{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"f74182cc-4812-4b9a-b173-32c7583a1fc9","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1af0f8204f7c545c697ceb981a83dc5619fca9c5ed343f889cae11c62f9b0bd9","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6f93f7fb2799366f0025599597e38f7b8b6ceac473e7b8b2347f8d6689f32593","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"726eccc62c29a130bd7f71ab387ccf225835745ac9dfd4709448634dba6fa13a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0e4786feeeeb0b5292ad7719c68a019f776f4316eef815ee1a575a4206b926d4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b9ace0645375af82b669ad4e13fefbc61b3c3c8631d7229d01107d038b83c0eb","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"fc7226d2fcbf38639e3afee7b39899abfc9e3a03e5137966734de9fc460cfc2a","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"15b04fc8f60521936b9e2b37c09a804685ec689fc98cd5b04510d986d3106a15","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"15b04fc8f60521936b9e2b37c09a804685ec689fc98cd5b04510d986d3106a15","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f51005885f2138b5a620b7346b0bbd9fb3e63003222b7ba17bbeed3385d382a8","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"7b0b0c51455d3ca5edd839ff55196fb8eaad4ecca71475a4afe720f2c55964a7","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build HAMLOCK, the hamster-powered time lock for Squeekchain (the hamster-powered proof-of-work toychain on Ethereum Sepolia, chainId 11155111). A user locks Sepolia ETH and it only opens after Squeektoshi the hamster has run the distance the user picked, measured on Squeekchain's own SqueekCore contract. Breaking the jar early costs 20%, which goes to everyone still holding. Ask for an independent security review of the contract before deployment. Code and contracts only in this job; the website comes in a later job.\n\nSQUEEKCORE (read only, never written): Sepolia proxy 0x980b4424c007caf7a1f3670b48c8eaef7ebc3d44 (the core the official API https://api.squeekchain.com/v1/core reports as identities.core). Interface: function state() view returns (CoreState) with struct CoreState { uint64 settledThroughRound; uint64 cumulativeWork; uint96 cumulativeBlockUnits; uint64 blockHeight; uint96 blockProgress; uint32 workPerThousandBlocks; uint256 authorizationNonce; bool paused; }. cumulativeWork only goes up; 1 work unit = 1 wheel turn = about 0.878 m.\n\nCONTRACT Hamlock (Solidity 0.8.28, one file, no owner, no admin, no pause, no upgrade, no external libraries needed). Constructor takes the SqueekCore address, stored immutable as core. Constants: WORK_PER_KM = 1139; MIN_KM = 1; MAX_KM = 100 (uint16); MIN_DEPOSIT = 0.001 ether; MAX_DEPOSIT = 1 ether; MAX_DURATION = 30 days; PENALTY_BPS = 2000; BURN = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD.\nStorage: struct Jar { uint128 amount; uint64 startWork; uint64 targetWork; uint64 deadline; uint16 km; uint256 rewardDebt; }; mapping(address => Jar) public jars (one active jar per wallet); mapping(address => uint256) public kmCompleted, jarsCompleted, jarsBroken; uint256 public accRewardPerWei (scaled by 1e24), totalLocked, activeJars, totalPenalties, totalBurned.\nReading the core: an internal try/catch wrapper returns (ok, cumulativeWork) and never reverts.\nlock(uint16 km) payable: revert AlreadyHasJar if caller has a jar; BadDistance if km outside 1..100; BadDeposit if value outside 0.001..1 ether; CoreUnavailable if the core cannot be read. startWork = current cumulativeWork; targetWork = startWork + km * 1139; deadline = block.timestamp + 30 days; rewardDebt = ceil(amount * accRewardPerWei / 1e24) (round UP). totalLocked += amount; activeJars += 1. emit Locked(owner indexed, amount, km, startWork, targetWork, deadline).\npendingReward(owner) view: accrued = amount * accRewardPerWei / 1e24 (round down); return accrued > rewardDebt ? accrued - rewardDebt : 0. Rounding must never let the contract owe more than it holds.\nisOpenable(owner) view: true if the jar exists and (block.timestamp >= deadline, or the core reads ok and cumulativeWork >= targetWork).\nworkRemaining(owner) view: 0 if no jar or reached; full distance if the core is unreadable. currentWork() view.\nopen(): revert NoJar; before the deadline revert StillLocked unless the core reads ok and cumulativeWork >= targetWork. hamsterRanIt = core reads ok and cumulativeWork >= targetWork (also checked after the deadline). Pay amount + pendingReward, delete the jar, totalLocked -= amount, activeJars -= 1; if hamsterRanIt then kmCompleted += km and jarsCompleted += 1. emit Opened(owner indexed, amount, reward, hamsterRanIt, km). After the deadline the jar always opens, even if the core is gone.\nbreakJar(): revert NoJar; revert AlreadyOpenable if isOpenable. forfeited = pendingReward; penalty = amount * 2000 / 10000; refund = amount - penalty. Delete the jar, update totals, jarsBroken += 1, toShare = penalty + forfeited, totalPenalties += toShare. If totalLocked is now 0, send toShare to BURN and add it to totalBurned; otherwise accRewardPerWei += toShare * 1e24 / totalLocked. emit Broken(owner indexed, refund, penalty, forfeited, burned). Send refund.\nAll ETH sends via call, revert TransferFailed on failure; a nonReentrant guard on lock/open/breakJar; checks-effects-interactions.\n\nTESTS (Foundry, with a mock core): limits; one jar per wallet; stays locked until target, opens exactly at target; 30-day valve opens without score, also when the core reverts; breaking pays 80% and splits the penalty pro rata (0.3/0.1 holders get 0.075/0.025 when a 0.5 jar breaks); late joiners get nothing from earlier penalties; a breaker's earned reward goes to the others; burn when nobody holds; cannot break an openable jar; reentrancy; fuzz invariant that the balance always covers every deposit plus every pending reward.\n\nDEPLOY: Sepolia only, no token, no owner. Constructor argument: 0x980b4424c007caf7a1f3670b48c8eaef7ebc3d44.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"b13c05d2472d730c2049ae11aa0afd0338b042813cc768e013a1e4d517931448","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"f74182cc-4812-4b9a-b173-32c7583a1fc9","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2793-build-hamlock-hamster-powered-time"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52011","feedbackHash":"0e453a3fc52e1b48c1238b7206639d8b7a74bacd80497f509e27d47e069d6901","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"1af0f8204f7c545c697ceb981a83dc5619fca9c5ed343f889cae11c62f9b0bd9","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52165","feedbackHash":"26c9fd2b27cfdd8c5458620797c0794c649e117a1cc0f57e2bb93fd9951e7d80","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"6f93f7fb2799366f0025599597e38f7b8b6ceac473e7b8b2347f8d6689f32593","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50981","feedbackHash":"cd815783c2f2afac02015c44d9c1a188c2d16d67f6d51bb9cfe021669491d2eb","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"726eccc62c29a130bd7f71ab387ccf225835745ac9dfd4709448634dba6fa13a","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52159","feedbackHash":"65fb7a99134ff34803ddcfd504fce08f053d071e08ad4c8ad4fc6382b2e78e1c","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"0e4786feeeeb0b5292ad7719c68a019f776f4316eef815ee1a575a4206b926d4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52601","feedbackHash":"4c8228b5f36168a8ec8413f4704e3636c47c6e5915c25a1bd19a76c4484b65e1","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"b9ace0645375af82b669ad4e13fefbc61b3c3c8631d7229d01107d038b83c0eb","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51422","feedbackHash":"5ae4cf866e002ae60a72ab916576bbcf4afdfab2a23a0bcadf9e6297edf984bd","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"fc7226d2fcbf38639e3afee7b39899abfc9e3a03e5137966734de9fc460cfc2a","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52231","feedbackHash":"24d7c1642c8ba17666337f890aebeee7ca936f9bbb2e149f26b2963cca6f9d2e","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"f51005885f2138b5a620b7346b0bbd9fb3e63003222b7ba17bbeed3385d382a8","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51891","feedbackHash":"d771d5cbc08c6aaa740e7dcd30d3bf4053570e581ccfc9e4c822eec2e3ecf18a","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"7b0b0c51455d3ca5edd839ff55196fb8eaad4ecca71475a4afe720f2c55964a7","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"7417db70d8898bc5dd1a69dd150b5e0377c441fe0999f200dfd30508f77bc0fc","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6b37e4ab65246705","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The Math Precision guide says fees round UP. Here penalty = floor(amount * 2000 / 10000) = floor(amount / 5), so for any amount not divisible by 5 the breaker is charged up to 0.8 wei less than the exact 20%, and the refund is correspondingly larger. The brief specifies exactly this formula (penalty = amount * 2000 / 10000), so this is spec-conformant and is recorded only so the author can decide the rounding direction deliberately. It is not farmable: a break costs at least 0.0002 ETH and each wallet can break one jar at a time, so the leak is bounded at <1 wei per break and never threatens solvency (the pool invariant is unaffected because the whole penalty that is charged stays in the contract). No change is required unless the author wants fees rounded up; the fix would be penalty = (amount * PENALTY_BPS + 9_999) / 10_000 with refund = amount - penalty.","line":177,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at work 10000. ALICE lock{value: 0.001 ether + 4}(1); BOB lock{value: 0.001 ether}(1); ALICE breakJar(). Expected under round-up: penalty 200000000000001 wei, refund 800000000000003 wei. Actual (verified in scratch test): penalty = totalPenalties() = 200000000000000 wei, refund = 800000000000004 wei; ALICE.balance = 100 ether - 200000000000000. Exact 20% would be 200000000000000.8 wei.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 penalty = uint256(jar.amount) * PENALTY_BPS / 10_000;","title":"Early-break penalty rounds down (in the breaker's favour) by less than one wei; matches the brief's formula"}],"hash":"0e4786feeeeb0b5292ad7719c68a019f776f4316eef815ee1a575a4206b926d4","nodeId":"13d19fb3-7d1b-427b-9ce7-5588234493e6","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is valid, the snippet matches line 177 exactly, the scratch tests are removed, and the working tree is clean apart from the required `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Result: no defects found in the math area.** The Hamlock arithmetic, boundaries and numerical seams hold against all three assigned Pashov guides (Math Precision, Boundary, Numerical Gap). The findings file holds one info-level note and nine coverage rows, all three verifier entry points marked `holds`.\n\n**What I checked**\n\n- **Rounding directions.** Entry debt rounds up, index increments and payouts round down, so a jar can lose under 2 wei versus its exact share but never gain. The balance always covers principal plus every pending reward. The shipped stateful invariant passes with zero reverts, and my own probe recycling forfeitures between two minimum-deposit wallets for 100 breaks stayed solvent.\n- **Zero-rounding and overflow.** A minimum-deposit holder in a 59 ETH pool still receives a non-zero share. Index growth per break is about 2.1e26, so overflowing the deposit-times-index product would need roughly 5.5e32 breaks. All uint64 and uint128 downcasts are guarded or bounded.\n- **Boundaries.** Deadline and target comparisons are inclusive as specified and tested one unit either side. The 63/64 gas rule means a tight gas limit cannot make the core read fail while the rest of `open` succeeds, so no silent loss of distance credit.\n- **Live dependency.** On a Sepolia fork, the real SqueekCore `state()` returns eight ABI words in the interface's order, with cumulativeWork matching the official API. The read costs about 16.5k gas from Hamlock, far below the 200k budget. The core caps work at 10000 per round, so uint64 work is unreachable.\n\n**The one note (info).** The 20% penalty rounds down by under 1 wei for amounts not divisible by 5. This matches the brief's formula exactly and is not farmable. It is recorded only so the author chooses the rounding direction deliberately.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing in my area was left unverified. The Slither and Aderyn leads on ETH sends and timestamps were checked and are design-conformant, not defects.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1492592,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":26084,"runtime":"claude","turns":33,"wallClockMs":531316}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a406deaac63a93b0","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"breakJar() credits penalty + forfeited rewards to whatever principal is in totalLocked at that instant, with no minimum age and no time weighting. Because lock() takes effect immediately and MAX_DEPOSIT is enforced per wallet only, (a) a mempool watcher who sees a breakJar() can lock 1 ether (km = 1) in the same block ahead of it and take the lion's share, and (b) a breaker can pre-lock a second wallet and recover almost the whole penalty, making the advertised 20% cost nearly free. At the live Squeekchain pace (cumulativeWork 58518 after ~5.26 days, ~11,100 turns/day) a km = 1 jar is openable about 2.5 hours later, so the capital is at risk for only that window and principal is never at risk. Committed holders do not lose principal, but they receive a fraction of the penalty the design promises them. The README acknowledges both facts ('Limits apply per wallet, not per person', 'a user entering before a visible break participates in it'), so this is reported as a design-level weakness for the requester to accept or change; the existing tests cover 'late joiners' only, never a same-block joiner or a two-wallet breaker. Any fix (minimum jar age before a jar participates in distributions, time-weighted shares, or a global per-period cap) changes the agreed economics and needs a scope decision; it is not a code slip.","line":190,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at work 10000, all actors funded. Scenario (a) front-run: lock(ALICE, 0.1 ether, 100); lock(BOB, 0.5 ether, 100); BOB submits breakJar(); MALLORY sees it and lock(MALLORY, 1 ether, 1) lands first; then BOB's breakJar() executes. Expected by the committed holder: ALICE pendingReward = 0.1 ether (the whole 0.1 ether penalty, as in the spec example where the remaining holders split the penalty). Actual: pendingReward(ALICE) = 9090909090909090 wei (0.00909 ether), pendingReward(MALLORY) = 90909090909090909 wei (0.0909 ether). After setWork(10000+1139) MALLORY opens and holds 100.0909 ether, 2.5 hours after entering. Scenario (b) sybil: lock(ALICE, 0.1 ether, 100); lock(CAROL, 1 ether, 100); lock(MALLORY2, 1 ether, 1) where CAROL and MALLORY2 are one person; breakJar() from CAROL. Expected: the person pays 0.2 ether. Actual: pendingReward(ALICE) = 18181818181818181 wei, pendingReward(MALLORY2) = 181818181818181818 wei; after setWork(10000+1139) and open() from MALLORY2 the pair's combined balance is 200 ether - 18181818181818182 wei, i.e. the break cost 0.018 ether instead of 0.2 ether. Both sequences were run in a Foundry test on this tree (test/scratch/EconScratch.t.sol, functions test_frontRunBreakDilutesCommittedHolders and test_sybilPenaltyEvasion) and produced exactly these numbers.","severity":"low","snippet":"            accRewardPerWei += toShare * REWARD_SCALE / totalLocked;","title":"Penalty redistribution is instantaneous and capital-weighted, so a same-block locker (front-runner or the breaker's own second wallet) captures most of the 20% penalty"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Principal leaves the distribution denominator only when its owner voluntarily calls open(). Once a jar is openable (target reached or deadline passed) it cannot be broken (AlreadyOpenable), its principal can be withdrawn at any moment at 100%, and yet it continues to receive penalty + forfeiture distributions pro rata forever. A km = 1 jar is openable roughly 2.5 hours after locking at the live pace, so anyone can park N wallets x 1 ether as permanent, zero-risk penalty collectors that dilute every genuinely locked 100 km holder. This contradicts the stated purpose of the penalty (compensating those who stay locked) while matching the literal 'everyone still holding' wording; the README lists 'reward participation by any active principal including expired jars' as a design assumption to confirm, so this is raised for that decision rather than as a code slip. A fix would require a design change (for example excluding jars from distributions once their target or deadline is reached, which needs per-jar openability at distribution time, or snapshotting the accumulator per jar at completion).","line":161,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at work 10000. lock(MALLORY, 1 ether, 1); setWork(10000+1139) so isOpenable(MALLORY) is true; warp 200 days (long past MALLORY's deadline, no action by MALLORY). Then lock(ALICE, 0.1 ether, 100); lock(BOB, 1 ether, 100); breakJar() from BOB. Expected (from the committed holders' point of view): ALICE, the only committed holder besides the breaker, receives the 0.2 ether penalty. Actual: pendingReward(MALLORY) = 181818181818181818 wei (0.1818 ether), pendingReward(ALICE) = 18181818181818181 wei; MALLORY then calls open() and leaves with 100.1818 ether having borne no lock risk for 200 days. Run on this tree as test/scratch/EconScratch.t.sol:test_openableJarFarmsForever.","severity":"low","snippet":"        totalLocked -= jar.amount;","title":"A jar that is already openable keeps its full share of future penalties indefinitely, giving a riskless, instantly-liquid claim on other users' penalties"}],"hash":"1af0f8204f7c545c697ceb981a83dc5619fca9c5ed343f889cae11c62f9b0bd9","nodeId":"8a1e57e6-66f4-4f1f-9660-92b1ce2d4598","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file holds two low-severity findings and eight coverage rows. The working tree is clean apart from the gitignored scratch tests.\n\n**Outcome.** The economics of `src/Hamlock.sol` are sound as coded. Conservation holds, rounding always favours the contract, and view and write paths agree. The two findings are design-level consequences of the agreed rules, not code slips, and neither puts principal at risk.\n\n**Findings written to .imd-findings.json**\n\n- **Low: instant capital-weighted penalty distribution.** A wallet that locks in the same block as a visible break captures most of the penalty. With Alice at 0.1 ETH and Bob breaking 0.5 ETH, a front-runner locking 1 ETH leaves Alice 0.0091 ETH instead of 0.1 ETH. The same mechanism lets a breaker pre-lock a second wallet and pay 0.018 ETH instead of 0.2 ETH. At the live hamster pace a 1 km jar unlocks in about 2.5 hours, so the attacker's exposure is short.\n- **Low: openable jars farm penalties forever.** A jar whose target or deadline has passed cannot be broken, can be opened at any time, and still takes its full pro rata share of every later penalty. A 1 ETH jar parked for 200 days took 0.18 ETH of a 0.2 ETH penalty that a committed holder expected.\n\nBoth are acknowledged in the README as per-wallet limits and participation by expired jars. Any fix changes the agreed economics, so they are raised for the requester's decision.\n\n**What held up under checking**\n\n- Solvency invariant: the project fuzz plus my extreme-ratio churn fuzz never broke balance ≥ principal + pending rewards.\n- Gas-starving the 200k-capped core read to break a completed jar: scanned every gas limit from 21k to 400k, every call reverted AlreadyOpenable.\n- Live Sepolia dependency: the proxy returns the expected 8-word struct, the read costs about 7k gas against a 200k cap, the burn address has no code, and the API's core address matches.\n- Static-analysis leads: ETH goes only to the jar owner or the burn constant. Timestamp use is the specified deadline.\n\n**Not reached.** No fork test against the live core was run, since the task forbids forks in proofs and the public endpoint was only used for read checks. The other three audit areas (math, permissions, control flow) were touched only where they intersected the economics.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1264333,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":32483,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":530460}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e12f98dda6acc55f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Hamlock reads cumulativeWork from the immutable core address and takes it as ground truth for isOpenable, open and breakJar. On live Sepolia the core 0x980b4424c007caf7a1f3670b48c8eaef7ebc3d44 is a transparent proxy: EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x284747c4664af2203e7a90a2ee76f22b6b5e6889, admin slot = 0x4a8ea91a43eeecb8cffc73631627a7d6f973fdbf (read with cast storage at block 12036114). The verified implementation (Sourcify, chain 11155111) matches the eight-field CoreState layout the interface declares, state() is a plain storage read (cast estimate 28395 gas, 20444 gas through _readCore on a fork, under the 200000 budget), and cumulativeWork is written only by settlement as a running sum, so it is monotonic today. None of that is enforced by Hamlock: an upgrade by the admin can (a) return a cumulativeWork at or above every targetWork, which makes every jar openable at once with kmCompleted credit (test shows open() scores whenever ok && work >= target, including after the deadline); (b) make state() revert, return malformed data or burn more than 200000 gas, which blocks new locks (CoreUnavailable), blocks scoring, and leaves only the 30-day valve, while a holder whose hamster has already finished can only wait or break for a 20% penalty; (c) lower cumulativeWork below startWork, which holds every jar until its deadline and strips the score. No ETH can be taken by the core in any of these cases: principal plus pending reward is always paid to the jar owner, and the deadline valve opens with the core absent. This matches the requested design (read-only core, no owner on Hamlock) and the handoff's stated assumption 'trusting the external core's progress and upgrades'. It is recorded so the release coordinator can accept it explicitly; no code change is proposed.","line":204,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"State: Hamlock deployed with core = 0x980b4424c007caf7a1f3670b48c8eaef7ebc3d44; Alice has locked 0.5 ether with km = 100 (targetWork = startWork + 113900). Action by the proxy admin only: upgrade the implementation so state().cumulativeWork returns type(uint64).max. Expected under the brief: Alice's jar opens only after 100 km of settled work or 30 days. Actual: isOpenable(alice) is true immediately; alice calls open() and receives 0.5 ether plus pending reward, kmCompleted[alice] += 100, jarsCompleted[alice] += 1. Mirror case: upgrade so state() reverts; then lock() reverts CoreUnavailable for everyone, open() before the deadline reverts StillLocked even if the hamster finished, breakJar() succeeds with a 20% penalty, and open() after the deadline pays in full but never scores. Locally reproducible with the existing MockCore by mock.setWork(type(uint64).max) or mock.setUnavailable(true) after a lock.","severity":"info","snippet":"        return ISqueekCore(core).state().cumulativeWork;","title":"Trust assumption, not a defect: the SqueekCore proxy admin (0x4a8ea91a43eeecb8cffc73631627a7d6f973fdbf) can change what cumulativeWork reports and thereby release, freeze or mis-score every jar"}],"hash":"6f93f7fb2799366f0025599597e38f7b8b6ceac473e7b8b2347f8d6689f32593","nodeId":"def8001f-3c0e-4657-831d-47c17f65ed6c","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and written to `.imd-findings.json`. No defect was found in the control-flow area; the file carries one info-level trust assumption and nine coverage rows.\n\n**What I checked**\n\n- **Execution Trace.** Traced `lock`, `open` and `breakJar` from entry to final send. Reads happen before writes, writes before sends, and every failed send reverts the whole call. No stale read, value leak, parameter divergence or partial update exists. A scratch gas sweep from 20k to 400k confirmed that no caller gas limit can make the swallowed core read bypass the AlreadyOpenable guard or drop the score on a post-deadline open. The 63/64 gas retention rule makes that path unreachable.\n- **Periphery.** The self-only STATICCALL wrapper decodes the struct inside the bounded frame, so every malformed core behaviour maps to an unavailable reading. I verified the live Sepolia proxy on a fork: the wrapper reads ok with cumulativeWork 58518 using about 20k gas, far under the 200k budget. The verified implementation source on Sourcify declares the same eight-field struct in the same order, and its `state()` is a constant-cost storage read with cumulativeWork written only as a running settlement sum.\n- **First Principles.** Existence is keyed on a nonzero amount, which the minimum deposit guarantees. Rounding directions favour solvency on every path. Burn versus redistribution is decided after totals are updated. The existing 53 tests pass, including the stateful invariant run.\n\n**What the file records**\n\n- One info item: the core is a transparent proxy whose admin at 0x4a8e…fdbf can upgrade it and thereby release, freeze or mis-score every jar. No ETH can be taken that way, the deadline valve still pays out, and the handoff already names this trust. It is recorded for the release coordinator to accept explicitly, not as a code change.\n- The Slither arbitrary-send and Aderyn unchecked-address leads are false positives: the recipient is only the caller's own jar or the constant burn address. The timestamp leads are the intended 30-day deadline.\n\n**Not reachable from here.** The Squeekchain API sits behind a Cloudflare challenge, so the \"identities.core\" claim could not be cross-checked. Economics items like penalty sniping by front-running a visible break belong to the economics specialist and were left out.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1182348,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":33645,"runtime":"claude","turns":41,"wallClockMs":480525}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5739ce0d803a43cd","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics (a547b753), write_foundry_tests (73e3f7bd) and audit_permissions (47a3accaa): one root cause. breakJar() splits penalty + forfeited reward over whatever principal is in totalLocked at that instant. lock() takes effect immediately, rewardDebt (lines 105-108) only excludes penalties that happened before the lock, and MAX_DEPOSIT is enforced per wallet. So (a) anyone who sees a breakJar() in the mempool can insert lock{1 ether}(1) ahead of it and take the largest share, then open at 100% as soon as the core advances 1139 turns (about 2.5 hours at the live pace the specialists measured); (b) a breaker can pre-lock a second wallet with km = 1 and recover most of the penalty, so the advertised 20% cost shrinks to a few percent. Committed holders never lose principal, but the penalty the brief promises 'to everyone still holding' is diluted by capital that was never at risk. The implementation follows the brief's literal rule and the README documents it ('a user entering before a visible break participates in it', 'Limits apply per wallet, not per person'), so this is a design-level weakness for the requester to accept or change, not a code slip; any fix (minimum jar age before a jar participates in distributions, time-weighted shares, snapshotting the holder set) changes the agreed economics. Reproduced on this tree in test/scratch/Review.t.sol (test_frontRun, test_sybil).","line":190,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at work 10000, all wallets funded with 100 ether. Scenario (a): lock(ALICE, 0.1 ether, 100); lock(BOB, 1 ether, 100); MALLORY sees BOB's breakJar() and lands lock(MALLORY, 1 ether, 1) first; BOB breakJar(). Expected by the brief's intent: pendingReward(ALICE) = 0.2 ether (the whole penalty, as in the spec example). Actual: pendingReward(ALICE) = 18181818181818181 wei, pendingReward(MALLORY) = 181818181818181818 wei. mock.setWork(11139); MALLORY open() succeeds and MALLORY.balance = 100181818181818181818 wei (100.18 ether) about 2.5 hours after entering. Scenario (b): lock(ALICE, 0.1 ether, 100); lock(CAROL, 1 ether, 100); lock(MALLORY2, 1 ether, 1) with CAROL and MALLORY2 one person; CAROL breakJar(). Expected: the person pays 0.2 ether. Actual: pendingReward(ALICE) = 18181818181818181 wei, pendingReward(MALLORY2) = 181818181818181818 wei; after setWork(11139) and MALLORY2 open(), 200 ether minus the pair's combined balance is 18181818181818182 wei, i.e. the break cost 0.018 ether instead of 0.2 ether.","severity":"low","snippet":"accRewardPerWei += toShare * REWARD_SCALE / totalLocked;","title":"Penalty redistribution is instantaneous and capital-weighted: a same-block locker (front-runner or the breaker's own second wallet) captures most of the 20% penalty at no lock risk"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics (3218d9b9) and write_foundry_tests (7f6faa74): one root cause. Principal leaves the distribution denominator only when its owner calls open(). Once a jar is openable it cannot be broken (line 174, AlreadyOpenable), its principal can be withdrawn at 100% at any moment, and yet it keeps receiving penalty + forfeiture distributions pro rata for as long as the owner leaves it unopened. A km = 1 jar is openable about 2.5 hours after locking at the live pace, so anyone can park N wallets x 1 ether as permanent, risk-free penalty collectors that dilute every genuinely locked holder. This matches the literal 'everyone still holding' wording, and docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md lists 'reward participation by any active principal including expired jars' as a design assumption to confirm, so it is raised for that decision rather than as a code slip. A fix needs a design change (exclude jars from distributions once openable, or snapshot the accumulator per jar at completion). Reproduced on this tree in test/scratch/Review.t.sol (test_openableFarm).","line":161,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at work 10000. lock(MALLORY, 1 ether, 1); mock.setWork(11139) so isOpenable(MALLORY) is true; vm.warp(+200 days) with no action by MALLORY (jar long past its deadline too). Then lock(ALICE, 0.1 ether, 100); lock(BOB, 1 ether, 100); BOB breakJar(). Expected from the committed holders' point of view: ALICE, the only holder still at risk, receives the 0.2 ether penalty. Actual: pendingReward(MALLORY) = 181818181818181818 wei, pendingReward(ALICE) = 18181818181818181 wei; MALLORY open() then leaves with balance 100181818181818181818 wei having borne no lock risk for 200 days.","severity":"low","snippet":"totalLocked -= jar.amount;","title":"A jar that is already openable (target reached or deadline passed) keeps its full pro-rata share of future penalties indefinitely with no remaining risk"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Test defect, not a contract defect. The contract's rounding is as specified (entry debt rounds up at src/Hamlock.sol:107-108, payout rounds down at line 125, accumulator increment rounds down at line 190), so a jar can receive floor(x+y) - ceil(x) where x is its scaled debt and y its exact share: that is up to 2 wei below its exact share when x sits just above an integer and x+y just below one. The test asserts the gap is at most 1 wei, so it fails on a reachable input. With the README's exact command (FOUNDRY_FUZZ_SEED=0x501449ff1297530ccba3524eca65b8218fd0e7363e3f6acccfab5407954e9e64 forge test) run from a clean cache, the suite reports 67 passed, 1 failed; the failing counterexample is deterministic under that seed (found at run 196 of 512). The README statement at README.md:125 that rounding costs 'less than two wei' is also inaccurate by the same case: the loss is exactly 2 wei. Solvency is unaffected: the dust stays in the contract, and both invariant suites pass. Fix: widen the tolerance at lines 190-191 to 2 (and keep line 192, which still holds), and correct the README wording to 'at most two wei'.","line":190,"path":"test/HamlockEdges.t.sol","reproduction":"a = 0.001 ether + 4765, c = 0.001 ether + 12665, d = 0.001 ether + 5135, c2 = 0.001 ether + 16367 (the fuzz counterexample args=[4765, 12665, 5135, 16367] through TestBase.bound). Mock core at 10000. lock(ALICE, a, 100); lock(CAROL, c, 100); CAROL breakJar(); lock(DAVE, d, 100); lock(CAROL, c2, 100); CAROL breakJar(). p2 = c2 / 5 = 200000000003273. Expected by the test: |pendingReward(DAVE) - p2*d/(a+d)| <= 1 where p2*d/(a+d) = 100000000001655. Actual: pendingReward(DAVE) = 100000000001653 (2 wei short), because accRewardPerWei after the first break is 200000000001579999999992, DAVE's debt is ceil(d*acc/1e24) = 200000000002608 while d*acc/1e24 is just above 200000000002607, and the increment is 100000000001141499999994 giving floor(d*acc'/1e24) = 300000000004261. The test's require at line 190 reverts with 'not less than or equal'. Reproduced in test/scratch/Review.t.sol:test_pinnedSeedCounterexample and by running the README command.","severity":"low","snippet":"assertLe(_absDiff(pd, p2 * d / (a + d)), 1);","title":"The README's documented verification command fails: testFuzz_lateJoinerSharesOnlyLaterPenalties uses a 1 wei tolerance but the contract's documented rounding can cost a jar 2 wei"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow (8402e4f0), audit_permissions (2b5b0755) and write_foundry_tests (9b062122): one root cause, the read-only dependency on whatever the core proxy returns. Hamlock takes cumulativeWork as ground truth for isOpenable, open and breakJar, and treats any failed or over-budget read as unavailable. Whoever controls the proxy can (a) report a huge value so every jar is openable at once with distance credit, and breakJar reverts AlreadyOpenable so no penalty is ever charged again; (b) make state() revert, return malformed data or burn more than 200000 gas, so lock() reverts CoreUnavailable, open() before the deadline reverts StillLocked even when the hamster finished, breakJar() still works at a 20% cost, and open() after the deadline pays in full but never scores; (c) lower the counter below startWork so jars wait the full 30 days. In every case principal plus pending reward is still paid only to the jar owner and the 30-day valve works with the core absent, so there is no loss of funds. This is the trust boundary the brief chose (read-only core, no owner on Hamlock) and the README and docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md state it. The specialists' live-chain claims (EIP-1967 proxy, admin 0x4a8ea91a43eeecb8cffc73631627a7d6f973fdbf, read estimate 28395 gas) could not be re-checked from this machine, which has no Sepolia endpoint; they are consistent with the brief and recorded as the specialists' observations. No code change proposed; the release coordinator should record the proxy admin as a trusted party and measure the live read cost against the 200000 budget before deployment. Reproduced locally in test/scratch/Review.t.sol (test_coreUpgradeOpensAll, test_heavyCore).","line":204,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at 10000. lock(ALICE, 0.5 ether, 100); lock(BOB, 0.5 ether, 100). mock.setWork(type(uint64).max): isOpenable(ALICE) is true immediately; BOB breakJar() reverts AlreadyOpenable; ALICE open() pays 0.5 ether and kmCompleted[ALICE] = 100. Then mock.setUnavailable(true): CAROL lock{0.1 ether}(1) reverts CoreUnavailable; BOB open() before the deadline reverts StillLocked although the last reading exceeded his target; BOB breakJar() succeeds at a 20% penalty. Gas budget: HeavyCore burning 250000 gas in state() gives currentWork() = (false, 0); the same core at 150000 gas gives ok = true.","severity":"info","snippet":"return ISqueekCore(core).state().cumulativeWork;","title":"Trust assumption: SqueekCore is an upgradeable proxy whose admin can open every jar at once, freeze new locks, strip scores, or make reads fail by exceeding the 200000-gas budget; no ETH can be moved "},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math (60be1f05), reproduced. penalty = floor(amount * 2000 / 10000), so for an amount not divisible by 5 the breaker is charged up to 0.8 wei less than exact 20% and refunded correspondingly more. The brief specifies exactly this formula, so it is spec-conformant; recorded so the author chooses the rounding direction deliberately. Not farmable (a break costs at least 0.0002 ETH per wallet and leaks under 1 wei) and the whole charged penalty stays in the contract, so solvency is unaffected. If fees are wanted rounded up: penalty = (amount * PENALTY_BPS + 9_999) / 10_000.","line":177,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at 10000. lock(ALICE, 0.001 ether + 4, 1); lock(BOB, 0.001 ether, 1); ALICE breakJar(). Exact 20% = 200000000000000.8 wei. Expected under round-up: penalty 200000000000001, refund 800000000000003. Actual: totalPenalties() = 200000000000000, 100 ether - ALICE.balance = 200000000000000, refund 800000000000004.","severity":"info","snippet":"uint256 penalty = uint256(jar.amount) * PENALTY_BPS / 10_000;","title":"Early-break penalty rounds down (in the breaker's favour) by less than one wei; matches the brief's formula"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From write_foundry_tests (a86056e0), reproduced. Payouts round down, entry debt rounds up and the accumulator increment rounds down, so each lock, open or break can leave a few wei nobody can claim; ETH forced in (coinbase reward, selfdestruct) likewise has no claim path. The README documents this and the adversarial invariant bounds the dust, so there is no solvency risk. Recorded for completeness; no change proposed under the no-owner design.","line":125,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at 10000. lock(ALICE, 0.3 ether, 100); lock(BOB, 0.5 ether, 100); BOB breakJar(); mock.setWork(10000 + 113900); ALICE open(). Expected: contract empty. Actual: totalLocked() = 0, activeJars() = 0 and address(hamlock).balance = 1 wei, unreachable forever.","severity":"info","snippet":"uint256 accrued = uint256(jar.amount) * accRewardPerWei / REWARD_SCALE;","title":"Rounding dust and forced ETH are permanently unsweepable (by design: no owner, no sweep)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Own finding (not raised by the specialists). The brief writes 'emit Broken(owner indexed, refund, penalty, forfeited, burned)' in a list where the preceding three names are wei amounts and 'burned' is set from the sentence 'send toShare to BURN and add it to totalBurned'. The implementation emits a bool. The ABI signature is therefore Broken(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,bool), so an integration written from the brief that decodes the last word as the burned amount will read 0 or 1 wei instead of toShare. The README documents the bool, so this is an interpretation to confirm with the requester before the website job consumes the ABI; the burned amount is derivable as penalty + forfeited when the flag is true.","line":78,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at 10000. lock(ALICE, 0.5 ether, 100) as the only holder; ALICE breakJar(). Expected under the amount reading: Broken(ALICE, 0.4 ether, 0.1 ether, 0, 100000000000000000). Actual event data: Broken(ALICE, 400000000000000000, 100000000000000000, 0, true), i.e. the last 32-byte word is 0x...01, and totalBurned() = 100000000000000000. Observable in the existing test test_lastHolderBurnsPenaltyAndForfeitedReward (test/HamlockRewards.t.sol:80-81), which expects Broken(ALICE, 0.4 ether, 0.1 ether, 0.1 ether, true) via vm.expectEmit.","severity":"info","snippet":"event Broken(address indexed owner, uint256 refund, uint256 penalty, uint256 forfeited, bool burned);","title":"Broken event's last field 'burned' is a bool, while the brief lists it beside the amounts and the burned amount is otherwise only recoverable as penalty + forfeited"}],"hash":"726eccc62c29a130bd7f71ab387ccf225835745ac9dfd4709448634dba6fa13a","nodeId":"9abe7511-36e4-422e-9a09-c2395e7c2a8c","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds 7 findings plus a coverage record for all three entry points. The working tree shows no tracked changes; only the ignored findings file and my scratch test under `test/scratch/` were written.\n\n**Outcome: no critical, high or medium defects in the contract.** The Hamlock code implements the brief correctly. The three low findings are two documented economic design weaknesses and one broken test in the shipped suite.\n\n**Findings kept, after reproducing each one on this tree:**\n\n1. **Low, merged from three specialists.** Penalty redistribution is instantaneous and capital-weighted, so a same-block locker or the breaker's own second wallet captures most of a visible break's penalty. Reproduced: with Alice at 0.1 ETH and a 1 ETH sniper locking ahead of a 1 ETH break, Alice gets 1/11 of the penalty and the sniper exits risk-free after 1139 turns. Design-level, needs a requester decision.\n2. **Low, merged from two specialists.** Jars that are already openable keep earning penalty shares forever at zero risk. Reproduced with a 200-day-stale km=1 jar taking 10/11 of a later penalty.\n3. **Low, found by running the suite.** The README's documented verification command with the pinned fuzz seed fails. The test at test/HamlockEdges.t.sol:190 allows a 1 wei gap, but the contract's specified rounding (ceil debt, floor payout) can legitimately cost a jar 2 wei. I traced the exact counterexample arithmetic. The README's \"less than two wei\" claim is off by the same case. Fix is in the test and README, not the contract.\n4. **Info, merged from three specialists.** The SqueekCore proxy admin is a trusted party who can open all jars, freeze locks or strip scores, but can never move ETH to anyone but jar owners. I could not re-check the live-chain claims because this machine has no Sepolia endpoint, and I say so in the finding.\n5. **Info.** Penalty rounds down by under 1 wei, per the brief's formula.\n6. **Info.** Rounding dust and forced ETH are unsweepable by design.\n7. **Info, my own.** The `Broken` event's last field is a bool, while the brief lists `burned` beside wei amounts. Worth confirming before the website job consumes the ABI.\n\n**Dropped:** the Slither and Aderyn arbitrary-send leads (recipients are only `msg.sender` and the burn address) and the timestamp leads (30-day deadline by design). I also tested a gas-starvation attack on `open()` and `breakJar()` across gas limits from 21k to 400k and confirmed the tester's claim that it cannot drop a score or break an openable jar.\n\n**Coverage:** `lock` holds, `open` holds, `breakJar` carries finding 1. The solvency invariant and the launch manifest hold.\n\nNo proofs were attached because nothing reached high severity. Note for whoever writes proofs later: this project has no forge-std vendored (libs is empty, tests use a minimal cheatcode interface), so a proof importing `forge-std/Test.sol` would not compile here.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1079100,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":31540,"runtime":"claude","turns":35,"wallClockMs":466277}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"5545471bb76af593a326a4aed90b0a6352135f15cb43fd96626981a0007fb834","device":"934ef01306a3cc89","findings":[{"description":"breakJar shares the penalty pro rata over whoever is locked at that moment (accRewardPerWei += toShare * 1e24 / totalLocked). A watcher who sees a breakJar transaction in the public mempool can lock just before it from several wallets (MAX_DEPOSIT is per wallet, so it is no cap against sybils) with km = 1. They then collect the share and open without any penalty as soon as the core reaches startWork + 1139. Long-term holders are diluted by capital that was never at risk. This follows the brief's literal rule ('goes to everyone still holding'), so it is reported as a design risk for the requester and reviewer, not a broken implementation. Options: a minimum holding time before a jar earns penalties, or weighting by time locked.","line":190,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at START_WORK. ALICE locks 0.1 ETH (km 100) at t0. At t0+29d BOB locks 1 ETH (km 100) and CAROL locks 1 ETH (km 100). Before CAROL's breakJar, five fresh wallets each lock 1 ETH with km = 1, then CAROL breaks (0.2 ETH penalty). Expected under a 'reward the patient holders' reading: the 0.2 ETH goes mostly to ALICE and BOB. Actual: the five new wallets get 5/6.1 x 0.2 = ~0.164 ETH and ALICE ~0.0033 ETH. Set the core to START_WORK + 1139 and the five wallets open and take back 5 ETH + ~0.164 ETH with no penalty. Checked in a local scratch test against the current code.","severity":"low","title":"Just-in-time lockers can capture most of a visible breakJar penalty and leave risk-free after 1 km"},{"description":"Once block.timestamp >= deadline the jar is openable, so it cannot be broken (AlreadyOpenable) and it carries no further risk. Its principal still counts in totalLocked, though, so it keeps earning a pro-rata share of every later penalty for as long as the owner leaves it unopened. A holder can park up to 1 ETH per wallet past day 30 as a risk-free penalty farm. The implementer documented this ('Openable but unclaimed jars continue earning penalties until closed'). The brief does not say whether it is intended.","line":132,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"ALICE locks 0.1 ETH (km 100). Warp 30 days: isOpenable(ALICE) is true and breakJar reverts with AlreadyOpenable. BOB locks 0.5 ETH and breaks, and pendingReward(ALICE) becomes 0.1 ETH (all of BOB's penalty), although ALICE's jar could have been opened at any time since expiry. Covered by the existing test test_expiredJarStillSharesAndGetsRewardsDuringCoreOutage.","severity":"info","title":"Expired jars keep earning penalty shares indefinitely with no remaining risk"},{"description":"Payouts round down and entry debt rounds up, so each lock, open or break can leave a few wei that no one can claim. ETH forced in (for example as a coinbase reward) also cannot be withdrawn, because there is no owner or sweep. The new invariant suite bounds the dust at <= 3*breaks + 2*opens + 2*activeJars + 1 wei, so it cannot grow beyond that. Reported for completeness only.","line":125,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"ALICE 0.3 ETH, BOB 0.5 ETH (km 100). BOB breaks, ALICE reaches her target and opens, and 1 wei is left in the contract forever (test_openableButUnclaimedJarStillSharesPenalties).","severity":"info","title":"Rounding dust and forced ETH are permanently stuck (no sweep by design)"},{"description":"If the upgradeable SqueekCore proxy is ever changed so that state() costs more than about 200k gas, every read returns ok = false. Jars then open only at the 30-day deadline and never earn distance credit, and lock() reverts with CoreUnavailable. Funds stay safe. HamlockEdges shows that starving the read with a low transaction gas limit cannot be used to break an openable jar or to lose credit when opening, because the 63/64 rule leaves too little gas for the rest of the call. Nothing can be done about the dependency's gas cost from tests. The live proxy's read cost should be measured before deployment.","line":210,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"HeavyCore that burns 250000 gas in state(): currentWork() returns (false, 0), and a jar whose distance was really run opens only after 30 days, with jarsCompleted = 0 (test_heavyCoreWithinBudgetStillReadsAndOverBudgetFallsBackToDeadline).","severity":"info","title":"Distance credit and openability depend on the external core read fitting the 200000-gas budget"}],"hash":"7b0b0c51455d3ca5edd839ff55196fb8eaad4ecca71475a4afe720f2c55964a7","nodeId":"4c5b36be-cca9-4eb2-b569-8b3130d2bc01","outcome":"completed","summary":"I've added 14 tests in two new suites. The full suite (67 tests, up from 53) passes with the verifier's fuzz seed. I didn't find any critical or high defect in `src/Hamlock.sol`, so no finding carries a proof. Four low and info findings are in `.imd-findings.json`. Everything I wrote is in the allowed test paths, and the contract and configuration are untouched.\n\n**Already covered by earlier work:** the brief's required scenarios, including the 0.075 / 0.025 penalty split, late joiners, forfeiture, the burn, reentrancy, core outages and malformed core replies, plus one invariant suite.\n\n**`test/HamlockEdges.t.sol`** (13 tests):\n- **Lock errors:** a fuzz over distance, value, core down and an existing jar checks that the right error fires in the brief's order (AlreadyHasJar, then BadDistance, BadDeposit, CoreUnavailable) and that nothing moves on a revert.\n- **Thresholds:** inputs are packed around the target distance and the 30-day mark. Exactly one of open and break succeeds, `isOpenable` and `workRemaining` agree with the expected result, and distance credit is given only on a good core reading.\n- **Penalty split** for any three amounts: each share is within 1 wei of exact, the shares never add up to more than the penalty, and both holders can actually withdraw.\n- **Other reward cases:** late joiners only share later penalties, a breaker's earned reward goes entirely to the remaining holder, the last breaker burns penalty plus forfeit, and a pool emptied by opening still burns on the next break.\n- **Gas starvation:** sending `breakJar` or `open` with any gas limit up to 600k can't break an openable jar or lose distance credit, including with a core whose read costs 150k gas.\n- **Proxy core:** a delegating proxy (the live core is one) reads correctly, and a core over the 200k gas budget falls back to the 30-day deadline.\n\n**`test/HamlockAdversarialInvariant.t.sol`:** a second invariant suite over random call sequences. Unlike the first, it also sends the calls that must fail (bad locks, early opens, breaking an openable jar, payouts to a wallet that refuses ETH) and checks the exact error and that nothing changed. Amounts sit at the limits or have odd wei, so rounding happens on nearly every step. The invariants check:\n- the balance covers every deposit plus every pending reward;\n- every wei is still held, paid out or burned;\n- leftover rounding dust stays within a few wei per operation;\n- the reward index and the penalty and burn totals never decrease;\n- the score counters match what was expected;\n- every jar can be settled at the end.\n\nTo check that these tests catch bugs, I planted defects in a throwaway copy of the contract:\n- **Caught:** the breaker's forfeited reward not being shared, entry debt rounded down, and distance credit given on every open.\n- **Not caught:** rounding the reward index up. At the 1e24 scale that overpays by less than 1e-5 wei per break, so it is effectively harmless.\n\n**Findings** (none is a broken implementation, so none got a test asserting it):\n- **Low:** someone who sees a `breakJar` coming in the public mempool can lock just before it from several wallets with 1 km. They take most of the penalty and open without loss after 1,139 work units. In a scratch run with 0.1 ETH and 1 ETH long-term holders, five such wallets took about 0.164 of a 0.2 ETH penalty. This matches the brief's \"everyone still holding\", so it's a design question for you.\n- **Info:**\n  - Jars past their 30-day deadline can't be broken but keep earning penalty shares for as long as they stay unopened.\n  - Rounding dust and ETH forced into the contract can never be withdrawn, since there is no owner or sweep.\n  - If a future upgrade of the core makes `state()` cost more than 200k gas, jars open only at the deadline and never earn distance credit. The live proxy's read cost should be measured before deployment.\n\nThere are no fork tests, since the task named no fork block.","treeHash":"ba364baafe997747e22da8152750352990f208cb","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1183072,"inputTokens":32,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":38128,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":503225}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"cc86b49d3c401897","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust gap (economics x asymmetry). A break's penalty plus forfeited reward is split by principal among whoever holds a jar at the moment breakJar() executes, with no minimum holding period or time weighting (rewardDebt at src/Hamlock.sol:105-108 only excludes penalties that happened before the lock). breakJar() is visible in the public mempool before it executes, so anyone can insert lock(1) with 1 ETH (the per-wallet maximum, and more via extra wallets) immediately ahead of it, capture the largest share, and leave as soon as the hamster runs 1139 turns. Measured on live Sepolia (blocks 12028916 to 12036116: cumulativeWork 45957 to 58518) that is about 2.2 hours, and the sniper's principal is never at risk because open() always returns it. The long-term holders the mechanism is meant to compensate are diluted from 100% of the penalty to a small fraction. The README acknowledges 'a user entering before a visible break participates in it', so this is reported as a documented design weakness rather than a code error; any fix (minimum eligibility age, time-weighted shares, or distributing based on the holder set at the start of the breaker's own lock) changes the agreed economics and needs the requester's decision.","line":190,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core at work 10000. Alice lock{0.1 ether}(100); Bob lock{1 ether}(100). Bob broadcasts breakJar(). Carol front-runs with lock{1 ether}(1). After Bob's break: penalty 0.2 ETH; pendingReward(Carol) = 181818181818181818 wei (10/11 of it), pendingReward(Alice) = 18181818181818181 wei (1/11). Without Carol, pendingReward(Alice) = 0.2 ether. Set core work to 11139 (1139 turns later): Carol open() receives 1 ETH + 0.181818 ETH. Expected by the brief's intent: the penalty compensates holders who were locked when Bob committed; actual: most goes to a holder who joined in the same block and exits about two hours later. Reproduced in test/scratch/Sniping.t.sol (test_frontRunCapturesPenalty, test_withoutSniperAliceGetsAll).","severity":"low","snippet":"            accRewardPerWei += toShare * REWARD_SCALE / totalLocked;","title":"Penalty redistribution can be sniped: a front-running lock(1) just before a visible breakJar takes most of the penalty at zero risk"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The only external dependency, 0x980b4424c007caf7a1f3670b48c8eaef7ebc3d44, is an EIP-1967 proxy on Sepolia (implementation slot currently 0x284747c4664af2203e7a90a2ee76f22b6b5e6889). Hamlock trusts whatever cumulativeWork it returns. Whoever controls the proxy can (a) report a huge value so every jar becomes openable and no jar can ever be broken (breakJar reverts AlreadyOpenable at src/Hamlock.sol:174), ending the penalty mechanism; (b) make state() revert or exceed the 200000 gas budget so lock() always reverts CoreUnavailable and existing jars can only use the 30-day valve; or (c) reset the counter below existing startWork so those jars wait the full 30 days. None of these moves ETH to anyone but the jar owners, so there is no loss of funds: this is the trust boundary the brief chose and the README documents. Live check done during this review: proxy has code (1525 bytes hex), state() decodes to the expected 8-field struct, cumulativeWork 58518 at block 12036116, read estimate 28395 gas, inside the budget. No code change is proposed; the deployer should record the proxy admin as a trusted party.","line":134,"path":"src/Hamlock.sol","reproduction":"Mock core. Alice lock{0.5 ether}(100), Bob lock{0.5 ether}(100), neither near target. Core upgrade reports cumulativeWork = type(uint64).max (mock.setWork(type(uint64).max)). Now isOpenable(Alice) and isOpenable(Bob) are true immediately, open() pays each 0.5 ETH with hamsterRanIt=true, and breakJar() reverts AlreadyOpenable, so no penalty can ever be charged. Conversely mock.setUnavailable(true): lock() reverts CoreUnavailable for everyone until the core is restored.","severity":"info","snippet":"        return ok && work >= jar.targetWork;","title":"Trust assumption: SqueekCore is an upgradeable proxy whose operator can open every jar at once or freeze new locks"}],"hash":"b9ace0645375af82b669ad4e13fefbc61b3c3c8631d7229d01107d038b83c0eb","nodeId":"e5d23c07-6414-42c7-8d4e-642657754b63","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is in place and parses, and no repository file was changed.\n\n**Outcome: no fund-loss defect found in the permissions area.** The Hamlock contract has no owner, admin, pause, upgrade, sweep, receive or fallback path. Every state-changing entry point acts only on the caller's own jar, the reentrancy guard covers all three, and effects precede every ETH send. The existing suite passes (53 tests, invariant 256 runs at depth 128).\n\n**Written to .imd-findings.json:**\n\n- **Low, penalty sniping.** A breakJar transaction is visible in the mempool, and the penalty is split by principal among whoever holds a jar when it executes. Anyone can insert a 1 ETH lock for 1 km just ahead of it and take most of the penalty with no risk, then exit when the hamster runs 1139 turns. On live Sepolia that is about 2.2 hours. Reproduced with concrete amounts in a scratch test. The README already acknowledges this, so a fix is a design decision for the requester.\n- **Info, trust assumption.** SqueekCore is an EIP-1967 proxy. Its operator can make every jar openable at once, freeze new locks, or reset the counter. None of these moves ETH anywhere but to jar owners.\n\n**Leads checked and closed:**\n\n- Gas-starving the core read to break an openable jar. Swept gas limits from 30k to 450k against cores costing up to the 200k budget. Every attempt reverted.\n- Slither's arbitrary-send and aderyn's unchecked-address lines. Both sends go only to the jar owner after the jar is deleted. False positives.\n- Live dependency fit. The proxy has code, state() decodes to the expected eight-field struct, and the read estimates at about 28k gas against a 200k budget.\n\n**Coverage:** rows for breakJar (finding 1), lock (holds), open (holds), the self-only read helper, the absence of receive/fallback, the solvency invariant, the gas-starvation invariant, and the live dependency fit. Nothing in my area was left unreached.\n\nScratch tests live under test/scratch/ and are gitignored. They import forge-std from a clone outside the repository, so they are not part of the submission.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1360192,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29472,"runtime":"claude","turns":39,"wallClockMs":570666}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"fe348e669febaa692231a70929748862951203ae64d2c9e84b822d6aa066e53b","device":"4f2ce49dc630c86e","findings":[],"hash":"f51005885f2138b5a620b7346b0bbd9fb3e63003222b7ba17bbeed3385d382a8","nodeId":"9790f618-1544-4ecb-9880-21486b0f75e9","outcome":"completed","summary":"`launch.json` is written and it's the only changed file. It names one contract, `Hamlock`, with the constructor argument `0x980b4424c007caf7a1f3670b48c8eaef7ebc3d44`. There's no `$owner` argument because the contract has no owner.\n\n- **Manifest:** it parses as JSON and has exactly the `kind`, `contracts` and `notes` keys. The notes are 946 characters, within the 4,000 limit. `constructorArgs` has the one entry that `constructor(address core_)` takes, and that constructor is nonpayable. Nothing runs a schema validator here, so this was a manual check.\n- **Build and tests:** `forge build` succeeds, and `forge test` passes all 53 tests with the verifier's fuzz seed. I ran these just before adding `launch.json`, and no source or test files changed.\n- **Protected checks:** I didn't run the protected suites here, because they need the launch environment. By reading them, `Hamlock` should be fine: its constructor makes no external calls, and the repo's own deployment tests do the same empty-chain and forbidden-opcode checks.\n- **Live core:** the official API reports this address as `identities.core`. On Sepolia, `state()` decodes against the brief's struct, returning `cumulativeWork` 58518 and `paused` false. Its gas estimate is about 28k, well under the contract's 200k read limit.\n\nThe independent security review the brief asks for hasn't happened yet. `docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md` requests it, and it needs to be finished before deployment.","treeHash":"51574608eca3d15e023befa859215e0ee83738ec","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":95936,"inputTokens":8,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":2841,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":72227}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"0d1724ea5555835d9ea8666346fccefe45b1f32fe271a777f2ad71f2f88e221f","device":"1d2eacca0a6e8449","findings":[],"hash":"fc7226d2fcbf38639e3afee7b39899abfc9e3a03e5137966734de9fc460cfc2a","nodeId":"eb2754d0-3b2c-4815-8b79-58d65b999777","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented [HAMLOCK](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/f74182cc-4812-4b9a-b173-32c7583a1fc9/eb2754d0-3b2c-4815-8b79-58d65b999777/src/Hamlock.sol), comprehensive tests, and deployment documentation.\n\nBuild, 53 tests, and formatting checks passed, including 32,768 invariant actions with the required seed. Local verification used Solidity 0.8.28 from scratch space because the compiler cache was read-only.\n\nPlease arrange independent security review before deployment. The [review request](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/f74182cc-4812-4b9a-b173-32c7583a1fc9/eb2754d0-3b2c-4815-8b79-58d65b999777/docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md) is included. Nothing was deployed.","treeHash":"eb9f291154a0f9bea55ba1a12b70d0790e25bbf6","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2677504,"inputTokens":78899,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":35639,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":785610}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1694,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 13 files with Solc 0.8.28\nSolc 0.8.28 finished in 1.63s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":13759,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 19 tests for test/Hamlock.t.sol:HamlockTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_validLock(uint96,uint16,uint64) (runs: 512, μ: 262666, ~: 262807)\n[PASS] test_cannotBreakAtTargetOrDeadline() (gas: 391888)\n[PASS] test_constantsAndInitialState() (gas: 146932)\n[PASS] test_coreFailureBeforeDeadlineBlocksNewLocksAndOpenButAllowsBreak() (gas: 497141)\n[PASS] test_deadlineAtUint64MaximumAndOverflowRejection() (gas: 265939)\n[PASS] test_deadlineStillChecksWorkAndScoresIfReached() (gas: 277629)\n[PASS] test_deadlineWorksWhenCoreReverts() (gas: 292995)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineOpensWithoutScore() (gas: 355067)\n[PASS] test_lockInclusiveLimitsAndEvent() (gas: 279520)\n[PASS] test_noJarCannotOpenOrBreak() (gas: 76019)\n[PASS] test_oneJarPerWalletEvenWhenOpenable() (gas: 256381)\n[PASS] test_onlyCallerCanExitTheirJar() (gas: 250788)\n[PASS] test_rejectsInvalidDeposits() (gas: 155115)\n[PASS] test_rejectsInvalidDistances() (gas: 159052)\n[PASS] test_staysLockedUntilExactTargetThenPaysAndScores() (gas: 529100)\n[PASS] test_targetAtUint64MaximumAndOverflowRejection() (gas: 391400)\n[PASS] test_walletCanRelockAndScoresAccumulate() (gas: 821486)\n[PASS] test_workRemainingClampsAtTargetAndOnRegressingCore() (gas: 295862)\n[PASS] test_zeroWorkAndPausedCoreAreValidReadings() (gas: 371571)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 305.61ms (167.33ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/HamlockEdges.t.sol:HamlockEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_breakerForfeitsEverythingToRemainingHolder(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 696019, ~: 696019)\n[PASS] testFuzz_gasStarvedBreakCannotBypassOpenableJar(uint32,bool) (runs: 300, μ: 742771, ~: 1051915)\n[PASS] testFuzz_gasStarvedOpenAfterDeadlineAlwaysScores(uint32,bool) (runs: 300, μ: 470628, ~: 626463)\n[PASS] testFuzz_lastBreakerBurnsPenaltyPlusForfeit(uint96,uint96) (runs: 500, μ: 719552, ~: 719557)\n[PASS] testFuzz_lateJoinerSharesOnlyLaterPenalties(uint96,uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 812802, ~: 812802)\n[PASS] testFuzz_lockRevertPrecedence(uint16,uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 155085, ~: 197832)\n[PASS] testFuzz_openOrBreakExactlyOneSucceeds(uint16,uint32,uint32,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 598150, ~: 607636)\n[PASS] testFuzz_penaltySplitsProRataAndIsFullyPayable(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 738065, ~: 738065)\n[PASS] test_heavyCoreWithinBudgetStillReadsAndOverBudgetFallsBackToDeadline() (gas: 1833677)\n[PASS] test_jarStartedAtNonZeroWorkNeedsItsOwnDistance() (gas: 390620)\n[PASS] test_lockRejectedSecondJarEvenAfterDeadline() (gas: 383986)\n[PASS] test_openedLastHolderLeavesNoBurnAndNextBreakerBurns() (gas: 820527)\n[PASS] test_readsThroughDelegatingProxyLikeLiveCore() (gas: 1047242)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 310.52ms (2.22s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/HamlockDeployment.t.sol:HamlockDeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroCore() (gas: 3652)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentWithLaunchArgumentOnEmptySepolia() (gas: 251226)\n[PASS] test_noOwnerAdminPauseUpgradeOrSweepInterface() (gas: 136656)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2048096)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 392.07ms (6.99ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/HamlockAdversarial.t.sol:HamlockAdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_coreCannotWriteDuringRead() (gas: 568284)\n[PASS] test_dirtyBooleanReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 384357)\n[PASS] test_dirtyWorkReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 381472)\n[PASS] test_emptyReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 379202)\n[PASS] test_failedBreakRefundRestoresRedistributionAndDebt() (gas: 1716245)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnTransferRollsBackEverything() (gas: 500186)\n[PASS] test_failedLastRefundAlsoRollsBackBurnTransfer() (gas: 1447864)\n[PASS] test_failedOpenRestoresJarRewardsAndScoreOtherUsersCanExit() (gas: 1813877)\n[PASS] test_gasHungryCoreCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533352)\n[PASS] test_missingCoreCodeCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 378883)\n[PASS] test_oversizedReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533396)\n[PASS] test_oversizedRevertDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533397)\n[PASS] test_readHelperOnlyCallableBySelf() (gas: 8470)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyAllEntryPointsDuringBreakWithOtherHolder() (gas: 1448021)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyAllEntryPointsDuringOpenAndEffectsVisible() (gas: 1636097)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyDuringLastHolderBreak() (gas: 1267330)\n[PASS] test_shortReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 379306)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedETHRejectedAndForcedSurplusDoesNotAffectRewards() (gas: 341627)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 443.93ms (17.96ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/HamlockRewards.t.sol:HamlockRewardsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_penaltyRoundingAndPayout(uint96) (runs: 512, μ: 321736, ~: 321736)\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundingAndChurnAlwaysCovered(uint96,uint96,uint96,uint96,uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 6702216, ~: 6000304)\n[PASS] test_breakPaysEightyPercentAndSplitsPenaltyProRata() (gas: 869256)\n[PASS] test_breakerForfeitsEarnedRewardsToOtherHolders() (gas: 825853)\n[PASS] test_expiredJarStillSharesAndGetsRewardsDuringCoreOutage() (gas: 476971)\n[PASS] test_lastHolderBurnsPenaltyAndForfeitedReward() (gas: 573371)\n[PASS] test_lateJoinerReceivesOnlyLaterPenalties() (gas: 923039)\n[PASS] test_oldAccumulatorDoesNotRewardNewRoundAfterAllJarsLeave() (gas: 809051)\n[PASS] test_openableButUnclaimedJarStillSharesPenalties() (gas: 528624)\n[PASS] test_roundsEntryDebtUpAndHandlesDebtAboveAccrued() (gas: 813079)\n[PASS] test_singleJarBurnAndNoDoubleBreak() (gas: 365483)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 465.50ms (776.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamlockAdversarialInvariant.t.sol:HamlockAdversarialInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHamlockAdversarialInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_scoresMatchGhosts\n[PASS] invariant_solventConservedAndDustBounded\n HamlockAdversarialInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract           | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| AdversarialHandler | advanceTime      | 4084  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AdversarialHandler | advanceWork      | 4106  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AdversarialHandler | badLock          | 4149  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AdversarialHandler | breakJar         | 4031  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AdversarialHandler | lock             | 4133  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AdversarialHandler | open             | 4104  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AdversarialHandler | setCoreDown      | 4089  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AdversarialHandler | setWalletRejects | 4072  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.65s (12.64s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamlockInvariant.t.sol:HamlockInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_balanceCoversEveryDepositAndEveryPendingReward() (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================+\n| HamlockHandler | advanceTime      | 4708  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | advanceWork      | 4701  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | breakJar         | 4718  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | coreAvailability | 4756  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | forceSurplus     | 4593  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | lock             | 4718  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | open             | 4574  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.67s (13.67s CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 13.67s (28.23s CPU time): 67 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (67 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":60,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Hamlock.breakJar()\",\"Hamlock.lock(uint16)\",\"Hamlock.open()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":166,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":50,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"src/Hamlock.sol\":221,\"test/Hamlock.t.sol\":273,\"test/HamlockAdversarial.t.sol\":255,\"test/HamlockAdversarialInvariant.t.sol\":353,\"test/HamlockDeployment.t.sol\":71,\"test/HamlockEdges.t.sol\":386,\"test/HamlockInvariant.t.sol\":210,\"test/HamlockRewards.t.sol\":217,\"test/helpers/Adversaries.sol\":142,\"test/helpers/ExtraCores.sol\":70,\"test/helpers/HamlockFixture.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/MockCore.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/TestBase.sol\":49},\"excluded\":[\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"7b0b0c51455d3ca5edd839ff55196fb8eaad4ecca71475a4afe720f2c55964a7","verifiedTreeHash":"ba364baafe997747e22da8152750352990f208cb","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1279,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 10 files with Solc 0.8.28\nSolc 0.8.28 finished in 1.22s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":13749,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 18 tests for test/HamlockAdversarial.t.sol:HamlockAdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_coreCannotWriteDuringRead() (gas: 568284)\n[PASS] test_dirtyBooleanReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 384357)\n[PASS] test_dirtyWorkReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 381472)\n[PASS] test_emptyReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 379202)\n[PASS] test_failedBreakRefundRestoresRedistributionAndDebt() (gas: 1716245)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnTransferRollsBackEverything() (gas: 500186)\n[PASS] test_failedLastRefundAlsoRollsBackBurnTransfer() (gas: 1447864)\n[PASS] test_failedOpenRestoresJarRewardsAndScoreOtherUsersCanExit() (gas: 1813877)\n[PASS] test_gasHungryCoreCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533352)\n[PASS] test_missingCoreCodeCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 378883)\n[PASS] test_oversizedReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533396)\n[PASS] test_oversizedRevertDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533397)\n[PASS] test_readHelperOnlyCallableBySelf() (gas: 8470)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyAllEntryPointsDuringBreakWithOtherHolder() (gas: 1448021)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyAllEntryPointsDuringOpenAndEffectsVisible() (gas: 1636097)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyDuringLastHolderBreak() (gas: 1267330)\n[PASS] test_shortReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 379306)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedETHRejectedAndForcedSurplusDoesNotAffectRewards() (gas: 341627)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 26.13ms (17.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/HamlockDeployment.t.sol:HamlockDeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroCore() (gas: 3652)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentWithLaunchArgumentOnEmptySepolia() (gas: 251226)\n[PASS] test_noOwnerAdminPauseUpgradeOrSweepInterface() (gas: 136656)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2048096)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 408.32ms (6.46ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/Hamlock.t.sol:HamlockTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_validLock(uint96,uint16,uint64) (runs: 512, μ: 262672, ~: 262807)\n[PASS] test_cannotBreakAtTargetOrDeadline() (gas: 391888)\n[PASS] test_constantsAndInitialState() (gas: 146932)\n[PASS] test_coreFailureBeforeDeadlineBlocksNewLocksAndOpenButAllowsBreak() (gas: 497141)\n[PASS] test_deadlineAtUint64MaximumAndOverflowRejection() (gas: 265939)\n[PASS] test_deadlineStillChecksWorkAndScoresIfReached() (gas: 277629)\n[PASS] test_deadlineWorksWhenCoreReverts() (gas: 292995)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineOpensWithoutScore() (gas: 355067)\n[PASS] test_lockInclusiveLimitsAndEvent() (gas: 279520)\n[PASS] test_noJarCannotOpenOrBreak() (gas: 76019)\n[PASS] test_oneJarPerWalletEvenWhenOpenable() (gas: 256381)\n[PASS] test_onlyCallerCanExitTheirJar() (gas: 250788)\n[PASS] test_rejectsInvalidDeposits() (gas: 155115)\n[PASS] test_rejectsInvalidDistances() (gas: 159052)\n[PASS] test_staysLockedUntilExactTargetThenPaysAndScores() (gas: 529100)\n[PASS] test_targetAtUint64MaximumAndOverflowRejection() (gas: 391400)\n[PASS] test_walletCanRelockAndScoresAccumulate() (gas: 821486)\n[PASS] test_workRemainingClampsAtTargetAndOnRegressingCore() (gas: 295862)\n[PASS] test_zeroWorkAndPausedCoreAreValidReadings() (gas: 371571)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 408.35ms (28.56ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/HamlockRewards.t.sol:HamlockRewardsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_penaltyRoundingAndPayout(uint96) (runs: 512, μ: 321736, ~: 321736)\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundingAndChurnAlwaysCovered(uint96,uint96,uint96,uint96,uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 6949236, ~: 6000304)\n[PASS] test_breakPaysEightyPercentAndSplitsPenaltyProRata() (gas: 869256)\n[PASS] test_breakerForfeitsEarnedRewardsToOtherHolders() (gas: 825853)\n[PASS] test_expiredJarStillSharesAndGetsRewardsDuringCoreOutage() (gas: 476971)\n[PASS] test_lastHolderBurnsPenaltyAndForfeitedReward() (gas: 573371)\n[PASS] test_lateJoinerReceivesOnlyLaterPenalties() (gas: 923039)\n[PASS] test_oldAccumulatorDoesNotRewardNewRoundAfterAllJarsLeave() (gas: 809051)\n[PASS] test_openableButUnclaimedJarStillSharesPenalties() (gas: 528624)\n[PASS] test_roundsEntryDebtUpAndHandlesDebtAboveAccrued() (gas: 813079)\n[PASS] test_singleJarBurnAndNoDoubleBreak() (gas: 365483)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 408.44ms (442.07ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamlockInvariant.t.sol:HamlockInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_balanceCoversEveryDepositAndEveryPendingReward() (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================+\n| HamlockHandler | advanceTime      | 4708  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | advanceWork      | 4701  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | breakJar         | 4718  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | coreAvailability | 4756  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | forceSurplus     | 4593  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | lock             | 4718  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | open             | 4574  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.67s (13.67s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 13.67s (14.92s CPU time): 53 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (53 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Hamlock.breakJar()\",\"Hamlock.lock(uint16)\",\"Hamlock.open()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":166,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":50,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":12,\"src/Hamlock.sol\":221,\"test/Hamlock.t.sol\":273,\"test/HamlockAdversarial.t.sol\":255,\"test/HamlockDeployment.t.sol\":71,\"test/HamlockInvariant.t.sol\":210,\"test/HamlockRewards.t.sol\":217,\"test/helpers/Adversaries.sol\":142,\"test/helpers/HamlockFixture.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/MockCore.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/TestBase.sol\":49},\"excluded\":[\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f51005885f2138b5a620b7346b0bbd9fb3e63003222b7ba17bbeed3385d382a8","verifiedTreeHash":"51574608eca3d15e023befa859215e0ee83738ec","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1502,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 10 files with Solc 0.8.28\nSolc 0.8.28 finished in 1.43s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":14271,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/HamlockDeployment.t.sol:HamlockDeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroCore() (gas: 3652)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentWithLaunchArgumentOnEmptySepolia() (gas: 251226)\n[PASS] test_noOwnerAdminPauseUpgradeOrSweepInterface() (gas: 136656)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2048096)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.36ms (39.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/HamlockAdversarial.t.sol:HamlockAdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_coreCannotWriteDuringRead() (gas: 568284)\n[PASS] test_dirtyBooleanReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 384357)\n[PASS] test_dirtyWorkReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 381472)\n[PASS] test_emptyReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 379202)\n[PASS] test_failedBreakRefundRestoresRedistributionAndDebt() (gas: 1716245)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnTransferRollsBackEverything() (gas: 500186)\n[PASS] test_failedLastRefundAlsoRollsBackBurnTransfer() (gas: 1447864)\n[PASS] test_failedOpenRestoresJarRewardsAndScoreOtherUsersCanExit() (gas: 1813877)\n[PASS] test_gasHungryCoreCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533352)\n[PASS] test_missingCoreCodeCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 378883)\n[PASS] test_oversizedReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533396)\n[PASS] test_oversizedRevertDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 1533397)\n[PASS] test_readHelperOnlyCallableBySelf() (gas: 8470)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyAllEntryPointsDuringBreakWithOtherHolder() (gas: 1448021)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyAllEntryPointsDuringOpenAndEffectsVisible() (gas: 1636097)\n[PASS] test_reentrancyDuringLastHolderBreak() (gas: 1267330)\n[PASS] test_shortReturnDataCannotTrapTimeout() (gas: 379306)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedETHRejectedAndForcedSurplusDoesNotAffectRewards() (gas: 341627)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 330.83ms (23.67ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/Hamlock.t.sol:HamlockTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_validLock(uint96,uint16,uint64) (runs: 512, μ: 262672, ~: 262807)\n[PASS] test_cannotBreakAtTargetOrDeadline() (gas: 391888)\n[PASS] test_constantsAndInitialState() (gas: 146932)\n[PASS] test_coreFailureBeforeDeadlineBlocksNewLocksAndOpenButAllowsBreak() (gas: 497141)\n[PASS] test_deadlineAtUint64MaximumAndOverflowRejection() (gas: 265939)\n[PASS] test_deadlineStillChecksWorkAndScoresIfReached() (gas: 277629)\n[PASS] test_deadlineWorksWhenCoreReverts() (gas: 292995)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineOpensWithoutScore() (gas: 355067)\n[PASS] test_lockInclusiveLimitsAndEvent() (gas: 279520)\n[PASS] test_noJarCannotOpenOrBreak() (gas: 76019)\n[PASS] test_oneJarPerWalletEvenWhenOpenable() (gas: 256381)\n[PASS] test_onlyCallerCanExitTheirJar() (gas: 250788)\n[PASS] test_rejectsInvalidDeposits() (gas: 155115)\n[PASS] test_rejectsInvalidDistances() (gas: 159052)\n[PASS] test_staysLockedUntilExactTargetThenPaysAndScores() (gas: 529100)\n[PASS] test_targetAtUint64MaximumAndOverflowRejection() (gas: 391400)\n[PASS] test_walletCanRelockAndScoresAccumulate() (gas: 821486)\n[PASS] test_workRemainingClampsAtTargetAndOnRegressingCore() (gas: 295862)\n[PASS] test_zeroWorkAndPausedCoreAreValidReadings() (gas: 371571)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 330.95ms (39.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/HamlockRewards.t.sol:HamlockRewardsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_penaltyRoundingAndPayout(uint96) (runs: 512, μ: 321736, ~: 321736)\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundingAndChurnAlwaysCovered(uint96,uint96,uint96,uint96,uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 6949236, ~: 6000304)\n[PASS] test_breakPaysEightyPercentAndSplitsPenaltyProRata() (gas: 869256)\n[PASS] test_breakerForfeitsEarnedRewardsToOtherHolders() (gas: 825853)\n[PASS] test_expiredJarStillSharesAndGetsRewardsDuringCoreOutage() (gas: 476971)\n[PASS] test_lastHolderBurnsPenaltyAndForfeitedReward() (gas: 573371)\n[PASS] test_lateJoinerReceivesOnlyLaterPenalties() (gas: 923039)\n[PASS] test_oldAccumulatorDoesNotRewardNewRoundAfterAllJarsLeave() (gas: 809051)\n[PASS] test_openableButUnclaimedJarStillSharesPenalties() (gas: 528624)\n[PASS] test_roundsEntryDebtUpAndHandlesDebtAboveAccrued() (gas: 813079)\n[PASS] test_singleJarBurnAndNoDoubleBreak() (gas: 365483)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 364.55ms (389.59ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamlockInvariant.t.sol:HamlockInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_balanceCoversEveryDepositAndEveryPendingReward() (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================+\n| HamlockHandler | advanceTime      | 4708  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | advanceWork      | 4701  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | breakJar         | 4718  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | coreAvailability | 4756  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | forceSurplus     | 4593  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | lock             | 4718  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamlockHandler | open             | 4574  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.11s (14.09s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 14.11s (15.15s CPU time): 53 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (53 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Hamlock.breakJar()\",\"Hamlock.lock(uint16)\",\"Hamlock.open()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":166,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":50,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"src/Hamlock.sol\":221,\"test/Hamlock.t.sol\":273,\"test/HamlockAdversarial.t.sol\":255,\"test/HamlockDeployment.t.sol\":71,\"test/HamlockInvariant.t.sol\":210,\"test/HamlockRewards.t.sol\":217,\"test/helpers/Adversaries.sol\":142,\"test/helpers/HamlockFixture.sol\":74,\"test/helpers/MockCore.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/TestBase.sol\":49},\"excluded\":[\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1179,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/medium] arbitrary-send-eth at src/Hamlock.sol:217: Hamlock._send(address,uint256) (src/Hamlock.sol#217-220) sends eth to arbitrary user\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Hamlock.sol:152: Hamlock.open() (src/Hamlock.sol#152-169) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Hamlock.sol:93: Hamlock.lock(uint16) (src/Hamlock.sol#93-121) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Hamlock.sol:129: Hamlock.isOpenable(address) (src/Hamlock.sol#129-135) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":451,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] eth-send-unchecked-address at src/Hamlock.sol:152: ETH transferred without address checks (2 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Hamlock.sol:35: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"fc7226d2fcbf38639e3afee7b39899abfc9e3a03e5137966734de9fc460cfc2a","verifiedTreeHash":"eb9f291154a0f9bea55ba1a12b70d0790e25bbf6","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"}]}