFuzz_reviewAccountingAcrossSeasons(bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 24647862, ~: 24643151)\n[PASS] test_auctionRaiseRefundExtensionAndExactPayout() (gas: 1853546)\n[PASS] test_batchLimitsAndValidationAtomic() (gas: 847308)\n[PASS] test_feeSplitAndNoPixels() (gas: 853194)\n[PASS] test_freezeTimeSnapshotAndReset() (gas: 23423661)\n[PASS] test_noBidTopPainterAndCarryIntoCurrentSeason() (gas: 1342329)\n[PASS] test_privilegedEntrypointsRefuseOthers() (gas: 134044)\n[PASS] test_repaintWindowAndCap() (gas: 1464626)\n[PASS] test_reviewFullCanvasMetadataGas() (gas: 63649159)\nLogs:\n  SVG bytes: 56636\n  SVG gas: 19066907\n  tokenURI bytes: 101021\n  tokenURI gas: 30308401\n\n[PASS] test_reviewLateCarryTargetsNextSeason() (gas: 875643)\n[PASS] test_reviewSVGCoordinatesAndFrozenColours() (gas: 22372454)\n[PASS] test_rewardsSurviveRepaintAndManySeasons() (gas: 2150580)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 694.15ms (1.60s CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 695.68ms (1.51s CPU time): 44 tests passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped (45 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":48,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Canvas.carryPot(uint256)\",\"Canvas.claim()\",\"Canvas.credit(address,uint256)\",\"Canvas.endSeason()\",\"Canvas.paint(uint16[],uint8[])\",\"Canvas.paintWithLimit(uint16[],uint8[],uint256)\",\"Canvas.payRecipient()\",\"Canvas.recordFee(uint256,uint256)\",\"Canvas.start(address)\",\"PlaceHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PlaceHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PlaceHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PlaceHook.collectFees()\",\"PlaceHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PlaceRouter.swap(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint160,uint256)\",\"PlaceRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"PlaceToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"PlaceToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.bid(uint256,uint256)\",\"Seasons.claim(uint256,uint16[])\",\"Seasons.finalize(uint256)\",\"Seasons.open(uint256,uint256,uint16,uint32,uint64,address)\",\"Seasons.rollUnbid(uint256)\",\"Seasons.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Seasons.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"Seasons.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"Seasons.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":124,\"REVIEW.md\":27,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":32,\"script/configure-site.mjs\":20,\"script/export-abi.mjs\":5,\"src/Canvas.sol\":259,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":30,\"src/Interfaces.sol\":17,\"src/PlaceHook.sol\":178,\"src/PlaceRouter.sol\":84,\"src/PlaceToken.sol\":10,\"src/Seasons.sol\":210,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":124,\"test/Canvas.t.sol\":302,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":40,\"test/Hook.t.sol\":252,\"test/IndependentReview.t.sol\":134,\"test/RobinhoodFork.t.sol\":34,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":13,\"test/mocks/PoolDriver.sol\":59,\"web/abi.json\":1,\"web/app.js\":161,\"web/deployment.json\":1,\"web/index.html\":32,\"web/style.css\":1,\"web/vendor/LICENSE.md\":21,\"web/vendor/PROVENANCE\":3,\"web/vendor/ethers.min.js\":1,\"web/vendor/package.json\":1},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":7542,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/high] arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/PlaceRouter.sol:56: PlaceRouter.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#56-83) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(Currency.unwrap(pay)).safeTransferFrom(r.payer,address(manager),spent) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#79)\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/Canvas.sol:82: Canvas.recordFee(uint256,uint256) (src/Canvas.sol#82-97) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/Seasons.sol:53: Seasons.minimumBid(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#53-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/Canvas.sol:190: Reentrancy in Canvas.endSeason() (src/Canvas.sol#190-210):\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Canvas.sol:122: Canvas._paint(uint16[],uint8[],uint256).spent (src/Canvas.sol#122) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/PlaceHook.sol:138: PlaceHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes).returned (src/PlaceHook.sol#138) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/PlaceHook.sol:113: PlaceHook.beforeSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,bytes).fee (src/PlaceHook.sol#113) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Seasons.sol:98: Seasons.claim(uint256,uint16[]) (src/Seasons.sol#98-117) ignores return value by (owner,None,None,None,rank) = canvas.pixels(id,pixel) (src/Seasons.sol#107)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PlaceHook.sol:167: PlaceHook.collectFees() (src/PlaceHook.sol#167-170) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/PlaceHook.sol#169)\n[low/medium] events-maths at src/Canvas.sol:212: Canvas.carryPot(uint256) (src/Canvas.sol#212-215) should emit an event for: \n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Seasons.sol:98: Seasons.claim(uint256,uint16[]) (src/Seasons.sol#98-117) has external calls inside a loop: (owner,None,None,None,rank) = canvas.pixels(id,pixel) (src/Seasons.sol#107)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Seasons.sol:142: Seasons.svg(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#142-194) has external calls inside a loop: rgb = bytes(Strings.toHexString(uint256(canvas.palette(colour_scope_3)),3)) (src/Seasons.sol#178)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/Seasons.sol:142: Seasons.svg(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#142-194) has external calls inside a loop: rgb = bytes(Strings.toHexString(uint256(canvas.palette(colour_scope_3)),3)) (src/Seasons.sol#178)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Canvas.sol:190: Reentrancy in Canvas.endSeason() (src/Canvas.sol#190-210):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/Canvas.sol:190: Reentrancy in Canvas.endSeason() (src/Canvas.sol#190-210):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PlaceHook.sol:91: PlaceHook.feeBps() (src/PlaceHook.sol#91-95) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PlaceHook.sol:105: PlaceHook.beforeSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,bytes) (src/PlaceHook.sol#105-121) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:58: Seasons.bid(uint256,uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#58-72) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Canvas.sol:117: Canvas._paint(uint16[],uint8[],uint256) (src/Canvas.sol#117-156) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PlaceHook.sol:123: PlaceHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/PlaceHook.sol#123-164) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:74: Seasons.finalize(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#74-90) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Canvas.sol:99: Canvas.price(uint16) (src/Canvas.sol#99-104) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:42: Seasons.open(uint256,uint256,uint16,uint32,uint64,address) (src/Seasons.sol#42-51) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PlaceRouter.sol:41: PlaceRouter.swap(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint160,uint256) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#41-54) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:92: Seasons.rollUnbid(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#92-95) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Seasons.sol:53: Seasons.minimumBid(uint256) (src/Seasons.sol#53-56) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Canvas.sol:190: Canvas.endSeason() (src/Canvas.sol#190-210) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":false}],"detail":"static analysis found arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/PlaceRouter.sol:56: PlaceRouter.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#56-83) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(Currency.unwrap(pay)).safeTransferFrom(r.payer,address(manager),spent) (src/PlaceRouter.sol#79)","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"rejected","submissionHash":"e623a6c8c5468859b307062ed217a7ed7c254d09cd0670f6d4b664ab8da65f48","verifiedTreeHash":"7edca7fa3be3d3dda5656af475ce8ab975c7079a","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ad90ce4c"}]}